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$ 89. circumstances that might have led a man to suspect that.

It is necessary to show that the person who gave value for
the bill, whether the value given be great or small, was
affected with the notice that there was something wrong
about it when he took it. It is not necessary that he
should have notice of what the particular wrong was.
Evidence of carelessness or blindness may be good evidence
upon the real question, which is, whether he did know
that there was something wrong in it. If he was honestly
blundering and careless, and so took a bill or note when
he ought not to have taken it, still he would be entitled to
recover. But if the facts and circumstances are such that
the jury, or whoever has to try the question, comes to the
conclusion that he was not honestly blundering and care-
less, but that he must have had a suspicion that there was
something wrong, and that he refrained on this account
from asking questions or making further inquiry-I think
that is dishonesty.

In re Gomersall, 1 Ch. D. at p. 146 (1875), it is said negligence that “negligence or carelessness on the part of the holder

of a bill, is not of itself sufficient to deprive him of his
remedies for procuring its payment. But negligence or
carelessness, when considered in connection with the sur-
rounding circumstances, may be evidence of mala fides."
In Swan v. North British Australasian Co., 2 H. & C. 184
(1863), Byles, J., says: “The negligence of the holder
makes no difference in his title. However gross the bold-
er's negligence, if it stop short of fraud, he has a title."
The same rule was laid down in Goodman v. Harvey, 4
A. & E. at p. 876 (1836), going somewhat farther in this
direction than Crook v. Jadis, 5 B. & Ad. 909 (1834), which
was a partial departure from the rule laid down in Gill v.
Cubitt, 3 B. & C. 466 (1824), when the jury was told that
the question was, whether the holder of the bill took it
under circumstances that ought to have excited the suspi-

Bad faith more than

cion of a prudent and careful man. This last case was $ 89. disapproved of in Bank of Bengal v. McLeod, 5 Moore's Indian Appeals 1 (1849), and Raphael v. Bank of England, 17 C. B. 161 (1855); and in London and County Bank v. Groome, 8 Q. B. D. 288 (1881), it was held to have been overruled. The old rule in England was similar to that laid down in the recent cases and adopted by the Act.

Some American authorities followed Gill v. Cubitt, but the contrary doctrine has been firmly established there. See Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 110 (1861); Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. (11 Otto) 564 (1879); Swift v. Smith, 102 U. S. (12 Otto) 444 (1880); Shreeves v. Allen, 79 Ill. 553 (1875); Jolinson v. Way, 27 Ohio St. 374 (1875); Mabie v. Johnson, 6 Hup. (N. Y.) 309 (1876); Stimson v. Whitney, 130 Mass. 591 (1881); Daniel, SS 775, 1503.

This rule has been generally recognized in Canada, although there are expressions in certain cases that are not quite consistent with it.

90. Where, by this Act, any instrument or Signature. writing is required to be signed by any person,

it is not necessary that he should sign it with his own hand, but it is sufficient if his signature is written thereon by some other person by or under his authority: Imp. Act, s. 90 (1).

As to what is a writing or signature within the meaning of the Act, see ante pp. 36, 39.

As to a signature by procuration, see section 25 and the notes and illustrations thereunder.

The person whose name is signed, is sometimes held liable on the ground of having authorized it before it was signed, sometimes on account of having ratified it, and frequently on the ground of estoppel.

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1. In an action against B. and S., a firm of solicitors, on promissory notes indorsed by B. in the name of the firm, it was proved that on other occasions S. had indorsed in the same manner with B.'s knowledge. Held, sufficient evidence to go to the jury of a mutual authority: Workman v. McKinstry, 21 U. C. Q. B. 623 (1862).

2. Where one executor was authorized by the others to manage the estate, and signed notes in the names of all executors, but was given no authority to bind them personally, and they were not aware of the giving of the notes, held that the others were not liable on the notes : Gore Bank v. Meredith, 26 U. C. Q. B. 237 (1866).

