See CARRIERS, 12, 13; MASTER and Servant, 3-7; NEGLIGENCE, 6; RAIL
ROADS, 20, 22; SALES, 4; TRESPASS, 1, 4.
DEADLY WEAPONS.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 7; HOMICIDE, 3, 4
See CONTRACTS, 3, 4; MORTGAGES, 1–3.
1 CREDITORS, WHO ARE PROTECTED AS.—If a statute declares a mortgage
void, as to the creditors of the mortgagor, unless filed in the office of the
registrar of deeds, the word "creditors" does not include those persons
whose debts were contracted before the execution of the mortgage and
while there was no default in not filing it, and who have in no manner
altered their position to their detriment before such filing. Union Nat.
Dank v. Oium, 533.
2 CHATTEL MORTGAGE.-A CREDITOR WHO MAY ASSAIL a chattel mortgage
as void for want of recordation is not a mere general creditor of the
mortgagor, but one who, by attachment or otherwise, secures a lien.
He must also be a creditor who dealt with the mortgagor subsequently
to the execution of the mortgage and without notice thereof.
Nat. Bank v. Oium, 533.
DECLARATIONS.
See AGENCY, 1, 2; Homicide, 5.
1. A DEED CONSISTS OF the name of the parties, the consideration, a descrip-
tion of the subject granted, the quantity of the interest conveyed, and,
lastly, the conditions, reservations, or covenants, if any there be. Any
words indicating an intention to transfer the estate, interest, or claim
of the grantor are sufficient to constitute a deed. Evenson v. Webster,
802.
2 WHAT IS SUFFICIENT.-A paper commencing with a statement that it is
a will between S. S. and H. L., by which S. S. declares that he has
made agreement with H. L. that the latter is to take care of him
until his death day, and that S. S. gives H. L. all his goods, chattels,
and real estate, except fifty dollars, which he leaves to G. J., and that
H. L. is to pay G. J. when the land is sold, or within five years from
date, is, when dated and signed by S. S., a sufficient conveyance of his
real property. Evenson v. Webster, 802.
3. A CONVEYANCE UPON CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT passes the title to the
grantee, subject to be divested by the failure to perform the condi
tions. Evenson v. Webster, 802.
CONVEYANCES-RESCISSIOn for Failure OF CONSIDERATION.-A convey-
ance of land made in consideration of support for life cannot be re
scinded and canceled by a subsequent conveyance by the grantor to
another person without the consent of the first grantee, merely because
the support has been withheld. The remedy in such case is an action
for the value of the support withheld, or an equitable action to rescind
on the ground of the insolvency of the grantee, or such other ground
as makes this the appropriate relief. McCardle v. Kennedy, 85.
See CORPORATIONS, 25.
DEFINITIONS.
Stewart v. Atlanta Beef Co., 112
"Creditors." Union Nat. Bank v. Oium, 533.
"Day laborer." Briscoe v. Montgomery, 192.
Franchise. State v. Scougal, 756.
Fugitive. State v. Hall, 501; In re Sultan, 433.
"Gross Negligence.” Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Guilmartin, 182.
"Heirs." Leavitt v. Dunn, 15.
"Inaccessible." Atlanta etc. Ry. Co. v. Gravitt, 145.
"Laboring person.” Farinholt v. Luckhard, 953.
"Paid." Conyers v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 100.
"Slight care." Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Guilmartin, 182.
"Slight care and diligence." Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Guilmartin, 182.
"Supply." Virginia Development Co. v. Crozer Iron Co., 893.
"Tax collector." Stewart v. Atlanta Beef Co., 119.
DELUSIONS.
See WILLS, 6, 8, 9.
DEMURRAGE.
See RAILROADS, 16, 17.
LA WITNESS WHOSE TESTIMONY IS TAKEN OUT OF THE STate Annexes
TO HIS DEPOSITION COPIES OF PAPERS instead of the originals, the court
in its discretion may allow them to be read in evidence. L'Herbette
v. Pittsfield Nat. Bank, 354.
WILLS. IF A SPECIFIC DEVISE IS MADE of Real ProPERTY WHICH IS
SUBJECT TO A MORTGAGE, the devisee, in the absence of an expression of a
contrary intent, on the part of the testator, is entitled to have such
property exonerated from the mortgage, even though the personal es-
tate is insufficient to pay the general legacies. Brown v. Baron, 331.
WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-MODE OF DISTRIBUTION.-Under a will devising
property to be divided equally between two named persons and the
children of another, such children take per stirpes, and not per capita,
if it appears by evidence aliunde that the first two persons are sisters,
and the latter a brother of the testatrix, that the latter was very fond
of her sisters, and of their children, and the children of her brother,
and had a favorite among the children in each of the three families, but
did not desire her brother to take any of the property on account of
his financial embarrassment and past conduct. White v. Holland, 87.
DIVIDENDS.
See CORPORATIONS, 15–19.
DRAINAGE
See WATERS, 2-4.
DYING DECLARATIONS.
See APPEAL, 4–7.
WAYS-RIGHT OF WAY AS DEFENSE TO EJECTMENT.-The existence of a
right of way over certain land is no defense to an action of ejectment
by the owner of the fee. A right of way does not justify exclusive
possession of the land by the party to whom such right belongs. Bur
net v. Crane, 395.
EJECTMENT.
See EASEMENTS.
PROPERTY ALREADY DEVOTED TO A PUBLIC USE. -The intention of the
legislature to grant the power to take land or property already de-
voted to another public use must be shown by express words or by
necessary implication. Louisville etc. R. Co. v. Whitley County Court,
220.
ENTIRETY OF CONTRACT.
See INSURANCE, 5.
See ATTACHMENT, 2; Insane PERSONS, 3, 4
1. MARRIED WOMEN-ESTOPPEL AGAINST BY AGREEMENT.-If, after judg
ment has been entered on a mechanic's lien against husband and wife,
counsel enter into an agreement to amend the record so as to change
the given name of the wife, strike off the judgment, and permit the judg.
ment defendants to file an affidavit of defense, the wife is estopped to
subsequently repudiate such agreement. Jobe v. Hunter, 639.
2 BANKS AND BANKING. If the holder of a check, relying upon the
statements of the officers of the bank on which the check is drawn,
is induced to take a course different from that which he otherwise
would have taken, and is thereby misled to his prejudice, the doctrine
of estoppel applies. Simmons Hardware Co. v. Bank, 700.
IF, AFTER THE EXECUTION of a paper styled therein as a will, but
purporting to give all the property of the signer to another person,
sister of the signer executes another paper that she will not make
any claim of the property or estate of such signer, she is estopped from
thereafter asserting any claim of title to such property. Evenson ▼.
Webster, 802.
See CORPORATIONS, 21; JUDGMENTS, 4.
L JUDICIAL NOTICE. THE COURTS WILL TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE
VERNACULAR LANGUAGE OF THE PEOPLE AND ITS MUTAtions, and
hence will take notice whether given words, letters, and figures are
or are not couched in ordinary language in use by the court and people.
Power v. Bowdle, 511.
2. JUDICIAL NOTICE WILL BE TAKEN BY THE COURTS OF A USAGE WHICH
HAS BECOME GENERAL, but if a usage is special, that is, limited to a
particular locality, or business, or class of people, this rule is often in-
applicable, and evidence may be received to show the existence of the
alleged usage. Power v. Bowdle, 511.
& JUDICIAL NOTICE WILL BE TAKEN OF SUCH ORDINARY ABBREVIATIONS AS
ARE IN COMMON USE. Power v. Bowdle, 511.
4 PRESUMPTION AGAINST PRESUMPTION.-IF THE PAPERS AND RECORDS in
an old case, wherein there was a verdict and judgment, are not to be
found, the presumption that the clerk did his duty in recording the
papers is overcome by the stronger presumption that the court had
before it the necessary proceedings to authorize the verdict and judg.
ment in question. Wiggins v. Gillette, 123.
6. WILLS-EVIDENCE TO AID CONSTRUCTION OF.-Parol evidence is admissi
ble to show the circumstances surrounding a testator at the time of
making his will, in order to arrive at a proper construction of its terms.
White v. Hulland, 87.
♣ RES JUDICATA.—WHEN THE RECORD DOES NOT SETTLE THE QUESTION
oral evidence is admissible to show what was in fact decided. Fahey v.
