Many a gloomy and melancholy mind, which would otherwise have passed its life in darkness and doubt, has been made light and happy, and fitted to inspire others with cheerfulness, by the associations which it enjoyed. Here all receive an energy into their social nature-a light which brightens their path in life and makes them men of heart, as well as men of intellect.

W. H. W.

Winter.

"TWAS winter first with frosty finger
Tipped the forest leaf with red,

And where the em'rald fain would linger,
Left a crimson stain instead.

But soon, alas! the bloom had faded,
And envious winds came whistling by,
To rob me of what erst had shaded
My summer bower right pleasantly.

Ere Winter came, the light of morning
Roused the robins from their nest;
And vieing each in friendly warning,
Vain to me were longer rest.
But now, alas! 'twere vain to listen-
The warblers wing their weary way,

Where flowers are glad, and dew-drops glisten,
When sunlight smiles at dawn of day.

The tiny brook, whose waves seemed twinkling
With mischief as they danced along,
The violets with its spray besprinkling
That dared to list its prattling song-
Amid, alas! that song entrancing,
Felt stern Winter's stiffning breath,
To lay aside its mirth and dancing
Within the chill embrace of death.

Speak not then of Winter's glory,
Nor her snowy spangled wreath-
Mournful is the sadd'ning story;
Forms once loved lie dead beneath.

W. R. F.

Conversation; a P. S. Cxegetical.

ONE of the truest of those sayings of genius which condense whole volumes into a single line, is that expression of Goethe, "When we begin to speak, we begin to err," disclosing by a single stroke the vast difference between thought and expression. Through this fog of words our ideas contract, expand, and waver, nor do any two eyes see them exactly alike. The truth of this impressed me with peculiar force a few days ago, on reading an article in the Lit. entitled "Conversation Again," containing strictures on one in the previous number, nearly all of which sprang from a misunderstanding—which I have too high a respect for the writer to believe intentional-of the meanings of words therein used, though after careful thought I can find none better. A due respect for my own character, and a certain paternal affection, must be my excuse to our subscribers (whom Allah increase and multiply) for occupying a few pages of this number in explaining what I meant, which will, I hope, be in itself a sufficient refutation of the charges preferred. One by one, and in all fairness, I will attempt to examine the status controversiæ, as I understand them.

First and foremost, my critic objects that instruction, though an "excellence, is not an essential " in good conversation; he even goes so far as to assert, "The highest style of discourse may be carried on, and neither party impart or receive information." If by information he means instruction-and the distinction is worth remarking-I at once and completely deny the allegation. In refuting it, I might bring up Sydney Smith, who was certainly capable of this "highest style," whatever it is, yet who states that he never talked to a man five minutes without learning something; I might adduce and examine the long talks of Wilhelm Humboldt, Goethe and Schiller, in the house of the latter in Jena, and quote from the biography of each the recognitions of the instruction that each received; but no; I will meet the critic on his own ground, I will take the "ideal of conversation" that he himself gives, and what is its very climax ? "When the wealth of each nature and each experience is poured out to enrich the character and ennoble the life of the other." Now if this means anything else but teaching the understanding of another what it did not previously know or appreciate, I can make no sense out of it; and if this is anything more or less than instruction, Noah Webster is at fault. If I mistake here, I should be extremely happy to learn an example of that highest

or any high style of conversation, wherein instruction is neither imparted nor received.

Next, I am told that he who says analysis of character is the end of Conversation "is grossly mistaken," (en passant, "grossly mistakes" is the more correct English;) indeed, that the proposition refutes itself. But let me ask what the word end, in this sense, means? Evidently two things. Objects, ends in view, are either immediate or remote, yet ever coetaneous, at least, should be. To illustrate; a boy does a sum, his immediate end being to gain a correct solution, but the remote, though ever-present and far more important end is to acquire mental power, intellectual ability. The distinction is obvious, and almost, by this very example, I illustrated it in my article, likening the victories and defeats in conversation to the figures of a problem, the analysis of character, the never perfectly attained, underlying result. To make it still clearer, I called this analysis the foundation of rational talk, upon which it is built, beyond which it cannot go, on which it relies for its strength. Every one, I argued, should seek to extend this foundation, to work at this unending problem, and while his immediate ends be what they may, ever to keep in view the strengthening and augmenting of this essential and fundamental one. Without fear and without hesitation, I leave to the judgment of every candid reader whether I "am grossly mistaken" in this or not.

