can usefully be modified. For the fourth, Austria, while professing 'perfectly to agree,' interpolates, with something almost like fraud, a reservation of what she calls 'the arrangements concluded in execution of those acts.' She then benevolently adds, that the Congress may consider of an understanding for the simultaneous disarming of the Great Powers: which it is plain principally means, that she is not herself to disarm before the Congress meets; and Count Buol hereupon claims from the British Government, in consideration of the proofs given in this paper of moderation and love for peace, that it shall urge France to join it in insisting that Sardinia shall immediately disarm, under the plea that pacific deliberations are impossible amid 'the clang of arms.' Austrian metal, we presume, does not ring.

We are at a loss to know how, without breach of the decorum due to these grave subjects, to characterise these extraordinary documents as they deserve. They seem to take for granted, either the deplorable stupidity or the hopeless corruption of the Governments to which they are addressed. They exhibit Sardinia simply as a criminal to be chastised by public justice. They require her at once to strip for the administration of the lash. In all cases except that of Sardinia, who is to be superseded by others, they remit every question, through the medium of the parties directly interested, that is to say, the local Italian Sovereigns, to the judgment of Austria herself. It is well, indeed, for that purblind Power, that the patience of European diplomacy was not exhausted, even upon receiving these desperate and daring propositions. Had they been taken as an ultimatum, war must have been immediate: and Austria would have entered into a struggle of life and death with a fearful weight of blood-guiltiness on her head.

But never let us despair of overcoming Italian pertinacity, when we find that even such obstinacy as was evinced in these most singular documents is not immoveable. We have seen no more recent information conveyed in official language: but it is clearly understood that the absurd demand that Sardinia alone should disarm has disappeared. It is supposed that, after thus far successfully confronting Austrian unreason, negotiation has since had for a time to encounter that of France; and that the question at present depending is that of a general disarming of the three States. We must however express our doubts whether this is the proper time for proposing to disarm. The very word may bear a thousand senses. The natural place for such a measure would appear to be after the main matters in dispute have been settled by negociation: and the introduction of it at

this

this stage, to whomsoever it may be due, can hardly have any other effect than to delay the meeting of the Congress upon which alone such hopes of peace as may still remain must depend.

We rejoice to see on every side the growing conviction that the first duty of England is to labour for peace, and that in labouring for peace she must keep her eye steadily fixed, not only on the acts and motives of the hour, but upon that heavy mass of grievance, that long course of aggression and misgovernment in the Italian peninsula, which alone have made such acts and motives possible. Peace itself is not a blessing when we purchase it upon conditions which from their very nature accumulate the materials of future indeed but fiercer and more profound convulsion. The great Italian reckoning grows from year to year more entangled, more difficult of settlement. Let Europe have peace by all means upon any terms that will mitigate the sharpness and lessen the mass of human suffering; upon any terms except such as basely sell the birthright of the future for the mess of pottage that is to feed only the hunger of to-day. May Heaven prosper the efforts which we believe that our Foreign Minister is making for peace in the sense we have described, but may Heaven also forbid that if he fail, he should set the seal of the approval or the silence of England on that shameful policy, which has so long inflicted on the Italian people the doom of mingled oppression and dishonour!

As far as it is possible to forecast the attitude of parties at the opening of a conflict now too probable, it seems plain that the neutrality of England will in all likelihood be matter not of prudence only, but of the very highest moral obligation. The relief of Italy is an honourable end, but it must not be sought by unholy means, such as would be countenance given to schemes, in whatever quarter, of selfish and reckless ambition. The power of Austria is vital to the equilibrium of Europe: but we must not be parties to defending for the sake of that power the acts and maxims by which she has been the means of inflicting beyond the Alps such woes on mankind. If we cannot assist Louis Napoleon without the fear of promoting piracy, so neither can we help Austria without the certainty of becoming the tools of tyranny. Our task should be to keep our moral and material force entire and unimpaired, to stand wholly clear of any selfish interest, to urge on this side and on that the claims of reason and justice, to concentrate as far as may be independent European opinion in the same sense, and to abide the opportunities which time may place at our command.

We could wish that our internal condition were more entirely favourable to the attainment of these great ends; but we are Vol. 105.-No. 210. unhappily

2 P

unhappily saddled, in this agony of the fate of Europe, with the
discussion of a domestic question of organic change. To guide
us through the mazes of this question, we have not the advan-
tages of the landmarks which are supplied either by glaring
public evils, or by pronounced popular desire. The early stages
as yet attempted towards a settlement have not been happily or
safely accomplished. We began with a bill which caused a
convulsion in the Cabinet, and deprived Lord Derby of the
assistance of two of his most valuable colleagues. We had next
a Resolution, which was supported and carried by statesmen
irreconcilably at variance among themselves as to its purpose
and effect. Defeat on this Resolution is now followed by an
appeal from the Parliament to the country. We believe that
Lord Malmesbury will continue to address himself to the dis-
charge of his duties with an enlightened impartiality, and in
the temper which befits the representative of his country. But
the main strength of every English minister lies in the con-
fidence of the Sovereign and of the nation as represented by the
Parliament. It is probable that those weeks, during which no
Parliament will exist, may be critical and even decisive. This
is against us, and is against the peace of Europe. All we can hope
is that, by virtue of his own good sense and good feeling, and with
the able assistance that he will have at his command, Lord Mal-
mesbury will confine this evil within the narrowest bounds he
may, by taking care, whether from his desk in Downing Street,
or when he assumes his seat at the still shadowy Congress, to own
no allegiance to any cause less worthy than the cause of Peace
founded upon Justice, and to speak in those manly and simple
tones which are not and cannot be disowned by any party recog-
nised among us, or by any ministry formed out of any combina-
tion, because they are the faithful echo of the sentiments cherished
by the whole people of England.

Although domestic affairs have been in a great degree cast
into the shade by the prospect of a tremendous European conflict,
it is not the less certain that the new Parliament will be required
to pronounce upon the question of Reform. It is now that the
country must decide between democratic change and Conservative
moderation. A more momentous, a more vital subject, could not
be submitted to the electors of this kingdom, and we trust that
no one will forget that upon the result of the contest depends the
future Constitution of England.

INDEX

TO THE

HUNDRED AND FIFTH VOLUME OF THE QUARTERLY REVIEW,