good; than, "whom you and I THOUGHT good"? There is nothing in the sentence to denote an opinion past. As regards the perhaps unsatisfactory explanation, received from the Scholiast, of τὸν ἀγαθόν, as spoken ἐν εἰρωνεία, we may avoid it by understanding :-Creon whom THEY think good; they say THEIR worthy Creon, i. e. whose conduct in this matter they approve as patriotic. And this, I think, is the sense which best suits the context: Antigone meaning, that this was a bitter part of the consummation, for her and Ismene, tv an Oidínov xaxwv, (vv. 2, 3,)—that their fellow-citizens were uniting with Creon in his refusal of burial to their fallen brother. See vv. 44, 79, 894. The datives σοὶ and ἐμοί, in connection with κηρύξαντ ̓ ἔχειν, denote, not, certainly, that Creon had made mention of Antigone and Ismene in his edict; nor, perhaps, that he had issued it with a special view to them above all others: but, that the general order issued by him navodýμy móds, v. 7, naturally and necessarily (so at least Antigone felt) concerned them, the two sisters, in particular. Further, as regards λéyw yàp xâμé, I conceive that Y.'s sense, no less than the interpretations of other commentators, would demand xapoí here, instead of xàué. Wex has, I think, given rightly the general meaning of the passage in the following part of the note which Y. quotes:-"Immo hoc dicit Antigona: Illud cum edixit Creon, ad te quoque pertinet hoc edictum et ad me, ad me inquam, quod cum repetit, significat, quam novum sibi quidem et inauditum videatur tale edictum, in quam talis obedientia cadere non possit." But that Wex did not discern the precise meaning and construction of this parenthetic clause, λéyw yàp xàμé, I infer from his remarking: "Ceterum exspecλέγω καμέ, taveris xapol, at sæpe illud λéyw, ubi aliquid materialiter repetendum erat, aut ubi explicationi illud inservit, accusativum assumit." For I believe that xàué, and not xauoí, was essential to the sense intended by Sophocles: nor is λéyw used here in either of the ways which Wex speaks of. That verb is here not inquam, nor dico; not I say (parathentic), or I repeat, or I mean, nor I tell (thee); but mentionem facio de I name, I specify,—as in Ed. C. 128, äs tpéμoμev λéyeiv, a sense which of course requires the accusative. Any other sense of Xéyw is excluded by ráp, an important and expressive word in the clause. But perhaps the surest indication of the meaning of the parenthesis, is the xai in xàué; which particle, as seems clear to me, has here no conjunctive use, in the sense of etiam, also, or even, but is used in an intensive adverbial way,—frequent enough in the tragedians; but which has been so little recognized or understood, that, by learned editors and commentators, many passages in which it occurs have been misinterpreted, and several very needlessly and mischievously altered. This usage I have endeavoured to call attention to, and to illustrate by examples, in my edition of the Prometheus Bound of Æschylus, in the note (Appendix C.) on the 51st line,-ěpvwxa · Toïode κοὐ δὲν ἀντειπεῖν ἔχω,—where I cannot think that καὶ ought to be disturbed by transposition, or need be explained by hyperbaWhat I conceive to be the construction and sense of the present clause, I may shew by quoting a few words from what I have written there :-" The intensive adverbial use of xai, as distinguished from its common use as a copula, is very observable in Antig. 