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veterate anger; Zeal, which is offended with him who hurt* that he loves; and iiruiat^ixaxia, a compound affection) of Joy and Hate, when we rejoyce at other men's mischief, and are grieved at their prosperity; Pride, Self-love, Emulation, Envie, Shame, &c. of which elsewhere.
Moving from place to place, is a faculty necessarily following the other. For in vaine were it otherwise to desire and to abhor, if we had not likewise power to prosecute or eschue, by moving the body from place to place: By this faculty there-' fore we locally move the body, or any part of it, and go from one place to another. To the better performance of which, three things are requisite: That which moves; by what it moves; that whicli is moved. That which moves, is either the efficient cause, or End. The end is the object, which is desired or eschued; as in a dog to cateh a hare, &c. The efficient cause in man is Reason, or his subordinate Phantasie, which apprehends good or bad objects: in brutes Imagination alone, which moves the Appetite, the Appetite this faculty, which by an admirable league of Nature, and by mediation of the spirit, commands the Organ by which it moves: and that consists of Nerves, Muscles, Cords, dispersed through the whole body, contracted and relaxed as the spirits will, which move the Muscles, or 'Nerves in the midst of them, and draw the cord, and so per consequent the joynt, to the place intended. That which is moved, is the body or some member apt to move. The motion of the body is divers, as going, running, leaping, dancing, sitting, and such like, referred to the predicament of Situs. Wormes creep, Birds flie, Fishes swim; and so of parts, the chief of which is Respiration or breathing, and is thus performed. The outward aire is drawn in by the vocall Artery, and sent by mediation of the Midriffe to the Lungs, which, dilating themselves as a pair of hellowes, reciprocally feteh it in, and send it out to the heart to coole it: and from thence now being hot, convey it again, still taking in fresh. Such a like motion is that of the Pulse, of which, because many have written whole bookes, I will say nothing.
IN the precedent Subsections I have anatomized those inferior faculties of the soul; the Rational remaineth, "a pleasant, but a doubtful subject" (as "one rermes ii) and with the like brevity to be discussed. Many erronious opinions are about
* Nervi a spiritu moveniur, spiritus ab anima. MeUnu. * Veleurio. Ju, cundum Sc anceps subjectum
the the essence and original of it; whether it be fire, as Zeno held; harmony, as Aristoxenus; number as Xenocrates; whether it be organical, or inorganical; seated in the brain, heart or bloud; mortal or immortal; how it comes into the body. Someholde that it is ex traduce, as Phil. 1. de Animd, Tertullian, Lactantius de opific. Dei cap. 19. Hugo lib. de Spiritu &f Animd, Vincentius Bellavic spec, natural, lib. 23. cap. 2. M 11. Hippocrates, Avicenna, and many blate writers; that one man begets another, body and soul: or as a candle from a candle, to be produced from the seed: otherwise, say they, a man begets but half a man, and is worse than a beast that begets both matter and forme; and besides the three faculties of the soule must be together infused, which is most absurd as they hold, because in beasts they are begot, the two inferior I meane, and may not be well separated in men. c Galen supposeth the soul crasin esse, to be the Temperature it self; Trismegistus, Musaeus, Orpheus, Homer, Pindarus, Phasrecides Syrus, Epictetus, with the Chaldees and ./Egyptians, affirmed the soul to be immortal, as did those Britan
* Druides of old. The d Pythagorians defend Metempsychosis; and Palingenesia, that soules go from one body to another, epotd prius Lethes undd, as men into Wolves, Beares, Dogs, Hogs, as they were inclined in their lives, or participated in conditions:
"f inque ferinas
Fossumus ire domus, pecudunique in corpora condi."
* Lucian's Cock was first Euphorbus a Captaine: ■
"Ille ego (nam memini) Trojani tempore belli,
A horse, a man, a spunge. 'Julian the Apostate thought Alexander's soul was descended into his body: Plato in Timaeo, and in his Phaedon, (for ought I can perceive) differs not much from this opinion, that it was from God at first, and knew all, but being inclosed in the body, it forgets, and leames anew, which he calls reminiscentia, or recalling, and that it was put into the body for a punishment, and thence it goes into a beast's, or man's, as appeares by his pleasant fiction de sortilione animarum, lib. 10. de rep. and after «10000. years is to returnc into the former body again,
* Goclenius in T»X0*,, P*Z, Bright in Phys. Scrib. 1. I. David Crusius, Melancton, Hippius Hernius, Levinus Lemnius, &c. c Lib. an mores scquantur, &r. * Caesar. 6. com. "Read tineas Gazeus dial, of the immortality of the Soul. f Ovid met. 15. • In (Jallo. Idem. * Nice
phorus liist. lib. 10. c. 35. e Phaedo.
"* Post "* post varios annos, per mille figuras,
Kursus ad humanae fertur primordia vitae."
Others deny the immortality of it, which Pomponatus of Padua decided out of Aristotle not long since, Plinius Avunculus cap. 1. lib. 2. M lib. 1. cap. 55. Seneca lib. 1. epist. ad Lucilium epist. 55. Dicearchus in Tail. Tusc. Epicurus, Aratus, Hippocrates, Galen, Lucretius lib. 1.
"(Praeterea gigni pariter cum corpore, & una
Averroes, and I know not how many Neotericks. "f This question of the immortality of the Soul, is diversly and wonderfully impugned and disputed, especially among the Italians of late,'' saith Jab. Colerus lib. de immort. avima, cap. 1. The Popes themselves have doubted of it: Leo Decimus, that Epicurean Pope, as J some record of him, caused this question to be discussed pro and con before him, and concluded at last, as a prophane and atheisticall Moderator, with that verse of Cornelius Gallus,
*' Et redit in nihilum, quod fuit ante nihil."
