such a case, as that suggested by this plea, would be one extremely difficult of proof; but that if proved, it might certainly be available to render the will invalid. On the part of the residuary legatees, a very long responsive plea also had been given in support of the will, setting forth the general sanity of the testator in the whole of his conduct through life: and his character, temperament, and religious opinions, as sufficiently accounting for that kind of irritation under which he had at times treated his daughter with perhaps extreme severity; that on the part of the daughter, herself, also, there had been such misconduct as had afforded the deceased some rational grounds for the testamentary dispositions he had made to her prejudice. In supply of proof of this allegation, many of the deceased's letters were exhibited; and several, likewise, of the daughter's; and these showed, it was contended, on the one hand, that the deceased was a rational person, acting upon rational grounds; and, on the other, that the daughter under her own hand admitted her past misconduct, and promised future amendment. This outline of the case, on either side, would suffice to demonstrate the extreme difficulty, in which, as the Court had observed, this cause was involved. It had been truly stated by counsel in argument, that the validity of this will could not be affected, unless the Court should be morally convinced, that the deceased, when he made it, was a person of unsound mind. Eccentricity of conduct, if it were no more than eccentricity, would be of no avail to take away from a man the right which the law conferred upon him, of disposing of his property, after death, as he

chose. Severity in his general conduct to his daughter, arising from the natural infirmity of his temper, or accidental excitements, would not prove mental derange ment, even though it should seem to have been excessive severity. The Court itself must be most careful not to indulge any feelings of compassion for the person who opposed the will in question, although she was an only child and prejudiced by that will, or though it might be shown even that she was the most amiable and unoffending of her sex. The Court must look only at the legal aspect of the case, without regarding the small an nuity with which the deceased had cut this daughter off; or that fact perhaps more distressing to her feelings as a mother-that he had left without any provision any child or children of her own, though these could, by no possibility, have offended him by any misconduct on their part. The deceased, in the exercise of his legal rights, might give the bulk of his property, if he thought fit, most undoubtedly, to public charities, or to these nephews, or to still more distant relatives, in preference to his own daughter; and any mere personal considerations, such as the Court had just adverted to, could have no legal effect whatever. This sort of proceeding might be an act of injustice, or an act of caprice; but the only question which the Court had to deal with, was was it an act of insanity? The true point now to be decided was, whether, at the time of making this will, the deceased was a person of sound or unsound mind? To the decision of that issue it. must direct and confine its attention. The first consideration to be determined was, the fixing

what should be the characteristics and the test of an unsound mind; and the determining at what point eccentricity and caprice might be said to end, and where derangement commenced. Derangement assumed a thousand different shapes, as various as the shades of human character. It existed in every imaginable variety, from that of the frantic maniac chained to the floor, to that of the person who was apparently rational in all his acts, and in his conversations on all subjects, excepting one; which delusion on one subject, though daily present to his mind, would not be elicited, perhaps, but under special circumstances, and on particular occasions. Thus, we had all heard of persons at large in Bedlam itself, acting as servants in that public institution; and even showing the other maniacs, and describing them to casual visitors; and who, although at large and competent to do this, were yet, themselves, essentially mad on some topic or other, all the time. We had also heard of the individual who fancied himself to be the duke of Hexham; and yet acted rationally enough as the servant of his own committee in the management of his own property. It was further observable, that persons labouring under a disorder of the mind, had often a temporary power of restriction over themselves, either from the respect and awe they felt in the presence of others; or from a consciousness of the peculiar relations in which others stood to them. Extraordinary instances of this faculty had occurred, in which they had even deceived their keepers and medical attendants, notwithstanding the constant and vigilant observation of the latter, in respect

