than a head, and yet is better to the body in its place, than another head would be in that place. The head therefore must be loved comparatively better than the finger, and the finger may be cut off to save life, when the head must not: so God can see meet to permit men and devils to fall into misery, and thieves to be hanged, and use this to the beauty of the whole, and yet love a true man better than a thief, and a good better than a bad.

And either you speak of goodness or holiness existent or non-existent. In a devil there is substance, which is good in its natural kind, and therefore so far loved of God; but there is no holiness in him, and that which is not, is not amiable but if you mean existent holiness, in a saint, then it it false that God loveth the person of a devil better than the holiness of a saint. Nor is it a proof that he loveth them equally, because he equally willeth their existence; for he willeth not they shall be equal in goodness, though equally existent: and it is complacency, and not mere volition of existence, which we mean by love.

Otherwise your arguing is as strong as if it run thus: that which God bringeth to pass, and not another thing, he willeth and loveth more than that other; but God bringeth to pass men's sickness, pain, death, and damnation, and not the holiness, ease, or salvation of those persons: therefore he loveth their pain, death, and damnation better than their holiness therefore we should love them better, than the devils or miserable men should love their misery better, than holiness. God sheweth what he loveth, oft by commanding it, when he doth not effect it; he loveth holiness in esse cognito,' and 'in esse existente,' respectively as his image.

Object. 'But at least it will follow, that in this or that person as the devils, God loveth the substance better than holiness; for what he willeth he loveth: but he willeth the substance without the holiness; therefore he loveth the substance without the holiness.'

Answ. It is answered already. Moreover, 1. God willed that holiness should be the duty of all men and devils, though he willed not insuperably and absolutely to effect it. 2. The word 'without' meaneth either an exclusion or a mere non-inclusion. God willeth not the person excluding the holiness: for he excludeth it not by will or work; but

only he willeth the person, not including the holiness as to any absolute will. And so God loveth the person without the holiness; but not so much as he would love him if he were holy.

Object. But you intimate, that it is best as to the beauty of the universe, that there be sin, and unholiness, and damnation; and God loveth that which is good as to the universe, yea, that is a higher good than personal good, as the subject is more noble, and therefore more to be loved of us as it is of God.'

Answ. 1. I know Augustine is oft alleged as saying, 'Bonum est ut malum fiat.' But sin and punishment must be distinguished: it is true of punishment presupposing sin, that it is good and lovely, in respect to public ends, though hurtful to the person suffering; and therefore as God willeth it as good, so should we not only be patient, but be pleased in it as it is the demonstration of the justice and holiness of God, and as it is good, though not as it is our hurt. But sin (or unholiness privative) is not good in itself, nor to the universe: nor is it a true saying, that 'It is good that there be sin;' nor is it willed of God, (though not nilled with an absolute, effective nolition) as hath been elsewhere opened at large. Sin is not good to the universe, nor any part of the beauty of the creature: God neither willeth it, causeth it, nor loveth it.

Object. At least he hath no great love to holiness in those persons, that he never giveth it to: otherwise he would work it in them.'

Answ. He cannot love that existent which existeth not. Nor doth he any further will to give it them than to command it, and give them all necessary means and persuasions to it. But what if God make but one sun, will you say that he hath no great love to a sun, that will make no more? What if he make no more worlds? Doth that prove that he hath no great love to a world? He loveth the world, the sun, and so the saints, which he hath made: and he doth not so far love suns, or worlds, or saints, as to make as many suns, or worlds, or saints as foolish wits would prescribe unto him. Our question is, What being God loveth, and we should most love, as being best and likest him, and not what he should give a being to that is not.

Object. VI. Holiness is but an accident, and the person is the substance, and better than the accident; and Dr. Twiss oppugneth, on such accounts, the saying of Arminius, That God loveth justice better than just men, because it is for justice that he loveth them.'

Answ. Aristotle and Porphyry have not so clearly made known to us the nature of those things or modes which they are pleased to call accidents, as that we should lay any great stress upon their sayings about them. Another will say that goodness itself is but an accident, and most will call it a mode; and they will say that the substance is better than the mode or accident, and therefore better than goodness itself. And would this, think you, be good arguing? Distinguish then between physical goodness of being, in the soul, both as a substance, and as a formal virtue; and the perfective, or modal, qualitative or gradual goodness; and then consider, that the latter always presupposeth the former: where there is holiness, there is the substance, with its physical goodness, and the perfective, modal, or moral goodness too; but where there is no holiness, there is only a substance deprived of its modal, moral goodness. And is not both better than one, and a perfect being than an imperfect?

