It seems that the rulers of France had been deceived into a belief, that the people of the United States would not sustain their government in a war against that country. The opposition shown to the British treaty had contributed to foster this delusion; and indeed the conduct of the French ministers in the United States, from the time Genet arrived at Charleston, had clearly indicated a design to separate the people from the government. Such was the confidence of the Executive Directory in this hope, and such their ignorance of the American character, that they had the effrontery to demand money of the envoys as a preliminary to any negotiation for settling the differences between the two nations. This demand was made under the pretence of a redress of grievances, in consequence, as it was alleged, of the unfavorable operation of the British treaty, and of the system of neutrality adopted by the American government. So degrading a proposal could not of course be regarded in any other light than as an insult.

Nothing now remained to be done but to prepare for war. Congress authorized the President to enlist ten thousand men, as a provisional army, and to call them into actual service, if war should be declared against the United States, or whenever in his opinion there should be danger of an invasion.

As soon as it was foreseen, that a resort to arms might be necessary, all eyes were turned upon Washington as the individual to be placed at the head of the army. The weight of his name was of the utmost importance to produce unanimity in the leaders, and secure the confidence and support of the people. "You ought to be aware," said Hamilton, in writing to him, “that, in the event of an open rupture with France, the public voice will again call you to command the armies of your country; and, though all who are attached to you will

from attachment, as well as public considerations, deplore an occasion, which should once more tear you from that repose to which you have so good a right, yet it is the opinion of all those with whom I converse, that you will be compelled to make the sacrifice. All your past labors may demand, to give them efficacy, this further, this very great sacrifice." The President also wrote to him; "We must have your name, if you will permit us to use it. There will be more efficacy in it, than in many an army." This letter was written before any appointments had been made. The following is an extract from Washington's reply.

"From a view of the past and the present, and from the prospect of that which seems to be expected, it is not easy for me to decide satisfactorily on the part it might best become me to act. In case of actual invasion by a formidable force, I certainly should not intrench myself under the cover of age and retirement, if my services should be required by my country to assist in repelling it. And, if there be good cause, which must be better known to the government than to private citizens, to expect such an event, delay in preparing for it might be dangerous, improper, and not to be justified by prudence. The uncertainty, however, of the event, in my mind, creates my embarrassment; for I cannot fairly bring it to believe, regardless as the French are of treaties and of the laws of nations, and capable as I conceive them to be of any species of despotism and injustice, that they will attempt to invade this country, after such a uniform and unequivocal expression of the sense of the people in all parts to oppose them with their lives and fortunes."

Before receiving this reply, the President had nominated him to the Senate as Commander-in-chief of the

armies of the United States. The nomination was unanimously confirmed on the 3d of July, the day after it was made. The Secretary of War was despatched in person to Mount Vernon, as the bearer of the commission. Washington accepted the appointment, with two reservations; first, that the principal officers should be such as he approved; secondly, that he should not be called into the field, till the army was in a condition to require his presence, or till it became necessary by the urgency of circumstances. He added, however, that he did not mean to withhold any assistance he could afford in arranging and organizing the army; and, in conformity with the rule he had always followed, he declined receiving any part of the emoluments annexed to his appointment, until he should be in a situation to incur expense.

If

There was much embarrassment in appointing the principal officers. Some of those, who had served in the revolution, were prominent candidates for appointments in the new army. It became a question, whether their former rank should be taken into account. this were decided in the affirmative, it would deprive the army of the services of men, whose talents, activity, and influence were of the greatest moment, but who would not accept subordinate places. It was the opinion of Washington, that, since the old army had long been disbanded, and a new one was now to be formed upon different principles and for a different object, no regard ought to be paid to former rank, but that the best men should be selected, and so arranged as most effectually to promote the public good. This opinion prevailed.

The inspector-general was to be the second in command, and there were to be likewise two majorgenerals. For these offices Washington proposed Alex

ander Hamilton, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and Henry Knox, who were to rank in the order in which their names here stand. They were thus appointed. The President was not satisfied with the arrangement. His choice for the inspector-general rested upon Knox, but he acquiesced in the decision of Washington. Unfortunately General Knox was displeased with the arrangement, and declined accepting his commission. He believed that his former services gave him higher claims, than could be advanced for the two younger officers who were placed over him.

From this time to the end of his life a great part of Washington's attention was taken up with the affairs of the new army. His correspondence with the Secretary of War, the major-generals, and other officers, was unremitted and very full, entering into details and communicating instructions, which derived value from his long experience and perfect knowledge of the subject. His letters during this period, if not the most interesting to many readers, will ever be regarded as models of their kind, and as affording evidence that the vigor and fertility of his mind had not decreased with declining years. He passed a month at Philadelphia, where he was assiduously employed with Generals Hamilton and Pinckney in making arrangements for raising and organizing the army. After the plan was finished, he applied himself, with all the ardor of his younger days, to effect its execution.

He never seriously believed, that the French would go to the extremity of invading the United States. But it had always been a maxim with him, that a timely preparation for war afforded the surest means of preserving peace; and on this occasion he acted with as much promptitude and energy, as if the invaders had been actually on the coast. His opinion proved to be correct,

and his prediction was verified. When it was discovered, that a war with the United States would not be against the government alone, but that the whole people would rise to resist aggression and maintain their rights and dignity as a nation, the French rulers relaxed into a more pacific temper. Intimations were given by them of a willingness to coöperate in effecting a friendly and equitable adjustment of existing differences. Listening to these overtures, the President again appointed three envoys extraordinary, and invested them with full powers to negotiate with the French government. When they arrived in Paris, they found Bonaparte at the head of affairs, who, having taken no part in the preceding disputes, and perceiving no advantage in continuing them, readily assented to an accommodation. No event was more desired by Washington, but he did not live to participate in the joy with which the intelligence was received by his countrymen.

Since his retirement from the Presidency, his health had been remarkably good; and, although age had not come without its infirmities, yet he was able to endure fatigue and make exertions of body and mind with scarcely less ease and activity, than he had done in the prime of his strength. On the 12th of December he spent several hours on horseback, riding to his farms, and giving directions to his managers. He returned late in the afternoon, wet and chilled with the rain and sleet, to which he had been exposed while riding home. The water had penetrated to his neck, and snow was lodged in the locks of his hair. A heavy fall of snow the next day prevented his going abroad, except for a short time near his house. A sore throat and hoarseness convinced him, that he had taken cold; but he seemed to apprehend no danger from it. He passed the evening with the family, read the newspapers, and conversed cheerfully till his usual hour for going to rest.