of all their actions; and yet after gaining the point for which they had so restrained themselves in the presence of those whom they knew to be most capable of detecting the real condition of their minds, those very individuals had been found to labour under the influence of undiminished insanity. Other people, who were most capable of delivering themselves with great propriety, and in the most rational manner, upon most subjects, were yet the victims of an utter delusion upon others. As far as the Court's own observation and experience went, guided and aided by those opinions and circumstances which every person must have occasionally encountered in society, and fortified also by cases which had occurred in this and in other courts of justice, or by what had been laid down on these subjects by medical and other writers; the learned judge declared his opinion to be this-where there existed delusion of mind, there existed that which was commonly termed insanity. Where persons believed things to exist, which, in fact, existed only,or, at any rate, in the degree in which they supposed them to exist,-in their own imagination, and of the nonexistence of which neither argument nor proof could satisfy them; such persons were of unsound minds. Or, as one of the learned counsel in support of the will (Dr. Lushington) had well put it-" it was only the belief of facts which no rational person would have believed, that constituted insane delusion." [Here the learned judge entered into a luminous and elaborate examination of the character of mental delusion generally its excess and its modifications its exciting causes-and, in

ort, of the principal diagnostics of s malady of mind. Our limits ll by no means allow us to do stice to this acute and careful instigation; and we can do little ore than indicate some of the thorities cited at this stage of s judgment.] In consequence of e definition and opinions which e Court had thus ventured to exess upon these points, it might ot be improper to refer to some thorities, medical as well as gal, on the same subject. The rmer had defined some characeristics by which insanity might e known. Dr. Batty, in his elebrated essay or treatise on Madess, in the first chapter, where the ature of madness is defined, after tating that it consists in "too ively or too languid a perception f things," declared "that a disrdered imagination was not only an indisputable, but an essential characteristic of madness." Mr. Locke (who, though more disinguished as a philosopher than a practising physician, had yet in his earlier years, and till his health caused him to discontinue the pursuit, acted for some time in the latter capacity) had given a chapter (chapter 2), in his Essay on the Human Understanding, upon idiots and lunatics; in which he said "Madmen, having joined to gether some ideas very wrongly, mistake them for truth; and, by the violence of their imagination, having mistaken their fancies for realities, make right deductions from them." Then followed the cele brated definition of the distinction between fools, or idiots, who from right premises draw false conclusions, and madmen, whose conclusions from false premises are correct. The only other medical authority the court would refer to,

was a name much distinguished in the history of those who had studied these particular disorders of the mind. He meant Dr. Francis Willis, who, in a very recent publication, had introduced some passages upon the subject of mental delusion, by no means undeserving of attention. The publication alluded to was a Treatise on Mental Derangement, which had formed the subject of the Gascoynean Lecture, delivered by him before the college of Physicians in 1822, and published by him in March, 1823. Dr. Willis seemed

to have referred to almost every writer upon those matters, both ancient and modern; and besides having, himself, had very great practice in respect of this particular disorder, he had had the advantage of acquiring the most valuable information from the extensive practice and experience of his own family. The authority of Dr. Willis was precisely to the same effect. Lord Hale's notion of the matter was much the same. He, in his pleas of the Crown, had said, "there is a partial insanity of mind, and a total insanity of mind; the former is either, in respect to particular things' quoad hoc vel illud insanire;' or in respect of particular persons. Some persons who have a competent reason in respect of some subjects are yet under a species of dementia as to other matters." Mr. Erskine, in his speech in defence of Hatfield, followed the like doctrine; and lord chief justice Coke, in his 1st. Inst. had this passage;"Here Littleton explaineth a man of no sound memory to be 'non compos mentis.' Many times (as here it appeareth) the latin word explaineth the true sense, and calleth him not amens, demens, furiosus, lunaticus

what should be the characteristics and the test of an unsound mind; and the determining at what point eccentricity and caprice might be said to end, and where derangement commenced. Derangement assumed a thousand different shapes, as various as the shades of human character. It existed in every imaginable variety, from that of the frantic maniac chained to the floor, to that of the person who was apparently rational in all his acts, and in his conversations on all subjects, excepting one; which delusion on one subject, though daily present to his mind, would not be elicited, perhaps, but under special circumstances, and on particular occasions. Thus, we had all heard of persons at large in Bedlam itself, acting as servants in that public institution; and even showing the other maniacs, and describing them to casual visitors; and who, although at large and competent to do this, were yet, themselves, essentially mad on some topic or other, all the time. We had also heard of the individual who fancied himself to be the duke of Hexham; and yet acted rationally enough as the servant of his own committee in the management of his own property. It was further observable, that persons labouring under a disorder of the mind, had often a temporary power of restriction over themselves, either from the respect and awe they felt in the presence of others; or from a consciousness of the peculiar relations in which others stood to them. Extraordinary instances of this faculty had occurred, in which they had even deceived their keepers and medical attendants, notwithstanding the constant and vigilant observation of the latter, in respect

