was fit to go to sea. This waiting-time was demoralising to all concerned, and it does Mends immense credit that after this tedious delay the ship not only held her own with others in the Mediterranean, but speedily excelled them in all duties or exercises, thus becoming crack ship in the Mediter

ranean.

In the end of 1852, being forty years of age, Mends attained the rank of post-captain. He had worked his way up in the service by diligence, smartness, and resource as a seaman and organiser; and now a new force was making its way in the navy which bade fair to sweep away masts, sails, and seamen together. The old type of seaman was naturally bitterly opposed to steam and all its accessories. But Mends was of another stamp. He saw the advantages which steam would bring with it, and decided not only to accept the inevitable, but to keep abreast of, if not actually ahead of, the times, and accordingly utilised another inevitable spell of half-pay for the study of marine engineering at Woolwich Dockyard.

Towards the end of 1853 it began to be apparent that war with Russia was wellnigh inevitable. Both navy and army were exceedingly ill prepared, and even the Admiralty recognised that the commander-inchief in the Mediterranean was not likely to distinguish himself if active operations were needed. Instead, however, of relieving Admiral Dundas, they

took the strange resolve to allow him to remain in command, and to appoint an active rearadmiral, who was to do the work whilst the commander-inchief acted as figurehead. The man selected for this somewhat invidious task was Rear - Admiral Sir E. Lyons,1 who, after making his reputation in the navy, had nineteen years before accepted an appointment in the diplomatic service, and had not since gone to sea. Moreover, distinguished as Lyons' services had been, he had never SO much as served on board a line-of-battle ship, nor had he any acquaintance with the working of a fleet. All his time had been served in frigates, and almost always on detached service. With steam he was of course entirely unacquainted, and yet his flagship was to be one of the finest of our steam line-of-battle ships. Under these circumstances Lyons looked about for a flag-captain who would bring with him the knowledge and experience that he himself lacked. He had any number of applicants: 132 captains were candidates for the pointment! His choice in the first place fell upon Captain Symonds, who was then serving in the Arethusa frigate; but Mends was to act as flag-captain for the passage out, and when on the Mediterranean station Symonds was to have the option of exchanging into the flagship. For one of the junior captains on the list the offer was most flattering to Mends,

3 к

ap

especially since he had very little interest in high quarters. But Lyons, when Minister at Athens, kept in close touch with the navy, and must often have had Mends's merits spoken of by his friends. The smart est commander in the Mediterranean is bound to be known and talked of, and Mends thus reaped the fruit of his labours in the Vanguard and Vengeance.

So modest was Mends that he never would have thought of offering himself for the appointment but for the persistency of his wife in urging him to at least make his claims known to Sir E. Lyons. Mends was one of those men who, instead of being, as Lord St Vincent declared all men were, spoilt for the service by his marriage, was all the better for having a good wife to spur him on.

The first incident of the Agamemnon's commission brought to the front Mends's knowledge as to steam engineering. When on trial off the Eddystone Lighthouse the blades of the screw suddenly broke off. "The momentary effect on the ship was extraordinary; the masts seemed inclined to jump out of her." This would have been quite enough for many a captain of the old school. Steam hence forth and for ever would stand condemned. Mends was equal to the occasion: he wrote at once to the Admiralty pointing out that new blades could be shipped on board, and that it was not necessary to delay or even to dock the ship. His advice was taken, and the ship was ready for sea in four days.

It was characteristic of the distrust of steam at the Admiralty that the first fullpowered steam line - of- battle ship sent to the Mediterranean should be directed to make the passage out under sail, so that no opportunity was given of accustoming those on board to the use of the engines. Mends characteristically speaks of this as "very provoking"; but he did his best with his sails, nevertheless, and made a very good passage out.