Esterley Machine Co., 554.
7. RES JUDICATA.-The records on a former appeal in the same action
may be looked into for the purpose of ascertaining what facts and
questions were then before the court. Plymouth County Bank v. Gilman,
782.
♣ A MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE without express
proof that it was signed by the priest who performed the ceremony,
where it is shown that the parties were married by a priest in church,
and there received the certificate, as this is evidence tending to show
that the signature attached thereto, purporting to be that of the offici
ating priest, is genuine; and that it was he who gave them the certif
cate. Fratini v. Caslini, 843.
9. BOOK ACCOUnt Against Married Woman is not proof prima facie e
services rendered, and an express undertaking of such married woman
to subject her separate estate to liability for their payment. Moore.
Copley, 664.
10. PHOTOGRAPHS are admissible in evidence of members of plaintiff's
family when they are testified to as being correct likenesses, for the
AM. ST. REP., VOL XLIV. - 63
purpose of supporting statements as to race and appearance of such
family. Van Houten v. Morse, 373.
See BANKS, 4-8, 19; BILLS OF LADING, 3, 4; Custom; Insurance, 3; LIBAL,
3; NEGLIGENCE, 2; Trial, 2
LA LEVY ON EXECUTION IS SUFFICIENT if, by its terms, it enables one to
locate the property, and to identify it when found. That is certain
which can be made certain. Hence, a levy on five certain lots is suffi.
cient as to description, although the plat referred to in the levy had
never been recorded, although the description does not mention the
original land lot containing the property, and notwithstanding the
frontage of each of the lots numbered 2, 3, and 4 appears by the plat
to be twenty-five feet more than as stated in the levy, if it appears
from the plat that the five lots are contiguous, and form one parcel,
and that lots 2, 3, and 4 lay between 1 and 5, the latter being out
side lots lying on opposite sides of the entire parcel, and the measure-
ments thereof, as recited in the levy, corresponding exactly with those
stated in the plat. Wiggins v. Gillette, 123.
2. AN EXECUTION SALE AT WHICH NO PERSON IS PRESENT EXCEPT THE
SHERIFF, and the plaintiff and his attorney, is not void for that reason.
Power v. Larabee, 577.
& SALES.-POSTPONEMENT AND READVERTISEMENT of the time of a sher
iff's sale are not sufficient to avoid it, unless intending bidders were
thereby misled as to the day of sale. Hollister v. Vanderlin, 657.
SALES-ADVERTISEMENT.—Under a statute requiring a sheriff's sale to
be advertised " once a week during three successive weeks," an ad-
vertisement in each of three successive weeks is sufficient, although
it may not have been published on the same day of every week,
and there may not have been twenty-one full days between the first ad-
vertisement and the day of sale. Hollister v. Vanderlin, 657.
SALES-JUDGMENT CREDITOR AS PURCHASER-INCREASE OF BID.-IL,
after a judgment creditor bids in property at execution sale, and re-
ceipts to the sheriff for the amount bid, an application is made to set
the sale aside, and a third party offers to increase the bid, the judg
ment creditor may be permitted to give an additional credit, equivalent
to the increased bid, and the proceeding to set the sale aside may then
be dismissed. Hollister v. Vanderlin, 657.
6. AN EXECUTION SALE WILL BE Vacated, Because Several Parcels of
REAL PROPERTY WERE SOLD IN A LUMP, on motion of the defendant,
unless the purchaser can show that the sale in that mode has not in-
terfered with the defendant's right of redemption. Power v. Larabee,
577.
7. AN EXECUTION SALE IN THE LUMP OF SEVERAL PARCELS OF REAL
ESTATE is not void. Power v. Larabee, 577.
& AN EXECUTION SALE WILL NOT be Vacated for inadequacy of price if
the defendant is entitled to redeem therefrom, and has notice of the
sale and an opportunity to exercise his right. Power v. Larabee, 577.
a SALES.-MERE INADEQUACY OF PRICE is not sufficient to avoid a sheriff's
sale. Hollister v. Vanderlin, 657.
10. EXECUTION SALES.-A MOTION TO VACATE AN EXECUTION SALE must be
made within a reasonable time, and, where there is a right of redemp-
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