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$ 2486. The duties and powers of the officers of a municipal corporation are prescribed by statute, and every person dealing with them as such is charged with knowledge of the nature of the duties and the extent of their powers. Ibid.

8 2437. Contract by mayor.– Although a city council has legislative powers in regard to the police of the city, a contract may be made under sanction of the council, by the mayor, with a private person, licensing a ferry. Fanning v. Gregoire, 16 How., 532.

$ 2488. Fraudulent contracts. - Although a municipal agent or officer may have unquestionable authority to make a contract, he may be guilty of fraudulent collusion with the other contracting party in making it, which will render it void. Hitchcock v. Galveston, * 3 Woods, 287.

§ 2459. Torts.- Municipal corporations are not prima facie liable for the torts of their officers or agents. Bowditch v. Boston,* 4 Cliff., 323,

$ 2499. Tax collectors.— Township and county collectors of taxes, so far as they are charged with the duty of collecting city taxes, must be deemed pro tanto city officers. Amy v. Galena, * 7 Fed. R., 163.

$ 2491. The governor of the District of Columbia is its executive authority. Barnes v. District of Columbia, 1 Otto, 540 (SS 2340–53).

$ 2492. Expiration of term.- Where a corporation or a board has been superseded by new officials, and the terms of its members have expired, they cannot individually exercise the functions of their old office. Barkley v. Levee Commissioners, 3 Otto, 253 ($$ 2158-64).

$ 2493. The Louisiana act of 1867 did not continue levee commissioners in office, because they were then out of office. Ibid.

§ 2494. Under the statutory provisions in Illinois, that, at the town meeting in April of each year, there shall be elected in each town one supervisor and one town clerk, who shall hold the offices for one year, and until their successors are elected and qualified; and that the justices of the peace shall hold their offices four years, or until their successors are elected and qualified; and that town officers, except as otherwise provided, shall hold their offices one year, and until others are appointed or elected in their places and qualified, a town clerk or a supervisor or a justice of the peace holds his office until his successor is qualified, notwithstanding he may have resigned and his resignation have been accepted, and although other provisions provide for the filling of the unexpired terms of town officers in case of death or resignation. Badger v. Bolles, 3 Otto, 599.

VIII. MISCELLANEOUS.

& 2495. Public property.- Whether or not a wharf on the batture in New Orleans is public is a question proper to be left to the jury. Railroad Co. v. Hanning, 15 Wall., 658.

$ 2496. A public place is inalienable except by the sovereign, but a public place which is a portion of a batture in New Orleans has a distinctive quality impressed upon it, and may be withdrawn from the use of the public by the city. New Orleans v. Morris, * 3 Woods, 115.

$ 2497. Where one town is merged in two others, the two towns succeed to the public property and immunities of the extinguished municipality. Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 10 Otto, 514 (SS 2191-2208).

$ 2498. Upon the repeal of a charter of a city the property held by it for governmental purposes passes under the immediate control of the state. Meriwether v. Garrett, 12 Otto, 472 ($8 2224-37).

$ 2499. Municipality composed of the inhabitants. — Municipalities are public corporations, and are composed of all the inhabitants of the territory included in their boundaries. Laramie County v. Albany Co., 2 Otto, 307 ($5 2179–88).

$ 2300. Inhabitants, no part of corporation.- Inhabitants of a municipal corporation as such are no part of the corporation. Fowle v. Corporation of Alexandria, * 3 Cr. C. C., 70.

$ 2501. Municipal charter not a contract.- Municipal charters are not contracts with the state. Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 10 Otto, 514 (SS 2191-2209); Laramie Co. v. Albany Co., 2 Otto, 307 (SS 2179–88).

$ 2502. Charter not a special privilege.- It is held that the granting of charters to municipal corporations is not granting “special privileges," within the meaning of the act of congress of March 2, 1867, providing that “the legislative assemblies of the several territories shall not, after the passage of this act, grant private charters or special privileges.” City of Elk Point v. Vaughn,* 1 Dak. Ty, 113.

$ 2503. Construction of charter by state and federal courts.— The federal courts are bound by the decisions of the courts of the states construing the charters of their municipal corporations. Goodrich v. Chicago, 4 Biss., 18.

$ 2594. Repeal of charter.- By the repeal of a municipal charter its powers and property revert to the state. Meriwether v. Garrett, 12 Otto, 472 (S5 2224-37).