The Agamemnon arrived in the Sea of Marmora immediately after the destruction of the Turkish squadron at Sinope, an incident which in Mends's opinion entailed "everlasting disgrace on the Allies, who had timely warning of the impending stroke." This remark, recorded on the spot by one who had every means of knowing what he wrote about, is of great weight as showing that there is strong presumption for the belief that the allied commanders were not only cognisant of the exposed position of the Turkish ships, but sanc tioned their remaining in an open port within 180 miles of the powerful Russian fleet at Sevastopol.

Acute as Mends was, and freely as he writes to his wife criticising the operations, no remark of his is recorded as to the necessity of either watching or blockading the Russian fleet. In the fifty years that had elapsed since Trafalgar the art of naval war had been wellnigh forgotten. It is especially curious that Lyons, who as a midshipman served in one of Nelson's frigates detailed for

the watch of the French fleet at Toulon, should never have so much as suggested that a single steamer should be kept off Sevastopol to observe the Russians, who were fully ready for sea. War was not declared until April, and Mends was fortunate enough to take part in the first operation conducted by the allied fleet. As a retaliatory measure for firing on a flag of truce, Odessa was to be bombarded, and the Arethusa (into which ship Mends had exchanged), though a sailing frigate, was detailed to take part in the operations. It was rather a trying ordeal: all the large ships, which, owing to their draught of water, were unable to take part, acted as spectators; and Mends's Arethusa was the only ship which had no steam-power to assist her. His journal records :

"We had a delightful working breeze, and the men being on their mettle and working beautifully, I was able to handle the ship exactly as I wished. We stood in twice, tacked close off the Mole, and engaged the works on it in reverse having on the second occasion got the range accurately, we poured in a destructive fire as we went about."

The onlookers were delighted,

all except the nervous old Admiral, who made the signal for Arethusa's recall, which Mends reluctantly obeyed. His conduct, however, stirred the blood of the seamen of the old school, and he was not only the hero of the hour, but received the personal congratulations of many of the French officers, who fell on his neck and embraced him, much to his emThe return fire barrassment. from the shore was wild and

ineffective, and the Arethusa did not lose a single man.

Mends remained in the Arethusa until the middle of the summer, and then, owing to a difference between Lyons and Symonds, he went back to the Agamemnon as flag-captain.

At this time the allied fleets were waiting on the land forces at Varna: the expedition to the Crimea had been ordered from home, but no steps had yet been taken to arrange for the embarkation and landing of the expeditionary forces. Mends writes:

"Sir Edmund [Lyons] being in full accord with the Government by whom he had been sent out, was the moving spirit and genius of this great enterprise; but though he knew that details were important to success, yet, as General Sir George Brown often used to say, 'Lyons hates details,' consequently it fell to my lot to think out and arrange for the whole of the embarkation, transport, and disembarkation on a hostile coast (down to the smallest detail) of that great army."

This

entailed an immense amount of work; but all on with a will, nothing daunted board the Agamemnon set to by the visitation of cholera, which, however, never got a firm hold of the Agamemnon, in great measure owing to the wise sanitary measures enforced by her captain. He writes, as the work proceeds :

"My head has never been so taxed as on this occasion. The providing for the disembarkation, in the face, probably, of an enemy of 25,000 men, the arrangements for anchoring the fleet, the plan to get the troops, guns, horses, everything disembarked as rapidly as is required, is an undertaking of no ordinary nature. Six thousand men were embarked this morning. Some of the noisy

...

declaimers were going on last evening, and particularly so, against the possibility of embarking 10,000 in a day. I said it provoked me to hear it, as I was satisfied I could embark 20,000 in a day."

Mends's forecast was fully justified by the event, as we shall presently see. The progress of the expeditionary force when embarked was extremely slow, the whole distance traversed was only 250 miles, and this occupied the French nine days and the British seven. Part of this delay was evidently due to the apathy of Dundas, on whom Mends in his letters animadverts freely. Seeing that there were over 400 vessels employed, the great majority being unarmed transports, the Russian fleet missed a splendid opportunity in not sailing out to attack them. Once arrived at the place of disembarkation, great promptitude was shown in getting the men ashore. In twelve hours some 25,000 British infantry and twenty-eight guns were landed; the French also landed nearly as many men in the same time. On the other hand, the horses, baggage, stores, and ammunition were not all landed for another three days, the beach being at times unapproachable owing to the heavy surf; and but for the special provision of large boats and pontoons, owing to Mends's foresight, the delay would have been greater.

