dant had given the plaintiff the option of having the action tried in two adjoining counties, and had not confined him of necessity to Bristol as a venue. Hawkins, Q.C., in support of his rule, cited Church v. Barnett (L. Rep. 6 C.P. 116), in which it was held that the venue will not be changed from the place where the plaintiff has laid it, unless it be shown that there is a manifest preponderance of convenience in trying the cause elsewhere. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-The evidence in this case is very equally balanced. The plaintiff has a right by law to lay the venue where he pleases, and in exercise of this right he lays the venue in Middlesex. The present state of the practice is that the venue is not removed, unless there be a preponderance of convenience upon the side of the defendant: (Church v. Barnett, L. Rep. 6 C. P. 116.) Now is there such a preponderance of convenience in the present case? I am not much influenced by the arguments of Mr. Hawkins. The consideration which chiefly weighs with me arises from an answer of Mr. Lopes to one of those arguments-an answer which is in effect an additional reason why the venue should not be removed. The cause of this action is that certain hostile comments upon the plaintiff's conduct have appeared in the defendants' newspaper. It is argued by Mr. Hawkins that these comments have caused considerable local excitement, and, from having been continued without attempts by the plaintiff to check them for many years, have resulted in a considerable local prejudice against the plaintiff. This Mr. Lopes meets by the suggestion that the political sentiments of the plaintiff happen to be those of a majority of the people of Bristol, so that the plaintiff would have at least an equal chance with the jury. But what is wanted in a jury is impartiality, and impartiality is not arrived at by two sets of opposing prejudices. That a plaintiff would be likely to find six jurymen predisposed in his favour, and the other six predisposed against him, is a strong reason why his case should be tried elsewhere. On the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that no preponderance of convenience has been made out for changing the venue. It only remains to inquire whether the exercise of the master's discretion in favour of the defendant will make up for the deficiency in the facts which are deposed to in support of it. It is difficult to lay down any general rule, but I do not think that such deficiency is made up. I am therefore of opinion that this rule must be absolute to rescind the order of the master. GROVE, J.-I am of the same opinion. At a trial in Middlesex, there will be a jury far less mixed up with the circumstances of the case. ARCHIBALD, J. concurred. [C. P. For a jury to allow interest upon a debt it is not necessary that the demand of payment should have specified the exact amount of such debt. By 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 28, the jury may allow interest upon all debts payable otherwise than at a time certain "from the time when demand of payment shall have been made in writing, so as such demand shall give notice to the debtor that interest will be claimed from the date of such demand until the term of payment." The defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in a large amount not payable at a time certain. In October 1872, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant asking for "a good round sum" and giving notice that he would charge the defendant interest on whatever sum might be due to him on the 1st Nov. In Oct. 1873, the plaintiff again wrote stating that the defendant owed him over 1100l. for balance of account and interest, and threatening legal proceedings if the account should not be settled by 1st Nov. The amount remaining unpaid, the plaintiff sued for it; whereupon the defendant pleaded never indebted as to interest, and in respect of the principal paid into court a sum which the plaintiff accepted, at the same time joining issue on the plea of never indebted. The plaintiff having been nonsuited: Held that the replication might be amended; that the letter of Oct. 1873 was a good demand within the statute; and a rule to set aside the nonsuit and enter a verdict for the plaintiff as from Oct. 1873 made absolute. Semble that, assuming the letter of Oct. 1872 was a demand of payment at all, such letter also was a good demand within the statute. Hill v. South Staffordshire Railway Company (L. Rep. 18 Eq. 154; 43 L. J. 556, Ch.) questioned. DECLARATION in common form for money payable for goods sold and delivered, &c., and for interest. Pleas, except as to interest, payment into court of 6181. 188. 6d., and to the residue of the declaration, never indebted. 66 Issue on the plea of never indebted, and as to the plea of payment into court, acceptance of the 6181. 188. 6d. in full satisfaction and discharge of the causes of action in respect of which it bad been paid in." The cause came on to be tried before Bramwell, B., and a special jury at the Surrey Summer Assizes 1874, when the following facts appeared: The plaintiff was a coal merchant, and the defendant represented a mining company in Cornwall, which the plaintiff had supplied with coals previously to, in, and after the year 1869. From that date to the date of the writ, which was issued in June 1874, the plaintiff had frequently demanded payment in writing. The present claim of the plaintiff was for interest only, and the following are the material letters upon which he relied in support of such claim. Plaintiff to defendants. 