1855 and the conveyance of 1864, J. C. Tone agreed to purchase the site of the intended back street, which was described as being the piece of ground described in the surrender to Thomas Wilson, eighteen feet wide, then in the occupa tion of J. C. Tone, and intended to be set out as a back street. And it was agreed "that the said piece of ground is sold subject to any rights of road over the same and the right to use the same as a back street, which any person or persons now have or may lawfully or equitably claim under or by virtue of the said surrender, dated the 16th July 1861." J. C. Tone died in 1880. In June 1882 the defendant Preston pulled down a part of the wall, thereby destroying the shed and the gable of the workshops. This action was brought by Mrs. Tone, the widow, one of the beneficiaries under the will of J. C. Tone, against Preston and one of the trustees of her husband's will, for damages, and an injunction on the ground, first, that the wall belonged to J. C. Tone's estate; secondly, that he had acquired an easement of support for the shed and gable. The first point was decided against the plaintiff on the evidence of the plans and descriptions in the deeds. On the second point, Barber, Q.C. and E. W. Byrne for the plaintiff. -Our buildings have been openly resting on the wall ever since 1855. Angus v. Dalton (44 L. T. Rep. N. S. 844; L. Rep. 6 App. Cas. 740) and Lemaitre v. Davies (46 L. T. Rep. N. S. 407; 19 Ch. Div. 281) show that an easement for the support of one building by another can be obtained under the Prescription Act. Napier Higgins, Q.C. and A. T. Watson for the defendant Preston.-The enjoyment for which the plaintiff must prove to establish his right to the easement he claims must be nec vi nec clam nec precario, or, as it is stated by Lord Denman in Tickle v. Brown (4 Ad. & Ell. 369, 382; 6 Nev. & Man. 230), must be, an enjoyment had not secretly or by stealth, or by tacit sufferance or by permission asked from time to time on each occasion, or even on many occasions of using it; but an enjoyment had openly, notoriously, without particular leave at the time, by a person claiming to use it without danger of being treated as a trespasser, as a matter of right." The fact that the building, in respect of which the easement is claimed, stood upon ground which Tone was bound by express covenant at any time on three months' notice to turn into an open street, is wholly inconsistent with any such enjoyment as of right. The covenant to make the street in the deed of 1864 and its recital in the agreement of 1877 amount to acknowledgments by Tone that he only enjoyed this easement by leave and licence of Scurfield. If at any time during the twenty years the enjoyment was not of right, there can be no prescription: Kinloch v. Neville, 6 M. & W. 795; Gaved v. Martyn, 13 L. T. Rep. N. S. 74; 19 C. B. Druce for the defendant Mackenzie, the trustee of J. C. Tone's will. Barber, Q.C. in reply. The question whether the defendant was entitled to the benefit of J. C. Tone's covenant to make the street was also argued at length, but [CHAN. DIV. the Court held that it was not necessary to decide the point. DENMAN, J. (after stating the facts as above, and that he had come to the conclusion, on the evidence, that the wall belonged to the defendant and not to the plaintiff, and that though it was, in the view of the case he took, unnecessary to decide the point, he was of opinion that the original building scheme had been abandoned, and its abandonment acquiesced in by all parties), proceeded:-Now several questions have been raised as to the easement claimed, which is, to rest as of right upon that wall the gable of the buildings in question. I was referred to several cases as to the possibility of having such an easement as that. One was the great case of Angus v. Dalton. In that case it would appear that the Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords (and I think he was the first of the judges who had the case before them to hold it with any confidence) held that an easement of this character, one building obtaining a right of support from the adjoining building was an easement within the Prescription Act. And in Le Maitre v. Davis I find Hall, V.C. also took that view and decided expressly that that was an easement capable of being claimed under the Prescription Act. The great difficulty in Angus v. Dalton, as far as I can gather from the very elaborate and full judgment given both in the court below and in the House of Lords, seems to have been whether the easement of support claimed in that case was one which could be properly claimed, or claimed under the Prescription Act (for both views were taken), or could exist in the particular case, because there was, it was alleged in that case, an absence of evidence that the person upon whom the burden of the easement would fall would know of the existence of the right during the time of its acquisition, and that his building was being subjected to such a burden. The great doubt between the judges in the House of Lords and in the courts below, in fact in every court, was whether it was a case in which the court could say positively without further evidence, that the plaintiff was entitled to the easement, or whether it was a case in which it must go down for a new trial, in order that it might be ascertained whether the easement was enjoyed clam, or in such a manner that the person who was to have