Solicitors for the appellants, Harper, Broad and Battock. Solicitors for the respondent, Phelps and Sidgwick, agents for Sale, Shipman, Seddon and Sale, Manchester. March 11 and 18. (Before the LORDS JUSTICES.) Ex parte CAREW; Re CAREW. Composition-Trustee appointed for receipt and distribution of composition-Balance in trustee's hands-Jurisdiction to take account as between trustee and debtor-Rights of creditors not bound by composition-Bankruptcy Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 71), ss. 72, 126-Bankruptcy Rules 1870, rule 279. Where a trustee has been appointed under the 279th of the Bankruptcy Rules 1870, for receipt and distribution of a composition, and, after all the creditors have been paid, a balance remains in the trustee's hands, the Court of Bankruptcy has jurisdiction to take an account as between the trustee and the debtor in order to ascertain the amount of the surplus, and to order the surplus so ascertained to be paid over by the trustee to the debtor. A creditor whose claim is not mentioned in a compounding debtor's statement in such a way as to make him bound by the composition, is nevertheless entitled to take advantage of the composition. THIS was an appeal from a decision of Mr. Registrar Murray sitting as Chief Judge in Bankruptcy. The facts of the case were as follows: In May 1874, B. F. H. Carew filed a petition for liquidation of his affairs by arrangement, and his creditors duly resolved to accept a composition of 19s. 11d. in the pound, and also resolved that the terms of the composition should be embodied in a deed to be made between the debtor, trustees, and the creditors. These resolutions were duly confirmed at a subsequent meeting ofthe creditors. In the statement of affairs filed with his petition the debtor stated that the executors of Lady Pigott had made a claim against him for 1500l. in respect of an alleged breach of trust, but that he did not admit the claim. He did not mention the names and addresses of the claimants, so that they were not bound by the composition. The following was the form in which he stated the claim: "Lady Pigott's executors. A claim has been made upon Mr. Carew as one of the executors of his late father for 11507., and interest for about twenty-five years at four per cent in respect of Lady Pigott's (Mr. Carew's sister) one fourth share in the personal estate of the late Mr. Carew, to which she was entitled by will, but which was never paid to her, the amount having been appropriated by one of the co-executors. The other surviving executor is Sir H. Stewart. The liability is not admitted, but for the purposes of this account it is estimated at 15001." A suit of Pigott v. Stewart had in fact been instituted, before the filing of the liquidation petition, by the next friends of the infant children of Lady Pigott claiming a sum of 22157. 58. 10d, against Carew and another defendant in respect of an alleged breach of trust. Before the meetings of the creditors were held, [CHAN. formal notice of this claim was served upon the debtor's solicitors, but the claimants did not attend the meetings or take any steps to prove their claim. Trustees were appointed under the provisions of the 279th of the Bankruptcy Rules of 1870 for receipt and distribution of the composition, and the debtor borrowed from an insurance company a sum of 26,000l., which was sufficient to pay the claims of all the creditors including that of the plaintiffs in the Chancery suit, and paid the amount over to the trustees. Out of this fund the trustees paid the composition to all the creditors who were bound by the arrangement, and they also paid certain costs and expenses, and retained the balance of 21487., which then remained in their hands, to answer the claim made by the plaintiffs in the Chancery suit. The debtor applied to the court for an order that the trustees should pay over the balance to him. This application was resisted by the plaintiffs in the Chancery suit. The registrar held that he had no jurisdiction to take an account as between the debtor and the trustees, and that, therefore, he could not makethe order asked for. From this decision Carew appealed. Winslow, Q.C. and Bradford, for the appellant. -In Ex parte Rumboll, Re Taylor and Rumboll (25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 253; L. Rep. 6 Ch. 842) it was held that the Court of Bankruptcy had jurisdiction under the 72nd section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 to decide all questions necessary to make a complete distribution under a deed of composijurisdiction to take such an account as is required tion registered under the Act of 1861; and the in the present case seems to have been recognised in Ex parte Lyons, re Lyons, 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 491; Megrath v. Gray, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 16; L. Rep. Ex parte Jacobs, re Jacobs, 31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 745 ; Ex parte The Manchester and Liverpool District The 45th section of the Act provides that the bankrupt shall be entitled to any surplus remaining after payment of his creditors, and of the costs, charges, and expenses of the bankruptcy. That section applies equally to a composition. Creditors who are not bound by the composition have noright to the funds handed over to the trustees for payment of the composition. The plaintiffs in the Chancery suit are not bound by the composition, and are not entitled to the benefit of it. They also referred to Maclean v. Lord Donoughmore, 1 Dr. & W. 227; Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, Rule 281. Roxburgh, Q.C. and E. C. Willis, for the plaintiffs in the Chancery suit.