And as to Arminius's saying, He cannot mean that God loveth righteousness with a subject or substance, better than a subject without righteousness; for there is no such thing to love (as righteousness without a subject, though there may be an abstract, distinct conception of it). If therefore the question be only, Whether God love the same man better, as he is a man, or as he is a saint, I answer, he hath a love to each which is suitable to its kind. He hath such complacency in the substance of a serpent, a man, a devil, as is agreeable to their being; that is, as they bear the natural impressions of his creating perfections, yet such as may stand with their pain, death, and misery. But he hath such a complacency in the actual holiness, love, and obedience of men and angels, as that he taketh the person that hath them, to be meet for his service, and glory, and everlasting felicity, and delight in him, as being qualified for it. So that God's love must be denominatively distinguished from the object; and so it is a love of nature, and a love of the moral perfections of nature: the first love is that by

which he loveth a man because he is a man, and so all other creatures; the second love is that by which he loveth a good man, because he is good or holy. And if it will comfort you, that God loveth your being without your perfections or virtue, let it comfort you in pain, and death, and hell, that he continueth your being without your well-being or felicity. Object. vII. All goodness or holiness is some one's goodness or holiness (as health is). And as it is the person's welfare and perfection, so it is given for the person's sake: therefore the person, as the 'finis cui,' and utmost end, is better than the thing given him, and so more amiable.'

Answ. That all goodness is some one's goodness, proveth but that some one is the subject or being that is good, but not that to be, is better than to be good, as such. And as he is in some respect the 'finis cui,' for whom it is, and so it is good to him; yet he and his goodness are for a higher end, which is the pleasing of God in the demonstration of his goodness that therefore is best which most demonstrateth God's goodness. And there is no subject or substance without its accidents or modes; and that person that is not good and holy, is bad and unholy. Therefore the question should be, Whether a person bad and unholy, be more amiable than a person good and holy, that hath both physical and moral goodness. And for all that the name of an accident maketh action seem below the person; yet it must be also said, that the person and his faculties are for action, as being but the substance in a perfect mode, and that action is for higher ends than the person's being or felicity.

Object. VIII. Love is nothing but benevolence, 'velle bonum alicui ut ei bene sit.' But who is it that would not wish good to God, that is, to be blessed as he is? But how can holiness then be loved, but rather the person for his holiness; because we cannot wish it good, but only to be what it is.'

Answ. 1. The definition is false, as hath been shewed, and as the instance proveth; else a man could not be said to love learning, virtue, or any quality, but only to love the person that wanteth it, or hath it. But love is a complacency, and benevolence is but its effect or antecedent. 2. The unholy wish not good to God, for they would all depose him from his Godhead: they would not have him to be a

hater of their sin, nor to be their holy and righteous Governor and Judge.

Object. Ix. It is better to be a man, though a sinner and miserable in hell, than not to be at all. Else God would never ordain, cause, or permit it.'

Answ. It is better to the highest ends, God's glory, and the universal order, to be a punished man, than to be nothing (when God will have it so); because punishment, as to those highest ends, is good: though it is not best for the poor miserable sinner; but the same cannot be said of sin. It is indeed better also to those highest ends, to be a man though a sinner (while God continueth humanity): for the latter implieth some good to be in the sin which hath no good, and therefore God neither causeth it, nor willeth it, though he permit it. But though a sinful man is better than no man to God's ends, it followeth not, that to be a man is better than to be a good man.

Object. x. If that be best and most amiable which is most to the glory of God, then it is more amiable to be a sinner in hell torment glorifying his justice, than not to be at all, or to be a brute.'

Answ. It is neither of these that is offered to your love and choice, but to be holy. All good is not matter of election; but that good which is in hell is not the sin, but the punishment. For the sin doth reputatively, and as much as in it lieth rob God of his glory, and punishment repaireth it. Therefore love the punishment if you can, and spare not, so you love holiness better; for that would honour God more excellently, and please him more.

Object. x1. If I must love to be like God, I must love to be great, and I must love the greatest as most like him.'

Answ. You must love to be like him in those perfections which you are capable of, and to the ends and uses of your proper nature: therefore you must be desirous to be like him in your measure, even in such power and greatness as are suitable to the nature and ends of a rational soul. Not in such strength as he giveth a horse, or such magnitude as he giveth a mountain, which is not to be most like him; but in the vital activity and power of an intellectual free-agent: to be powerful and great in love to God and all his service,