pose of guarding myself against it being supposed that I have laid down any rule, by virtue of which a receiver may be at liberty to make charges, which otherwise he would have no right whatever to make. In my opinion there is no ground whatever for this appeal, and it must, therefore, be dismissed with costs.

The second appeal was then heard.

De Gex, Q.C. and Finlay Knight, for the appellant, submitted that it was ultra vires for the receiver to make an allowance to the debtors for wages or to employ them in carrying on the business. It was for the trustee, who is entitled, and not for the receiver, to appoint the bankrupt to superintend the management of the estate and to make him an allowance for his services.

The Bankruptcy Act 1869, ss. 26, 38. Winslow, Q.C. and Brough, for the debtors, were not called upon.

The CHIEF JUDGE being of opinion that the appeal was frivolous and without substance, dismissed it with costs.

Solicitors for the appellants, Williamson, Hill, and Co., agent for Bond and Barwick, Leeds.

Solicitor for the receiver, C. Walker. Solicitors for the debtors, Crook and Smith, agents for J. Ibberson, Dewsbury.

[PRIV. CO.

the appellants were owners, for the recovery of damages in respect of losses occasioned to the respondents by reason of a collision between the said vessels.

The collision happened between 9 p.m. and 10 p.m. on the 18th Nov. 1874, in the English Channel, about fifteen miles off Beachy Head.

The Peru, which is a Swedish barque of 589 tons register, was prosecuting a voyage from the Tyne to Monte Video with a cargo of coals. The Fanny M. Carvill, which is a British barque of 592 tons register, was on a voyage from London to Barcelona with a cargo of deals.

The case on behalf of the Peru was that she was sailing close hauled by the wind on the starboard tack, heading about S.W., making about three knots an hour, with the wind about W.N.W., and the weather fine, clear, and moonlight, and that she had a red light on her port side and a green light on her starboard side, both burning brightly, and that whilst so proceeding the green light of the Fanny M. Carvill, which vessel was on the port tack, was seen at the distance of about one mile and a half from the Peru, bearing about two points on the port or lee bow, that the Peru was kept close hauled by the wind on the starboard tack, but that the Fanny M. Carvill approached, and though loudly hailed, ran into and struck the Peru on her port side. The respondents attributed blame to the Fanny M. Carvill, which was

ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY OF IRELAND.

Reported by J. P. ASPINALL, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

April 29 and June 9.

(Present: The Right Hons. Sir J. W. COLVILE, Sir BARNES PEACOCK, Sir M. E. SMITH, Sir R. P. COLLIER, and Sir H. S. KEATING.)

THE FANNY M. CARVILL. Collision-Breach of regulations for preventing collision-Light--Screens - Merchant Shipping Act 1873 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 85), s. 17-Construction.

To render a ship liable to be deemed in fault under the Merchant Shipping Act 1873, sect. 17, for an infringement of the regulations for preventing collisions, the infringement must be one having some possible connection with the collision in question; a mere infringement, which by no possibility could have anything to do with the collision, will not render the ship liable.

A ship carrying her side lights, with screens shorter than required by the regulations, is not to be deemed in fault if the shortness of the screens could not by any possibility have contributed to the collision.

66

Semble, that the peculiar build of a ship requiring her side light screens to be shorter than provided in the regulations, is not a circumstance of the case making a departure from the regulation necessary," within the meaning of the Merchunt Shipping Act 1873, sect. 17.

THIS is an appeal from a decree of the Right Hon. Sir R. J. Phillimore, Judge of the High Court of Admiralty of England, in a cause of damage lately pending in that court, brought by the respondents as the owners of a barque called the Peru, and the owners of the cargo lately laden on board her, against the barque Fanny M. Carvill, of which

way of the Peru, the close-hauled starboardtacked vessel.