the burden was bound to take notice of it. That seems to have been the great contest in that case. Ultimately the House of Lords held that they were not bound to send it down for a new trial, for it was apparent from the facts of the case that there was an easement acquired in such a way that the party to bear the burden of it was bound to know of it, and so ultimately the plaintiff succeeded. That was a very difficult and complicated case. It was put in both ways, by the Lord Chancellor on the Prescription Act, and by other judges as a case to which the old law of prescription would apply, and that, in the absence of anything to show the exact origin of the thing, user for the time would be sufficient to give the easement, provided only that the enjoyment of the easement was of such a nature that the party on whom the burden was to fall was bound to take notice of it. It appears to me that, so far as that part of the case is concerned, this would have been an à fortiori case in favour of the plaintiff; that is to say, this being a vertical burden, a burden of property actually resting upon other property, no such difficulty would arise as arose in Angus v. Dalton. It would not be necessary to ask a jury the question whether the wall obviously and apparently supported the gable. It must be so in the nature of things, and Angus v. Dalton, being a case in which it was held that there may be such an easement by reason of one building supporting another, would be conclusive in favour of the plaintiff, provided that there was an easement to which he had made out his title in all other repects. But there is another difficulty: enjoyment by which the easement is acquired must not only not be clam, but it must not be precario; and in this case one has to see from evidence whether the party claiming the easement has had that easement as of right, or whether, having regard to the circumstances of the case and to any recognition by him in the course of the twenty years immediately preceding the action brought, he has so dealt with it as to show that he is not claiming it as of right. Looking at it in that way, I have come to the conclusion that this is an ensement which the plaintiff has not established, because, when one looks at all those deeds, the deed of 1864 and the deed of 1877-especially putting these two together-I think that not only in writing, but by deed, the plaintiff's predecessor in title has practically admitted that this was not an easement to which he was asserting an absolute right. It is a perfectly new case. There is no case that I can find in which that is to be gathered from a quantity of documents and conduct which do not expressly refer to the easement itself or to the thing itself upon which the easement is supposed to rest. But what I think is this, that it is impossible, where a building rests upon land, as to a portion of which the party admits that at any moment upon three months' notice he is bound to do something which is inconsistent with the continued existence of that building, to say that an easement can have been established with respect to the gable of that very building, the extreme wall of it, during the very time within which such admission has been made. It seems to me thoroughly inconsistent with the user of that wall as of right that the party within twenty years of the action brought should have agreed that he would upon three months' notice pull down the very building the gable of which is the thing in respect of which the easement is claimed. It is so inconsistent with common sense that it is impossible to say that, where that has occurred within the twenty years, the party has been during the whole of the twenty years insisting on that easement as of right; and, though there is no authority on the subject, I think that does bring the case within the cases which hold that the enjoyment must be as of right; and if any act be proved to have been done within the twenty years before action brought, which is an indication that the person claiming does not do it as of right, then the easement is not claimable. Many cases were cited, although I do not refer to them in detail. One was a case in 4 Adolphus & Ellis, and another was in the Exchequer, to the effect that there must be an absence of facts which show that the thing was not as of right within the twenty years. Now, here in 1864, which is niueteen [Q.B. DIV. years ago, and in 1877, there do appear to me to be deeds in which Tone himself practically admitted facts wholly inconsistent with a right to have the gable of the buildings resting upon the wall, for they show that eighteen feet of that building were all the while resting upon a way, which way at any rate upon three months' notice he was obliged to open up into a back street and preserve as a back street. On that ground I think the plaintiff has failed to make out her title, first, to the wall, and, secondly, to the easement she claims. Action dismissed with costs. Solicitors: Paterson, Snow, and Bloxam, for Ranson and Nelson, Sunderland; Shum, Crossman, and Co., for F. J. Mackenzie, Sunderland. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION HORSLEY V. PRICE AND CO. (a) Ship-Charter-party-Construction-" At all times of the tide "-Shipowner's duties-Demurrage. A charter-party provided that a steamship should load a cargo of timber, and being so loaded proceed to Sharpness, or so near thereto as she may safely get at all times of the tide and always afloat. 