$ 2505. Surrender of charter during pendency of suit. - Where, during the pendency of a suit against a corporation, it surrenders its charter, which is accepted by the legislature, the corporation becomes defunct and the suit against it abates. Greeley v. Smith, 3 Story, 657.

$ 2306. Extinguishment.- A municipal corporation extinguished by the legislature cannot sue or be sued. Its officers do not continue in existence for the settlement of its affairs. Beckwith v. Racine,* 7 Biss., 142.

& 2507. Where a municipal corporation is extinguished by merging it in another, its power of taxation is not annihilated, but merely transferred to the other municipal body. Ibid.

$ 2508. Subject to the control of the legislature.- Counties, cities and towns are municipal corporations, subject to the full control of the legislature, which may amend their charters by enlarging or diminishing their powers, may extend or limit their boundaries, may divide them into two or more, may consolidate two or more into one, and may overrule their action whenever it is deemed unwise, impolitic or unjust, or can even abolish them altogether. Laramie Co. v. Albany Co., 2 Otto, 307 (SS 2179-58).

$ 2509. Municipal bodies may be extinguished, enlarged or reduced in size. Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 10 O.to, 514 ($S 2191-2203).

$ 2510, Municipal corporations are completely within the control of the legislature, and may be changed, altered, enlarged, diminished or extinguished by it. Beckwith v. Racine, * 7 Biss., 142.

$ 2511. The legislature may alter, modify, or even annul the franchises of a public municipal corporation, although it cannot impose burdens on it without its consent. Girard v. Philadelphia, 4 Phil., 413.

$ 2512. Irregular municipal elections may he validated by prior as well as subsequent legislative acts. St. Joseph Township v. Rogers, 16 Wall., 664.

$ 2313. Territory may create a municipal corporation.— The legislature of a territory has the implied power to create and charter municipal corporations. Wagner v. Harris, * 1 Wyom. T'y, 197.

$ 2514. Corporate seal imports a consideration. The principle that an instrument under seal imports a consideration applies as strongly to a corporation acting within its powers as to a natural person. Sturtevant v. City of Alton,* 3 McL., 393.

S 2515. Cannot make an affidavit. - Where a pleading was required by statute to be supported by an affidavit, held, that this statute could not be literally enforced where the defendant was a corporation, for a corporation cannot make an affidavit; and since the mayor was one of the officers whose act was questioned in the case, the affidavit was properly made by a member of the common council, although he swore only to the best of his knowledge and belief. Hitchcock v. Galveston,* 3 Woods, 287.

$ 2516. May exist without officers. — A municipal corporation is not dissolved by the mere failure to elect officers. It may be doubted, even, whether the legislature of a state, notwithstanding its general supremacy over public corporations, may dissolve a corporation so as to defeat the rights of its creditors. In 1865 the constitutional convention of Missouri passed an "ousting ordinance,” which was subsequently adopted in the constitution, and which provided that within sixty days thereafter every person holding any office of honor or profit under the state, and in any municipal corporation, should take and subscribe the oath of loyalty therein prescribed; failing to take such oath within sixty days, such office, it was declared, should ipso facto become vacant, and the vacancy should be filled according to the law governing the case, and it was made penal to hold or exercise any of such offices without having taken and subscribed the oath. Held, that the officers of the city of Ste. Genevieve having failed to take the prescribed oath, their official existence was absolutely at an end on the 4th day of September, 1865, at which time the corporation had no legal officers, votwithstanding which, however, the corporation continued in existence. Welch v. Ste. Genevieve, 1 Dill., 130 SS 2165–71).

$ 2517. Bond given to a municipal corporation.— A bond given to a municipal corporation must be made payable to the corporate name designated in the act authorizing it to be taken. Fowle v. Common Council of Alexandria, * 3 Pet., 393.

$ 2518. Addition to a town subject to existing regulations.- When an addition is made to a town the part added becomes subject to all the existing regulations of that town. So where a by-law prohibited slaughter-houses within the corporate limits, and an addition was made, the by-law was held to be in force in the addition and to prohibit slaughter-houses there. Virginia v. Smith, 1 Cr. C. C., 47.