The case set up by the appellants was that the red light of the Peru was seen bearing four points on the starboard bow of the Fanny M. Carvill, distant about two miles, and that almost immediately afterwards the green light of the Peru came into view, and that the Peru continued to approach showing both lights broad on the starboard bow of the Fanny M. Carvill, that in about ten minutes the Fanny M. Carvill showed a flash light, and shortly afterwards the red light of the Peru was shut in and the two vessels would have passed clear, starboard side to starboard side, but that the Peru shut in her green light and again opened her red light, causing immediate danger of collision, that thereupon the helm of the Fanny M. Carvill was put hard aport and her mainyard squared, but that she was unable to clear the Peru, and with the bluff of her port bow struck the Peru on her port side amidships. The appellants charged the Peru first with having neglected to keep a good look-out; secondly, with having neglected to keep her course; thirdly, with having her lights improperly fixed and screened, and they attributed the collision to such alleged acts of neglect, and they further alleged that the Peru was in fault within the true intent and meaning of the 17th section of the Merchant Shipping Act 1873, for infringing the regulations for preventing collisions at sea by neglecting to carry proper side lights.

The cause was heard on oral evidence before the learned Judge of the court below, assisted by two of the Elder Brethren of the Trinity Corporation. It then appeared that the screens of the lights of the Peru fell short of the regulation length by nearly one foot, but no other complaint was made against the lights. The appellants alleged that, in consequence of the shortness of the screens, green light of the Peru was seen across her port

the

bow. The evidence as to the position of the lights and the other facts will be found in the report of the case below (32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 129, 134; 2 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 478, 483).

The learned judge of the court below, after hearing the evidence and consulting with the Elder Brethren, came to the conclusion that the story told by the witnesses from the Peru was true, and that that told by the witnesses from the Fanny M. Carvill was untrue, and that the deficiency in the length of the screens of the lights of the Peru did not, in fact, in any way contribute to the collision; but he reserved his judgment as to whether, owing to such deficiency, the Peru must also be held to blame under the said statute. The learned judge subsequently gave judgment upon this point in favour of the Peru, and made the usual decree, pronouncing for the damage proceeded for with costs. The judgments of the court below will be found: (32 L. T. Rep. N. S. 135; 2 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 485). From the decree so made the owners of the Fanny M. Carvill appealed for the following, amongst other, reasons:

1. That on the evidence taken in the court below, the collision was solely attributable to the negligence and improper navigation of those on board the Peru.

2. That the collision was in no way occasioned by any negligence or improper conduct of those on board the Fanny M. Carvill.

3. That on the evidence the side lights of the Peru were improperly screened, allowing the green light to show across her bow.

4. That on the evidence those on board the Fanny M. Carvill were misled by the improper exhibition of the lights on board the Peru.

5. That on the evidence it is clear that the collision was occasioned by the improper exhibition of the green light of the Peru.

6. That the finding of the learned judge that the green light of the Peru was not seen across the bow of the Peru by those on board the Fanny M. Carvill is not warranted by the evidence in the

cause.

7. That the evidence established that the green light must have been and was seen across the bows of the Peru by those on board the Fanny M. Carvill.

8. That the learned judge should have found the Peru in fault within the meaning of 17th section of the 36 & 37 Vict. c. 85, on the ground of the improper condition of her side lights.

9. That upon the evidence given at the hearing of the cause, the circumstances of the case were not, such as to make a departure from the regulation as to side lights necessary.

April 29. Butt, Q.C. and R. Webster for the appellants. We submit, first, that the facts show that the Peru altered her course; secondly, she showed her green light, and so brought about the collision; thirdly, that even if she did not show her green light, the lights were not screened in accordance with the regulations, and that under 36 & 37 Vict. c. 85, s. 17, she must be held to blame; fourthly, that even if the judgment in the court below is right, the lights were so screened that they could by possibility have contributed to the collision, and that consequently upon that construction of the statute the Peru must be held to blame. As to the construction of the statute we submit that it is so worded that an infringement of the regulations, even if it does not, and

[PRIV. Co.

cannot, in any way contribute to a collision, renders the ship infringing liable for the collision. In the present case it is clearly established that the screens were too short, which is an infringement of Art. 3 (d) and Art. 5 of the regulations for preventing collisions, and is consequently an infringement within the meaning of the Merchant Shipping Act 1873, sect. 17; that section expressly enacts, if such a regulation" has been infringed, the ship by which such regulation has been infringed, shall be deemed to be in fault, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the circumstances of the case made departure from the regulation necessary." Before the passing of this Act a departure from the rules must have contributed to the collision before the ship infringing could be deemed in fault. Hence it is to be presumed that the Legislature intended some change. The judgment of the court below says that the infringement meant by the last Act must be an infringement material to the case, and by possibility causing or contributing to the collision. But with submission, that is not the plain meaning of the words which clearly include every infringement, whether causing, or contributing, or not, and this construction has already been put upon the statute in the Hibernia (31 L. T. Rep., N. S., 805; 2 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 454), where it was held that in every case of collision the questions for the court to inquire into were, first, if the regulations had been infringed, and, secondly, if the circumstances had rendered a departure from those regulations necessary.