3. Where a person, whose name had been signed as indorser for notes by a friend, gave a mortgage to secure the indebtedness and renewals “similarly indorsed," and allowed the maker to sign his name to the mortgage so that it would be in the same handwriting, the indorser was held liable for the indorsements although they were for a much larger sum than he was aware of: Merchants’ Bank v. Bostwick, 3 Ont. A. R. 24 (1878).

4. A bank manager is not acting without the scope of his authority in accepting the cheque of a customer to deliver to another customer on a particular day, or on the happening of a specified event: Grieve v. Molsons Bank, 8 0. R. 162 (1885).

5. The power to draw bills is not of itself sufficient to establish the right to indorse in the name of the principal: Prescott v. Flinn, 9 Bing. at p. 22 (1832).

6. Where a wife had authority to indorse bills for her husband, and the name was written by her daughter in her presence and at her request, held, sufficiently authorized : Lord v. Hall, 8 C. B. 627 (1819).

7. The payee of a note transfers it for value without indors- $ 90. ing it. The transferee is not authorized to indorse it in his name: Harrop v. Fisher, 10 C. B. N. S. 196 (1861).

8. The right of a solicitor to sign his firm's name to a cheque, does not authorize him to issue post-dated cheques which are in effect equivalent to bills payable after date: Forster v. Vackreth, L. R. 2 Ex. 163 (1867).

9. If another person sign the name of the party in his presence and at his request, it is the same as if he did it himself: Sager v. Tupper, 42 Mich. 605 (1880).

10. Verbal authority to execute or indorse a bill is sufficient, and it is not essential that the agent add his own name or initials: Mechanics' Bank v. Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 326 (1820); First Nat. Bank v. Loyhed, 28 Minn. 398 (1881); Bettis v. Bristol, 56 Iowa, 41 (1881).

2. In the case of a corporation, where, by this as to cor

. Act, any instrument or writing is required to be signed, it is sufficient if the instrument or writing is duly sealed with the corporate seal; but nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring the bill or note of a corporation to be under seal. Imp. Act, s. 91 (2).

As to the powers of Foreign, Dominion and Provincial corporations with regard to bills and notes, see the notes and illustrations ante pp. 131-136.

Before the Act it was doubted whether an instrument in the form of a note, but under the seal of a company, was a negotiable note : Merritt v. Maxwell, 14 U. C. Q. B. 50 (1856); Merchants' Bank v. U. E. Club, 44 ibid. 468 (1879); Crouch v. Credit Foncier, L. R. 8 Q. B. at p. 382 (1876); Clark v. Farmers' Mnfg. Co. 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 256 (1836); Merritt v. Cole, 9 Hun (N. Y.) 98 (1876).

$ 90.

A municipal corporation in Ontario may be liable on a promissory note under seal or without a seal: Armstrong v. Garafraxa, 44 U. C. Q. B. 515 (1879).

An instrument in the form of a note signed and sealed is not a promissory note: Wilson v. Gates, 16 U. C. Q. B. 278 (1858); Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. 239 (1810); Raw. son v. Davidson, 49 Mich. 607 (1883); Brown v. Jordhal, 32 Minn. 135 (1884).

Computation of time.

91. Where, by this Act, the time limited for doing any act or thing is less than three days, in reckoning time, non-business days are excluded : “non-business days,” for the purposes of this Act, mean the days mentioned in the fourteenth section of this Act; any other day is a business day. Imp. Act, s. 92.

The Imperial Act names the holidays; the list in Canada being so much longer and varying with the provinces, it was more convenient to embody them by reference.

Some of the short delays in the Act are:—the drawer has two days to decide whether he will accept a bill : section 42; notice of dishonor must be given the next following business day: section 49 (k), and s-s. 4; and presentment to the acceptor for honor should be on the day following maturity: section 66, S-s. 2.

When noting is

92. For the purposes of this Act, where a bill equivalent or note is required to be protested within a speci

fied time or before some further proceeding is taken, it is sufficient that the bill or note has been noted for protest before the expiration of the specified time or the taking of the proceeding; and the

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