But how is it that deduction, if, in the order of evolution, it supposes induction, arrived at the purely formal stage of development before the latter? This is to be accounted for by the fact that the problems which were found approachable at the dawn of inquiry were of the kind to demand deductive rather than inductive treatment; the induction that they involved was implicit or spontaneous only, of that sort, for example, which brought forth the axioms and definitions of Euclid. Since universal propositions of the first instance, demanded as a starting point for deduction, were thus acquired, they came, because of their occult origin, to be called self-evident truths, and, in course of time, rational intuitions, à priori judgments, and various other names signifying that, as to origin, they are independent of experience, and are not derived, according to the order of evolution, from single instances. As questions involving more inductive treatment came within reach, induction of the statistical order began to be developed, giving rise in course of time to that stage which the à priori school describe as incomplete or material induction. But if the doctrine contained in this paper be correct, it follows that there is no reason for limiting universal truths to the sphere of logical and mathematical necessity, and for demanding for them any higher origin than induction. The universal truths of chemistry seem to me to be founded on precisely the same evidence as the universal truths of geometry. A Law of Nature, if proved by induction to be a necessary connexion, stands exactly on the same foundation, as to evidence, as 2+3 equals 5. Even the Laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle are, to my thinking, first, simple perceptions giving birth to conceptions; secondly, singular inductions; thirdly, universalisations flowing from the latter source.

From the brevity I have imposed upon myself, I am conscious that I have not done full justice to the doctrine here advanced; I have, however, recounted its leading features; and after pondering over these for more than a quarter of a century, I venture to think that logicians are called upon to reckon with them before they can confidently affirm what Induction is and is not. W. GEO. DAVIES.

XI-NEW BOOKS.

The Philosophy of Reflection. By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON, Hon. LL.D., Edin., Author of Time and Space, The Theory of Prac tice, &c., 2 vols. London: Longmans & Co., 1878.

312.

Pp. 441,

"The purpose of these volumes," says Mr. Hodgson in his very striking Preface, "is, first, to lay down the outlines, principles, and method of a system of Metaphysic, basing it upon known facts of consciousness; next, to show that this system necessitates the conception of a Constructive Branch of philosophy, dealing with phenomena which are but very partially accessible to us; and lastly, to combine these two branches (the latter given in merest outline) into a single

System of Philosophy". The present work, following upon its two predecessors, completes for the author a cycle of thought, and he declares, as the result of his whole speculative effort, that "we are at last in possession of a metaphysical system which will not have to be reversed, however much it may in the future be enlarged and differentiated". By Metaphysic or Metaphysical Philosophy he means "that analytic branch of knowledge to which Physic leads, and which in order of study comes after physical knowledge; but while allowing, and even claiming for, it the character of a doctrine of Existence, he means existence that is relative and phenomenal, and thus distinguishes metaphysic from all that has been understood (since Aristotle) under the name of Ontology. The principle he claims to "have established beyond the possibility of reversal is that of Reflection". "Reflection is the foundation of metaphysic, because, being the moment of distinguishing the objective and subjective aspects of phenomena, it gives us our notion of existence as well as cognition, and that in the largest sense of the term existence, so that we cannot speak or even frame a notion of anything beyond it." Also, by his distinction of Nature and History (expounded in MIND, Nos. I.-III., as in the present work), he claims to have drawn a firm line between Science and Philosophy without sacrificing the necessary independence of either; while, in the sketch he attempts of the Constructive Branch of Philosophy, he shows why the ontological questions are not soluble in their old shape, and also in what shape they are conceivably soluble. After otherwise presenting the principal features of his system, Mr. Hodgson, in his Preface (to which attention is now confined), goes on to speak of the sources of his Philosophy. He set himself in these days, after Hegel and Schopenhauer, to carry farther the critical strain in Kant's speculations in the manner (as he has since discovered and heartily acknowledges) adopted already in Kant's later years by the Jew Salomon Maimon. The philosophical inspiration came upon him, however, from Coleridge. From Coleridge he has learnt "everything" -notably, the two principles of reflection and of distinction of inseparables, but, most of all, "the intimate union between the intellectual and the emotional elements in human nature". With Coleridge he would maintain that "the emotions, and among them the religious emotions, are as deeply inwoven in the structure and mechanism of consciousness as any feature of sense or reason," carrying us down "into the heart of things, the hidden springs of Being, the inmost nature of the Existent ". And, in fine, it seems to him that the two questions of supreme practical importance, in relation to philosophy, at the present time are these :-(1) "Have we or have we not valid reasons for conceiving of ourselves and the actual world in which we live as surrounded by an unseen, but in its nature phenomenal, world, of which ours is the seen part and with which it has real but unseen relations?" (2) "Can we treat that unseen world, simply because it is unseen, as if it were not existent ?" His affirmative answer to the first is implied in the putting of the second question, and to this his answer, closing a remarkable utterance, in a most impressive No.