-Every creditor can enforce a composition whether he is bound by it or not. If this were not so, a debtor could exclude from the benefit of the composition any creditor by omitting his name and address from his statement of affairs. We cannot be said to be interfering with the rights of the other creditors, for they have all received their composition. De Gex, Q.C. and F. Turner, for the trustees. Northmore Lawrence, for other parties. Lord Justice MELLISH.-In this case Mr. Carew filed a petition for liquidation of his affairs by arrangement, and his creditors duly resolved under the 126th section of the Act to accept a composition of 19s. 11d. in the pound, and that the terms of the composition should be embodied in a deed. Mr. Carew then borrowed a large sum of money from an insurance company, and handed it over to the trustees chosen by the creditors to pay the composition. In his statement of affairs he mentioned a claim which had been made upon him as one of the executors of his late father by Lady Pigott's executors in respect of an alleged breach of trust, and he also stated that he disputed his liability, but for the purposes of the account he estimated it at 15007. That was not such a description of the persons who claimed in respect of the alleged breach of trust as that they would have been bound by the composition under the provision of the 126th section of the Act which provides that "the provisions of a composition accepted by an extraordinary resolution in pursuance of this section shall be binding on all the creditors whose names and addresses, and the amount of the debts due to whom, are shown in the statement of the debtor produced to the meetings at which the resolution was passed, but shall not affect or prejudice the rights of any other creditors." The persons representing the infants did not attend the meetings of the creditors, but they sent notice to Mr. Carew's solicitors and to the trustees of the nature of their claim. The claims of the creditors whose debts were undisputed have been satisfied, and certain costs and expenses have been paid, and there remains a sum of upwards of 2000l. in the hands of the trustees. Mr. Carew applied to the Court of Bankruptcy that the trustees might be ordered to pay over to him this sum. The first question raised was whether the court has jurisdiction to entertain this application, and I am of opinion that if the trustees have no valid reason why they should not pay over the surplus to the debtor the court has jurisdiction to take the accounts between the debtor and the trustees and to order the surplus to be paid over to the debtor. I am of opinion that this comes within the 72nd section of the Act, and that this is a question of fact that it is necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of the property within the meaning of that section. The question, therefore, arises whether the account ought to be taken now, or ought to be postponed till it has been decided by the Court of Chancery whether the claim raised by the plaintiff's in the Chancery suit is a valid one or not. That brings me to the question really to be decided in this case, namely, whether any creditor not bound by the composition may nevertheless take advantage of the composition. I am of opinion that the provision of the 126th section of the Act which declares that the provisions of a composition duly accepted by an extraordinary resolution shall be binding on all the creditors whose names and addresses, and the amount of the debts due to whom are shown in the debtor's statement, but shall not affect or prejudice the rights of any other creditors, was a provision inserted for the benefit of the creditors and not for the benefit of the debtor. It was [CHAN. inserted for the purpose of compelling the debtor to give an accurate description of his creditors, and was not intended to enable the debtor to exclude any creditor from the benefit of the composition by omitting him from his statement. And when a subsequent clause of the same section (sect 126) says that the provisions of any composition made in pursuance of this section may be enforced by the court on a motion made in a summary manner by any person interested, I am of opinion that an application may be made under that enactment, not only by those creditors who are bound by the composition because their names and addresses and the amounts of their debts are properly entered in the debtor's statement, but by any creditor who would have been entitled to prove his debt if the estate were being wound-up in bankruptcy or in liquidation. If no trustee had been appointed and no funds had been paid into his hands, such a question would probably not have arisen, as in all probability it would in that case not be for the advantage of a creditor not bound by the composition to seek to enforce it when he might sue the debtor for the whole amount of his debt; but if property is conveyed to a trustee upon trust to realise, or if money is paid over to a trustee for the