14th October, 1872. I am sorry to have occasion to write to you. I am in want of cash, and must get some. I hope you will oblige me by paying me a good round sum on account of my supplies to Treweatha Mine immediately. Wheal Treweatha Mine Company owe me a large sum of money. I cannot allow it to remain idle. I feel it now my duty to give you this notice, that I shall charge this company interest on whatever sum may be due to me from them on the 1st November, at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum from that date until paid. Same to same. 6th October, 1873. Treweatha Mine Company. I feel it my duty to write to you about my claim on this company. They owe me for balance of coal account and interest over 1100l. . . . Now I must ask you the plain question, Why is not my account paid? I know the company will find fault with me for leaving the account open so long, and if the affairs of the mine get into the Stannary Court, I shall get a severe reprimand from the judge for allowing my account to go on so long unpaid. I must now give you notice that if my account with this mine be not settled on or before the 1st day of November next, I shall instruct my solicitor to take the necessary proceedings to recover the money this company Owes me. The learned judge, being of opinion that neither of these letters constituted a sufficient demand within the statute 3 & 4 Will., 4 c. 42 (a), directed a nonsuit to be entered, reserving leave to move. A rule was afterwards obtained accordingly to set aside the nonsuit, and to enter the verdict for the plaintiff for 1341. 11s. 9d., or some lesser sum on the ground that the evidence disclosed a demand in compliance with the statute, or for the plaintiff to amend his replication. Philbrick, Q.C. and Macrae Moir showed cause.As there has been no contract to pay interest, it can only be recovered under the statute, and the claim for the interest could not come before the jury upon these pleadings. And the rule ought to be discharged unless the judge had power to amend the pleadings at the trial. [Per CURIAM. The replication must be taken to be amended]. Even after amendment, there is no independent cause of action upon which the statute can operate. The demand must be for a sum certain payable at a time certain. The operation of the statute is discussed in Chitty on Contracts (8th edit. A.D. 1868, p. 599), where a note is appended giving a form of demand which specifies the amount of the debt spoken of as 66 now due." In Mowatt v. Lord Londesborough (3 E. & B. 307, aff. 4 E. & B. 1), the plaintiff wrote to the defendant, stating that he claimed interest from a time named, which was earlier than the date of his demand, and not stating to what time he claimed it. This was no doubt held to be a sufficient compliance with the statute, and the case will probably be relied on by the other side; but it is distinguishable on the ground that the specific sum owing was mentioned in the demand. Hill v. South Staffordshire Railway Company (L. Rep. 18 Eq. 154; 43 L. J. 556, Ch.), is on all fours with the present case. There the contract between the plaintiff, a contractor, and the defendants, provided that payments should be made monthly, as the works proceeded, on the certificates of the defendants' engineer. There was no stipulation in the con (a) By 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 28, it is enacted as follows: Upon all debts or sums certain, payable at a certain time or otherwise, the jury, on the trial of any issue, or on any inquisition of damages, may, if they shall think fit, allow interest to the creditor at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest from the time when such debts or sums certain were payable, if such debts or sums be payable by virtue of some written instrument at a certain time, or if payable otherwise, then from the time when demand of payment shall have been made in writing, so as such demand shall give notice to the debtor that interest will be claimed from the date of such demand until the term of payment; provided that interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is now payable by law." By sect. 29: "The jury, on the trial of any issue or on any inquisition of damages, may, in certain actions, give damages in the nature of interest." [C. P. tract in reference to the payment of interest to the plaintiff on any sums due but not paid to him. The plaintiff made a demand in writing for a sum as the balance due to him, and claimed interest thereon. His accounts were disputed, but on a bill filed by him against the defendants the result showed that he was entitled to a balance less than one half of the sum which he had claimed to be due from the company. It was held by Hall, V.C., that the plaintiff was not entitled to interest under the statute, inasmuch us the demand in writing for payment was not a demand of a sum certain payable at a certain time; this was the ratio decidendi. The statute applies only to an uncontroverted amount, and, as the plaintiff would have no title at all to the interest without the statute, it is for the plaintiff to bring himself within it. [GROVE, J.If the statute only applies to uncontroverted amounts, a debtor has only to dispute the debt, and then he may at once escape its operation.] Lucius Kelly and Darling, for the defendant, in support of the rule, were requested by the court to distinguish Hall v. South Staffordshire Railway Company (ubi sup.). The decision in that case was upon a mixed question of law and fact, the question of fact being whether or not the plaintiff had been guilty of misconduct. Non constat therefore that the decision of Hall, V.C., proceeded on a view of the law unfavourable to the present defendant. But even if it did, it is submitted that such view of the law was incorrect. The decision is irreconcilable with numerous cases at common law, not all referred to in the argument. The result of these is that it is not necessary to specify the amount of the debt in the demand: Edwards v. Great Western Railway Company, 11 Berrington v. Phillips, 4 Dowl. 458; 1 M. & W. 48; And the cases in Chancery, with the exception of Hill v, South Staffordshire Railway Company, are to the same effect: Mildmay v. Methuen. 