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of amo. In poetry, which is conservative of by-gone constructions and phrases, we find most instances of the middle meaning. Thus taking at random from the Second AEneid, we have excutior somno, (302)—I rouse myself from sleep : In flammas et in arma feror, (337)—I bear myself, I rush : Induitur galeam, (393)—puts on himself the helm : Notá conduntur in alco, (401)—hide themselves : Coluber mala gramina pastus, (471)—having fed himself on norious herbs : (Priamus) ferrum Cingitur ac densos fertur moriturus in hostes, (511) —girds on, and rushes. Nor in prose is this meaning unknown, though less frequent, as, fit particeps publici consilii, he makes himself, Cicero in Catilinam, 1.1. With regard to the verbal in tus, an additional confirmation is gained from the corresponding verbal in Tós in Greek; dovuatos is just as much a perf. pass. participle of its verb quqvićakw, as pastus is of pasco. But this verbal in tds is actice as well as passive, and this has been allowed from the first. So long as cingitur in such phrases as cingitur ferrum was considered strictly pass., no government for the accus. could be found in the phrase itself. Recourse was therefore had to the whimsical expedient of a preposition, exerting a secret mystical influence over a noun, but ashamed to show itself to claim its full rights. There is an insurmountable difficulty, in our judgment, in a preposition uniformly governing a particular case after particular words, but being as uniformly omitted. Besides, secundum never has the meaning attributed to it in this rule. The only possible view, then, of this accus. is simply this: the passive and middle tenses in Greek were originally identical. Remains of a pure middle are found in Latin of the Augustan age to a considerable extent: this middle had a tendency in several instances to subside into a mere active; in others, to be entirely restricted to the passive. An accus. after such forms, when transitive, is what might be expected. The following quotation from Professor Key's Latin Grammar shall conclude these remarks: “The perfect participles of what are commonly called passive verbs, are used, particularly by the poets, like those of reflective or deponent verbs, and so take an accusative case.”
Herodotus, in B. H. c. 39, where he describes the Egyptian rites of sacrifice, says, according to the common reading, . . . . a7sgowa,
There is a passage in the speech of Nicias in Thucyd. vi. 21, which has given much trouble to the interpreters and commentators. It stands thus in Bekker's edition, (Oxford, reprint, 1821): 'yorras Gr,
Having carefully read Mr. Richmond's remarks on my proposed interpretation of this passage, I am bound to say that my opinion remains unshaken. Mr. Richmond considers “the trajection of the datives to the place they occupy after the substantive Kpéovia,” to be a decisive objection. This is a question of grammatical aesthesis, on which I cannot agree with Mr. Richmond. Had I time to read Plato, Demosthenes, and Thucydides for the purpose, I am confident I should find numerous instances of collocation equally free; and if so, poetical arrangement has an a fortiori freedom. Sophocles could not write, 7 du got ka? enoi, Aérow Yap kai čue, dyadov Kpéovza : he therefore throws the words into the order of the text, the admissibility of which I consider free from doubt." Mr. Richmond asks, “if such be the construction, would not the sense more naturally be, Creon whom you and I THINK good, than, whom you and I THOUGHT good.” I perceive no force in this objection. Tov dyadov does not define time at all: the participle ovia, which the mind supplies, may refer as much (imperfect) to duration in time past, as (present) to subsistence in time present. Mr. Richmond conceives that my interpretation would demand cquo; instead of kāué. Here again I cannot agree with him. While I grant that Sophocles might have written wäuos, I hold that it was quite open to him to write cauá in the same sense: i. e. “for I name myself also, (as having been accustomed to entertain this opinion,)" instead of “for I say to me also.” Mr. Richmond interprets Káně, “emphatically me.” Without denying the possibility of such an interpretation, (which, by the way, is not inconsistent with my view of the passage,) it seems to me more simple and probable to explain squé from the preceding a duo', “and to me also ; yes, me also I say.” Mr. Richmond refers Tov dyadov to the opinion of the citizens. This, in itself, is open to no objection. My interpretation I regard as necessary, not to explain Töv disabów, but to elucidate the pronouns and parenthesis. For I cannot accept as satisfactory Mr. Richmond's paraphrase: “Such is the edict which they say Creon in his good zeal has proclaimed,—an edict which must needs affect you and ME abore all the citizens ; in saying which I make special mention of myself, * My opinion on this point is shared by one of the best Greek scholars in England, the Rev. T. S. Evans of Rugby.
because, whether you join with me or not, I mean to incur the penalty of burying our brother.” This explanation, like Wex's, with which it agrees in the main, I cannot accept: (1) because I do not believe that words, such as totaútá Øaat Kpéovtsi oot kāpooi kekopvyéval can mean, “Such is the edict which they say Creon has proclaimed, an edict which must needs affect vow and me :” or any thing else but, “Such is the edict which they say Creon has proclaimed to you and me ;” (2) because the hint suggested to be lurking in the parenthesis is too obscure and enigmatical for even the daughter of an OEdipus; (3) because such an emphasis and such a hint seems to destroy the beauty and propriety of Antigone's character. How much more suitable to suppose her saying, “this is the proclamation of the man whom you, dear sister, from the impulse of your gentle, affectionate, and too confiding nature, used to call ‘the good, whom even I–let me frankly own it—though of sterner temper, have often called so.” I will merely add that, although more accustomed to be sceptical than dogmatical in the interpretation of difficult passages in classical literature, I entertain no doubt in the present instance. This affords no reason for the mere adoption of my present opinion : but it serves to explain why I continue to place it before the eyes of scholars, trusting that it will be generally sanctioned for its own value. BENJ. H. KENNEDY.
1. GREEK VERBs, Irregular and Defective, their Forms, Meaning, and Quantity: Embracing all the Tenses used by the Greek Writers, with References to the passages in which they are found. By the Rev. William Veitch. Edinburgh: Adam & Charles Black. 1848.
CLAssical scholars are much indebted to Mr Veitch for this most elaborate and meritorious work. It contains all that the title conveys or implies, and more. There is truly little left to be done by future labourers in the same field.
All will admit that it is indispensable to correct scholarship, to be acquainted, not only with the general principles on which the Greek verbs are constructed, but with the anomalies in which that language, so luxuriantly rich in forms, abounds. The analogies of the language, when these are correctly ascertained, may lead, and have often led, to the correct reading, and the right understanding of a disputed passage.