the King's interest (as he might easily understand) not to interfere with an undertaking so happily begun, by landing men. The barbarians who were already conquered and obedient to the Emperor, whose name they revered, would revolt as soon as they understood that the Spaniards' were at strife amongst themselves and acting for different ends.

' Meaning the partisans of Cortes and those of Narvaez.

Τ

BOOK V

HE representatives of the two rival parties conferred at length, but reached no decision; Narvaez refused to make any concessions. During this time Muteczuma received from some of his subjects, bark tablets, on which were depicted the Spanish vessels, each with its cannon and horses, not to mention the eighty musketeers and the one hundred and twenty archers who had landed. This news also greatly disturbed Cortes, and he was uncertain what course to follow. If he ignored the landing, he risked seeing the authority of his declared enemy increased; not only over the Spaniards, but also amongst the barbarians. It was hard for him to abandon such an undertaking, for he divined the approaching revolt of the barbarians which in fact followed. He judged it wiser to go himself to meet Narvaez, hoping the latter would respect the authority he bore as a justice in Cuba, where he was the superior of Narvaez and the newcomers.

Leaving a garrison' in the palace inhabited by Muteczuma, Cortes spoke to the latter in the following words: "Muteczuma, my king, you have now the opportunity to assure your future happiness. If your sovereign is convinced of your fidelity, in these circumstances, all future events will be advantageous and agreeable for you. I am

Cortes left Pedro de Alvarado in command, and in so doing committed one of the gravest blunders of his life. Alvarado was quick tempered, violent, and cruel, in short totally unsuited to exercise authority under the actual conditions and in his commander's absence.

leaving to obtain information for myself, and in my absence do you take care that nothing occurs here. I commit to your care the Spaniards I leave in your service."

Muteczuma promised all that was asked of him, and affirmed that he would treat the Spaniards as his kinsmen, adding: "Go, and may good fortune go with you; and let me know if these men have landed with hostile intent, for I will give orders for them to be driven from my territory."

Leaving the garrison in Temistitan, and having made some presents to Muteczuma and his son, which pleased them, Cortes set forth to meet Narvaez. The latter was established at Cempoal, where he had induced the inhabitants to declare against Cortes. He was resolved to stop at nothing on his march. Cortes approached, and waiving all other formalities, summoned his aguazil (that is to say the sheriff, and in Latin miles1), whom he sent on ahead with eighty foot-soldiers, ordering him, in virtue of his judicial powers, to seize Narvaez. He himself prepared to follow with his remaining one hundred and seventy men. He therefore had two hundred and fifty men against Narvaez, who, acting upon the information of his spies, was well on his guard. He had fortified himself in one of the lofty towers of the temple of Cempoal, upon the steps of which he had placed eight

cannon.

Less fortunate than the Trojan Hector, he and his eight hundred soldiers were surrounded, besieged, and captured. We believe the soldiers did not venture to resist Cortes, who had intimidated them when he was justice in Cuba. We rather think their chiefs had been bought by Cortes, when, under pretext of negotiating, they left their swords in their scabbards. Many insinu

1 (is est justitiæ executor, quem latinus militem appellat, ut Rarus venit in cænacula miles). The last six words appear to be a quotation, but it seems inapt and of obscure origin.

ations in this sense were levelled at Cortes, which I will later explain. However that may be, as Narvaez showed some resistance, he lost one of his eyes and, in company with the officers who still remained faithful to him, was taken prisoner.1 These officers were a very small

number.

Narvaez had been accompanied by the licenciate Ayllon, an eminent jurisconsult and one of the chief officials of Hispaniola. In the name of the government of Hispaniola, which possessed sovereign power in all this region, Ayllon had forbidden Velasquez to send his fleet against Cortes, lest he should thereby provoke a great disaster. He said that the quarrel should be settled by royal authority, and not by an appeal to arms. He overtook Narvaez, and, animated by the same intentions, he strove by every means to divert the authors of this project from their intentions. Not only did this Terentian Panfilo reject this advice, but he put the licenciate into irons and sent him back to Velasquez, the director of the expedition in Cuba. The licenciate's ability was so great that he not only won over the sailors to his view, but he likewise prevailed upon them to carry his own gaolers back to Hispaniola. Such are the surprises of fortune; but these are only the lesser facts of history. Let us now proceed to the narration of serious events.

All the men who had embarked under Narvaez recognised Cortes as their new leader, and the latter immediately sent ships to Vera Cruz to announce his success to the garrison, while he himself set out with the rest of the men for Temistitan. He despatched a mes

'After his defeat, Narvaez was conducted before Cortes to whom he remarked with bitterness: "You have good reason to thank Fortune for giving you an easy victory and placing me in your power." To which Cortes cuttingly retorted: "The least important deed I have accomplished in this country, was to capture you." Consult, Bernal Diaz, cap. cxxii.; Relacion de Andres de Tapia; Oviedo, Historia de las Indias; lib. xxxiii., cap. xlvii.; MacNutt, Fernando Cortes, cap. ix.

senger in advance to announce the happy result to Muteczuma and the Spaniards. This messenger was found on the road, covered with wounds and groaning. He said: "All Temistitan is in revolt; the barbarians have risen and burned the four brigantines [above mentioned] and which would have secured the escape of our men. The Spanish garrison is besieged, and reduced to the last extremity, for it is closely surrounded by armed men, and is in flames. All provisions are intercepted; everything would already be lost but for the intervention of Muteczuma, to whom, however, his subjects begin to refuse obedience."

As soon as he reached the shore of the salt lake Cortes sent some men in a canoe dug out of a tree trunk to reconnoitre. They were met by another canoe carrying a messenger from Muteczuma, and a Spaniard from the besieged garrison. These men explained the dangerous situation to Cortes, and assured him that what had happened was in spite of Muteczuma, but that there was no time to be lost. If Cortes would but quickly arrive, Muteczuma hoped the revolt would soon subside. The General immediately embarked on a number of canoes and betook himself to the assistance of the garrison and the Emperor, who was terrified by this sedition. This was the eighth day of the calends of July.

The wooden bridges which divided the stone causeways at intervals were all raised, and the streets were barricaded. Cortes at first attributed these precautions to fear, but in this he was entirely mistaken. The natives were resolved to die rather than endure the presence of such guests, who held their king prisoner under the pretext of protecting him, and took possession of their town. The maintenance of their hereditary enemies of Tascalteca, Guazuzingo, and other tribes lodged among them, constituted a perpetual outrage; all these people were consuming the provisions, difficult to obtain in a town