the same as the agents of the corporation, for the benefit of the corporation, and now hold it as such agent, because it seems to me that a fair construction of the allegations of the complaint do not show that such is the position of the defendants. If, under the allegations of the complaint, these defendants ever held this money as the agents of the corporation, they abandoned that position when they received it from the corporation as the purchase price of their mining option; and if they are entitled to hold the money at all they must hold it as vendors of such option, and as the purchase money thereof; and if they cannot, according to the rules of law and equity, hold it as such purchase money, then they must return it to the corporation. They cannot now assume to hold it as the agents of the corporation. In receiving the money as the purchase price of their option, they abandoned their position as agents of the corporation, if they ever were such as to this money, and cannot now assume such agency to defeat a recovery. Fox v. Cash, 11 Pa. St. 207; 2 Benj. Sales, 681. We think the complaint states a good cause of action in favor of the plaintiff, and that the circuit court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint. The order of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings according to law.

Lyon, J., dissents.

CHAPTER XVI.

LIABILITY OF CORPORATION FOR TORTS.

LAKE SHORE ETC., RAILWAY CO. V. PRENTICE.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1893.

(147 U. S. 101.)

Liability of a Corporation for a Malicious Tort-Punitive Damages.

This was an action of trespass on the case against the defendant corporation to recover damages for the wrongful acts of the defendant's servants. On Oct. 12, 1886, the plaintiff, his wife and a number of other persons were passengers holding excursion tickets, on one of defendant's trains. During the journey the defendant purchased of several passengers their return tickets, which had nothing on them to show that they were not transferable. The conductor of the train learning this, and knowing that the plaintiff had been guilty of no offense for which he was liable to arrest, telegraphed for a police officer, an employee of the defendant, who boarded the train as it approached Chicago. The conductor thereupon, in a loud and angry voice, pointed out the plaintiff to the officer, and ordered his arrest; and the officer by directions of the conductor and without any warrant or authority of law, seized the plaintiff and rudely searched him for weapons, in the presence of the other passengers, hurried him into another car, and there sat down by him as a watch, and refused to tell him the cause of his arrest, or to let him speak to his wife. While the plaintiff was being removed into the other car, the conductor, for the purpose of disgracing and humiliating him with his fellow passengers, openly declared that he was under arrest and sneeringly said to the plaintiff's wife "where's your doctor now?" On arrival at Chicago the conductor refused to let plaintiff assist his wife with her parcels in leaving the train or to give her the check for their trunk, and in the presence of the passengers and others, ordered him to be taken to the station house, and he was forcibly taken there, detained until the conductor arrived, and knowing that the plaintiff had been guilty of no offense, entered the charge of disorderly conduct against him, upon which he gave bail and was released. No one appeared

against him next day and he was discharged. The declaration alleged that all these acts were done by the defendant's agents in the line of their employment, and that the defendant was legally liable therefore; that the plaintiff had thereby been put to great expense, and greatly injured in mind, body, and reputation. At the trial it was admitted that the arrest was wrongful and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover actual damages therefor. The court instructed the jury that if the defendant acted oppressively, wantonly and illegally they might also give the plaintiff punitive damages. Plaintiff had a verdict and defendant sued out a writ of error.

Mr. Justice Gray:-The only exceptions taken to the instructions at the trial, which have been argued in this court, are to those on the subject of punitive damages.

The single question presented for our decision, therefore, is whether a railroad corporation can be charged with punitive or exemplary damages for the illegal, wanton and oppressive conduct of a conductor of one of its trains towards a passenger.

This question like others affecting the liability of a railroad corporation as a common carrier of goods or passengers, such as its right to contract for exemption from responsibility for its own negligence, or its liability beyond its own line, or its liability to one of its servants for the act of another person in its employment, is a question, not of local law, but of general jurisprudence, upon which this court, in the absence of express statute regulating the subject, will exercise in its own judgement, uncontrolled by the decisions of the courts in the several States. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 368; Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 443; Myric v. Michigan Central Railroad, 107 U. S. 102, 109; Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U. S. 213, 226.

The most distinct suggestion of the doctrine of exemplary or punitive damages in England before the American Revolution is to be found in the remarks of Chief Justice Pratt, (afterwards Lord Camden) in one of the actions against the King's messengers for trespass and imprisonment under general warrants of the Secretary of State, in which, the plaintiff's counsel having asserted, and the defendant's counsel having denied, the right to recover, "exemplary damages," the Chief Justice instructed the jury as follows: "I have formerly delivered it as my opinion on another occasion, and I still continue of the same mind, that a jury have it in their power to give damages for more than the injury received. Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself." Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft, 1, 18, 19; S. C., 19 Howell's State Trials, 1353,

1167. See also, Huckley v. Money, 2 Wilson, 205, 207; S. C., Sayer on Damages, 218, 221. The recovery of damages, beyond compensation for the injury received, by way of punishing the guilty, and as an example to deter others from offending in like manner, is here clearly recognized.

