The Spiritual and temporal liberty of fubjects in England, addreffed to F. N. efq; at Aix-la-Chapelle. In two parts. Part 1. Of the fpiritual liberty of proteftants in England. Part II. Of the temporal liberty of fubjects in England. By Anthony Ellys, D. D. late lord bishop of St. David's. London. Printed for Whifton, White, and Hooper.

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HERE cannot be a hap pier omen, or even a better human fecurity, for the duration of any government, than the clergy, who live under it, heartily engaging in its defence; fince by that means, the principles of it, flowing through the fame channel with the truths of religion, muft, in fome meafure, make an equal impreffion upon the minds of the bulk of the people. It muft, therefore, be very pleafing to thofe, who wish well to the British conftitution, to fee a bishop of the church of England draw his pen in favour of it; and, on this confideration alone, we may venture to affirm, that the work before us, even were the writer a person of common abilities, cannot fail of meeting, in confequence of his ecclefiaftical dignity, with the warmest welcome from the public.

But the truth is, that doctor Ellys's abilities for the task he has engaged in may be compared with thofe of the greatest men who ever trod in the fame path; having united whatever arguments philofo

phy could fupply him with to prove the intrinfic goodness of the British conftitution, and whatever examples hiftory could afford him to illuftrate it; and added feveral things of his own, not only new, but, though natural, not within the excurfions of ordinary writers.

In fpeaking thus of the doc. tor's performance, we wish that what we fay may not be underftood of the controverfial part of it, of which, did we think ourfelves ever fo able, we are by no means difpofed to give any opinion. Controverfy, therefore, being fo much interwoven with the firft part, which treats entirely of fpiritual liberty, we fhall fay nothing of it, but that our brethren of the prefbyterian will, perhaps, think themfelves as roughly handled by the doctor, in the great point of toleration, as our enemies of the popish communion.

The fecond part, which treats entirely of civil liberty, contains fix tracts, fome of which are fubdivid ed into fections. In his first tract the doctor fpeaks of the liberty of the fubject in judicial proceedings, as to matters both criminal and civil; in the fecond, of the right and manner of impofing taxes, and of the other privileges of the parliament; in the third, of the means, whereby the free conftitutions of other nations have been impaired, while that of England has been preferved and improved; in the fourth, of the antiquities of the commons in parliament; in the fifth, of

the

the royal prerogative, and the here ditary right to the crown of Great Britain; in the fixth, of the dangers that may be incident to the prefent establishment, and the profpect of its continuance.

But, notwithstanding the doctor's great abilities, he does not appear quite equal to himself upon all thefe, points, allowing that his intention was only to difcufs them; fince, in that cafe, it was not his bufinefs to palliate defects, or excufe errors: and there was the less reafon for his doing fo, as his book, though addreffed to one perfon, could not but be intended for the perufal of many; and moft of thofe, who alone could be expected to peruse it, were fuch, as thefe precautions must be entirely loft upon; or fuch, at least, as it rather behoved him to inftruct than blindfold, fuppofing it poffible for him to do fo, on account of the opportunity afforded them, by their ftation in life, of contributing to the reformation of thofe vices, under which the British conftitution may, without derogating from its fuperiority to all other actual forms of government, be allowed to labour.

As a fpecimen of our author's file and manner in treating thefe fubjects, we fhall fubjoin what he fays in answer to Rapin's objection to our conftitution; that the matters to be treated of, in parliament, are not expreffed in the fummons, as king John promised they should; and that the members of the house of commons have not inftructions about them from the people they reprefent; or, if any fuch inftructions are given, are at liberty not to obferve them.

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"From what has been faid, it is evident that the house of commons is poffeffed of all, or at least of the most important, powers and privileges neceffary in a reprefentative of the people at large: and, if there be yet fome difadvantages and defects remaining in our confitution, perhaps they are not fo great as they may, at first fight, be thought. Monfieur Rapin de Thoyras looked upon it to be a confiderable defect in our conftitution, that the matters to be treated of in parliament are not expreffed in the fummons, as king John promifed they fhould, and that the members of our house of commons. have not inftructions about them, from the people whom they reprefent; or, if any fuch inftructions be given to them, that they are at liberty not to obferve them. The matter of fact indeed is true: our members of parliament are not, by law, obliged either to confult thofe who have chofen them, nor to have any regard to the inftructions farther than they themselves judge them to be reafonable; for, though a

man is chofen by a particular county or burgh, he is, in law, reputed to ferve for the whole kingdomt. But as thefe things could not be ordered otherwife, as the ftate of our nation is at prefent, fo fome perfons are far from thinking, with Mr. Rapin, that thefe are circumftances of any difadvantage in our conftitution.