33,-coì xàμoí, λéyw yàp xàμé-to thee and to me, for I say emphatically ME; I have special cause for mentioning myself." The especial reason which Antigone had for particularizing herself as affected by Creon's edict, was, that she, whatever her sister might do, was solemnly resolved to brave and break that edict. In λέγω γὰρ καμέ she hinted what she presently declared explicitly : ton. 66 Other instances of xai so used are found in the Antigone. One is in the 280th line,παῦσαι, πρὶν ὀργῆς καμὲ μεστῶσαι λέγων, (where xai, I would maintain, is in its proper place, to give emphasis to the pronoun as well as to μsotuvca). Another is in v. 493, μισῶ γε μέντοι χὤταν κ. τ. λ. (not, also when, or as much when; but, especially, chiefly when; zaì giving to őtav an emphasis which reaches to the end of the sentence). Another instance occurs in that passage (vv. 681-3,) of which, in the same No. XIX. of the Classical Museum, the meaning is well explained by Dr. R. Maclure, as it is similarly by Mr. Donaldson in his recent edition of the Antigone :-'Eyà ở.... out ἂν δυναίμην, μήτ' ἐπισταίμην λέγειν· Γένοιτο μεντἂν χατέρῳ καλῶς exov: where xaì gives a strong exclusive force to έtépw,—IN ANOTHER, not in ME, that might and would be proper; (as in v. 567, ἀρώσιμοι γὰρ χατέρων εἰσὶν γύαι, we should perhaps understand of others' instead of her's, rather than, of others' as well as her's.) Compare also vv. 764-6.—X O. ǎμ‡w ràp avrà xai (really, actually, κατακτεῖναι νοεῖς; ΚΡ. οὐ τήν γε μὴ θιγοῦσαν· εὖ γὰρ οὖν λέγεις. ΧΟ. μόρω δὲ ποίῳ καί σφε βουλεύει κτανεῖν ; By what death wilt thou her for certain (xaí) kill?—her, at any rate; HER, though not the other. As other instances of xai united, only for emphasis, with the first personal pronoun, as in the present clause, I may add, Eumen. 790, Kayò néпoda Zŋví. Med. 1129, ἔχω τι κἀγὼ τοῖσδε . . . . εἰπεῖν. Iphig. Τ. 596, καὶ τὰς Μυκήνας οἶσθα, χοὺς κἀγὼ θέλω. Looking now into Ellendt, I am pleased to find-vol. 11. p. 17-the following good interpretation (which Y. has not noticed) of λέγω γὰρ κἀμέ ; 66 nam de industria meum non excludo nomen." I think, then, that the meaning wrapt up in the two lines may be unfolded by a paraphrase of this kind: Such is the edict which they say Creon in his good zeal has proclaimed,—an edict which must needs affect you and ME above all the citizens; in saying which, I make special mention of myself, because, whether you join with me or not, I mean to incur the penalty for burying our brother. And I would translate thus: They say that Creon-and call him good-for thee Has heralded an edict such as this. I take the opportunity of adding some remarks on several other passages of the Antigone, which appear to me to have been imperfectly understood. V. 3. vov En Cúca Teλet.-Here I understand, not in our lifetime, or before we die; but on or for us the two survivors, the only living remains of the family of Edipus after the death of both our brothers. I think the emphasis is on vov, more than on Coav: and that the sense requires that those two words should not be genitives, as some of the chief commentators suppose them to be, but datives depending on teλe. Mr. Donaldson considers them as datives; but he translates, "for us while yet we live." I think, for us who yet survive, or for us who live as yet, would express the sense much better. V. 323. ἡ δεινὸν, ᾧ δοκεῖ γε καὶ ψευδή δοκεῖν.—I do not see how this line (devov being in the neuter) can admit of the sense given to it by Boeckh (as quoted by Wunder) and by Ellendt (1. p. 441, "si quis apud sese constituit,") and by Donaldson, who translates, "Tis sad when one thinks good to think a lie." The cunning sentinel would scarcely have spoken such dangerous impertinence to the angry king; for which he might have anticipated a fiercer retort than κόμψευε νῦν τὴν δόξαν (talk Now as finely as you please about appearance and opinion: but unless you soon shew me the REALITY, &c.) I think the construction which δεινὸν requires after it is, ᾧ δοκεῖ γε, [τούτῳ] καὶ ψευδῆ doxe, Sad, that to one to whom IT SEEMS, i. e. who judges only by appearances, things altogether (xai) false should seem! This philosophic dictum about tò doxouv, seeming, and not a punning use of doxav in different senses, was, as I conceive, the xoupsía which Creon in his reply alluded to. Compare, partly for construction and partly for sentiment, Electr. 