& 2519. Devise to corporation in trust for charities.- Where there is a valid devise to a corporation in trust for certain charitable purposes, unaffected by any question as to its validity because of superstition, the sovereign may interfere to enforce the execution of the

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trust, either by changing the administrator if the corporation be dissolved, or, if not, by modifying or enlarging its franchises, provided the trust be not perverted and no wrong done to the beneficiaries. Where the trustee is a corporation no mo:lification of its franchises or change in its name, while its identity remains, car affect its right to hold property devised to it for any purpose, nor can a valid vested estate in trust lapse or become forfeited by any misconduct in the trustee or inability in the corporation to execute it, if such existed. Charity never fails; and it is the rigit as well as the duty of the sovereiga, by its courts and public officers as also by legislation, if needed, to have the charities properly administered. Girard v. Philadelphia, 4 Phil., 413.

$ 2520. Where property is devised in trust to a municipal corporation, heirs of the testator have no right to interfere by bill quia timet, because they anticipate future perversions of the charity by tie corr:iption or folly of the municipal corporation, and the moral impossibility of its just administration, and a court will not seize upon the fund or any part of it and deliver it up to such heirs because of such apprehensions. Ibid.

$ 2521. Authority to remove a nuisance. - A municipal corporation, without any general laws either of the city or of the state within which a given structure can be shown to be a nuisance, cannot, by its mere declaration that it is one, subject it to removal by any person supposed to be aggrieved, or even by the city itself. Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall., 565.

$ 2522. Authority to remove a private wharf.- Authority to establish a wharf and dock line does not warrant a city in declaring, by a special ordinance, a private wharf extending beyond such line to be a nuisance, and to authorize its removal. Ibid.

S 2523. Ordinance -- Constitutional provision.— Under a constitutional provision, that “laws making appropriations for the salaries of public officers and other current expenses of the state shall contain provisions on no other subject," an ordinance appropriating bonds, and providing for the levy and collection of taxes to pay them, must not contain provisions as to the securing of building material and the construction and repair of public buildings. Coulson v. Portland, * Deady, 481.

$ 2524. Ordinance levying taxes not a revenue law.- Ordinances of municipal corporatops levying taxes are not revenue laws of a state, and a city suing under such ordinance has no right to the preference allowed to a state when the execution of the revenue laws of the state is enjoined or suspended. Such city cannot have its case advanced on the docket and assigned specially for hearing under this statute. Davenport City v. Dows, 15 Wall., 390.

$ 2525. Constraction of ordinance. The statements of supervisors in debate on the passage of an ordinance cannot be resorted to for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the terms used, but they can be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the general object of the legislation proposed and the mischief sought to be remedied. Ah Kow v. Nunan, 5 Saw., 552.

$ 2526. Ordinance must not conflict with an act of congress.- Where a municipal ordinance conflicts with an act of congress the ordinance must give way.

United States v. Hart, Pet. C. C., 392.

$ 2527. Ordinance, part valid and part invalid.— The whole ordinance of a city is not void because the penalty imposed is in excess of that which is authorized by the charter. If, omitting the void part, that which remains is complete in itself and capable of being executed, it must be sustained. City of Elk Point v. Vaughn,* 1 Dak. T'y, 113.

$ 2528. Ordinance as to vessels in a river running through the city.- City ordinances relative to vessels in a river running through the city are binding only as police regulations; beyond this they have no controlling force upoa the courts of the United States, which are governed by the principles and rules of the admiralty law. The Palmetto, 1 Biss., 453.

$ 2529. Federal courts are not in all cases bound by city ordinances relative to the equipment and management of vessels in a river running through the city. The B. S. Sheppard, 1 Biss., 225.

$ 2530. Regulations with respect to landings.- Testimony to show that the rules and regulations of a town, situated upon a navigable river, with respect to its landing have not been usually enforced, will not authorize the court to disregard them, in a libel for collision at the landing. Steamboat Southern Belle, Newb., 461.

$ 2531. In the case of a libel for damages sustained by a collision at a landing, it is of no importance whether the libelant, in taking his position at the landing, did so voluntarily or in accordance with the directions of the proper officer of the town in control of the landing, provided he was acting in accordance with the local regulation of the town. Ibid.

$ 2532. Warrant for violation of a by-law.- The warrant of a justice for the violation of a by-law of a municipal corporation should set forth the offense substantially as created by the by-law. So, where the by-law prohibited the running of horses in the city within three hundred yards of any house, a warrant which did not state the running to be within three hundred yards of any house was held insufficient. White v. Corporation of Washington, 2 Cr. C. C., 337.