66 On the 5th Sept. 1882 the ship arrived at King Road, a place sixteen miles from Sharpness, and not within the ambit of its port, but which in the state of the tides prevailing on that day was as near thereto as she could get with her full cargo always afloat. The captain offered to deliver at King Road the whole cargo, or so much as would lighten the ship enough for her to proceed to Sharpness. The charterers refused. On the 9th Sept. the state of the tides permitted the ship to proceed, and she did proceed to Sharpness, and delivered her cargo. Held, that, on the true construction of the charterparty, the ship was not bound to reach a spot within the ambit of the port of Sharpness, and that the insertion of the words "at all times of the tide" relieved the shipowner from any liability to wait a reasonable time for the tide, and that he was entitled to demurrage, on the basis of the voyage having terminated on the ship's arrival at the nearest place to Sharpness that she could reach with a full cargo in the state of the tides prevailing at the time of her arrival. THIS was the further consideration of an action tried before North, J. without a jury upon circuit. The following statement of the facts is taken from the judgment: The plaintiff was the owner of a steamship named the Halo, of 924 tons, and on the 26th July 1882 he chartered her to the defendants through their agents. The charter-party provided that the ship, which was then at Rouen, should proceed to Ljusne (Soderhamn), a Swedish port in the Baltic, or so near thereunto as she may safely get, and, there load always afloat from the factors of the charterers a full cargo of deals and battens, and. being so loaded, should there with proceed to Sharpness, "or so near thereto as she may safely get at all times of the tide and always afloat," and deliver the same on payment of freight. The only (a) Reported by J. B. BROOKE, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. other material stipulations in the charter-party were that the cargo should be discharged with all despatch,' as customary, and that demurrage was to be paid at the rate of 351. a day, that the cargo was to be taken from alongside the vessel at the expense of the charterers, and that demurrage was to be payable if more than six days were occupied in discharging. On the 5th Sept. the Halo arrived with her cargo at King Road, an open roadstead in the Severn, opposite the mouth of the Avon, where ships can lie at anchor, but there is no wharf; it is within the ambit of the port of Bristol. Sharpness is a place fifteen or sixteen miles higher up the Severn, and is not within the port of Bristol, but is within that of Gloucester. It was admitted that King Road was the nearest place to Sharpness; that the Halo could reach it with her full cargo on board in the then state of the tides in the Severn at any time up to the 9th. In that state of things various communications took place between the persons acting for the ship and the charterers respectively, and the result of the evidence on that subject was, in the opinion of the court, that the ship's agents alleged that the voyage was complete, and offered to deliver the cargo at King Road, or if the charterers would lighten the vessel by taking delivery of part, then to proceed to Sharpness with the remainder, and in either case to enter the ship at Bristol; but that the defendants' agents declined that offer and refused to take delivery of any part of the cargo at King Road, or to recognise the ship at all until she arrived at Sharpness. Under these circumstances the ship was not entered at Bristol, as such entry would have been useless. She remained at King Road till the 9th, and on that day the tides just permitted her to go on to Sharpness, and she arrived there that evening. On Monday, the 11th, she began the discharge of her cargo, which was completed on the 14th. H. Matthews, Q.C. and Lawrence for the plaintiff. The state of the tides from the 5th Sept. to the 9th prevented the ship getting to Sharpness always afloat, the plaintiff was therefore entitled to adopt the alternative and deliver the cargo as near as she could safely go with full cargo: Shield v. Wilkins, 15 L. T. Rep. O. S. 117. The plaintiff was ready to deliver at King Road on the 5th Sept.; for the evidence shows that the preliminary objection taken by the defendants that he had not entered the ship at Bristol and could not deliver was waived. The lay days, therefore, began to run from the 5th Sept. They referred to Jones v. Barkley, 2 Doug. 684; Nelson v. Dahl, 41 L. T. Rep. N. S. 365; 12 Ch. Div. 568; and in H. of L. 44 L. T. Rep. N. S. 382; L. R. 6 App. Cas. 38; Capper v. Wallace, 42 L. T. Rep. N. S. 130; Q.B.Div. 163; Parker v. Winlow, 7 E. & B. 942; Hotham v. The East India Co., 1 T. R. 638, 645. J. J. Powell, Q.C., Anstie, Q.C., and H. D. Greene for the defendants. The words" at all times of the tide" are new and must be construed reasonably, and as they are ambiguous, most strongly against the shipowner who inserted them. The result of the plaintiff's construction would be, that if at any point of the voyage, even in leaving the port of departure, the ship arrived at a place she could [Q.B. DIV. not pass at dead low water, she could claim that the voyage ended there. The captain was bound to go on if he could get on without unreasonable delay; the state of the tide is one of the