1022, † de‹vòv eð λέγουσαν ἐξαμαρτάνειν. V. 357. ἄπορος ἐπ ̓ οὐδὲν ἔρχεται τὸ μέλλον.—Hermann joins èπ oùôèv tò μéλλov, and interprets "ad nihil quod est futurum.” Mr. Donaldson, rejecting such a construction, and “taking tò μέλλον as a sort of adverb, analogous to τὸ πρίν, τὸ νῦν, &c.,” explains the construction thus: “ τὸ μέλλον, ἄπορος ἔρχεται ἐπ' odèv, in regard to the future, he comes to nothing without resources." This seems better: but is it not best to take the words simply in the order in which they stand, which seems to me to give both lawful construction and good sense: without expedient for nothing, i. e. with an expedient for every thing; he goes to the future, i. e. he meets whatever comes? Of ǎropos taking after it (by reason of the transitive notion in πóρos,) ni with the accusative, we have an instance in Ed. R. 665, ἄπορον ἐπὶ φρόνιμα. If, similarly, ἄπορος ἐπ ̓ οὐδέν is the construction here, this negative periphrasis is a repetition of the preceding лavτonóρoç in a stronger shape; and we may compare it with such phrases as oùdevòs μailov odével, Prom. v. 1015, is stronger than no one, i. e. as weak as any one; and Suppl. 590, Ζεὺς . . . οὔ τινος . τὸ μεῖον . . κρατύνει. Οὔ τινος σέβει záτw, i. e. is superior to every one. The version which Mr. Donaldson gives in the text of his translation agrees (but I suppose from his note undesignedly,) with the construction I suggest : "Planless in nothing, meets he the future!" V. 518. ἀλλ ̓ οὐχ ὁ χρηστὸς τῷ κακῷ λαχεῖν ἴσος.—The commentators—Hermann, Wunder, &c.,-connecting τῷ κακῷ with ἴσος (“ par malo,” leave the infinitive λαχείν in an awkward, disconnected position, to which I see no resemblance in the passages referred to by Wunder ; for in v. 437, ταῦθ ̓ ἧσσω λα βεῖν ἐμοὶ πέφυκεν. 632, γάμος μείζων φέρεσθαι,—Elec. 1016, οὐδὲν ἀνθρώποις ἔφυ κέρδος λαβεῖν ἄμεινον, the infnitives are dependent in no unusual way on πέφυκε, μείζων, ἄμεινον ; and in Αj. 1332, τοιούσδ ̓ ἐπαινεῖς δῆτα σὺ κτᾶσθαι φίλους ; the construction and the sense are not such as Wunder gives, but xrãoda is dependent on ἐπαινεῖς, and governs φίλους; do you recommend the acquiring such friends? Is not the present passage an instance of the personal construction for the impersonal, οὐκ ἴσον ἐστὶ τὸν χρηστὸν λαχεῖν τῷ κακῷ, It is not equal that the good man should have lot with the bad, i. e. not equitable towards the good, that he should obtain no more than the bad (compare v. 514, ἐκείνῳ δυσσεβῆ τιμᾶς χάριν . . . εἴ τοί σφε τιμᾶς ἐξ ἴσου (no more than,) τῷ δυσσεβεῖ.) Is not that construction as suitable to ἴσος as to δίκαιος in v. 398, δίκαιός εἶμι τῶνδ ̓ ἀπηλλάχθαι κακῶν ? Since in Philoct. we have ἴσος ἀνήρ in the sense of ἀνὴρ δίκαιος, is it not as lawful to say ἴσος ἐστὶ λαχεῖν, as it would be to say δίκαιός ἐστι λαχεῖν ? For λαχεῖν τῷ κακῷ (= λαχεῖν ἐξ ἴσου — μετέχειν ἴσων—κοινωνεῖν—τῷ κακῷ,) compare v. 829, τοῖς ἴσοθέοις ἔγκληρα λαχεῖν. V. 557, 8.—θάρσει. σὺ μὲν ζῆς· ἡ δ ̓ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ πάλαι τέθνηκεν, ὥστε τοῖς θανοῦσιν ὠφελεῖν. · I do not see how this passage can bear Mr. Donaldson's translation : "Thou still livest; but my soul Is dead the while, e'en since I served the dead." To me Wunder's interpretation of the latter clause seems to express the true and natural sense, "ita ut vivis nihil jam utilis sim." I think that clause has a much more general meaning than a reference to the burying of Polynices, and may be explained by comparing vv. 74–6,— and also vv. 884-8,—ἐλθοῦσα μέντοι κάρτ ̓ ἐν ἐλπίσιν τρέφω φίλη |