In this court, the doctrine is well settled, that in actions of tort the jury, in addition to the sum awarded by way of compensation for the plaintiff's injury, may award exemplary, or punitive or vindictive damages, sometimes called smart money, if the defendant has acted wantonly, or oppressively, or with such malice as implies a spirit of mischief, or criminal indifference to civil obligations. But such guilty intention on the part of the defendant is required in order to charge him with exemplary or punitive damages. The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat, 546, 558, 559; Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371; Philadelphia & C. Railroad v. Quigley, 21 How. 202, 213, 214; Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. Arms, 9 1 U. S. 489, 493, 495; Missouri Pacific Railway v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 521; Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550, 562, 564; Denver & Rio Grande Railway v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597, 609, 610; Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 36.

Exemplary or punitive damages, being awarded, not by way of compensation to the sufferer, but by way of punishment of the offender, and as a warning to others, can only award against one who has participated in the offence. A principal therefore, though of course liable to make compensation for injuries done by his agent within the scope of his employment, can not be held liable for exemplary or punitive damages, merely by reason of wanton, oppressive or malicious intent on the part of the agent. This is clearly shown by the judgment of this court in the case of The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546.

In that case, upon a libel in admiralty by the owner, master, supercargo and crew of a neutral vessel against the owners of an American privateer, for illegally and wantonly seizing and plundering the neutral vessel and maltreating her officers and crew, Mr. Justice Story, speaking for the court, in 1818, laid down the general rules as to the liability for exemplary or vindictive damages, by way of punishment, as follows:-" Upon the fact disclosed in the evidence this must be pronounced a case of gross and wanton outrage, without any just provocation or excuse. Under such circumstances, the honor of the country and the duty of the court equally required that a just compensation should be made to the un-offending neutrals, for all the injuries and lossess actually sustained by them. And if this were a suit against the original wrong doers, it might be proper to go yet farther, and visit upon them, in the shape of exemplary damages,

the proper punishment which belongs to such lawless misconduct. But it is to be considered that this is a suit against the owners of a privateer, upon whom the law has, from motives of policy devolved a responsibility for the conduct of the officers and crew employed by them, and yet, from the nature of the service, they can scarcely ever be able to secure to themselves an adequate indemnity in cases of loss. They are innocent of the demerit of this transaction, having neither directed it, nor countenanced it, nor participated in it in the slightest degree. Under such circumstances, we are of the opinion, that they are bound to repair all the real injuries and personal wrongs sustained by the libellants, but they are not bound to the extent of vindictive damages.' 3 Wheat. 558, 559.

The rule thus laid down is not peculiar to courts of admiralty; for, as stated by the same eminent judge two years later those courts proceed, in cases of tort, upon the same principles as courts of common law, in allowing exemplary damages, as well as damages by way of compensation or remuneration for expenses incurred, or injuries or losses sustained, by the misconduct of the other party. Boston Manuf. Co. v. Fisk, 2 Mason, 119, 121. In Keene v. Lizardi, 8 Louisiana, 26, 33, Judge Martin said: "It is true, juries sometimes very properly give what is called smart money. They are often warranted in given vindictive damages as a punishment inflicted for outrageous conduct. But this is only justifiable in an action against the wrongdoer, and not against persons who, on account of their relation to the offender, are only consequentially liable for his acts, as the principal is responsible for the act of his factor or agent." To the same effect are: The State Rights, Crabbe, 22, 47, 48; The Golden Gate, McAllister, 104; Wardrobe v. California Stage Co., 7 Calfornia 118; Boulard v. Calhoun, 14 La. Ann. 445; Detroit Post v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447; Grund v. Van Vleck, 69 Illinois, 478, 481; Becker v. Dupree, 75 Ill. 167; Rosencrauz v. Burkey, 115 Ill. 331; Kirksey v. Jones, 7 Ala. 622, 629; Pollock v. Gantt, 69 Alabama, 373, 379; Eviston v. Cramer, 57 Wisconsin, 570; Haines v. Schultz, 21 Vroom, (50 N. J. Law) 481; McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Penn. St. 63, 72; Clark v. Newsam, 1 Exch. 131, 140; Clissold v. Machell, 26 Upper Canada, Q. B., 422.

The rule has the same application to corporations as to individuals. This court has often, in cases of this class, as well as in other cases affirmed the doctrine that for acts done by the agents of a corporation, in the course of its business and of their employment, the corporation is responsibe, in the same manner and to the same extent as an individual is responsible under similar circumstances. Philadelphia &c. Railroad v. Quigley, 21 How. 202, 210; National Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 699, 702; Salt