ordinary risks of navigation which fall on the shipowner: Bastifell v. Lloyd, 1 H. & C. 388; 31 L. J. 413, Ex. Metcalfe v. Britannia Iron Works Co,, 35 L. T. Rep. The words "at all times of the tide " cannot refer to the verb "get" which precedes them; they must be taken with the words "always afloat" which follow. The important point is that a ship should be always afloat when lying in port. That is what the parties meant the words "at all times of the tide to refer to. The legal result is the same as if those words were omitted: Hillstrom v. Gibson, 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 248; 8 Sess. The charter-party is made out on the ordinary printed form for the port of London, but those words are struck out, and the port of Sharpness written in. Where part of a document is on a printed form, and the rest written in by the parties, the written part must prevail: Robertson v. French, 4 East, 130; Mercantile Marine Assurance Co. v. Titherington, 11 L. T. Rep. N. S. 340; 5 B. & S. 765. Even if the plaintiff had a right to terminate the voyage at King Road, his proper claim is not for demurrage. He ought to have delivered and warehoused the cargo at Bristol, or sent part by lighters up to Sharpness, and sued us for the June 16.-NORTH, J. (after stating the facts of the case as above) :-This action is brought to recover 1051. for three days' demurrage, upon the basis that the ship's voyage terminated, upon the true construction of the charter-party, on her arrival at King Road on the 5th, that the six lay days expired on the 11th, and that demurrage is payable for the three subsequent days. This action is defended upon the footing that the voyage was not completed until the ship's arrival at Sharpness on the 9th, when the six lay days completely discharged within the six days, no began to run, and that the cargo having been demurrage is payable. A subordinate point is raised by the pleadings that the plaintiff never was ready and willing to deliver the cargo at King Road, inasmuch as no delivery could take place without the ship being first entered at Bristol, which never was done; but, as I find that the parties did offer to make such entry, and the defendant refused to accept, this defence fails. To adopt the language of Lord Mansfield in Jones v. Barkley (ubi sup.), "the party to perform must show that he was ready; but if the other party stops him, on the ground of an intention not to perform his part, it is not necessary for the first to go further and do a nugatory act." principal question in this case is whether the voyage was terminated, and the lay days began to run, and this depends upon the true construction of the charter-party, and principally on the words at all times of the tide." It appears from The Parker v. Winlow (ubi sup.), Bastifell v. Lloyd (ubi sup.) and Nelson v. Dahl (ubi sup.), that when the charter-party provides that a ship shall go to a harbour named, or as near thereto as she can safely get, the primary object is to get to the place named, and the alternative condition does not arise unless the cause which prevents the immediate arrival of the ship at the place named is such that it cannot be got rid of by the shipowner by reasonable means, and within a reasonable time, having regard to the nature and the object of the voyage; and further, that if the cause of detention be the arrival of the vessel during the low tides, her having to wait for the tide to increase is one of the ordinary incidents of navigation, and the shipowner must submit to the delay so occasioned. No one could say that four days' waiting for such a purpose was not reasonable, and it was not disputed that if the words "at all times of the tide" had not been found in the charter party, the plaintiff must have borne the risk of the delay at King Road, the lay days would not have commenced till the 9th, and the defendants would have been entitled to judgment. What, then, do the words mean? The defendants cannot say that they have practically any meaning at all. Their contention is that they are not to be read in connection with the previous words, 66 So near thereto as she may safely get," but with the succeeding words, "and always afloat," and that the whole sentence thus read means simply that the ship is, during the progress of the voyage, and while lying at the port of discharge, to be afloat at all times of the tide, that is to say, always. There are several reasons why I cannot adopt this construction. The words in common use to provide for this purpose are "always afloat," or "lie always afloat," and I have no recollection of having ever myself seen a charterparty or policy containing the words "at all times of the tide," though the words "so near thereto as she may safely get, and lie afloat at all times of the tide" are found in the Scotch case of Hillstrom V. Gibson (ubi sup.); but in that case the words "and always" are not found. In the present case the usual phrase "always afloat" is found, and I am asked in effect to treat the words "at all times of the tide "as surplusage, adding nothing to the meaning of the contract. This, in my opinion, I cannot do. They are not words of usual Occurrence; they are, as pointed out by Baron Channel in Bastifell v. Lloyd, essentially words put in by the shipowner, and I must give them a meaning, if possible. In the present case there is one reason which appears to me absolutely conclusive why I should not