Mends obtained an excellent view of the battle of the Alma, and altogether contradicts Kinglake so far as the action of the French was concerned. He writes:

"The rapid ascent of the Zouaves up the almost precipitous hillside to the edge of the height was wonderful and beautiful. . . . They rolled over the Russians so rapidly with their deadly fire that the Russian advance was soon checked, and a retreat commenced. We saw friends falling fast, but Russians faster, until they were out of sight."

On visiting the French portion of the battlefield, he records :

"The field was strewed with dead, wounded, and dying. . . . Where the fort against the French, the dead and

Russians made a stand round a small

wounded were so thick that you were obliged to pick your way and step over them.

66

The letters are outspoken in their criticism of our own forces. The military officers are very gentlemanly, very slow, but they fight like Englishmen." In the first week of October, before there was any thought of the winter troubles, when speaking of the defence of Balaclava, he writes: "The fact is, strange as it may appear, little is done that the navy does not take the initiative in. Sir Edmund does not fail to put in the spur where Horse-Guard apathy and formality block the way to the front." On October 13 he notes that information has been received of an impending attack on Balaclava; yet, as is well known, on the 25th, when the attack took place, the works for its defence were of the feeblest.

There is a vivid description of the gallant part taken by the Agamemnon in the attack on the sea front of the harbour forts, but nothing material is added to Kinglake's account. Mends's comment is very sound: "Thus ends the naval attack upon Sebastopol for the present, nor do I think another will be tried,

so futile are the efforts of ships against batteries unless they can get very close to them.' The account of the very serious damage to the Agamemnon's spars and rigging shows that the Russians fired too high, otherwise the ship must have been very badly, if not fatally, injured. As it was, she was repaired without leaving her station. Much of the Agamemnon's immunity is attributed to the accuracy of her fire, which disturbed the laying of the guns on shore. "The Albion suffered very much, because she slacked her own fire."

Writing on the general situation on shore on the day before Balaclava, and a week before the Inkermann, he says:

"A certain degree of apathy and very much ignorance prevails, made up for only by the desperate gallantry of the troops, which ever covers the faults of superiors, and on this they depend. . . . Sir Edmund is virtually commander-in-chief of the navy, and an active adviser and participator in the arrangements for the army, which latter ought not to be.

"Admiral Dundas is the man, the head of all; under him, and applied for by him, are some officers of high rank quite unfitted for the arduous and important duty of conducting so superb a service. On one of these rests the responsibility for the serious losses sustained during that severe

the

gale. I myself said to Sir Edmund, as we were quitting the anchorage of Balaclava in consequence of the threatening appearance of the weather, Would it not be well, sir, approach of bad weather and the to signalise to Captain necessity for sending the transports to sea?' The admiral's reply was: 'I cannot do it; it is entirely his own affair and the commander-inchief's.' I have always thought Sir Edmund wrong in this, entre nous; he ought to have risked censure for interference to save life and

property."

And so twenty-one vessels were dashed to pieces, entailing the loss of everything that was most wanted ashore; and many a poor soldier died owing to the lack of warm clothing, which went to the bottom of the sea because the naval commanderin-chief was given his appointment owing to political services.

Mends's letters are full of similar instances of elderly inefficient men being placed in positions for which they were entirely unsuited, whilst there was "much talent, energy, and zeal in the subordinate branches which were never allowed free scope."

As the war went on matters improved, especially afloat. Lyons himself, though well over sixty, was no favourer of old worn-out men, and he succeeded in getting young men appointed to most of the vacancies occurring, so that at the close of the war the fleet was in a far better state than at its beginning. But the