66

Milward, Q.C., and E. C. Clarkson, for the respondent.-We submit that, as the facts were found in our favour in the court below, which proceeded entirely on the credibility of evidence, the finding ought not to be disturbed. On the question of law, we submit, first, that there was a substantial compliance with the regulations. The Regulations Art. 3 (b and c) require the lights to be so placed that they cannot be seen across the bows, and so long as this is complied with there is no infringement; Art. 3 (d) is merely subsidiary to Arts. 3 (b and c), and only points out the mode of carrying them out, and so long as the object is effected the mere length of the screens is unimportant. Secondly, the circumstances rendered a departure from the rule necessary. The lights were placed on the round of the ship's bows, the only available place; if the screen had been longer the lights would have been washed out by the sea; if the position had been altered the lights would have been obscured. [Sir R. P. COLLIER.— You can't support that proposition. If your ship is of such a construction that she cannot comply with the regulation, she ought to be altered so as to make compliance possible. Sir MONTAGUE SMITH.-A departure from the regulations is not necessary if occasioned by something under the shipowner's own control.] Thirdly, the defect in the screens could not by any possibility have contributed to the collision, and hence under the true meaning of the Merchant Shipping Act 1873 the Peru cannot be deemed in fault; the lights of the Peru could not possibly have been seen across her bows. Fourthly, the Peru is a foreign ship, and if the statute is to be construed, as contended for by the appellant, it cannot be applied to a foreign ship. A British Act of Parliament cannot be binding upon a foreign vessel upon the high

seas.

The Amalia, 1 Moore P. C. C., N. S., 484;
The Halley, L. Rep. 2 P. C. 198; 18 L. T. Rep. N. S.
879; 3 Mar. Law Cas. O. 8. 131;

The Guldfaxe, L. Rep. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 325; 19 L. T.
Rep. N. S. 741; Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 201;
The Saxonia, Lash. 410.

Butt, Q.C., in reply.-The Peru is seeking to recover against the Fanny M. Carvill in an English court, and she must in consequence accept the lex fori in all matters consequent upon the jurisdiction, and as the Merchant Shipping Act 1873 enacts that the court shall take a certain course on certain facts appearing, any suitor, British or foreign, puts in motion the jurisdiction subject to that provision. Cur, adv. vult.

June 9.-The judgment of the court was delivered by

Sir JAMES W. COLVILE.-This is a case of collision between the American barque the Fanny M. Carvill, and the Swedish barque Peru. The undisputed facts of the case are that the collision took place about half-past nine of the evening of the 18th Nov. 1874, some fourteen or fifteen miles off Beachy Head; that both vessels were beating down Channel close hauled against a westerly wind, and were crossing so as to involve risk of collision; that the Fanny M. Carvill was on the port, and the Peru on the starboard tack, on accordingly that it was the duty of the former to get out of the way of the latter, and the duty of the latter to keep her course. Of the case made by the appellants in order to excuse the failure of the Fanny M. Carvill to keep out of the way of the Peru, and to cast the responsibility of having caused the collision wholly or partially on the latter, the material allegations are that those on board the Peru improperly neglected to keep their course, and that the lights of the Peru were improperly fixed and screened. The principal witness in support of this defence was Martin Scheringer, the mate of the Fanny M. Carvill, and the officer of the watch at the time of the collision. His testimony is, that when the Peru was first sighted he saw her red light; that he knew she must be beating down Channel, close hauled on the starboard tack, and that it was his duty to keep out of her way; but that before he took, or could take, any means towards that end, she opened her green light, and continued to show both her lights for ten minutes; that, inferring from this that she was bearing away, he kept his own course, after showing a flash light in order to make the other vessel give him a free berth; but that she, after having apparently kept away at least two points, ultimately luffed four points, with her sails aback and shivering, shutting out by the last manoeuvre the green light; and this caused the collision. Their lordships must remark on this evidence that it is inconsistent with any theory except an actual deviation from her course on the part of the Peru. If, as is now suggested, the improper length of the screen would account for the fact that the green light was seen by those on board the Fanny M. Carvill, although the Peru may have kept her course, it would not account for what the mate has sworn touching her luffiing and the appearances of her sails. It is therefore material to come to a clear conclusion upon the question whether the Peru did, in fact, keep her course. That she did so their lordships have no doubt. The learned judge of the Court of Admiralty, upon the conflicting evidence before him,

