Judge Cooley, in treating of the police power of the states, after observing that all contracts and all rights are subject to this power, says:

"Perhaps the most striking illustrations of the principle here stated will be found among the judicial decisions which have held that the rights insured to private corporations by their charters, and the manner of their exercise, are subject to such new regulations as from time to time may be made by the state with a view to the public protection, health, and 133 safety, and in order to guard properly the rights of other individuals and corporations. Although these charters are to be regarded as contracts, and the rights assured by them are inviolable, it does not follow that these rights are at once, by force of the charter contract, removed from the sphere of state regulation, and that the charter implies an undertaking, on the part of the state, that in the same way in which their exercise is permissible at first, and under the regulations then existing, and those only, may the corporators continue to exercise their rights while the artificial existence continues. The obligation of the contract by no means extends so far; but, on the contrary, the rights and privileges which come into existence under it are placed upon the same footing with other legal rights and privileges of the citizen, and subject in like manner to proper rules for their due regulation, protection, and enjoyment": Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., 709. See, also, New York

etc. R. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 567.

3. The result of these views is that the act itself incorporating the rolling-mill company was not affected by the subsequent enactment of the code, although a new regulation is prescribed by the code, under which the rights of other persons are guarded and protected, and the rights and privileges granted by the charter to the company are to be exercised or enjoyed. It is hardly necessary, therefore, to notice the point made by the appellants as to the provision of section 4203, excluding from the operation of the code any act passed by the legislature between the 15th of March, 1887, and the 1st of May, 1888. It may be as well, however, to say that the act of incorporation is a private one, and that the acts referred to in that section are acts of a general nature. This is obvious not only from the title of the code, but from the language of section 4202, which is in pari materia.

4. Another point contended for is that supply liens are given precedence by section 2485 only over those mortgages and deeds of trust which were executed between the 21st of March, 134 1877, and the 1st of May, 1888. But this was not the intention of the legislature, although its meaning, it must be admitted, is rather awkwardly expressed. The language of the section is that "no mortgage, deed of trust, sale, hypothecation, or conveyance executed since the 21st day of March, 1877, shall defeat or take precedence over said lien." This applies to mortgages, etc., executed as well after the enactment of the code as before. No reason can be imagined why the legislature should have otherwise intended, and it is not to be supposed that if such had been the intention, it would not have been plainly and unmistak ably expressed.

It is unnecessary, therefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, to decide whether, inasmuch as the rolling-mill company is not complaining, it is competent for the bondholders, whose debts were contracted subsequent to the enactment of the code, to deny the validity of the legislation in question; for, be that as it may, the result is the same.

5. A more difficult question, and in fact the only one in the case about which we have had any doubt, is, whether the pig iron furnished by the Crozer Iron Company is embraced within the term "supplies." The appellants deny that it is. Their contention is that the term embraces only the incidentals of the business, such as oil, waste, fuel, and the like, and not the raw material from which the product of the concern is manufactured. In other words, they draw a distinction between supplies necessary to the operation of the plant and the material operated upon.

The statute gives a lien to "all persons furnishing .... fuel and all other supplies necessary to the operation of any manufacturing company," chartered or doing business in this state. The question, therefore, is whether pig iron is "necessary to the operation of" a rolling-mill whose business it is to manufacture, among other things, iron, steel, and other metals.

The statute is a new one, and has not heretofore been construed in this particular, so that we are without the aid of 135 authority in construing it. The term "supplies" seems not to have a technical or legal meaning, and it is not clear from the face of the statute what meaning was intended to

be attached to it. Numerous witnesses, however, experienced in the business of manufacturing iron were examined, and the preponderance of this evidence is in support of the ruling of the lower court. Indeed, several of the appellants' own witnesses testify in favor of this view. Thus, the witness Murphy says pig iron and fuel, in cases of this sort, belong to the same class and stand upon the same footing, and the same opinion is given by several other witnesses on the same side. If this view be correct, then, according to the rule of ejusdem generis, pig iron, like fuel, is a "supply" within the meaning of the statute. Many witnesses for the appellees testify to the same effect. The statute, moreover, is a remedial one, and, therefore, to be construed liberally, as has been held in regard to statutes giving liens to mechanics and laborers: Davis v. Alvord, 94 U. S. 545; Flagstaff Silver Min. Co. v. Cullings, 104 U. S. 176. So that, upon the whole, we deem it best to affirm the decree, leaving it to the legisla ture to remove the obscurity of the statute if, upon its attention being called to the matter, it shall see fit to do so.

We hold, therefore, that section 2485 of the code is valid and constitutional; that it is not repugnant either to the fourteenth amendment or to any thing in the constitution of Virginia, and that both of the "supply liens" in question are paramount to the deed of trust.

