In the public jurisprudence of the United States there has been established a table-land of professional eminence, occupied by such men as Pinkney, Martin, Wirt, Mason, Webster, not to mention later names of the living. Taney is, in some respects, liable to a comparison with them. Webster was certainly his superior as an orator and a judicial advocate, but it is doubtful whether he could ever have been so great a chief-justice. Pinkney was more elaborately learned in his profession, and more elegantly cultivated out of it. He had some defects which detracted from his merits as a lawyer, and which rendered it improbable that he was entirely fitted for the highest judicial station. Martin was more learned in his profession than Pinkney, but less accomplished out of it. He never had any opportunity for the exhibition of judicial ability. But there can be no question that he would have succeeded as a judge. Mason was a man of the highest order of ability as a jurist; learned, original, acute, and logical; but the most of his life was spent in local tribunals. If the credit which has been generally accorded to him is deserved, he only required the same fields of labor to have ranked as the peer of Marshall and Taney.

It is not a matter of wonder that so able a judge of merit as President Jackson should have discovered in the leader of the bar of Baltimore a man worthy of public advancement, and competent for public service. In June, 1831, he conferred upon Mr. Taney the best office in the executive department of the government for a genuine lawyer, that of attorney-general. This post Taney held until September of 1833, when he was transferred to the treasury. He held the place of law officer of the government but a little over two years; but it was long enough to establish his fame firmly among the ablest lawyers who have adorned that place. His connection with the treasury was, at the time, made a subject of political attack; but history has since vindicated him, and also the great leader with whom he served. Taney was through life incapable of doing a dishonest act for personal aggrandizement: Jackson was incapable of asking such a sacrifice of any man.

The principal event connected with his administration of the treasury, was the removal of the government deposits from the United States Bank to the state banks. At this time Taney shared with Jackson much of party obloquy. At this later day it may be conceded that the act was a somewhat high-handed one; still the motive and the con

duct of the secretary are abundantly cleared of all intentional assumption of illegal power. His right to remove the public funds in case of their manifest peril, existed by virtue of the 16th section of the Charter of the United States Bank. Taney, in his official capacity as attorney-general, had given to the executive an opinion in favor of both the right and the expediency of a removal. When Mr. Duane refused to obey the President's order, and the executive tendered the appointment to Taney, it could not be a matter of doubt whether he should accept. It was simply a question of duty in assuming the necessary responsibility connected with his previously expressed official opinion. It is due to historical truth to state, that after all the fury of party wrath had been poured upon the head of the secretary, when his name was subsequently presented to the Senate for confirmation in the office of chief-justice, John Davis, of Massachusetts, and others voted in his favor, on the ground that he was the fittest man that was likely to be put in nomination. This sufficiently demonstrated that even his enemies had confidence in his personal and official integrity.

But distinguished as had been the previous career of Mr. Taney, its crowning epoch began when he became chiefjustice. Jay and Marshall had preceded him,and made the place illustrious. His immediate predecessor had made it a dangerous place to be occupied by any man of less than the first order of judicial capacity. Chief-Justice Taney, for twenty-eight years, kept good the established fame of that great tribunal. All in this country felt that a safe, wise, learned, and honest chief was at the head of the American judiciary. England and the Continent recognised in him a worthy successor of Marshall, a more than equal associate of Story, and a magistrate worthy to rank by the side of the Hardwickes, the D'Angessans, and the Mansfields of history.

The office of chief-justice of the United States is a peculiar judicial station, and differs materially from that of chiefjustice in England. It combines the functions of the chiefjustice, the chancellor, and the chief-judge in admiralty in Great Britain. The office of a chief-justice here is the more important also, not only for the reason that our system of government gives rise to most important constitutional questions of power between the states and the nation, but from the further fact that both state and national governments are limited in their powers by precise written constitutions.

Marshall derived most of his fame from these great questions, and Taney's best opinions were on this class of topics, whereas, in England they have no such constitutional questions, because parliament is considered omnipotent. The courts there have, therefore, only to administer the common law, interpret and apply acts of parliament, international law, and public treaties.

In

Our space will not permit us elaborately to dissect Taney's mental constitution; still less to trace his intellect as displayed in the many important decisions which are recorded under his name. His mind was comprehensive, acute, and logical; not brilliant, imaginative, or impulsive. This eminently fitted him for the judicial function. learning he was highly respectable, but he relied more upon himself than his library for correct legal conclusions. His patience in listening, his calmness in weighing, his candor, care, and independence in deciding, were the admiration of the bar. A serious and hearty love of legal truth, and a stern and unflinching devotion to legal justice, were the great moral characteristics of the man. The highest guarantee of legal justice was afforded the American people, when a great constitutional question was argued in the Supreme Court, and decided by Taney and his associates.

