I would not scruple to put myself at the head of an army;"*—and accordingly she issued orders for soldiers and ships to be equipped. Large sums were transmitted from Madrid to St. Petersburg, larger still to Vienna; in fact, it is said, that this last Court received no less than 1,300,000 pistoles in fourteen months.

Such formidable preparations called for a counter confederacy on the part of England. Horace Walpole obtained the accession of France; Prussia was secured by Townshend, through a guarantee of its claims on Juliers; and, on the 3d of September, was signed a defensive alliance between these three Powers, called, from the place of its signature, the Treaty of Hanover. A separate article referred to some cruelties lately practiced on the Protestants at Thorn in Polish Prussia, and engaged to obtain satisfaction for them. The second and third undertook that, in case of any attack on one of the contracting parties, the others should furnish a certain quota in troops, or the value in ships or money; and, in case of need, should agree concerning further succours. These were nearly all the apparent stipulations; but their real drift was, moreover, to counterbalance the treaty of Vienna; compel the Emperor to relinquish the Ostend Company; and withstand any attempts that might be made in behalf of the Pretender.

Such was the celebrated treaty of Hanover, against which the opposition so often thundered during the administration of Walpole. "Thus Hanover rode triumphant on the shoulders of England," writes Chesterfield. "It was a treaty, the tendency of which is discovered in the name," cries Chatham. But their judgment loses much of its weight, when we find it built on the assumption that there was, in fact, no secret agreement at Vienna. The proofs of that agreement, depending mainly on private and confidential disclosures, could not, at the time, be made known; and party spirit was eager to deny an injury which it would not resent. But we, who can scarcely be unconvinced that there was such an agreement, who observe that the two Courts were rapidly marching to its execution, and that Spain had just taken the first public step by a peremptory demand of Gibraltar from the British Government-can we doubt that it was necessary to provide against this alarming combination, and that a counter-alliance was likely to prove, as it did prove, the best means of averting the danger, and preserving the peace to England and to Europe?

Nor can it truly be said, that the treaty of Hanover was framed to promote Hanoverian objects. I do not deny, that the interests of Hanover had, in many instances, been unduly cherished, and had given rise to some of the difficulties out of which the treaty sprung. It was the acquisition of Bremen and Verden from Denmark which produced the seizure of Sleswick and the resentment of Russia, while the Emperor was no less offended at this spirit of aggrandisement, and at the refusal of George to pay the large fines required for in

* Mr. Poyntz to Lord Townshend, May 14, 1725.

vestitures. Had it not been for Hanover, there might have been no confederacy at Vienna. But that confederacy once formed, and once pointed against England, from whatever cause, it was necessary for England to withstand it; and the treaty of the 3d of September was, in fact, only for the defence of England and of English objects; Gibraltar, the Ostend Company, and the attempts of the Pretender; in all which Hanover had not the least concern. So certain is this, that the King's German ministers were unanimous against it, complaining that the King was exposing his foreign states to the vengeance of the head of the Empire for the sake of the English trade. The King himself opposed the treaty on this ground, and it was with great difficulty that his consent was extorted by Townshend. And thus, while the opposition at home was clamorous against the treaty as too Hanoverian, the Germans, with more reason, denounced it as too English.

The treaty of Hanover was, I think, the only Ministerial measure from 1721 to 1742, in which Walpole did not take the principal lead. A statesman so jealous of power, was not a little displeased to find this important transaction almost solely conducted by a colleague. He was determined, according to his own phrase, that the firm should be Walpole and Townshend, not Townshend and Walpole. To this period may probably be ascribed his first animosity against his brother minister; perhaps even the fixed intention to remove him at a fitting opportunity. He complained that Townshend had been "too precipitate;" meaning, no doubt, that there would have been sufficient time to receive his advice and directions,-and surely his talents deserved it. All his remarks on this subject display his superior sagacity. He fully approved of the main principles of the Treaty, but he remonstrated against the large sums required to gain Sweden; he would not lay an embargo on the Russian ships of war; he thought it a grievous omission not to have secured Portugal in the event of another war with Spain. Still more must he have disapproved a wild scheme which Townshend had formed and communicated to his brother Horace; to conquer the Austrian Netherlands, and divide them between England, Holland, and France. Walpole was far too wise a statesman to allow the French, under any pretext, a footing in the Netherlands. He knew, as was emphatically said many years afterwards by an American minister in London, that "if ever France should acquire the dominion of Flanders, having at the same time a good constitution, the consequence of this island is gone."†

In December, the King began his journey to England; and landed at Rye after a most violent tempest, which exposed him to considerable danger. The engagements he had lately concluded produced the principal, indeed the only important, debates of the eusuing

Lord Townshend to Horace Walpole, August 27, 1725.

† Gouverneur Morris's Letters to President Washington, August 30, 1790. [See Mr. Sparks' Life and Correspondence of Gouverneur Morris, vol. ii. p. 37.]

