' and tactics were too much for the enemy who turned and fled."*

It is a pity that after this exploit England's brigade was not pushed forward with a little more rapidity. After the unfortunate affair of the 28th of March, England had fallen back upon Quettah and had there begun vigorously to fortify his position. The General took some credit to himself for the orderly manner in which he restored and formed his camp on the evening of the 28th, but Colonel Stacy gives a different coloring to at least one part of the affair. "Our reverse," he says, "appeared to have affected the whole detachment. Never was a camp put ' down which was calculated to give greater confidence to the enemy; it was of no form or shape; her Majesty's 41st were huddled within the ruined walls of the fort of Old Bazaar, and 'the commissariat and native regiments were in no order at all. It rained heavily from 10 till past 11 P. M., when the full moon shone forth. I did not go to bed and was standing at the door of my tent, when I saw Majors Wyllie, Boyd, and Davidson passing from that of the General who had called several officers. I had not been summoned. Pointing to a string ' of camels, moving towards the godown, I asked them whether the men could have correctly understood their orders to load. Neither of the three officers (to whom I am well known, and 'whose merits are known to me) seemed inclined to reply: it appeared to be a secret. This was not a time for scruples, and I observed it was evidently in contemplation to retreat immediately, and earnestly begged them to return to the General and represent to him that to attempt a retreat at that hour, the tents charged with rain, would expose the force to confusion, disorganization, and destruction, and pledged myself if he would wait until day, I would shew him a road direct to Hyderzye. After a long conversation, the three staff, at my earnest request returned and communicated what had passed between us to the General, who adopted my recom'mendation and the camp enjoyed repose until sun-rise." On the following morning the force moved off, halted on the 30th at Kuchlag, and on the next day reached Quettah. There the General began to entrench himself. "On the 3d of April, writes Colonel Stacy, "plans of very extensive fortifications were submitted by the engineer and approved of by Major General England, and next day half the troops were employed upon

A private letter now before us says, "The sepoys especially the 8th, are spoken of in the highest terms. I am delighted to find the sepoys can do something even with Europeans; a havildar of the 8th was first into the breast-work, where the flag stood and carried it off in triumph."

them or upon out-works, their labour not being suspended even on Sunday."

On the 10th of April, General England wrote to General Nott. "I am throwing up breast-works to protect the straggling cantonments, whilst the walls of the town are also in progress f of being strengthened, and a covered way is prepared to communicate from the latter to the Commissariat godown. I am not aware if you know these localities, but I mention these particulars to enable you to judge of the number of men required to defend works of this extent." To this General Nott replied, that he knew them well, and that he could not help expressing " surprise that the authorities at Quettah should for a moment have thought of throwing up breast-works and entrenching that straggling and wretched cantonment, when the town and citadel are so well calculated for every purpose which can render a post at all desirable in Shawl." And," added the General, "I am quite certain it may be well defended by 500 "* On the 17th (it was a Sunday) General England sud

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The entire letter has such a fine Soldierly flavor about it that we cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of quoting it entire. England's letter, a portion of which we have given above, set forth, in strong terms, the dangers of a forward movement and the evil consequences of leaving Quettah without a strong garrison, "the impossibility of adopting concerted operations" and the possibility of being "obliged to retire without effecting any part of the intention of the march"-to all of which General Nott replied as follows:

--

"Candahar, 18th April, 1842.

