tially necessary to preserve the body in health. We forebore complaint, endured every privation, presuming the commanding officer had sufficient reasons for his conduct, and concluding it was pro bono publico. The scene has past and time sufficient has elapsed to have discovered those reasons, had they existed: none have been found; on the contrary, circumstances have demonstrated that it was a useless and unnecessary sacrifice of both public and private property. The army remained at Chateaugy twenty six days, and on the 21st October commenced an excursion into the enemy's country. The first brigade followed the course of the Chateaugy river to Spears, the distance of 18 miles and upwards and there met the second brigade, which had taken a nearer and more convenient route. The march was very fatiguing, equalled only by another that soon followed. Credit is due to both officers and soldiers for their orderly conduct, patience, and perseverance, in surmounting the incredible obstacles the enemy threw in their way. On the 25th a difficult and very fatiguing expedition was planned, and the execution of it assigned to the first brigade, which had been for some time previous and still remained under my command. The design was to cut off the retreat of a body of the enemy, supposed to be encamped on the banks of the Chateaugy, six miles distance. With this intention the first brigade was or dered to cross the river at night, march silently down and recross at a ford two miles below the enemy and attack them in rear, giving a preconcerted signal, while the second brigade moved down the road in front. We commenced the march at sun-down, and by sun-rise the next morning had gained only six miles. Here we were discovered by the enemy and fired on from the opposite side of the river. During that night we were repeatedly misled by the guides who knew nothing of the country, having never been that way, and at the time we were attacked, they had led us into a thick cedar growth or swamp on the banks of the river and immediately opposite the enemy's position, and knew not how to extricate us. Incredible as it may appear, general Hampton entrusted nearly one half of his army, and those his best troops, to the guidance of men, each of whom repeatedly assured him that they were not acquainted with the country, and were not competent to direct such an expedition. At the same time general Hampton told me he had a man by the name of Smith, who had a perfect knowledge of the country, and whom he promised to send me, but which he neglected to do. The defeat of the expedition was the con sequence of this neglect of the major-general. About two o'clock, while receiving an order from colonel King, adjutantgeneral, upon the opposite side of the river, to march back four miles and then ford the river and join the 2d brigade, the enemy made a furious attack on the column by a great discharge of musketry, accompanied by the yells of the savages. Unfortunately, the word "retreat," was heard, which, for a short time spread confusion among the several corps. A sufficient number, however, remained firm, and the enemy was soon compelled to retire. Towards sun-down I sent general Hampton a request that a regiment might be ordered down to cover my landing on the opposite side of the river; but judge my surprise, on receiving intelligence that he had retreated with the second brigade nearly three miles. Thus was I deserted without the smallest guard to cover my landing. To what cause shall it be attributed, that the general ordered a retreat, and that too at the moment when the presence of the second brigade was required or could be useful, as soon afterwards he declared "he should be willing to compound with the first brigade for 500 men." The wounded had previously been conveyed across on rafts, which made a removal of my brigade to that side absolutely necessary for their protection. An attempt was accordingly made, and a floating bridge soon constructed of old logs found on the margin of the river. The enemy discovering our disposition, commenced a firing from the opposite side, and killed several while crossing. Major Snelling, with about 100 men effected a landing, and joined the main body. The remainder of my force, exhausted by the excessive exertions of the preceding night, and weary with the fatigues of the day, not having had a moment either for rest or refreshment, were compelled to endure the privation of sleep another night. We retired two or three miles and took a position. At about 12 o'clock the enemy came up and made an attack upon us, but were soon routed. The men at this time were formed and lying on the ground they were to occupy in case of an attack, and were ordered to and did immediately rise, seize their arms, and remained under them the residue of the night. An excessively heavy rain prevented the firing both of the enemy and ourselves, except occasionally a single gun from the former. Our troops were ordered not to fire, but in case of a repetition of attack to charge bayonets; this was accordingly done. The enemy charged several times, and as often were put to flight. It is observable in this place, that so greatly were the men over powered by fatigue, though in a situation every way dangerous, and in which they had every reason to believe they should be sallied upon by the enemy every moment, many were unable to conquer their disposition to sleep, and it was not in the power of the officers to keep them awake. It was on the morning of this last attack, that the general expressed his apprehensions for the first brigade, and made the declaration above quoted. The next morning we crossed the river and joined general Hampton; on the 28th the army retreated four miles, and on the 30th and 31st marched back to Chateaugy. The troops at the times of the attack were not in a situation to endure further fatigue; and it is an indubitable fact, that many of them were so debilitated they were unable to proceed with the brigade on its march from the place of its last attack, and actually did not reach the main body until the day after the brigade had