purpose of paying the composition, then it may possibly be for the benefit of creditors who are not bound by the composition to come in under the composition rather than to seek to recover their debts by other means. Probably, if a creditor does not come in at the two meetings of the creditors, it would be held that he was not entitled to interfere with the other creditors; but as against the debtor, when all the creditors bound by the composition have been paid, I cannot see any good reason why a creditor not bound by the composition should not have the benefit of the money remaining in the hands of the trustee after paying their composition to all the creditors bound by the composition. He clearly would have been entitled to be paid out of the money remaining in the trustee's hands if this had been a case of bankruptcy or liquidation. The court would then have postponed the matter till the claim in the Chancery suit had been decided by the Court of Chancery. I am of opinion that it is competent for the court to adopt the same course in the case of a composition. It would be wrong to order the trustees to pay over to the debtor the surplus remaining in their hands, wher it is possible that a valid claim may be established against it by a creditor. I therefore think that no order ought to be made on this motion, but that we ought to await the result of the Chancery suit before making any order as to the surplus remaining in the hands of the trustees. The order of the Registrar must therefore be affirmed, and the appeal must be dismissed with costs, without prejudice to any application by Mr. Carew after the decision of the Chancery suit. Lord Justice JAMES concurred. He said that the registrar might take any accounts necessary to ascertain what was the balance in the hands of the trustees. Appeal accordingly dismissed with costs. Solicitor for the appellant, Walter Webb. Solicitors for the respondents, E. T. Luscombe; Paine and Hammond; E. F. and B. Davis. Q. B.] Re THE GUARDIANS OF THE POOR OF THE DARLINGTON UNION-ANGELL v. DUKE. Common Law Courts. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, Reported by J. SHORTT and M. W. MCKELLAR, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. Monday, April 19. Re THE GUARDIANS OF THE POOR OF THE Elementary Education Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 86), s. 3-Payment of school fees of pauper children. Money granted under the Elementary Education Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 86), s. 3, for the education of the children of persons receiving relief out of the workhouse, need not be paid to the parents, but may in the discretion of the guardians be directly applied in payment of the school fees. Manisty, Q.C. (C. Crompton with him) moved, on behalf of a guardian and ratepayer, for a rule calling on the auditor and the guardians of the poor of the Darlington Union to show cause why a writ of certiorari should not issue to bring up the school fees account together with the allowances and reasons for the allowances. The object of this motion, which is made under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 35, is to obtain the decision of the court on the construction of the Elementary Education Act (36 & 37 Vict. c. 86), s. 3, as to which a difference of opinion has arisen among the guardians. That section repeals Denison's Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 34), and in lieu thereof enacts the following provisions: "Where relief out of the workhouse is given by the guardians or their order by way of weekly or other continuing allowance to the parent of any child between five and thirteen years of age, or to any such child, it shall be a condition for the continuance of such relief that elementary education in reading, writing, and arithmetic shall" (except under certain circumstances) "be provided for such child, and the guardians shall give such further relief (if any) as may be necessary for that purpose. Any such relief to a parent as above mentioned shall not be granted or refused on condition of the child attending any public elementary school other than such as may be selected by the parent. The guardians shall not have power under this section to give any relief to a parent in order to enable such parent to pay more than the ordinary fee payable at the school which he selects, or more than one farthing for each attendance at such school, as defined by the minutes of the education department for the time being in force with respect to the Government grant. All relief given by guardians under this section shall be paid out of their common fund." According to the true construction of this enactment, it is obligatory on the guardians, where relief is granted for the purpose of education, to pay the money the persons relieved, and the practice which has been adopted of paying the money direct to the master or mistress of the school which the children attend is illegal. The other children bring the money for the fees with them to the school, and, consequently, when the children of parents who are in receipt of relief come to school without the money, they become known among their schoolfellows as pauper children. There is no suggestion in this case of any appre to [Q. B. hension on the part of the guardians that the money may be misappropriated by the parents. COCKBURN, C. J.