"Having by these means studied your man, you have wherewith to mould him to your purpose.' Indeed! Mould him to your purpose'!!! Is this recommended as an honorable, legitimate use of conversation?" Yes, O most sapient critic, it undoubtedly and undeniably is, but very bitter words, my friend, more bitter than he would like to hear, or I to write, might justly be said of that man who seems incapable of imagining any purpose but a dishonorable and illegitimate one. Such a man would see obscenity in pure white marble. This passage is attacked from one of three reasons; either he means that conversation should have no purpose, which no sensible man would assert, or that no purpose is praiseworthy, which is absurd, or that I intended no praiseworthy purpose, in which case he most unjustly and unwarrantably calumniates my motives. By judicious discourse to soothe the dying moments of suffering humanity, to foster and cherish the germs of neglected merit, to snatch an erring brother from the path of sin, or in any way to soften and better the hard lot of the sons of men, are purposes which I recognize as fully, and credit to others more willingly, than he does, and I, in turn, ask of any right-minded man, is it not legitimate, is it not honorable, to mould men to these or any honest purposes?

In passing, I will explain the signification of "weak." It means assailable, not wicked, as the critic seems perversely to believe. I said, attack the weak points of a man's character, and thought it would recommend itself to the common sense of everybody that it would be as absurd to commence an attack on a man's fixed prejudices, as it would be for a general to plant batteries against the most impregnable part of an enemy's fortress.

Having laid down a few general principles, I found it necessary to confine my subject, so casting about for one of the most efficient aids in influencing men, I stated it to be flattery. This horrifies my critic. Not but that it is perfectly true; even he does not deny that; but, as in the fable of the monkeys and the traveler, the truth is so hateful. Of course he begins by taking the very worst and narrowest definition of flattery, and that only. If he had consulted Mr. Webster's Dictionary, he would have found that flattery is not confined to adulation, but includes "just commendation that gratifies self-love;" the exact definition which was present to my mind, and which I would have given had I not thought it superfluous, was that of a celebrated French writer"the saying such things as are capable of pleasing others," (" choses les plus flatteuses, c'est-à-dire, celles qui sont les plus capables de plaire aux autres," Maximes de la Rochefoucauld, Max. C, variante.) Now, if a man chooses to lie and deceive in flattery, just as logic may make a sophist, rhetoric a demagogue, he becomes a sycophant, but the assertion that all flattery is inconsistent with "moral obligation and hightoned honor," is contradicted by the signification of the term itself, and could only be advanced by a person ignorant of the real meanings of the words he employed.

We next come to direct collision on a point of fact, the nature of women; I maintaining that they are more accessible to direct flattery than men, he denying it. I am consigned to the righteous indignation of the sex. Terror overpowers me; with fear and trembling I search the why and wherefore I made that unfortunate assertion, and am almost induced to recant, for I find only three reasons, and two of them are hardly worth a floccus ;-because the shrewdest analysts of human nature had said so before me; because my own limited experience had confirmed their judgment; and because I had found it to be the general opinion of men with whom I had talked. That the first is not mere assertion, let me refer the reader to La Bruyère's Chapter on Women, La Rochefoucauld's Maxims, the 163d, 183d, but especially the 161st Letter of Lord Chesterfield, various plays of Fielding, and all the

works of Thackeray, particularly his Modern Wives. Now if I err, it is in such company, and I do not know where you will get greater names to convince me of it; but if it is truth, I care not a straw whom it casts a slur upon, or whom it insults, but am prepared to assert and maintain it, and am perfectly willing to be left "to their disposal," as every honest man ought to be. That noble and brilliant exceptions may be pointed out, I most cheerfully admit, for this is a rule, not a law of human nature, as the very notice we take of the exceptions prove its general applicability, and I am only astonished that such a common-place remark should find a denier at this late day.

Concerning various insinuations connected with the names of lago, Uriah Heep & Co., I have nothing more to say, than that he who rejects a science because bad men have employed it to wicked purposes, indicates something very like narrowness of mind, and bigotry of judg ment, anything but recommendatory to a candid and unprejudiced intellect.

The other aids to a skillful conversationist, as truth, good-nature, courtesy and good sense, mentioned by my critic, I am far from ignoring, but had space permitted, would have been glad to speak of the relative advantages of these and many other qualities, but I preferred to treat of one thing somewhat thoroughly than many superficially.

Before closing, I wish to warn my readers, distinctly and clearly, that I laid down no precepts, attempted no portrayal of an “ideal conversation, when two noble characters, two great souls, pure and beautiful, meet in full freedom and sympathy," for neither I nor they will ever have occasion for them. I had no such object in view. I only proposed to hint at a few of those rules by which we may study men, influence them, pass our time agreeably and profitably, and fit ourselves for gaining a commanding and useful position. If they think them founded in practical common sense and reality, it is all I ask; if, on the other hand, they consider it more efficacious to use a transcendental, a spirituo-harmonical, or any other style, pray do so, for

"Who shall decide where doctors disagree,

And soundest casuists doubt, like you and me ?"

D. G. B.