3 Drew. 91; Macintosh v. Great Western Railway Company, 4 [Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-In Hill v. South Staffordshire Railway Company, Hall, V.C., speaks of himself as "acting as a jury."] Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-I am of opinion that this rule ought to be made absolute to set aside the nonsuit, and enter a verdict for the plaintiff, for an amount to be settled by counsel on both sides, upon principles which I will explain presently, for interest from the 6th Oct. 1873, and not from the 14th Oct. 1872. The question which the court has to decide arises upon the construction of sect. 28 of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42. That enactment enables the jury, and, under the circumstances of the present case, the court, to give interest to a plaintiff under certain conditions prescribed therein. I should have thought the words of the section plain, notwithstanding the discussions to which they have given rise. [Section read]. The only important word in the present case is "debt," for the second part of the section goes on to speak of debts 'payable otherwise than at a time certain, of which character the debt of the plaintiff was. If a debt then be payable otherwise than at a time certain, the jury may give interest "from the time when demand of payment shall have been made in writing, so as such demand shall give notice to 66 the debtor that interest will be claimed from the date of such demand until the time of payment." I think that all that is necessary to satisfy the statute is that there should be a debt due, a demand for that debt, and notice that interest will be claimed. It has been suggested by a very able judge that there must be a demand of a sum certain, and of payment at a time certain. But I cannot find words in the statute to any such effect. The statute contains nothing to show that in the document claiming interest, the amount of pounds, shillings, and pence in respect of which interest is claimed must iis nominibus be expressed. It may be that Hall, V.C., did not intend as a matter of law to rule that such expression was essential. If he did, I must decline to follow him. Must the demand be for payment of a sum ascertained at the time of the demand? I think not. The authorities which have been cited all go to show that the maxim certum est quod certum reddi potest will apply. Berrington v. Phillips (ubi sup.), for instance, is strong to that effect. It was an action upon an attorney's bill, and the plaintiff gave notice claiming interest from the date of the notice, and the bill was referred to taxation at the instance of the defendant. No amount can be less ascertained than that due upon an untaxed bill. To the same effect is Juggomohur Ghose v. Manickchund (7 Moore, Ind. App. 263). There the question arose whether an Indian Legislative Act which applied to India the enactment 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 28, comprehended within its scope a wager contract upon the average price which opium would fetch at the next Government opium sale. The court held that the wager contract was not within the scope of the Act, inasmuch as the debt was contingent in amount and time of coming due; but in the course of the judgment language was used of an extremely strong character in favour of the present plaintiff. The court observes: 66 With respect both to amount and time of payment, it was argued that the maxim id certum est quod certum reddi potest must be applied; and in a reasonable sense this is true. In the simplest case we may be obliged to have recourse to calculation for the actual amount, or to the calendar for the precise day of payment. A promise to pay on the last Saturday of the year, at the rate of 158. a week for twelve months, would certainly be a promise to pay a sum certain at a time certain. argued also that, in respect of both time and amount, it was a question of degree; and in the same reasonable sense that every statute is to be construed, not captiously, but with a view to the expressed intention of the Legislature, this is true also. But these propositions do not remove the greater difficulty of determining at what period of the transaction between the parties must the amount and time of payment be ascer tained. Is it necessary that these should be ascertained at the time when the promise is made? Or will it suffice if they become so at the time when it ought to have been fulfilled, and is broken? Ascertainment at any later period certainly could not suffice." The court then points out that the statute was framed on the principle not simply of compensation to the creditor, but of penalty, and afterwards proceeds as follows: "This reasoning leads their Lordships to conclude that the certainty required must exist at the time when the promise is made; and therefore that the Act does not affect debts contingent in It was [C. P. amount and time of becoming due: a construction