It began of nothing, and in nothing it ends. Zeno and his Stoicks as § Austin quotes him, supposed the Soul so long to continue, till the Body was fully putrified, and resolved into materia prima: but after that, infumos evanesce re, to be extinguished and vanish; and in the meane time, whilst the body was consuming, it wandred all abroad, & e longinquo multa annunciare, and (as that Clazomenian Hcrmotimus averred) saw pretty visions, and suffered I know not what.
"|| Errant exangues sine corpore &i ossibus umbrae."
Others grant the immortality thereof, but they make many fabulous factions in the mean time of it, after the departure from the body: like Plato's Elisian fields, and that Turkic Paradise. The soules of good men they deified; the bad (saith h Austin) became devils, as they supposed; with many such absurd tenents, which he hath confuted. Hierome, Austin, and other Fathers of the church, hold that the Soul is immortal, created of nothing, and so infused into the childe or Embrio in his mother's wombe, six monthes after the'conception; not as those of brutes, which are ex traduce, and dying with them
* Claudian lib. 1. de rap. Proserp. f Haec quaestio multos per annos varie, ac mirabiliter impugnata, &c. J Colerus ibid. § De eccles. dog. cap. 16. |l Ovid. 4. Met. h Bonorum lares, malnrum veco larvas & lemures. t Some say at 3. dayes, some 6. weekes, others otherwise.
vanish into nothing. To whose divine treatises, and to the Scriptures themselves, I rejourne all such Atheistical spirits, as Tully did Atticus, doubting of this point, to Plato's Phsedon. Or if they desire Philosophical proofs and demonstrations, 1 refer them to Niphus, Nic. Faventinus' tracts of this subject. To Fran, and John Picus in digress: sup. %. de Aniina, Tholosanus, Eugubinus, To. Soto, Canas, Thomas, Peresius, Dandinus, Colerus, to that elaborate tract in Zanchius, to Tolet's 60 reasons, and Lessius 22. arguments^ to prove the immortality of the soul. Campanella lib. de sensu rerum, is large in the same discourse, Albertinus the Schoolman, Jacob. Nactantus, Tom. 2. op. handleth it in four questions, Antony Brunus, Aonius Palearius, Marinus Marcennus, with many others. This Reasonable Soul, which Austin calls a spiritual substance moving it self, is defined by Philosophers to be "the first subtantial act of a Natural, Flumane, Organical Body, by which a man lives, perceives, and understands, freely doing all things, and with election." Out of which definition we may gather, that this Rational Soul includes the powers, and performes the duties of the two other, which are contained in it, and all three faculties make one Soul, which is inorganical of it self, although it be in all parts, and incorporeal, using their Organs, and working by them. It is divided into two chief parts, differing in office only, not in essence. The Understanding, which is the Rational power apprehending; the Will, which is the Rational power moving: to which two, all the other Rational powevs are subject and reduced.
Of the Understanding.
« ¥ TNDERSTANDING is a power of the Soul, "by which \J we perceive, know, remember, and judge as well singulars, as universals,having certain innate notices or beginnings of aits, a reflecting action, by which it judgeth of his own doings, and examines them." Out of this definition (besides his chief office, which is to apprehend, judge all that he performes, without the help of any Instruments or Organs) three differences appear betwixt a man and a beast. As first, the sense only comprehends Singularities, the Understanding Universalities. Secondly, the sense hath no innate notions. Thirdly, brutes cannot reflect upon themselves. Bees indeed make neat
and and curious works, and many other creatures besides; but when they have done, they cannot judge of them. His object is God, Ens, all nature, and whatsoever is to be understood: which successively it apprehends. The object first moving tha Understanding, is some sensible thing; after by discoursing, the minde findes out the corporeal substance, and from thence the spiritual. His actions (some say) are Apprehension, Composition, Division, Discoursing, Reasoning, Memory, which some include in Invention, and Judgment. The common divisions are of the understanding, Agent, and Patient; Speculative, and Practick; In Habit, or in Act: Simple, or Compound. The Agent is that which is called the Wit of man, acumen or subtilty, sharpness of invention, when he doth invent of himself without a teacher, or learns anew, which abstracts those intelligible Species from the Phantasie, and transferres them to the passive understanding, "'because there is nothing in the understanding, which was not first in che sense." That which the imagination hath taken from the sense, this Agent judgeth of, whether it be true or false; and being so judged he commits it to the Passible to be kept. The Agent is a Doctor or Teacher, the Passive a Scholar; and his office is to keep and farther judge of such things as are committed to his charge: as a bare and rased table at first, capable of all formes and notions. Now these Notions are two-fold, Actions or Habits: Actions, by which we take Notions of, and perceive things; Habits, which are durable lights and notions, which we may use when we will. Some reckon up eight kinds of them, Sense, Experience, Intelligence, Faith, Suspicion, Error, Opinion, Science; to which are added Art, Prudency, Wisedom: as also m Synteresis, Dictamen rationis, Conscience; so that in all there be 14 species of the understanding, of which some are innate, as the three last mentioned; the other are gotten by doctrine, learning, and use. Plato will have all to be innate: Aristotle reckons up but five intellectual habits: two practick, as Prudency, whose end is to practise; to fabricate; Wisedom to comprehend the use and experiments of all notions and habits whatsoever. Which division of Aristotle (if it be considered aright) is all one with the precedent; for three being innate, and five acquisite, the rest are improper, imperfect, and in a more strict examination excluded. Of all these I should more amply dilate, but my subject will not permit. Three of them I will onely point at, as more necessary to my following discourse.