[PRIV. CO.

has found in terms:-"That the Peru, a starboard tacked vessel, continued on her course without alteration up to the time of the collision; that it is untrue, as stated by the witnesses on the part of the Fanny M. Carvill, that the Peru ever came right up into the wind two and a half points with her sails flat aback." There is nothing in the case to induce their lordships to doubt the correctness of this finding, which is materially confirmed by the fact that, in the first instance, the master of the Fanny M. Carvill has so little faith in the account given by his own officer, that he openly threw the blame of the collision upon him, and would, under legal advice, have admitted his liability, had it not been ascertained that the screens of the Peru's lights were of less than the prescribed length. And accordingly, the learned counsel who argued the appeal have faintly, if at all, contended that the Peru did, in fact, alter her course, and have chiefly directed their argu ments to show that the green light was, by means of the defect in the screen, visible to those on board the Fanny M. Carvill; was, in fact, seen by them; and, therefore, naturally gave rise to the inference that the Peru was bearing away. To this defence, as to that founded on an actual deviation by the Peru from her course, it is essential to establish that the green light was, in fact, seen by those on board the Fanny M. Carvill across the bows of the Peru. Upon this point there is the direct evidence of the mate and look-out man, who, having been disbelieved upon other points, cannot be treated as trustworthy witnesses. Their evidence on this point, however, is in some degree corroborated by that of the captain, the surveyors for the Board of Trade, and the other witnesses who were called to prove that the green light might be seen across the bows of the Peru. On the other hand, there was a considerable body of testimony to the contrary, and the learned judge of the Admiralty Court, upon this conflict of evidence, has found as a fact that the green light of the Peru was not seen across the bows of the Peru by those on board the Fanny M. Carvill; and, therefore, could not have contributed to the collision. Their lordships are so far from dissenting from this finding, that they are prepared to go beyond what is directly expressed by it, and to hold upon the evidence before them, and for the reasons next to be stated, that in the circumstamces in which these vessels were placed, the green light of the Peru could not by any possibility have been seen by those on board the Fanny M. Carvill. The vessels, though on opposite tacks, were both close hauled, and may be assumed to have been sailing within six points of the wind, whether the direction of that was west, or two points to the north of west. This being so, their lordships are of opinion that each must first have seen the other as stated by those on board the Peru, about two points on her own lee bow. For if the bearing of the Peru, when first sighted by the Fanny M. Carvill, was four or even three points on the lee bow of the latter, as stated by her mate, it is difficult to see how the two vessels, sailing as they were sailing, and each keeping her course, could ever have come in collision. Now their lordships are satisfied that the green light of the Peru could not have been visible two points over her port bow, if the screen projected, as it is proved to have projected, considerably more than one foot from the position of the light in a direction parallel to