On the Theory of Logic: An Essay. By CARVETH READ. London: Kegan Paul, 1878. Pp. 258.

The readers of MIND had a foretaste of this Essay in No. VI., and later on it will receive the critical notice which its importance deserves. It is a fruit of the studies made by the author three or four years ago, when holding a travelling scholarship from the Hibbert Trust The Elements of Inductive Logic, designed mainly for the use of Students in the Universities. By THOMAS FOWLER, M.A., Professor of Logic in the University of Oxford. Third Edition, corrected and revised. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1876. Pp. xxviii., 360.

This new Edition of Prof. Fowler's well-known and useful Manual (appearing only now, though dated 1876), is prefaced by some pointed observations on the "inconsistencies and paradoxes" into which Professor Jevons has fallen in his Principles of Science, when treating of the validity of inductive inferences, of the relation of Induction to Deduction, &c. Various alterations and additions have been made throughout the work, rendering it still more effective than hitherto for students' purposes.

BACON'S Novum Organum, Edited with Introductions, Notes, &c., by THOMAS FOWLER, M.A., Prof. of Logic in the University of Oxford. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1878. Pp. 619.

A very elaborately annotated edition, replacing the older Clarendon Press edition by Mr Kitchin. The Notes and Introduction together are intended as "a commentary which, besides explaining the difficulties of the work (by no means few or small), should also present Bacon in his relations to the History of Philosophy, Logic, and Science". Prof. Fowler has put into the seventeen distinct sections of his Introduction (amounting in all to 151 pp.) the results of much inquiry, which it may be possible on another occasion to appreciate with due care.

A Candid Examination of Theism. By PHYSICUS. (Vol. IX. of the English and Foreign Philosophical Library.) London: Trübner & Co., 1878. Pp. 197.

An essay of marked ability, that does not belie its title. It examines in six chapters-(1) various Illogical arguments in favour of Theism, (2) the argument from the existence of the Human Mind, (3) the argument from Design, (4) the argument from General Laws, (5) the logical standing of the question of the being of a God, (6) the argument from Metaphysical Teleology; and in a final chapter sums up to a conclusion mainly negative. The essay was written several years ago, before the publication of Mill's posthumous treatise. An Appendix, expository of a fallacy in Locke's use of the argument against the possibility of matter thinking on the ground of its being inconceivable that it should, is followed by four supplementary essays: (1) examining Mr Spencer's Theistical argument with reference to Mr Fiske's

"Cosmic Theism " built upon it; (2) examining Prof. Flint's Theism ; (3) on the speculative standing of Materialism; (4) on the Final Mystery of Things.

Insanity in Ancient and Modern Life, with chapters on its Prevention. BY DANIEL HACK TUKE, M.D. London: Macmillan & Co., 1878. Pp. 226.

The author deals in Part I. with the Prevalence of the Causes of Insanity among the Nations of Antiquity,' and enumerating as general causes-intoxication, defective nourishment, inter-marriage, emotional disturbance, and intellectual strain, finds evidence that, if not largely active in primitive races, they became distinctly so among such cultured peoples as Egyptians, Jews, Greeks, and Romans. In Part II., treating. of Insanity in relation to Modern Life,' he finds, after making every possible deduction, "that there is reason to fear some real increase of occurring insanity" in this country. In Part III. he gives practical advice with a view to 'Self-prevention of Insanity'.