For it, it would be impracticable for the king to exprefs, in his fummons, all the things that are to be treated in parliament; because any member of either houfe of parliament is at liberty

to propofe and to afk leave of the houfe to bring in, any bill that he thinks proper, which he may keep fecret to himself till the time of parliament, though it really may be of great importance. In queen Elizabeth's time, a bill was propofed to limit the fucceffion of the crown and, in Charles the second's time, a bill was propofed for taking from the crown the power of creating any more new peerages than a certain number. Thefe, and many other bills of the utmost importance, have been and may be firft propofed by private perfons: moreover they may have a design to call to an account, or to impeach, minifters of ftate, &c.

zdly. It would be often impolitic in the king to make public, beforehand, what laws or other matters he defigned to propofe. I mean fo as to fpecify what fupplies of money would be needful for the fervice of the next year, or what wars, or alliances, he defigned to make, or feveral other matters of that nature; because, by fo doing, he would give foreigners, his enemies, an opportunity to know, or guess at, his councils, foon enough to provide againft and defeat them.

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with regard to them. Nor would they be able to judge competently of feveral laws that might be propofed to be made, even with regard to our conftitution at home. Things of this fort depend fre quently upon the knowing and balancing abundance of particulars, which can only be known to those who have the infpection, for instance, of the cuftom-house counts, the ftate of the imports and exports, the produce of the feveral parts of the nation, the ftate of their manufactures, their different conditions, and the alterations likely to be in each as to popularity and wealth, the difpofitions of the people as to religion and as to loyalty, their circumstances as to quartering and fubfifting of troops, and a great variety of other things, which muft be exactly known and weighed, before any man can judge aright, whether a law for levying money, in this or that way; whether a law for allowing, encouraging, or forbidding this or that branch of traffick; whether a law for admitting any of the fubjects to this or that privilege, religious or civil; whether a law for retrenching this or that branch of the prerogative of the crown, or adding to it in any other inftance; whether, I fay, any laws of these, or the like kinds, would be really expedient, and for the public welfare or not.

If the king was to declare, in his fummons to parliament, that he intended to propofe any thing of this nature in parliament, it would be hardly poffible for perfons in the country, or even in London, to judge rightly of the matter immediately: the greatest

natural

foment fuch a democratical spirit in them, as would, by degrees, weaken and deftroy the effential balance of power in our conftitu

tion.

It was found by experience, to be a great defect in most of the republics, and popular ftates of antiquity, that they allowed the people at large to have deliberative voices in matters of this nature. They were frequently influenced by their demagogues, and their own want of judgment, to very rafh and imprudent measures. Pericles indeed, flatteringly, told the Athenians that each private perfon understood public affairs very well; but experience fhewed the contrary; and the moft judicious politicians, even of their own countrymen, complained of it, Polybius blames the Athenian and Theban governments; for that in them Ὄχλα χειρίζει τὰ όλα The fame author obfervest, that, at the time of the fecond Punic war, the conftitution of the republic of Carthage was impaired and corrupted: for with them plurimam populus fibi authoritatem vindicaverat, quæ apud Romanos, illibata penes fenatum, adhuc erat. Quo factum, ut illic, populo de rebus omnibus confultante; hic, civium optimo quoque, Romani vicerint.??

Tully obferves, that "Græcorum tota reipublicæ fedentis concionis temeritate adminiftrantur. Itaque ut hanc Græciam, quæ jam diu fuis confiliis afflicta eft, omittam ; illa vetus, quæ quondam opibus, imperio, gloriâ foruit,

hoc uno malo concidit, libertate immoderatâ ac licentiâ concionum 1."

It was therefore a right provifion in all the conftitutions of the Gothic model, that these inconveniencies were avoided, by leaving only the choice of reprefentatives to the people, out of themselves ; but, at the fame time, investing them, when once chofen, with a difcretionary power, to act as they thought fit, within the established bounds of the conftitution; that is, fo as not to give up any point, or make any alteration, that would have an effect or tendency deftructive to its welfare,' This is at once a temperament against the too great vehemence of the people, and a guard against their unfkilfulness and want of judgment; at the fame time that it ferves to keep up a fpirit of liberty in them, and in a great meafure fecures them against the ill management of their reprefentatives: fince, if they do not approve their conduct in parliament, they may, after a fhort time, lay them afide, and fend other perfons more likely to ferve them well.

As to this nation in particular, we fee, by the times of Richard II, and Edward VI. when the popu lace got a-head, what work they would probably have made, had they then been to inftruct their reprefentatives, and had these been obliged to follow them. In the reign of Charles I. we fee what inftructions the lower claffes of people actually gave to their reprefentatives, as far as they could do it

Orat. pro Flacco, fect. 7. by