$ 2533. A warrant for the violation of a by-law of a municipal corporation should specify the by-law, and the nature of the violation of it by the defendant. Booth v. Corporation of Georgetown, 2 Cr. C. C., 356.

& 2534. Iaformation apɔn a by-law. It is held that an information will not lie upon the by-law of a municipal corporation created by a private act, and whose charter gives all penalties for breaches of by-laws to the use of the town. Virginia v. Howard, 1 Cr. C. C., 61.

82533. By.law not interiering with a state statute.- Where the charter of a municipal corporation gave it power to "restrain or prohibit gambling," a by-law imposing a penalty for keeping a gaming table was held not to repeal or interfere with a statute of the state imposing a penalty for keeping a faro table in a house occupied by a tavern keeper. United States v. Wells, 3 Cr. C. C., 45.

$ 2536. Process against. — The provision in the charter of a town requiring that the first process in all suits against the town shall be a summons, an attested copy of which shall be served on the recorder, does not apply to an action of ejectment. Robertson v. Town of Wellsville, 5 McL., 459.

$ 2537. Service on corporation - Seizure of corporate stock.-One Fairfax was the owner of certain obligations of the city of Alexandria, which were in the form of bonds not negotiable, and called stock of the city of Alexandria. Fairfax having joined the Confederate army and taken his bonds with him, the United States district attorney for that district. ordered the marshal to seize his stock in the city of Alexandria, in pursuance of an act of congress to confiscate the property of rebels. The marshal returned on the order of seizure that he had seized the property by giving notice to one Johnson, auditor of the corporation of Alexandria. It was held that this was not a sufficient service on the corporation, since the statutes in Virginia provided that process or notice should be served on the mayor, rector, president, or other chief officer, and, in his absence, on the president of the council or board of trustees, and, in his absence, on the recorder or any alderman or trustee. Alexandria v. Fairfax. 5 Otto, 774.

8 2539. Injury from a dilapidated bridge.- Where it was conceded that a city was bound by its charter to maintain a bridge and keep it in repair, and it was proved that it was defective and very much out of repair at the time an accident for which damages were sought occurred, and it was proved that plaintiff was seriously and permanently injured by such accident, without any fault of his own, and solely through the insufficiency of the bridge and its want of repair, and testimony was introduced tending to show that the city was guilty of negligence in suffering the bridge to continue open for public travel while it was known to be out of repair and insecure, held, that an instruction whereby the court withdrew the case from the jury, telling it plaintiff could not recover, was erroneous. Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black, 39.

$ 25:9. Duty to repair or rebuild a bridge.- Where many powers and privileges are conferred upon a city, and the duty is cast upon it of building and maintaining in good condition a bridge, and means are provided for it to do so, held, that the burden of repairing or rebuilding the bridge is imposed upon the city in consideration of the privileges and inimunities conferred by its charter, and such city is liable for injuries to persons or property arising from its neglect to perform such duties or from negligence or unskilfulness in keeping the bridge in good repair. Ibid.

$ 2540. Liability for wrongful acts.- A municipal corporation is legally and justly amenable to the law in redress of wrongful acts done by it or its agent, either wilfully or through negligence, to the injury of other persous or their property. Leavenworth v. Casey,* McCahon, 124.

$ 2541. Liability for property destroyed by a mob.— In an action by the owner of houses against the city of Baltimore, to recover damages for injury done to his property by a mob, which, as he alleged, it was the duty and within the power of the city to suppress, held, per Taney, C. J.: (1) In order to entitle the plaintiff to recover it must be shown by the evidence that the property was destroyed by a riotous and tumultuous assemblage, too strong to be resisted without the aid of the civil authority. (2) It must appear, also, that the city authorities had reasonable ground for believing that such an assemblage, too strong to be resisted without their aid, had taken place, or was about to take place, and did not use reasonable diligence to suppress or prevent it. (3) If it was destroyed by a tumultuous or riotous meeting, yet the corporation is not responsible, if diligent inquiry was made, after notice that danger was apprehended, and reasonable precautions taken by the civil authorities to guard against such a riotous and tumultuous assemblage. (4) Nor are they answerable, if the injury was done upou a sudden excitement, which the civil authorities had not good reason to apprehend, or, from the suddenness, had not time to prevent. (5) The city authorities

were not bound to place officers or guards to prevent trespasses and depredations, and are not liable for any destruction unless committed by a riotous and tumultuous assemblage, too strong to be resisted without the aid of the civil authority, an l which tumultuous assemblaze the civil authorities had reasonable ground to believe would take place, for the purpose of destroying the property. Verdict for the defen lant. Duffy v. Mayor of Baltimore, * Taney, 200.