SIR,-I have been favored with your letters of the 1st and 10th instant. I have also heard of the affair you had with the enemy on the 28th ultimo, and deeply regret the result. I have attentively perused the Government despatch of the 15th ultimo, forwarded through you. I have looked at our position in Affghanistan in every point of view that my judgment, aided by three years' experience of its people, will admit of. I now deliberately note what I consider to be necessary to carry out the intention of the Supreme Government and to assert and uphold the honour of our country. Even should the Government ultimately determine on withdrawing the British troops from the right of the Indus-it would be impossible to retire the troops below the passes before October. The Troops at Candahar are four months in arrears, and we have not one rupee in the Treasury. In the event of much Field Service we should run short of musket ammunition and we are without medicine for the sick and wounded. I think it absolutely necessary that a strong Brigade of 2,500 men should be immediately pushed from Quetta to Candahar with the supplies noted in the foregoing paragraph. I therefore have to acquaint you that I will direct a Brigade of three Regiments of Infantry, a troop of Horse Artillery, with a body of Cavalry to march from Candahar on the morning of the 25th instant. This force will certainly be at Chummun at the Northern foot of the Kojuk on the morning of the 1st May, and possibly on the 30th of this month I shall, therefore, fully rely on your marching a Brigade from Quettah so that it may reach the southern side of the Pass on the above mentioned date. I believe there can be no difficulty whatever in accomplishing this, nor of crossing the Kojuk without loss, provided the heights are properly crowned on either side, I have crossed it three times in command of troops and I know that what I now state is correct. There can be no danger in passing through Pesheen provided a careful and well ordered march is preserved and patroles and flanking parties of horse are thrown well out. The people of this country cannot withstand our troops in the open field. I am well aware that war cannot be made without loss, but yet, perhaps, the British Troops can oppose Asiatic armies without defeat; and I feel and know that British officers should never despair of punishing the atrocious and treacherous conduct of a brutal enemy. You say you not aware if I know the localities of Quettah. I know them well, and I hope I shall be excused when I express my surprise, that the authorities at Quettah should for a moment have thought of throwing up breast-works and entrenching that straggling and wretched cantonment when the town and its citadel is so well calculated for every purpose which can render a post at all desirable in Shawl, and Iam quite certain may be well defended by 500 men. Did I command at Quettah I would relinquish the cantonment-it is useless

denly struck his tent, and went into his house within the breastworks. No one knew anything of his intentions but Major Browne who had received the General's orders to move his regiment within the works; the artillery, the native infantry and the irregulars followed; and the whole force was soon comfortably located as though for a long spell of cantonment life.

General Nott's letter was received on the 23d of April. By this time all idea of an advance seems to have been abandoned. "So general," writes Colonel Stacy, "was the belief that the force would not move towards Candahar that houses had been purchased and every body had settled down as if in a cantonment." But the letter from Candahar was unanswerable, General Nott had despatched a Brigade of three infantry regiments (not two as stated by Mr. Hall,) with guns and some cavalry details to "form a junction with England's detachment. On the 26th of April, the latter marched-out of Quettah. On the 28th, as already shown, it beat the enemy on its old ground at Hykulzye-but when two or three days afterwards it entered the Kojuk pass, it found that Colonel Wymer's brigade had made better use of its time. The pass was already occupied by British troops. We give Colonel Stacy's account of this matter:

"The force moved off a little before day broke. I was delayed some time by the unsatisfactory parting with the chiefs, and afterwards went to the ground occupied by Murj Mull, to learn whether I could, if required, procure horsemen to convey a letter to Salu Khan. I then rode to the head of the column, and joined General England before the low ground and stunted trees which mark the entrance of the defile leading to the Kojuk Pass. Having been over this pass four times before, each time in command, I was intimately acquainted with every turn. I was riding with the horse artillery, when the halt sounded. I waited full half an hour, until, tired of the delay at such a moment, I went back to ascertain the cause, and met General England, with whom I was returning when at a spot near the head of the horse artillery, he dismounted, called for his chair, and sat down. I explained to him that we were entering the defile leading to the pass, and observed that the Candahar troops would rob us of our

Quettah is not a place for a large body of troops. I feel obliged to you for pointing out the many difficulties attending our position, but you are aware that it is our first and only duty to overcome difficulties when the national honour and military reputation is so deeply concerned-nothing can be accomplished without effort and perseverance. In the last para.

of yourletter of the 10th instant, I have only to observe that I have not yet contemplated falling back. Without money I can neither pay the long arrears due to the troops, nor procure carriage for field operations. I deeply regret this state of things which onght to have been attended to, months ago. Had this been done, I should now have been on my march to Ghuzni. I shall fully rely on your Brigade being at the Kojuk on the 1st May or before. This letter 1 request may be forwarded to Major Outram.

TO MAJOR GENERAL ENGLAND,

Commanding S. F. Force.

(Signed) W. NOTT, Major General.