-I am of opinion that there ought to be no rule. All that the Act was passed to secure was, that where parents were in a condition of pauperism, and could not find the money to get their children educated, in order to insure the education of the children, the guardians should find the money necessary for that purpose. This may be done either by paying the money to the parents, or by paying the school fees for the children, as is done here; as to adopting the one course or the other, it is left in the discretion of the guardians under the particular circumstances of each case to do what they think most beneficial. There may in this particular instance be no danger of diversion of the money to other purposes; but cases might arise where persons of bad character, and of bad habits and mode of life, might do so. With regard to the alleged hardship on the childen, it does not appear to be unjust that children who are the children of paupers should be looked upon as being in that position at school, just as they would be anywhere else. BLACKBURN, J.-I am entirely of the same opinion. The intention of the Act is that the guardians are to insist on the children of paupers being sent to school and educated, and, if necessary, are to provide the funds required for that purpose, but in so doing the Act leaves them at liberty to pursue whichever course they think fit. MELLOR and FIELD, JJ., concurred. Rule refused. Attorney, C. T. Foster. Wednesday, April 21. ANGELL v. DUKE. Written contract-Previous parol promise—Admissibility of evidence. Where a written contract has been executed, containing all the terms agreed upon between the parties, a previous parol promise relating to the same subject-matter is invalid. Defendant let a house and furniture to plaintiff by a written agreement; evidence of a previous parol promise by defendant to put in more furniture was tendered at the trial and rejected. Held, that the rejection was right, and a rule to set aside a nonsuit refused. Mann v. Nunn (30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 526; 43 L. J. 241, C. P.) questioned. THE first count of the declaration stated that in consideration that the plaintiff would at the request of the defendant sign an agreement, whereby the plaintiff agreed to let, and the defendant to take, a messuage and premises, with the use of the furniture, &c., on the premises, on the terms therein specified, the defendant promised, within a reasonable time after the signature of the said agreement, to do certain works and repairs, and send in such additional furniture as might be necessary for the completing of the furnishing of the house and its convenient occupation by the plaintiff. Averment: That relying upon the said promise, defendant did sign the agreement, and that all conditions, &c., were performed, &c., yet the defendant did not, within a reasonable time or at all, Q. B.] JEBSEN V. THE EAST AND WEST INDIA DOCK COMPANY. execute the works and repairs or send in the furniture, whereby plaintiff was put to expense and suffered damage. The second count is set out in the report of the argument on demurrer, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 25. The pleas were: First, non assumpsit; secondly, that a reasonable time had not elapsed; thirdly, denial of breaches. At the trial before Blackburn, J., at the London Sittings after Hilary Term, it was proved that the defendant had let the house and furniture to the plaintiff by a written agreement dated the 24th March 1873, and evidence was tendered of a promise alleged to have been made by the defendant before that date to put more furniture into the house, and to change some of that which was already in it. It was also alleged that there was a promise to the same effect made after the date of the written agreement. The learned judge rejected evidence of the earlier promise, and ruled that the agreement was conclusive as to all that referred to taking the house and the furniture, and that the plaintiff could not recover upon any prior agreement made during the negotiation and not put into the written record of the agreement, and refused leave to move. He also held, that if the above ruling was right, the plaintiff could not show a fresh consideration, and ruled that there was no subsequent consideration, and nonsuited the plaintiff. Hollings moved for a rule calling on the defendant to show cause why the nonsuit should not be set aside and 3 new trial had, on the ground of misdirection and improper rejection of evidence. The verbal agreement to put in more furniture, which was made before the written agreement of the 24th March, was an agreement on a distinct collateral matter, and therefore ought to have been admitted in evidence: Morgan v. Griffith, 23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 783; L. Rep. Mann v. Nunn, 30 L. T. Rep. N. S. 526; 43 L. J. 241, The decision in this same case on demurrer is conclusive in favour of the plaintiff: (Angell v. Duke, 32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 25; 23 W. R. 307.) [BLACKBURN, J.-That turns on the question of an interest in land.] It shows the verbal agreement to be collateral. COCKBURN, C.J.