of all their actions; and yet after gaining the point for which they had so restrained themselves in the presence of those whom they knew to be most capable of detecting the real condition of their minds, those very individuals had been found to labour under the influence of undiminished insanity. Other people, who were most capable of delivering themselves with great propriety, and in the most rational manner, upon most subjects, were yet the victims of an utter delusion upon others. As far as the Court's own observation and experience went, guided and aided by those opinions and circumstances which every person must have occasionally encountered in society, and fortified also by cases which had occurred in this and in other courts of justice, or by what had been laid down on these subjects by medical and other writers; the learned judge declared his opinion to be this-where there existed delusion of mind, there existed that which was commonly termed insanity. Where persons believed things to exist, which, in fact, existed only, or, at any rate, in the degree in which they supposed them to exist,-in their own imagination, and of the nonexistence of which neither argument nor proof could satisfy them; such persons were of unsound minds. Or, as one of the learned counsel in support of the will (Dr. Lushington) had well put it-"it was only the belief of facts which no rational person would have believed, that constituted insane delusion." [Here the learned judge entered into a luminous and elaborate examination of the character of mental delusion generally its excess and its modifications its exciting causes-and, in

short, of the principal diagnostics of this malady of mind. Our limits will by no means allow us to do justice to this acute and careful investigation; and we can do little more than indicate some of the authorities cited at this stage of his judgment.] In consequence of the definition and opinions which the Court had thus ventured to express upon these points, it might not be improper to refer to some authorities, medical as well as legal, on the same subject. The former had defined some characteristics by which insanity might be known. Dr. Batty, in his celebrated essay or treatise on Madness, in the first chapter, where the nature of madness is defined, after stating that it consists in "too lively or too languid a perception of things," declared "that a disordered imagination was not only an indisputable, but an essential characteristic of madness.' Mr. Locke (who, though more distinguished as a philosopher than a practising physician, had yet in his earlier years, and till his health caused him to discontinue the pursuit, acted for some time in the latter capacity) had given a chapter (chapter 2), in his Essay on the Human Understanding, upon idiots and lunatics; in which he said "Madmen, having joined together some ideas very wrongly, mistake them for truth; and, by the violence of their imagination, having mistaken their fancies for realities, make right deductions from them." Then followed the cele brated definition of the distinction between fools, or idiots, who from right premises draw false conclusions, and madmen, whose conclusions from false premises are correct. The only other medical authority the court would refer to,

was a name much distinguished in the history of those who had studied these particular disorders of the mind. He meant Dr. Francis Willis, who, in a very recent publication, had introduced some passages upon the subject of mental delusion, by no means undeserving of attention. The publication alluded to was a Treatise on Mental Derangement, which had formed the subject of the Gascoynean Lecture, delivered by him before the college of Physicians in 1822, and published by him in March, 1823. Dr. Willis seemed to have referred to almost every writer upon those matters, both ancient and modern; and besides having, himself, had very great practice in respect of this particular disorder, he had had the advantage of acquiring the most valuable information from the extensive practice and experience of his own family.

The authority of Dr. Willis was precisely to the same effect. Lord Hale's notion of the matter was much the same. He, in his pleas of the Crown, had said, "there is a partial insanity of mind, and a total insanity of mind; the former is either, in respect to particular thingsquoad hoc vel illud insanire;' or in respect of particular persons. Some persons who have a competent reason in respect of some subjects are yet under a species of dementia' as to other matters." Mr. Erskine, in his speech in defence of Hatfield, followed the like doctrine; and lord chief justice Coke, in his 1st. Inst. had this passage ;-" Here Littleton explaineth a man of no sound memory to be 'non compos mentis.' Many times (as here it appeareth) the latin word explaineth the true sense, and calleth him not amens, demens, furiosus, lunaticus