adopt the defendant's construction, which is this, the charter-party shows that the shipowner considered it quite as important that the vessel should be always afloat at the loading port as at the port of discharge. He provides for it in both places by the use of the words "always afloat," but in speaking of the port of discharge the words, "at all times of the tide are added; and the only conclusion I can come to is, that they are intentionally introduced there for the purpose of making provision for something not otherwise provided for, and in contemplation of some event possibly arising at the ship's destination not anticipated at the loading port. I do not forget Mr. Greene's argument that, as the word "Sharpness" is written in the charter-party, and the words "or as near thereto as she may [Q.B. DIV. safely get are printed, I must strike out the latter words, and read the charter-party as providing for the port of arrival being Sharpness only. If his view was sustainable, I should have to do more, for I should have also to strike out the words "at all times of the tide and always afloat," and this certainly would simplify the construction of the document; but it is sufficient to say that I cannot strike out or reject any words, but must construe the document as it stands, and must give every portion of it some signification, if possible. In my opinion, the words "at all times of the tide" were put in on purpose to make the contract different from what it would have been if they had not been inserted, in other words, to relieve the shipowner from a burden which the law would have thrown upon him in the absence of those words, viz., the risk of delay upon arrival from the state of the tides in the river to which the charterer's convenience required the ship to go. It is obvious that every day's delay must be a considerable loss to the shipowner, and this charterparty seems to me expressly designed to relieve the owner at the charterer's expense from a chance of loss, to which he was possibly awakened by the decision in Nelson v. Dahl (ubi sup.). The point which arose for decision in Hillstrom v. Gibson and Capper v. Wallace (ubi sup.), viz., whether and how far it was incumbent on the shipowner to discharge part of the cargo at King Road, and so by lightening the vessel enable her to proceed to Sharpness with the residue, does not arise here, for on the evidence I find that the plaintiff offered to adopt this course, and the defendants declined to consent to it, pointing out that it would not be of any use. It was said that a construction of the charter-party which enables the shipowner to end the voyage at a point short of Sharpness, when by a short and reasonable delay he would have been able to carry his whole cargo to that destination, is a hard and unreasonable one. But if it appears to me, as it does, the only one which gives a proper signification to the words used by the parties, I cannot reform the contract upon any such ground as suggested; and further, any argument founded upon hardship is open to this rejoinder, that it is the interest of shipowners to act reasonably towards charterers; and in the present case the plaintiff actually did more than he was bound to do, and for their accommodation, and to save them expense, did wait at King Road, and ultimately proceeded to Sharpness, and in my opinion he is only acting reasonably in claiming payment as agreed for the time so lost to him. This seems to me a far more appropriate and reasonable course for the shipowner to adopt than that which Mr. Anstie says was his only and proper one, viz., to have himself discharged the cargo at King Road at the end of the lay days, and warehoused it at Bristol, leaving the charterers to get it as they could, and then to have sued the charterers for damages from their refusal to take delivery at King Road. It was also argued by Mr. Anstie that the decisions in Schlizzi v. Derry, and Metcalfe v. The Britannia Iron Works (ubi sup.) show that the words " thereunto as she can safely get" must be construed to mean a point within the ambit of the port named as near the port itself as she can safely get. It is not for me to say after those decisions that such a construction would be adding words to the charter-party not found there, as near Q.B. Div.] REG. V. THE GUARDIANS OF THE PRESTON UNION. but to make those cases analogous at all to this present I should certainly have to add words to those charter-parties which were not found there, viz., some such words as "in all states of the river" in the first case, "and at all seasons of the year" in the second. In the present case I cannot accede to the contention so urged. If I were to read the words "to Sharpness, or as near thereunto within the ambit of that port" (or the port of Gloucester, if you will), as she could safely get at all times of the tide and always afloat," I should be reading the charter-party ut magis pereat quam valeat, for it is not suggested that any such place exists, or that the ship ought to have gone or could have gone to any port above King Road short of Sharpness itself; and, therefore, what I am asked to do is to exclude from this charter-party all the qualifying words following the word " Sharpness," and this I cannot do. I may add that, in the case of The Alhambra (44 L. T. Rep. N. S. 637; 6 P. Div. 68), the contention that the words "within the ambit of the port were to be read into a charterparty