6. The decree is also right in giving priority to the lien of the Pocahontas Coal Company over that of the Crozer Iron Company, it having been first filed. In the silence of the statute on the subject the rule of the common law applies, which establishes liens in the order of their acquisition, the first in order of time standing first in order of rank: 6 Lawson's Rights, Remedies, and Practice, sec. 3093; Voorhis v. Westervelt, 43 N. J. Eq. 642; 3 Am. St. Rep. 315. This is not so in regard to mechanics' 136 liens, because the statute itself forbids priorities in those cases; and the failure of the legislature to so provide in regard to supply liens indicates its intention to leave the common-law rule on the subject unaltered, so far as liens of the latter class are concerned. Decree affirmed.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SPECIAL LEGISLATION.-Class legislation is such as denies rights to one which are accorded to others, or inflicts on one a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in a like case offending: People v. Bellet, 99 Mich. 151; 41 Am. St. Rep. 589, and note. See, further,

the extended notes to State v. Ellet, 21 Am. St. Rep. 781, and State v. Goodwill, 25 Am. St. Rep. 877.

STATUTES-IMPAIRMENT OF VESTED RIGHTS-GENERAL RULE.—Substan. tial rights of parties cannot be changed or impaired by subsequent laws: Coriell v. Ham, 4 G. Greene, 455; 61 Am. Dec. 134, and note; Conway v. Cable, 37 Ill. 82; 87 Am. Dec. 240. and note. This subject is thoroughly discussed in the extended note to Goshen ▼. Stonington, 10 Am. Dec. 134.

MUMPOWER v. CITY of BRISTOL.

[90 VIRGINIA, 151.]

WATERS AND WATERCOURSES-APPROPRIATION-RIGHT TO MAINTAIN DAM. An upper and prior owner of a dam in a natural stream cannot be enjoined by a lower dam-owner from penning back the water and raising a sufficient pond to supply his mill with water to run the machinery therein, although such use at times holds back the water so as to deprive the lower owner of a sufficient supply thereof.

Fulkerson, Page & Hurt, for the appellant.

Hamilton, Rhea & Peters, for the appellee.

151 LACY, J. The bill was filed by the appellee, alleging that it was the owner of a water-works dam erected across Mumpower creek for the purpose of raising a pond of water sufficient to supply the said appellee, the city of Bristol, with water.

152 That some seventeen years before the erection of its dam the appellant was the owner of a milldam several hundred yards above, across the said creek, erected and used from that time to the present time for the purpose of raising a pond of water for the purpose of supplying his mill with water to operate the machinery of its water gristmill; that the dam of the said appellant holds back the water so as to deprive it of water at times, and that its rights are thus invaded, and praying an injunction against the said appellant to prevent him from damming back the water of the said stream so as to cut off its supply of water.

The appellant demurred and answered and denied that the water-works dam of the appellee was sufficient to supply it with water, and denied that he had diverted the water of the stream from its natural channel; stated that his parents had used and operated this mill and fixtures for many years, and he himself, succeeding them, had operated this mill continuously since 1875, and insisted that he had the right to use the

water in such way as was necessary to operate his mill, and denied that he had used the water in any improper manner either to divert it or to pollute it.

The cause came on to be heard upon the depositions taken in the cause and upon the foregoing. The court, upon the hearing, being of opinion that the defendant had threatened to pollute the water, and had unreasonably detained the water, conceding his right to use the water for his mill, decreed that the defendant be perpetually enjoined from entirely cutting off or so far diminishing the natural flow of the stream in controversy as that by reason thereof the plaintiff shall not at all times have a reasonable supply of water from the said stream, and that the defendant pay the costs.

From this decree the defendant applied for and obtained an appeal to this court.

The stream in question is a natural stream of water, and 153 both parties have a natural right to the use of the water of the said stream.

The appellant, W. H. Mumpower, has no right by prescription to obstruct the water of this stream, as his use has not extended to twenty years uninterruptedly in any particular manner adverse and injurious in its nature. No such presumptive right can arise from an adverse use for a less period: Cornett v. Rhudy, 80 Va. 714, and authorities cited.

We have to deal here with the natural right of two riparian owners to the use of the water of a stream. The right of any riparian owner to the use of the water of a running stream is a right inherent in the land as a right publici juris. And the right to the use of the water, as a general rule, is limited to such use as is not inconsistent with a like reasonable use by the other riparian owners on the same stream above and below. But in a controversy between the owners of two dams over the same stream the proprietor who first erects his dam for a useful purpose has a right to maintain it, as against the proprietors above and below. And to this extent, prior occupancy gives a prior right to such use. It is a profitable, beneficial, and reasonable use, and, therefore, one which he has a right to make. If it necessarily occupy so much of the fall as to prevent the proprietor above from placing a dam or mill on his land it is damnum absque injuria.

For the same reason the proprietor below cannot erect a dam in such manner as to raise the water and obstruct the