strictly conformable to the natural meaning of the language used." We have here a strong and high authority that there need be no demand of a specific sum. It is enough if the creditor says, "On the 1st Nov. I expect to be paid what is due, and shall charge interest if I am not paid." Such being the law, what are the facts? We have been much pressed with the letter of Oct. 1872. To me, and also to the other members of the court, it appears to be at least arguable that this letter contained no demand of anything at all. There is no doubt a notice that interest will be charged upon whatever may be due. If there had been also a demand of payment, we should have had a demand within the statute as it has been expounded by the cases. In Mowatt v. Lord Londesborough (3 E. & B. 307), there was an express and direct demand of payment. This was held by the Court of Queen's Bench, though not without doubt, to be sufficiently within the spirit of the statute, although informal. In the Exchequer Chamber (4 E. & B. 1), the decision was affirmed, but with express doubts on the part of Parke, B. Maule, J. did not hear the whole of the argument, but also doubted. When therefore I bear in mind that there were perhaps doubts in the mind of the Court of Queen's Bench, and that there were certainly doubts in the mind of the Exchequer Chamber, I am not prepared to say that this letter of Oct. 1872 was a sufficient demand. I am clearly of opinion, however, that the letter of Oct. 1873 was a sufficient demand. I cannot conceive how anybody could question that this amounts to a demand of payment, with notice that interest will be claimed. The rule, therefore, must be made absolute to enter the verdict for the plaintiff for such a sum as would represent interest from the date of the letter of Oct. 1873; the sum to be arrived at by the counsel for the parties. GROVE, J.-I am of the same opinion. It was argued by Mr. Moir, and the argument is partly supported by the reasoning of Hall, V.C., in Hill v. South Staffordshire Railway Company (ubi sup.), that to constitute a demand within the statute the sum demanded must be specified in the notice. I agree with my Lord in thinking that there are no words in the statute to support that argument. Nothing is mentioned in the statute but demand of payment and notice that interest will be claimed, nor is the requirement that the amount be specified within the spirit of the statute. Both in Berrington v. Phillips (ubi sup.) and Mildmay v. Methuen (ubi sup.), the amount claimed must be taken to have been such amount as might be ascertained to be due. The statute indeed would be rendered inoperative by the construction which the defendant's counsel seeks to put upon it. A case could rarely occur in practice where the sum claimed was so incontestably due that the plaintiff must be entitled to recover that precise sum and no other. There is no necessity therefore to claim a fixed sum; the claiming of such a fixed sum is a mere flourish of figures, like the claim which comes at the end of a declaration. I am inclined to read sum certain" as meaning a liquidated sum, especially as sect. 29 proceeds to deal with unliquidated sums. The letter of Oct. 1873 was clearly within the statute. As for the letter of Oct. 1872, I am far from saying that that letter was not sufficient also. Now if the demand had been conditional, if the letter had indicated that unless a 66 round sum were paid interest would be claimed, the letter would not be within the statute. But I see no such condition. The notice as to the claim for interest is absolute. But the question is whether there is a demand of payment at all. On the whole there is not enough in the letter to persuade me, speaking as a juryman, that the notice of 1872 was a sufficient one. As to the notice of 1873, I agree with the rest of the court. ARCHIBALD, J.-I am also of opinion that the rule ought to be absolute to enter the verdict for the plaintiff for an amount to be calculated as from Oct. 1873, and I agree in the reasons already given. I will only add that the construction contended for by Mr. Philbrick would very much narrow the proper operation of the Act. Before the passing of it interest was payable on certain commercial debts, and the object of the Act was to extend the operation of the law to debts generally. Sect. 28 comprehends two cases: first, the case of a debt payable at a time certain and by virtue of some written instrument; and secondly the case of debts not so payable. In neither of these cases is it necessary to specify the amount due. The illustration given by the Privy Council (7 Moore Ind. App. 263) applies to the first case. It is said, "A promise to pay on the last Saturday of the year, at the rate of 15s. a week for twelve months, would certainly be a promise to pay a sum certain at a time certain." Then if there had been a supply of the goods at the agreed prices, there would be a debt due, and a prospective demand coupled with non-payment would be a good notice within the statute. The second case, which is the present case, is where the debt is payable otherwise. With respect to such a debt it is provided that interest may be given "from the time when demand of payment shall have been made in writing, so as such demand shall give notice to the creditor that interest will be claimed from the date of such demand until the term of payment." In this case coal had been supplied by the defendant to the plaintiff, and some amount or other was due to the plaintiff in respect of such supply. Then in Oct. 1872, the plaintiff asks for a good round sum, and