-I am of opinion that there should be no rule. To allow the plaintiff to recover in this action would be to allow a parol agreement to conflict with a written agreement afterwards entered into. I agree with the cases which have been cited to this extent, that there may be instances of collateral parol agreements which would be admissible, but this is not the case here: something passes between the parties during the course of the negotiations, but afterwards the plaintiff enters into a written agreement to take the house and the furniture in the house, which is specified. Having once executed that, without making the terms of the alleged parol agreement a part of it, he cannot afterwards set up the parol agreement. MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion. There is one contract; the house is the same, the rent the same, and the general terms the same. During the negotiations it appears to have been suggested that some more furniture should be put in, but afterwards a written contract is made affecting the house, affecting the furniture, and affecting [C. P. the rent, and to this agreement the plaintiff is attempting to add an additional term. The cases which have been cited are distinguishable, though one of them appears to be rather an extreme decision. The decision in this case on demurrer does not affect the present question. FIELD, J.-I am of the same opinion. BLACKBURN, J.-I think the ruling was right. It is a most important rule that where there is a contract in writing it should not be added to if the written contract is intended to be the record of all the terms agreed upon between the parties; where there is a collateral contract the written contract does not contain the whole of the terms. As to the cases which have been cited, I should decide Morgan v. Griffith the same way; the decision in Mann v. Nunn I am inclined to think wrong, but it is unnecessary to say how that may be. Here the lease expresses the whole of the terms; the defendant agrees to let, and the plaintiff to take, the house and furniture at a certain rent; there is said to have been an arrangement made beforehand during the negotiation, that the defendant should let the plaintiff have more furniture for the same rent; how is this collateral? I cannot perceive that it is. At the trial I refused leave to move, and I have no doubt that the same reasons are sufficient for refusing a rule now. Rule refused. Attorney for the plaintiff, John Pullen. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. Reported by ETHERINGTON SMITH and J. M. LELY, Eɛqrs. Barristers-at-Law. Jan. 16 and Feb. 25. JEBSEN V. THE EAST AND WEST INDIA DOCK Action by partners for breach of contract-Gain of individual partners arising from the breach What may be taken into account in assessing damages-Part owners of ships. In order to entitle a defendant in an action brought against him by partners for a breach of contract causing damage to the partnership, to take into account a benefit accruing to any of the plaintiffs from such breach, for the purpose of reducing the damages, such benefit must be a joint benefit accruing to the partnership, and it is immaterial for the assessment of damages whether or no individual plaintiffs have actually benefited in other ways from the very default of the defendants for which as a partnership they are suing. Where partnerships sue for breach of contract, the damages must be confined to those sustained by the partnership; and part owners of ships are for the purposes of such an action in the same position as partners. The plaintiffs, as owners of an emigrant ship, were unable to carry their destined passengers through the defendants' default. Many of the emigrants so lost to the plaintiffs' ship went consequently by another ship, of which also some of the plaintiff's were part owners. Held, that the true mode of assessing the damages to which the plaintiffs were entitled was to estimate the actual loss to them as owners of the ship delayed by the defendants' breach of contract, and wholly to disregard any gain which those of them who were part owners of the second ship had in consequence made. C. P.] JEBSEN V. THE EAST AND WEST INDIA DOCK COMPANY. DECLARATION: First count, That the plaintiffs are the owners of the steamship Peter Jebsen, and at the time of the making of the promise hereinafter mentioned the said ship was engaged to take in emigrants at Bergen, in the kingdom of Norway, and was about to be unloaded at the port of London, and the plaintiffs were desirous that the said steamship should be unloaded with all possible dispatch, and thereupon, in consideration that the plaintiffs would send the Peter Jebsen in to discharge at the defendants' dock, for reward to the defendants in that behalf, the defendants promised the plaintiffs that they would discharge her fast, that is to say, in two or three days, and the plaintiff's say that they did send the said steamship in to discharge in the defendants' dock, and all conditions were fulfilled and all things happened and existed, and all times elapsed necessary to entitle the plaintiffs to have the defendants perform their said promise, and to have the said vessel discharged fast in accordance with the said promise, and to sue for the breach hereinafter mentioned. Yet the said vessel was not discharged fast, that is to say, in two or three days, but great delay occurred in discharging the same, whereby the plaintiffs were put to great expense, and lost the use of the vessel for a long time, and were called