$ 2342. Liability for neglect of dnty.— A municipal corpɔration is liable to an action upon the ca je at common law for nezlect of its duty. Fowle v. Corporation of Alexandria, * 3 Cr. C. C., 70.

$ 9543. Injunction – Use of patent.- An injunction issued against a city to restrain it froin the use of a patent pavement binds members of its board of public works. Pnillips v. City of Detroit, 2 Flip., 97.

S 2:41. The court refused to grant an injunction against the city of Brooklyn for the unlawful use of a patented seat in the public schools of the city, on the ground that the seats belonged to the board of education, and the corporation of the city had no power to direct a disconiinuance of the seats. Allen v. City of Brooklyn, 8 Blatch., 535.

$ 2545. Mandamus.- A public body cannot be compelled by mandamus to do acts not within the scope of its authority. Barkley v. Levee Commissioners, 3 0.to, 253 (SS 2158-64).

$ 251". A mandamus will not be awarded to compel county officers to do any act which they are not authorized to do by the laws of the state through which they derive their powers. Supervisors v. United States, 18 Wall., 71 (SS 2153-57).

$ 237.. Adveriisement for bids to do work.- An ardvertisement for bids, under a city ordinance directing it, is a condition precedent to a valid contract to do the work for which proposals were asked. Hitchcock v. Galveston,* 3 Woods, 287.

$ 2545. An advertisement. giving notice that proposals would be received at the mayor's office until a certain day named, to fill up to the grade and pave the sidewalk specified in a certain ordinance, describing the work to be done as prescribed in the ordinance for that parpose; and that specifications of the work would be prepared by the city engineer and could be seen by calling at the mayor's office; closing with these words: “Any other information desired will be furnished. The city reserves the right to reject any and all bids," and signed by the mayor in his official capacity, held, to be a sufficient notice as required by the ordinance, although not signed by the chairman of the street committee of the com'non council, Ibid.

$ 2549. Contracts for work.- A failure to prepare specifications of work to be contracted for does not invalidate the contract made for such work. Ibid.

S 2550. Where a contract specified the materials and nature of the work to be done, but provided that it should be done according to the specifications declared to be then in the mayor's office, held, that the failure to prepare and tile such specifications in the mayor's office did not invalidate the contract, but rendered it optional for the contractors either to refuse to do the work for want of the stipulated specifications or to go on and do the work in the ordinary and accustomed mode. Ibid.

$ 2.531. Where an ordinance requires the consent of a majority of property owners, a contract to do the work, which requires the consent of the property owners gencraily, is not invalid. Ibid.

$ 25.2. Municipal bonds.- The measure of damages for the non-delivery of municipal bonds is their market value. Collateral damages are not allowed. Memphis x, Browu,* 1 Fiip., 188.

$ 25,3. The bonds of a municipal corporation, loaned to a person, are to be considered as chattels in esse. Ibid.

$ 2554. Whether or not a municipal corporation has power to issue its bonds for the purpose of loaning them to third persons, held, that a loar of such boods to a contractor in order to furnish him funds, by a city which was indebted to such contractor in a sum much greater than the amount of the bonds loaned to him, was not ulcra vires. Ibid."

8 2557. Where a contractor was a large creditor of a city under a puving contract, and accepted from it a loan of bonds, the city being unable to pay him in cash, helid, that the acceptance and sale of such bonds was not a waiver by him of his claim for damages. Ibid.

$ 255v. An undertaking to “guaranty the said bonds and assume the payment of tho principal thereof at maturity” is a guaranty of the bonds, including interest as well as principal. New Orleans v. Clark.* 5 Ott), 614.

$ 2557. Loan of municipal bonds in aid of a railroad - Security.- Cincinnati was authorized to issue its bonds for $1,000,000 in aid of a railroad, by a statu.e enacting "that it shall be the duty of the said city council, and it is hereby authorizeil, to contract with the said company to secure by mortgages, transfers or hypythecations of stock of said company, or by other liens or securities, real or personal, as muy de mutually agreed on, the payment of the anoint of the principal of such bunds as may become due and for the reimbursement of the

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