providing that a ship should go to a port, or as near thereto as she could safely get, does not seem to have occurred to the judges of the Court of Appeal, or to the experienced counsel who argued that case. I think I have noticed all the arguments addressed to me on behalf of the defendants except one founded on the case of Hayton v. Irwin (ubi sup.), and that I am obliged to pass over without comment, because, probably from my own fault, I was quite unable to follow it, or to see its application to this case. Under these circumstances there will be judgment for the plaintiff for 1057., and the costs will follow the event. Solicitors for the plaintiff, Turnbull, Tilly, and Mousir. Solicitors for the defendant, Harvey, Oliver, and Capron, for Smith and Franklin, Gloucester. Friday, March 16. (Before POLLOCK, B. and NORTH, J.) REG. on the prosecution of THE GUARDIANS OF THE GARSTANG UNION . THE GUARDIANS OF THE PRESTON UNION. (a) Poor law-Pauper lunatic-Married_woman— Removal to husband's settlement-Consent of husband-Wife certified to be a proper person to be kept in a workhouse-25 & 26 Vict. c. 111, 8. 20. J. B. resided with his wife in the Garstang Union, but had not acquired a settlement there, and it was admitted that the last legal settlement of husband and wife was in the Preston Union. In 1881 the wife became of unsound mind and chargeable to the parish, and the medical officers of the union certified under 25 & 26 Vict. c. 111, 8. 20, that she, being a pauper lunatic, was a proper person to be kept in a workhouse. On the 4th Aug. 1881 an order was made by two justices for the removal of the woman to the Preston Union, and the husband consented to the order of removal. The Court of Quarter Sessions quashed the order of removal on the ground that the wife could not be separated from her husband, and that she, (a) Reported by H. D. BONSEY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. [Q.B. DIV. as a married woman, was irremovable without her husband. Held, that the decision of the Court of Quarter Sessions was wrong, and that the order of removal must be upheld. RULE calling on the Guardians of the Preston Union to show cause why an order of sessions should not be quashed. At the Court of Quarter Sessions in and for the county of Lancaster, holden at Preston, in the said county, on the 5th Jan. 1882 an order of removal directing that Margaret Billington, a pauper, the wife of James Billington, should be removed from the Garstang to the Preston Union was quashed subject to the opinion of the Court upon the following case: CASE. 1. From Aug. 1880 to July 7 1881, the said Margaret Billington resided with her husband, James Billington, in his house at Myerscough, in the Garstang Poor Law Union, and neither husband nor wife during such time were ever at anytime chargeable to, or received relief from, any parish or union. 2. The legal settlement of the said James Billington and of his said wife, the said Margaret, in his right, is admitted to have been, on the said 7th July 1881 and the 4th August 1881, in the Preston Poor Law Union. 3. A certificate bearing date the 11th July 1881, and in the following terms, was signed by the medical officer of health for the Garstang Union : LUNATICS IN WORKHOUSES.-Certificate to be given to the medical officer of the workhouse under section 20 of the 25 & 26 Vict. c. 111. I, William Chapman, the medical officer of the Garstang Union Workhouse, do hereby certify, pursuant to the provisions of the 25 & 26 Vict. c. 111, s. 20, that in my opinion, Margaret Billington, aged forty-six years, a pauper lunatic, is a proper person to be kept in a workhouse, and that the accommodation of the Garstang Union workhouse is sufficient for her reception. 4. (Not material). 5. On the 4th of Aug. 1881 two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace for the said county of Lancaster made an order for the removal of the said Margaret alone, from the said Garstang Union to the said Preston Union. The said order was, omitting formal parts, as follows: Whereas, complaint hath been made unto us, two of Her Majesty's justices of the peace in and for the said county, by the guardians of the poor of the said Garstang Poor Law Union, that Margaret Billington (hereinafter called the pauper) has come to inhabit, and is now inhabiting, in the township of Barnacre-with-Bond, in the county of Lancaster (the same being one of the townships comprised in the said Garstang Union) not having gained a legal settlement there, nor in any other township in the said union, nor having produced any certifi cate acknowledging her to be settled elsewhere, and that she is now actually chargeable to the common fund of the said union, in respect of relief made necessary by sickness and unsoundness of mind, being such as will produce permanent disability, and that the township of Woodplumpton, in the Union of Preston (being one of the townships comprised in the said Preston Poor Law Union) is the place of her last legal settlement. We, the said justices, upon due proof thereof, do adjudge the same to be true, and that the place of the last legal settlement of the said pauper is in the said township of Woodplumpton, in the said union of Preston, and we, the said justices, do hereby further state, that we are satisfied, by the evidence aforesaid, that the said sickness and unsoundness of mind of the said Margaret Billington will produce permanent disability in the said |