upon to pay large sums in respect of the wages of the captain and crew, and in providing provisions for them, and lost the passage money due and payable by the said emigrants, and were also called upon to pay and paid several large sums in respect of the support of the emigrants, of which the defendants had notice at the time of the making of their said promise. There were three other counts varying the form of the alleged promise by the defendants respecting the discharge of the vessel all founded on the consideration stated in the first count, and there were also two counts which recited that a considerable delay had arisen after the ship had gone into dock, and stated that thereupon in consideration that the plaintiffs would pay all charges (or 28. per ton) on the output from the said ship beyond the discharging rate, and would take all risk and responsibility on themselves, the defendants promised to place the said steamship alongside the quay in a proper discharging berth, and to land the whole of the cargo forthwith and without further delay; averments of fulfilment of conditions precedent, breach and special damage as in the first count. : Pleas First, non assumpsit; secondly, denial of the breaches; thirdly, that the defendants were prevented performing their promise by the acts and defaults of the plaintiffs; fourthly, to the fifth and sixth counts that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing to pay the charges on the output of the ship therein mentioned. Issue thereon. The plaintiffs in this action, twelve in number, were the owners of the ship Peter Jebsen, 1450 tons burden, which was built for an emigrant ship to ply between Bergen and New York. In 1872 she had carried emigrants out and was to have a return cargo to London, and in June a shipbroker called Lawson was informed that the ship was coming to the port of London, and that he would have to do what was necessary for the vessel, in getting her cargo discharged and clearing her for Bergen. He had previously had to do the same for the St. Olaf, a ship of the same size, [C. P. and engaged in the same trade, the only differ-ence being that the St. Olaf had brought a full cargo to London, and the Peter Jebsen on this occasion had only an incomplete cargo. The St. Olaf had gone into the East India Docks, and was unloaded in four days. Upon rotification of the expected arrival of the Peter Jebsen, Lawson, on the 18th June, applied to the defendants, who were the Dock Company, for the same berth, and for the same dispatch as the St. Olaf had had. He received an answer that she could not have the same berth, but should have equal dispatch. On 21st June, the ship arrived, and went into dock. On the 24th June, Lawson heard that the dispatch was not going on satisfactorily, and went to the docks where he found the ship in an improper position, where rapid discharge was impossible. Thereupon he went to the dock superintendent and complained, he told him of the importance of dispatch in the case of this ship for she had to get to Bergen so as to take the next detachment of emigrants who were to be ready there on July 1st. A discussion ensued, and Lawson was asked if he would pay extra for immediate dispatch and he replied that price was immaterial, and so an agreement was come to that 28. a ton extra should be paid, and a note was made to the effect that the 2s. should include all charges. At that time occurred a strike among the dock labourers, and the contract for dispatch was broken, and the ship was not discharged till 4th July. She sailed at once for Bergen, and arrived there on 10th July, and found that another ship had taken on board the emigrants that had been destined for her. She eventually sailed on the 15th July for New York with eleven emigrants only, having lost 248 emigrants. It was to recover for the loss of the profit to be made by carrying these that the action was brought against the dock company. Five questions were left to the jury. 1. Was there in your judgment such a special contract as that alleged made with the defendants before the Peter Jebsen came into dock? If so, was it broken? Answer: Yes, in both cases. 2. Was there in your judgment such a second special contract as the plaintiffs have endeavoured to make out entered into with the defendants on the 24th June? If so, was it broken? Answer: Yes, in both cases. 3. Was there a want of reasonable dispatch in the unloading of the Peter Jebsen, apart from any special contract? Answer: Yes. 4. Had the defendants notice of the special purposes for which the Peter Jebsen was to be employed, at any time? Yes. 5. If so, when had they such notice? Answer: On 24th June. Upon this a calculation of the damages claimed was made upon the following basis. Passage money of 240 emigrants 9627 dols. 24 sch., from which was to be deducted the freight by rail in America, amounting to 2089 dols. 92 sch., the costs of the steamer in Norway conveying the people to Bergen 540 dols.; cost of food on the voyage 884 dols., and the money received from the eleven emigrants who afterwards went in the ship, 309 dols. 22sch., and to which was to be added the cost of board and lodgings of the emigrants while waiting at Bergen, 801 dols. 72 sch. The total loss claimed being, therefore, 6605 dols. 102 sch., or in English money 14441. 158. 6d. The verdict was accordingly |