joined it, and some not even until the army had reached the Four Corners of Chateaugy. Never to my knowledge, during our march into Canada, and while we remained at the Four Corners, a term of twenty-six days, did general Hampton ever send off a scouting or reconnoitring party (except in one or two cases at Spear's in Canada, when he detached a few dragoons for this duty) nor did he, from the time we commenced our march from Cumberland-head to our arrival at Plattsburg, ever order a front, flank, or rear guard to be kept up, though a great part of the time we were in situations which evidently required it. True it is, these guards were occasionally sent out, not, however, by his order, but by the orders of the officers commanding brigades. By a general order, dated Chateaugy, November 5, the general says he has paid the first attention to the sick, and has granted them indulgences which created murmurings on the part of some officers at their posts. It is only necessary here to observe, that every officer of the army can testify that the sick were very much neglected as far as regards comfortable quarters and transportation, and that they were strewed along the roads through which we marched without care or attendance; and it is presumable that many have died in consequence of this who might have been saved to themselves if not to the service. The general, indeed, at the time this order was issued, which was after our return to the Four Corners, did order transportation for the sick to Burlington, but this is the only instance to my knowledge. The commissary's department is worthy of notice. My order for provision was not sufficient: nor could I obtain any but by special license of general Hampton. The commissary of issues has been constantly in the habit of selling the livers, &c. of beeves to officers; and though I represented this to general Hampton as unusual and improper, he refused to take any other notice of it than saying, "the commissary is accountable for all parts of the beef, even to a pound or ounce of tallow;" nor did he take any notice of another piece of misconduct of the commissary, that of acting in the capacity of sutler, but sanctioned it by purchasing of him. The common practices with general Hampton, of arresting officers and releasing them without their consent; of releasing arrested officers without the knowledge or consent of the officers by whom they were arrested (the case of lieutenant Morris, of the 33d regiment, who was arrested by me on the charge of cowardice and misconduct before the enemy on the 26th October, 1813, the time of the skirmish with the enemy at Ormstown, or Chateaugy river, being an instance); of refusing to arrest officers whom I reported to him as having deserted their posts in time of action; of daily issuing orders and countermanding them; and of interfering in an improper manner with the subordinate commands of the army, as a reference to the orders issued by him will show, mark very strongly the capriciousness of his conduct and the total want of steadiness in his intentions. Such has been the general's conduct on some occasions, that I have, in common with other officers, been induced to believe that he was under the influence of a too free use of spirituous liquors. I must, in justice to general Hampton say, that the expedition he planned, and which I have called "difficult and fatiguing," did, at the time it was suggested to me, by him,meet my full approbation, and that I have since seen no reason for changing my opinion of its practicability or usefulness; but I must also say that it required competent guides; and these (as I said before) he promised to furnish me, but did not. I am of opinion no officer that has served under majorgeneral Hampton, on the late campaign, can or will contradict this statement. (Signed) A true copy. ROBERT PURDY, R. H. M'PHERSON, Extract of a Letter from the Secretary of War to MajorGeneral Wilkinson. Albany, Nov. 18, 1813. "My last advices from you are of the 3d instant. Report says that the garrisons of Kingston and Prescott have found means to overtake your rear, to bring it to action, to handle it roughly, and to compel it to retreat to the main body. To this I give no credit: "1st, Because moving with the celerity necessary to your objects, it is highly improbable that they could, by any exertion, have been able to overtake you; and "2d, Because it is quite incredible, that finding in your rear, a heavy corps capable of disturbing the main action of the campaign, you should not have taken effectual measures to beat and destroy it. If 1600 men were not sufficient for this purpose, 6000 were so; and the garrisons of Kingston and Prescott destroyed (though we failed of getting to Montreal), the upper province was won." Extracts of a Letter from Major-General Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, dated French Mills, Nov. 24, 1813. "I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 15th instant from Albany, and hope my despatches have reached you which left this on the 17th. "With respect to the unfortunate issue of the campaign, I disclaim the shadow of blame, because I know I have done my duty, and more than my duty, and so do those with whom I have acted. To general Hampton's outrage of every principle of subordination and discipline may be ascribed the failure of the expedition, and that I have not yet arrested him must be attributed to my respect for you, and my desire that the arrest should proceed from the highest authority; for if this act be suffered to pass unnoticed and unpunished it will establish a precedent to justify disobedience and subvert those obligations of blind obedience on which the efficiency of military institutions exclusively depend. "After our losses by deaths, desertions, and discharges since we left Sackett's Harbour, I think we shall not be able to show you more than 6000 men at this point, exclusive of the dragoons who have been ordered to Greenbush and Pittsfield for convenience and economy." Sir, War Department, November 25, 1813. It is recommended to you to consolidate your infantry and |