the keel. For these reasons, as well as upon the direct evidence in the cause, they have come to the conclusion, in which they are confirmed by their assessors, that the green light of the Peru not only was not, but could not by possibility have been seen by those on board the other vessel; and, accordingly, that the defect in her screens neither did, nor could have contributed to the collision. This conclusion was probably intended to be implied, though it is not in terms expressed, in the finding of the Court of Admiralty. These being the facts of the case, it follows that the Fanny M. Carvill, which failed to keep out of the way of the Peru, must be pronounced solely to blame for the collision, unless by force of the 17th section of the Merchant Shipping Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 85), as construed in the recent case of the Hibernia, the Peru is to be deemed to be also in fault; although the particular infringement of the sailing rules imputed to her neither did, nor could by possibility have contributed to the accident. The words of the statute are, "If, in any case of collision, it is proved to the court before which the case is tried, that any of the regulations for preventing collisions contained in, or made under the Merchant Shipping Acts 1854 to 1873, have been infringed, the ship by which such regulation has been infringed shall be deemed to be in fault, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the circumstances of the case made a departure from the regulations necessary." The alleged infringement is of that part of Article 3 of the sailing Rules which prescribes that " the green and red side lights shall be fitted with inboard screens, projecting at least three feet forward from the light, so as to prevent these lights from being seen across the bow." The screen of the Peru is shown to have been nearly a foot (about 11 inches) short of the prescribed length. It must be assumed that those under whose advice the rule was framed considered that a length of 3ft. was necessary in order to prevent the light from being seen, under any circumstances whatever, across the bow. And there is evidence in the cause, independent of that of the discredited witnesses, to show that, under some circumstances, the green light might be perceptible across the bow. Their Lordships, therefore, notwithstanding their conviction that the green light could not have been seen more than a very few degrees (if at all) across the bow of the Peru, will assume that there was an infringement of the regulation within the meaning of the statute. And it has certainly not been shown that the circumstances of the case made a departure from the regulation necessary. In construing the clause in question, it is to be observed that the Act of 1873 did not repeal, nor was it a substitute for, the Merchant Shipping Acts of 1854 and 1862. On the contrary, its 2nd section declares that it is to be construed as one with them. Now, the 298th section of the Act of 1854, and the 29th section of the Act of 1862, provides each that in certain cases of infringement of the sailing regulations those guilty of the infringement shall incur certain consequences. But each contains the qualification that the collision shall appear to the court to have been occasioned by the non-observance of the regulation infringed. When, therefore, in the 17th section of the Act of 1873, the Legislature omitted this qualification, it must be presumed to have done so designedly, and, at all events, to

[PRIV. CO.

have intended that it should no longer be incumbent on the opposite party to prove that the non-observance of the regulations in fact contributed to the collision. Nor does it appear to their Lordships that the 17th section of the Act of 1873 can be taken merely to shift the burthen of proof by raising a presumption of culpability, to be rebutted by proof that the non-observance of the rule did not in fact contribute to the collision, because the preceding (the 16th) section clearly shows that where the Legislature intended only to raise a presumption capable of being rebutted by such proof it used apt words to express that intention. Their Lordships therefore conceive that, whatever be the true construction of the enactment in question that which would take the case out of its operation by mere proof that the infringement of the regulation did not, in point of fact, contribute to the collision, is inadmissible. They conceive that the Legislature intended at least to obviate the necessity for the determination of this question of fact (often a very nice one) upon conflicting evidence. There remain, however, two other possible constructions. The first is that, on proof of an infringement of any of the regulations for preventing collisions, there arises, subject only to the qualification contained in the final clause of the section, an absolute presumption of culpability against the vessel guilty of such infringement, to which the court is bound to give effect, whatever the nature of the infringement may be. The other is that the infringement must be one having some possible connection with the collision; or, in other words that the presumption of culpability may be met by proof that the infringement could not by any possibility have contributed to the collision. The former of these constructions, though possibly the more consistent with the literal meaning of the words of the section, seems to their Lordships to be the less reasonable of the two. It not only leads to the extravagant consequences pointed out by the learned judge of the Admiralty Court; it implies an intention which, without the plainest language, can hardly be imputed to the Legislature. For it is one thing to say that when the circumstances show that the infringement of the regulations might have contributed to the collision, the court shall conclusively infer that it did So. It is another, and very different thing to say, that the court shall draw the same inference, when the circumstances show that the infringement, from its nature, could not possibly have contributed to the collision. In the latter case the Legislature would entirely alter the nature of the shipowner's liability. As the law stood, he was civilly liable in damages for the consequences of his act or omission. The new law, so far as it enacts that the consequences which might have flowed from that act or omission, shall be presumed to have flowed from it, does not affect the nature of that civil liability. But on the supposed construction it would virtually substitute for a civil liability which the shipowner could not have incurred, a penalty for the infringement of the regulations irrespective of the nature or possible consequences of that infringement-a penalty, moreover, of uncertain application, since it is dependent on a collision, and varying in severity with the injury done by the collision. It would, in effect, make the vessel guilty of the infringe. ment, a sort of outlaw of the seas, by depriving