Great as he was, and strong as he was felt to be, he is said to have never been dictatorial or arbitrary with his associates, but the youngest man upon the bench was allowed the full weight of his opinions. In the conduct of his court he was a pattern of a dignified chief-justice. There was no pert colloquy with the bar, no hasty interruptions or rude suggestions. All was calm, deferential, and judicial. He seemed to sit upon that high bench the very embodiment of justice, its even scales severely poised.

He relied on principles, rather than on precedents. He was more of a legal philosopher than a case lawyer. His legal common sense was worth more than a library of textbooks. His services to constitutional, international, commercial, and patent law will be the admiration of the future historian of the Supreme Court.

The mental constitution of the chief-justice admirably fitted him for the judicial office. The intellectual qualities appropriate to judicial greatness, are peculiar. There are forensic, oratorical, executive, and judicial greatness, each distinct in its attributes. The great judicial character, suited to such a position as American chief-justice, must

combine integrity, patience, acuteness, logical vigor, firmness without pride of opinion, comprehensive grasp, and accurate learning. A capacity to preside is also highly desirable, if not absolutely necessary. A nice judicial balance of mind is more than all needed. This enables the great judge to view both sides, to distinguish and decide impartially, rather than to assume a side and defend it. This last is forensic, rather than judicial genius.

There are certain approved standards of judicial excellence by which a great national judge is tested in the popular mind; such as great penetration, analysis, comprehension, quickness, integrity, impartiality, equanimity, learning. He who possesses these in combination, is considered a first-class magistrate; he who lacks some important one, or who lacks the combination, must take his place in a second, third, or fourth rank. In which must Taney be classed? is a natural enquiry. No one will claim that we should give to this enquiry any larger scope than whether he was a first-class man ; or, rather, the first of a second class of men? Taney's reputation as a public man, is that of a jurist, rather than a legislator or statesman. His life was, for the most part, devoted to the law, either in its practice or its administration. He figures much less in official political life than either Jay or Marshall. It is, therefore, with the great jurists of the world that he must be compared.

The materials from which to portray the chief-justice, although somewhat varied, are uncertain guides. The great merit of any description of such a man must consist in its individuality and truthfulness. All marked men differ in their leading qualities; it is the business of criticism to depict those peculiarities. The means of judging him may be summed up as consisting of the books of his recorded opinions, the testimony of those who practised before him, who were on familiar terms with him, and who sat by his side.

The volumes of the reports of the Supreme Court do not afford an absolute record of Taney's merits, or any adequate conception of the extent of his labors. It was the custom of Marshall to draw up most of the tnore elaborate opinions on great constitutional questions. Taney, on the contrary, for some reason, exhibited no partiality whatever in that respect. There was, however, an unambitious field which he was accustomed to occupy-that of the opinions upon questions of practice. These he almost invariably drew up. The reason of this is reported to have been that, constituted as the Fed

deral courts were, he considered it of great importance that the practice should be uniform, fixed, and correct. The reasons for his abstinence in drawing up the more elaborate opinions upon great questions, have been variously assigned. His feeble health, it is said, disabled him for those tedious investigations of authority which would be essential in writing such opinions. It has also been said, that he was surrounded by younger and more ambitious judges, who coveted the importance that attaches to the writing of opinions, and that, to secure his influence with such, he deemed it well to defer to their aspirations. Neither of these considerations could have much influenced his conduct. Nor is it probable that indolence had any connection whatever with it. It is more probable that it was either accidental, or else that his natural modesty never permitted him for a moment to think of the figure he was to make in the volumes of Court Reports during his presidency.

The record of the chief-justice, as exhibited in the decisions bearing his name in the Reports, must be pronounced meagre. His true record consists rather in a series of laborious services, from the year 1336 to 1864, in all the causes before the Supreme Court. By whomsoever delivered, the opinions bear somewhat of the impress of Taney's mind and character. He sat in consultation upon them all, and brought to bear upon them the highest order of judicial wisdom. Besides this unprinted record, an extended examination of his leading opinions in the books is essential to a correct estimate of his labors. Our space would not permit any detail of this judicial record. A more limited space would suffice for a note of the leading constitutional questions which he decided. But these pages are hardly the proper place for such a review. To enter upon any argument in support of their soundness would be a matter of supererogation; and to attempt any remarks in opposition to their soundness, would be bold indeed.

Did he possess originality? This is that subtle attribute of genius which the poet, the artist, the orator, the captain, and the statesman are, by some, supposed to inherit from nature, by others to achieve by virtue of a fixed purpose and laborious life. There is certainly such a quality as judicial genius; and originality must constitute one of its leading attributes. Intellectual courage, independence, and honesty must be its leading moral attributes.

It cannot be an overestimate of Marshall to declare that