Session; their policy was severely arraigned by Pulteney, Shippen, and Lord Lechmere; but ably defended by Townshend and the two Walpoles, and supported by large majorities in both Houses. The funds also, which, on the apprehension of war, had fallen 12 or 14 per cent.,* gradually recovered from their depression.

* See Mr. Barnard's Speech, Feb. 9, 1726. (Parl. Hist. vol. viii. p. 502.)

CHAPTER XIV.

WHILE such engagements were concluded at Hanover, and confirmed in London, the little Court of the Pretender was full of expectation and scheming. "I have had for some time reason to hope," writes James to one of his Scotch adherents, "that the Emperor will soon espouse my restoration in a very particular manner. You will allow it is no easy matter to persuade a foreign prince of the facilities he would find in such an attempt. Therefore I proposed to the Emperor, to send a minister privately to England, to take information there of the good disposition of my subjects, and I have reason to believe that he will send one soon. A secret mission of this kind would, however, have been so liable to suspicion and discovery, that the inquiry was relinquished, or rather left to be the private object of a public embassy. But James, on his own part, sent over one of his most trusty followers, Allan Cameron, to visit the Highlands, and prepare them for a rising. This agent found there a curious combination of zeal and caution; for example, among the Gordons it was already arranged, that the Duke should stay at home in the next insurrection and secure the estate, while the Earl of Aboyne, as next man of the family, should head the clan.† The principles of the Highlanders were still unchanged, and their spirit unbroken. In vain had the Act for the encouragement of Loyalty in Scotland, brought in by Stanhope in 1715, and commonly called the Clan Act, endeavoured to dissolve their bond of feudal union, by providing, that whenever a vassal took arms in any rebellion, his property was to devolve upon his liege lord if he remained quiet; and on the other hand, that a loyal vassal was to receive the freehold of his lands from a rebellious lord. In vain, also, had there passed in the very last Session, an Act for disarming the Highlanders. There was indeed a simulated surrender of arms to General Wade; but in fact none but old rusty firelocks, and other unserviceable weapons, were yielded by the disaffected clans, while the few well-disposed gave all, so that, in 1745, the latter were found defenceless, and the first prepared.‡ General Wade, who had been sent into Scotland with very full powers, seems to have been a judicious and conciliatory man, insomuch that he became personally

* To Mr. Lockhart, Feb. 2, 1726. Lockhart Papers.

† Mr. Lockhart to James, July 7. 1726.

See an article ascribed to Sir Walter Scott, Quart Rev. No. xxviii. p. 322, &c. [It is included in Sir Walter Scott's Miscellaneous Prose Works, vol. xx.]

popular, even whilst faithfully obeying most distasteful orders. He employed himself more usefully in making military roads across the Highlands, but these (such is the capriciousness of fame!) are perhaps less remembered for the solid advantage, than for the silly panegyric, they produced.*

From the North, Allan Cameron proceeded to Edinburgh to confer with the Duke of Hamilton, Mr. Lockhart, and the other managers or "trustees" of James in the south of Scotland; for it is very remarkable how slight and casual were then the communications between the Highlands and Lowlands, and how little the Chiefs in one quarter knew what was passing in the other. Though attainted, Cameron remained for some time at Edinburgh, and ventured to frequent the most public taverns, observing only a new and convivial plan for his security. "All his caution," writes Lockhart, "consisted in outsitting all other companies at the same tavern, so that he was safe going home!" Cameron was assured, that James's party had not fallen off in numbers or in zeal, and that the people at large were ripe for another attempt. But it was added, that this attempt could never promise success unless made with a foreign force; that such a force ought to land in England, and the nearer London the better; and that nothing should, or need be expected from Scotland, except a diversion, to prevent the troops stationed there from being called to England, or to intercept them if they marched. With this view a smaller division of foreign troops would be useful in Scotland; and it was recommended, that if sufficiently strong to stand against the regular forces, they should land to the south of the Forth; but if too weak, they should be set on shore in the Highlands, so as to be quickly joined by the clans. The "aversion to the Union," it was also said, "daily increases, and that is the handle by which Scotsmen will be incited to make a general and zealous appearance."

Almost every Court in Europe now became the scene of negotiations on the part of James. Bishop Atterbury was his ablest, and not his least active partisan: on his first landing, he had gone to Brussels; but had afterwards proceeded to Paris, where he managed the Pretender's business, although so covertly, that his friends in England were still able to deny his Jacobite connections. In his own words to James, "I obey all your commands, as far as my sad state of health, and the recluse and solitary life I am obliged to lead, have enabled me. I do my best; and what is wanting in abilities, endeavour to make up by my prayers for your prosperity and happiness."§ There was little to be done with the ruling French ministers, but a large field for intrigue with the statesmen out of

I allude to the well-known couplet:

'Had you but seen these roads, before they were made,

You'd have lifted up your eyes, and blessed General Wade!"

†To Lord Inverness, June 9, 1726.

Mr. Lockhart to James, December 18, 1725.

Bishop Atterbury to James, June 25, 1725. Appendix.