her of the right to recover, under any circumstances, more than half the damages to which, by the general law maritime, she might become entitled. Again, it can hardly be denied, though the words perhaps admit of such a contention, that the infringement proved must be one existing at the time of the collision. And if this be so, it seems but reasonable to infer that it must also be one that has some possible connection with the accident. Their Lordships are of opinion that the second construction, which is not absolutely inconsistent with the phraseology of the enactment, and is by far the more reasonable of the two, ought to be adopted. It gives effect to the statute by excluding proof that an infringement, which might have contributed to a collision, did not in fact do so; and by throwing on the party guilty of the infringement the burden of showing that it could not possibly have done so. Applying this construction of the statute to the facts found, their Lordships are of opinion that if, in this case, both vessels had been British ships, the Peru could not have been pronounced in fault. This conclusion renders it unnecessary to consider whether this particular clause in the statute is applicable to foreign vessels; whether, in other words, it falls within the principle enforced in the Amalia (B. & Lush, 150) or that enforced in the Saxonia (Lush, 410). That this question, which is not free from difficulty, will have to be determined at no distant date is highly probable. But their Lordships abstain the more willingly from considering it at present, because it was not very fully argued before them. Their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty to affirm the judgment of the Court of Admiralty, and to dismiss this appeal with

Property acquired by or devolving upon a liquidating debtor, after he has obtained his discharge, but before the liquidation has been closed, is not divisible amongst his creditors under the liquidation.

Re Bennett's Trusts (31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 720;
L. Rep. 19 Eq. 245), overruled.
THIS was an appeal from a decision of the Master
of the Rolls.

The facts of the case were as follows:
On the 6th June 1871, the plaintiff, Joseph
Ebbs, in conjunction with John Ebbs and Edward
Jones Ebbs, with whom he had up to that date

[CHAN.

been carrying on the business of a builder in partnership, filed a petition for liquidation of his affairs by arrangement.

A general meeting of the creditors of the copartnership was held on the 28th June 1871, and special resolutions were duly passed by the statutory majority of the creditors that the affairs of the debtors should be liquidated by arrangement and not in bankruptcy, that certain persons therein named should be appointed trustees, and that the discharge of the debtors should be granted forthwith.

These resolutions were confirmed at a second meeting, and were duly registered.

The separate creditors of the plaintiff and his two partners were duly summoned to attend the meeting of the 28th June 1871, but none of the separate creditors attended the meeting.

On the 18th July 1871, the discharge of the plaintiff and his partners was duly certified by one of the registrars of the London Bankruptcy Court. Shortly after the issuing of this certificate, the plaintiff recommenced his business of a builder.

By an agreement made the 27th Nov. 1874, between the plaintiff, of the one part, and the defendant, John Arthur Boulnois, of the other part, the plaintiff agreed to sell, and the defendant agreed to buy, at the price of 16007., a piece of ground situate on the south-west side of Portsdown-road, Paddington, together with the messuage thereon erected, which premises were called No. 83, Portsdown-road, and were held by the plaintiff under a lease dated the 11th July 1874, for the term of 97 years from the 24th June 1874, at a ground rent of 121. 10s. And the defendant paid the plaintiff a deposit of 1601.

The defendant refused to complete the purchase on the ground that, the liquidation not being closed, the estate and interest of the plaintiff in the subject matter of the contract belonged to and was vested in the trustees under the liquidation as part of the assets to be administered in the liquidation, and that consequently the plaintiff could not make a good title to the premises in question.

Thereupon the plaintiff instituted the present suit to enforce specific performance of the agree

ment.

The defendant demurred.

The Master of the Rolls allowed the demurrer. In delivering his judgment his Honour said: I give no opinion of my own at all as to the proper construction of the 15th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869. I find before me in the case of Re Bennett's Trusts (31 L. T. Rep., N.S., 720; L. Rep. 19 Eq. 245) a decision of Bacon, V.C., who is the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy, deciding the very point-the point being this, that until the close of the bankruptcy or liquidation, according to the literal meaning of the 15th section, all the property acquired by a bankrupt during the continuance of the bankruptcy vests in the trustee, even though the property is acquired after the bankrupt has obtained his order of discharge. I cannot say that that is so plainly contrary to the terms of the Act of Parliament, that it comes within one of the two exceptions in which I think it is allowable for a judge of co-ordinate jurisdiction to decline to follow a recent decision, namely, when that decision is contrary to the plain words of an Act of Parliament. Indeed, the plain words of the Act of Parliament