P. S.-You will of course perceive that I intend your Brigade should join and accompany the detachment sent from this to Candahar. I have no cattle for Treasure or Stores,

520 SCENES IN A SOLDIER'S LIFE THE CANDAHAR DIVISION.

share of the credit of forcing the Kojuk if we delayed. The column was at this time well locked up. I continued to urge this for at least a quarter of an hour, and finding that the General did not think it expedient to move, I begged him to give me a havildar's party, and offered to go in advance, and ascertain whether the pass was occupied This and every other proposition I made were refused. Disappointed in the extreme, Í went to the head of the horse artillery. Major Waddington, of the Engineers, hearing the halt had returned from the head of the column, composed of Bombay native infantry, and joined General England, and, observing that the column was well up, begged him to proceed. The General still declined, and Major Waddington left. He was passing to the head of the column, when we spoke to each other, and found that our communications with the General had been of the same tenour. We agreed to proceed on, and taking twelve men from the advance, we had scarcely got half a mile before we met some of the irregular cavalry of the Candahar force, who very composedly reported all clear for us. We could only say, You will find the General a little further on.' I accompanied Major Waddington to shew the gun-road, by the water-course, and, as we walked on, we found the Kojuk crowned by parties of the 2nd, 16th, and 38th regiments of Bengal Native Infantry, part of the force sent under Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer by General Nott, from Candahar.

General England's troops were much disappointed and vexed at being kept back, yet generously expressed no jealousy at the distinction won by their comrades. These fine fellows had been led forward by Colonel Wymer at daybreak to occupy the heights commanding the pass from Chummun to the western side to secure General England's party a safe passage. I have never seen our sepoys to such advantage. It was impossible to climb the precipitous hills in pantaloons; this part of their dress had, therefore, been discarded, and the men were in their doties. As they shewed on every accessible point they were the admiration of all. I can easily imagine how painful it must have been to the Bombay regiments to find the Candahar troops in full possession of the pass before they were allowed to enter it."

On the 10th of May, the force reached Candahar—and there for the present we must leave it. We had intended to have accompanied it further, but time presses, and we are compelled to forego our intentions. It is not without a melancholy interest that we have made these quotations from Colonel Stacy's Narrative. Scarcely had the book reached India when its gallant author was removed beyond the reach alike of friendly and of adverse criticism. It may be doubted whether he lived to see it in its completed form. It is bootless now to say anything more about the "case," which forms the leading design of the work. Death has settled the question-has placed it beyond the reach of human adjudication. Honorary rewards and titular distinctions are now nothing to him. And having already, in a general way, expressed our mind upon the subject, to prosecute it any farther in our pages, would be a wholly superfluous

task.

ART. VII.-1. Post Office Reform-Its importance and practicability. By Rowland Hill. 1837.

2. The Post Circular. Nos. I to XIV. 1838.

3. Reports from the Select Committee on Postage; together with the Minutes of Evidence and Appendices. Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed. 1838.

4. Hansard's Parliamentary Reports: Debates on the Budget, July and August, 1839.

5. State and Prospects of the Penny Postage. By Rowland Hill. 1844.

6. Taxation and the Funding System. By J. R. McCulloch. 1845.

7. Post Office Returns. 1846.

8. Progress of the Nation. By G. R. Porter, 2d Edition. 1847.

9. De la Réforme de la Taxe des Lettres. [Revue de deux Mondes, 1st May, 1847.] Par Leon Faucher.

10. Reports to the hambre de Deputés, by M. M. Chegaray (1844), Vuitry (1846), and Emile de Girardin (1847). 11. Articles on Indian Postage Reform, published in 1846, 1847, and 1848, by the Friend of India, the Bengal Hurkaru, the Calcutta Englishman, the Calcutta Star, the Eastern Star, the Delhi Gazette, the Mofussilite, the Bombay Times, the Bombay Telegraph, the Madras Spectator, and the Madras Athenæum.

12. Post Office Reform M.S.S. By Lieut. Staples, Bengal Artillery.

IF on a careful and deliberate review of the great social improvements recently achieved in Europe, or now in agitation among the friends of progress, a person were asked which of them it would be alike expedient, feasible and gratifying to the general public to introduce in India, we think he would unhesitatingly answer-"Cheap and uniform postage."

The expediency of a measure which shall secure to India the blessings bestowed on Britain by Rowland Hill is suggested by the positive injustice of the present postal rates, by the startling inadequacy of the revenue accruing from them to the imperial exchequer, by the importance of the class interests which a judicious. and sufficient reform will benefit, and above all these objects of the day, by the manifest and proved stimulus that will be given