"in

The Final Philosophy, or, System of Perfectible Knowledge issuing from the Harmony of Science and Religion. By CHARLES WOODRUFF SHIELDS, D.D., Professor in Princeton College (New Jersey, U.S.). London: Trübner & Co., 1878. Pp. 609.

The scope of this large treatise will be understood from the following Table of Contents:

"Introduction-The academic study of Christian Science. Part I. The philosophical parties as to the relations between Science and Religion— Early conflicts between them, or the historical causes of their present disturbed relations-Modern Antagonism between them, or the battle of Infidels and Apologists in each of the sciences, in philosophy, and in civilisation-Modern Indifferentism between them, or the truces of Sciolists and Dogmatists in the sciences, &c.-Modern Eclecticism between them, or the exploits of Religious Eclectics in the sciences, &c.-Modern Scepticism between them, or the surrender of Religious Sceptics in the sciences, &c. Part II. The philosophical theory of the Harmony of Science and Religion-The Umpirage of Philosophy between Science and Religion -The Positive Philosophy, or theory of Science as ignoring RevelationThe Absolute Philosophy, or theory of Omniscience as superseding Revelation-The Final Philosophy, or Theory of Perfectible Science as concurring with Revelation-Philosophia Ultima: project of the perfected Sciences and Arts."

Live Questions in Psychology and Metaphysics. By Prof. W. D. WILSON. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1877. Pp. 164. Six lectures, selected from the author's Courses on Psychology and Metaphysics with History of Philosophy, as delivered to his classes in Cornell University. The first three are psychological, and treat of Sensation, Consciousness, Volition; the special aim of the author being to sift the various explanations that have been given of these fundamental facts, in the hope of clearing them of some confusion and error. Thus in regard to Sensation he remarks on the absence of any clear definition of its meaning, whether as referring to

an act fundamentally distinct from perception, or as implying that along with the latter it goes to make up one complex act. He himself proposes to limit the signification of the term to "any state of either of the two lower nerve-centres, which has been recently produced". Perception, on the other hand, is an act of the mind, consequent on a sensation reaching the hemispheres of the brain. So in regard to Consciousness he observes that several different and conflicting interpretations have been given to the term, and then proceeds to argue that consciousness is not essential to sensation, either as an element or as a sign. The last three lectures are devoted to the consideration and proposed solution of the three great questions in Metaphysics— the Nature and Origin of Knowledge, the Ground and Extent of Certainty or Absolute Truth, and the Nature and Limits of Real Causes. L'Imagination. Etude psychologique. Par HENRI JOLY, Professeur à la Faculté des Lettres de Dijon. Paris: Hachette, 1877. Pp. 264. M. Joly's work, written with delightful facility of style and with fine pyschological insight, contains a very thorough study of the various forms of Imagination in health and disease. Opening with a chapter on the relation between Sensations and the Images formed from them, M. Joly puts forward as explanation of the production of images the general law that each organ struggles to live its own life, to develop and maintain itself, and to continue its normal activity even under unfavourable circumstances. Thus the organs which under external stimulus are concerned in the production of sensations tend in the absence of these conditions to resume the mode of action to which they have become accustomed. The various forms of Imagination are then traced under three heads: (1) Where the images mingle with our ordinary intelligent life without disturbing it or suspending its normal activity (Imagination in health); (2) Where the image does not put an end to the activity of sense or reason, but so interferes with them that their normal order is reversed (Hallucinations, Madness); (3) When the image is so powerful that it veritably suspends in whole or part the exercise of the other mental functions, even of the senses; our mental life is replaced by a secondary mode of existence, dominated throughout by some fixed image or idea (Somnambulism, Ecstasy). These three forms are then treated with considerable detail. Beginning with Somnambulism, M. Joly points out how the remarkable phenomena of intensified sensibility, manifested even in the absence of the normal conditions of experience, may be explained by the action of the image which is dominating the mental life of the somnambulist. The receptivity to impressions in such circumstances is determined to one definite direction, that which harmonises with the ruling idea. Numerous illustrations of this principle are given, and the facts of induced somnambulism or magnetic sleep are brought forward in support of it. In the following chapter (iv.) the author lays down as the conditions of Hallucination, cerebral excitement, suspension of external impressions, and the involuntary exercise of memory and imagination. He