gives notice that he will charge interest on whatever may be due to him on 1st. Nov. I am very much inclined to think that this was a sufficient demand of payment, and therefore brought the statute into operation. But I have enough doubt upon the point to prevent me from dissenting from the rest of the court. As to the letter of Oct. 1873, I have no doubt whatever. That letter contains a distinct notice that legal proceedings will be taken in the event of nonpayment. Nothing could be clearer than this, and no more specific demand was required by the Rule absolute. statute. [C. P. The defendant, within the jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court, drew upon a Huddersfield bank a cheque payable to the plaintiff, the defendant having no effects at the Huddersfield bank, and having had notice not to overdraw. The plaintiff having sued the defenant upon the cheque : Held, that the whole cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court, and a rule to prohibit discharged. THIS was a rule for a prohibition to the Mayor's Court of London. The action was brought by the plaintiff as indorsee of two cheques drawn by the defendant within the jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court upon a bank at Huddersfield. It appeared from affidavits filed on behalf of the plaintiff, that the defendant at the time of drawing the cheques had not only no effects at the Huddersfield bank, but had had notice from the manager of that bank, with which he had at one time kept an account, that no cheques drawn by him would be honoured in future unless he should have previously paid in cash for the purpose of meeting them. Finlay, for the plaintiff, now showed cause, and argued that the whole cause of action arose within the City, inasmuch as presentment of the cheques was not necessary, citing, Byles on Bills, 10th edit. p. 215; Carew v. Duckworth, L. Rep. 6 Ex. 313; 38 L. J. 149 Cock, for the applicant, in support of the rule, sought to distinguish the cases cited. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.--The rule for this prohibition was granted on the ground that the whole cause of action did not arise within the jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court, according to the authority of Mayor of London v. Cox (L. Rep. 2 H. L. 239; 6 L. T. Rep. N.S. 497). But Mr. Finlay shows that presentment at Huddersfield was not necessary, inasmuch as the defendant had no funds at the Huddersfield bank, and had had notice from that bank that his cheques drawn upon that bank would not be paid unless provided for. In Byles on Bills it is said at p. 215, “ Absence of effects in the drawee's hands will, as against the drawer, dispense with the necessity of presenting for payment." And this proposition is supported by Terry v. Parker (6 A. & E. 502; 1 Nev. & P. 752). I also find, on reference to Bullen & Leake's Precedents of Pleading, p. 82, a common form of declaration by payee of a bill against drawer for default in payment, excusing presentment because the drawee could not be found; and it is added, citing Terry v. Parker (ubi sup.), that a count excusing presentment may be framed on that form in the case where the defendant had no effects in the hands of the drawee. The case of a bill is not different in this respect from that of a cheque. The plaintiff, therefore, could prove his case without having to resort to evidence of facts occurring outside of the jurisdiction, and this rule must be discharged. GROVE, J.—I am of the same opinion. ARCHIBALD, J.-I am of the same opinion. Presentment was no part of the cause of action here. Rule discharged with costs. Attorney for the plaintiff, G. F. Gray. Attorneys for the defendant, Green and Prid ham. EXCHEQUER CHAMBER. Reported by M. W. M'KELLAR, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Wednesday, June 16. KISH v. CORY. Charter-party-Demurrage-Damages for delayCharterer's liability. A charter-party between plaintiff, the shipowner, and defendants, the charterers, provided the number of loading days, and the rate of discharge per working day; ten days on demurrage for all like days above the said days to be paid at the rate of fourpence per register ton per day; and charterer's liability to cease when the ship was loaded, the captain or owner having a lien on cargo for freight and demurrage. Held by the Exchequer Chamber affirming the Queen's Bench in an action for demurrage and for damages caused by detention at the port of loading (upon demurrer to a plea alleging both claims to be for demurrage under the charter-party) that the demurrage days related to the port of loading as well as to the port of discharge; and that the charterer's liability for all such demurrage ceased when the ship was loaded. Semble, the shipowner's lien for demurrage would include a claim for damages caused by detention beyond the demurrage days. THIS was error from the Queen's Bench upon demurrer to a plea. The action was brought by shipowner against charterers for five days' demurrage at port of loading beyond the thirteen clear working days allowed by the charter-party for loading. The declaration contained two counts both alleging the same default on the defendants' part in not loading, and in detaining the ship: the first count claimed damages because the plaintiff lost the use and profits of the ship, and was put to expenses in the second count claimed consequence; payment by the defendants, as by alleged agreement upon default in loading the cargo, at the rate of fourpence per register ton of the said ship per day. By the third plea the defendants, as to the said first and second counts, said that the agreement in the second count alleged was and is contained in the charter-party mentioned in the said first count, that it was not otherwise agreed between the plaintiff and the defendants; which said charterparty is as follows, that is to say: CHARTER PARTY. Cardiff, 17th Oct. 1872. It is this day mutually agreed between Mr. Thomas Kish of the good ship or vessel called the Spring of 377 tons register measurement or thereabouts now en route from Falmouth to Hull, and Cory Brothers and Company, merchants, that the said ship being tight staunch and strong, and every way fitted for the voyage, shall, with all practical dispatch, sail and proceed to the usual safe loading berth at Hull, as ordered by shippers in the regular and customary manner, and there take on board as tendered a full and complete cargo of coal which the said merchants bind themselves to provide for shipment, not exceeding what she can reasonably stow and carry, over and above her tackle, apparel, provisions, and furniture. Stiffening coal if required to be supplied at the rate of twenty tons per lear working day after written notice is given of it being required, and that the ship is ready to receive the same, each working day the ship may be detained beyond that time to be deducted from the loading days, hereinafter mentioned cargo to be loaded in thirteen clear working days from the day written notice is given that all ballast or inward cargo is discharged and the stiffening coals (if any) are on board, [Ex. CH. and of the vessel being ready to receive remainder of her cargo (any time lost through riots, strike, or stoppage of said agents, pitmen, or other hands connected with the working or delivery of the said coal, or by reason of accidents to mines or machinery, obstruction on the railway and in the docks, or by reason of floods, frosts, storms, or any cause beyond the personal control of the shippers not to be computed as part of the aforesaid loading), and being so loaded the vessel shall, with all practical dispatch proceed to Alexandria or so near thereunto as she may safely get, and deliver the same, as customary alongside steamer, or depôt ship, or into craft as ordered, on being paid freight at the rate of 211. sterling per keel of 21. One-fifth tons delivered or taken on board at charterer's option with 51. gratuity: (the act of God, the Queen's enemies, fire, frosts, and all and every other dangers and accidents of the seas, rivers, and navigation of whatever nature or kind soever during the said voyage always excepted). The ship to pay consulages, lights, pilotage, and other port charges whatsoever. Freight to be paid, one-third if required in cash on signing bills of lading less five per cent. for all charges, balance at port of discharge in cash at current rate of exchange for ship's disbursements, and the remainder by an approved bill upon London at three months date or all cash equal thereto at captain's option, on the right and true delivery of the whole cargo. Cargo to be discharged weather permitting at not less than thirty-five tons per working day, time to commence on the ship's being ready to deliver. Ten days on demurrage for all like days above the said days to be paid at the rate of four pence per register ton per day. The ship to discharge as directed by consignee alongside steamer or depôt ship or into craft, or at any wharf, pier, or arsenal, or at such safe place of anchorage or moorage where she can safely lie. Cargo to be brought to and taken from alongside at merchant's risk and expense. Sufficient coal to be taken on board for ship's use, the same to be endorsed on bills of lading which are to be signed as presented without prejudice to this charter-party. The ship to be addressed to charterer's agent at port of discharge, free of commission, paying the usual commission of two per cent. when loaded. Trimming cargo to be done by merchant's trimmer at market price. Any duty which may be levied in consequence of the vessel not being British to be borne by the owner Charterer's liability to cease when the ship is loaded, the captain or owner having a lien on cargo for freight and demurrage. And the defendants further said that the plaintif was not ready and willing to take, and did not take the agreed cargo on board as tendered in the regular and customary manner. For a fifth plea the defendants as to the said first and second counts repeated all the allegations contained in the third plea, except those which followed the setting out of the charter-party. And the defendants further said that the said ship was loaded by the defendants, with the agreed cargo within the ten days on demurrage stipulated in the said charter-party, and that thereupon the defendants' liabilities as charterers upon and under the said charter-party ceased. This fifth plea was demurred to on the grounds. amongst others, that the charter-party did not provide for demurrage at the port of loading, nor did it absolve the charterers from such liability on loading the cargo. The demurrer was argued in the court below on the 5th June 1874 before Lush and Archibald, JJ who considered the case identical with Francesco v Massey (L. Rep. 8 Ex. 101), and in accordance with that authority gave judgment for the defendants A. L. Smith now argued for plaintiff, the appellant -There is a distinction between this charter-party and that in Francesco v. Massey; the words ther are ten days on demurrage over and above her said laying days," which naturally refer to day both of loading and discharging. Here the words 66 |