صور الصفحة
PDF
النشر الإلكتروني

all the Royal Burghs in Scotland are empowered to dispose of funds and revenues to a great extent,-have authority to contract debts, and in all probability, to render the Burgesses' property liable to the creditors,—and enjoy, besides, a qualified power of taxing the inhabitants and Burgesses. Yet it does not appear that they can be made accountable for their management, at the instance of individuals; and, considering that they themselves elect their successors in office, there seems to be no chance that a subsequent magistracy, created by them, and standing in need of similar indulgence, will be strict in calling them to account.

To deny the Burgesses a remedy against this abuse, and leave the common property and their own possessions in such a state of insecurity, would be too palpable injustice to be at all defensible. Accordingly, whenever the question of Burgh Reform has been stirred, the necessity of subjecting the Magistrates to a more effectual responsibility, has been uniformly acknowledged. When the subject was formerly before Parliament, a bill was brought forward (and a similar measure was lately proposed), professedly for the purpose of enabling individual Burgesses to demand from the Magistrates a statement of the Town's funds, and an account of their management. The discouragements, however, attached to any proceeding against the Magistrates are so great and alarming, that no profitable result could have been looked for, had the measure been actually adopted. No control of this kind would be at all efficient, unless some means were fallen upon to lay the town's expenditure regularly before the citizens, with a detail and precision similar to those observable in the national accounts. But, even were this point accomplished, the remedy would still be inadequate. Private persons would generally be deterred from having recourse to legal procedure; and, if some were found so public-spirited as to hazard the expense and annoyance, it cannot be denied, that of a great deal of mismanagement no court of law could take cognizance. A magistracy might be utterly unfit for their situation, who had not committed themselves so far as to justify the interference of the courts against them. Here, as before, the only redress that promises to be efficacious, is that of giving effect to public opinion, by vesting in the Burgesses the choice of the Magistrates, and consequently forcing the latter to approve themselves, in the eyes of the former, worthy of their honourable trust. This remedy is, in every way, preferable. It is the most efficacious the most easily, and probably, too, the most correctly administered-reaching the greatest number of cases, and operating often in prevention as well as cure.

6

These are not abuses merely fanciful, or plausibly supposed solely because they are likely to exist. They have been actually experienced to a very great degree, and have furnished, from a remote period, a subject of complaint. They early drew the attention of the Legislature; and statutes of a very ancient date describe, while they attempt to remedy, the internal mismanagement of the Burghs. In the act 1535, cap. 26, for instance, it is narrated, that the Burghs are put to poverty, wasted, and destroyed in their goods and policy, and almost ruinous, thro' fault of using of merchandize, and thro' being of outlandsmen, Provost, Baillies, and Aldermen within Burgh, for their own particular weil, in consuming of the common good of Burghs, granted to them by our Sovereign Lord and his predecessors, Kings of Scotland, for the uphold of honesty and policy within Burgh.' Subsequent statutes recount the dissipation of the common good, and perversion of privileges; and in 1684, King Charles II. granted a commission, which proceeds on the narrative that the common property and revenues have been dilapidated, wasted, misapplied or peculated, and debts contracted without any necessity, that factions procured themselves to be elected to the magistra cy, and squandered the funds of the burgh, in rewarding their adherents and supporting their own interest,—and that numberless murmurs and complaints proceeded from this corrupt administration, &c. Many other documents might be produced, exactly to the same purport; for it unfortunately happened, that the Parliament mistook the true remedy, and that its measures were neither effectual nor complete. The object it was chiefly attempted to accomplish, was to make the Magistrates responsible for their management, and compel them to account for their application of the Burghs' revenues. This corrective, probably, would have done little good; but, imperfect as it was, it does not appear to have been used; the statutes being so framed as to protect the Magistrates against their application, by rendering it difficult or incompetent for the Courts to interpose. It will be seen, however, from these documents, how long and how often the misgovernment of the Burghs has been the subject of popular remonstrance; and it is only proper to add, that as no remedy has ever been applied, the abuse is as prevalent now as in the time of Charles II.; though, it is to be hoped, we may now profit by our experience, and destroy the principle which vitiates the system, by restoring the Burgesses to their rights, and to the election of their own magistrates. That the internal government of the Royal Burghs is

6

at this moment the cause of great discontent, is sufficiently notorious, from the innumerable resolutions that have been everywhere made by the public bodies of which they consist; and, what puts the fact beyond all question, in a large proportion of the Burghs, the Magistrates and Town-Council themselves, the very parties to whose power and authority reform would be most fatal, have been constrained to concur with the Burgesses, and to express the necessity of some great and radical change. In Aberdeen, the members who retired from the Town-Council in 1817, after declaring the sincerity of their intentions, and the misconstruction of their motives in what they had formerly done, reiterate their decided opinion, that the present mode of election of the Town-Council, and management of the Town's affairs, are radically defective and improvident, tending to give to any individual or party who may be so inclined, an excessive and unnatural preponderance; and to foster and encourage a system of secrecy and concealment, under which the most upright and best intentioned Magistrates may not be able to acquire that thorough knowledge of the situation of the Burgh which is requisite for the due administration of its affairs. The subscribers are therefore of opinion, that some change ought to be effected in the ⚫ manner of electing the Council, and an effectual control given to the citizens over the expenditure of the Town's office-bearThe government of Aberdeen, however, is not more defective than that of almost every other Burgh in Scotland. They are all liable to the same objection; and, in many of them, the Magistrates have been equally forward to proclaim the ne cessity of some radical change in the system.

6

6

With such proofs as these before us, it would be unnecessary, were we even furnished with the materials, to give any particular instances of maladministration. A number of these will be found recorded in the Resolutions of the London Committee, contained in the present publication; though it is believed they are insignificant, both in number and extent, to what would cer tainly appear if any inquiry were made by adequate authority. The affairs of most Burghs are studiously concealed: For while it is affected to open the books for the inspection of the public, yet the accounts are so made up, that the opportunity is almost useless; and the management of the Burgh is conducted, not only without effectual responsibility, but even without explana tion. This is, however, only another striking abuse, so much the greater and more pernicious, that it secures others from detection. But, notwithstanding all these endeavours at secrecy, the general mismanagement is notorious. We believe there

VOL. XXX. No. 60.

LI

are smaller Burghs where the whole revenue is consumed by the Magistrates and Council,-and a debt, very large in pro portion to the income, actually contracted for payment of ta vern bills. Many of the more considerable are said to be in great embarrassment; and the insolvency of Aberdeen, for a debt which has been reported as high as 300,000l., while it shows the importance of the subject, just exhibits what must be the result in all the other Burghs, if things remain on their present footing. But it is unnecessary to dwell upon these points. If further investigation be thought requisite, we trust it will be undertaken in a quarter that will ensure complete disclosure; and in the meanwhile, we do not think it can be reasonably objected, that the complaints are vague and unsatisfactory. It would be nearer the truth, we are afraid, to describe all cure as impossible, and to illustrate the present anxiety for reform, by comparing it to the case of the person in the proverb who locks his stable after the steed is stolen. Neither do we imagine that the present system will be mentioned as the cause of the prosperity of such of the Burghs as have partaken in the national advancement. The case is too plain to admit that common sophism in political discussion which we so often find urged in favour of existing institutions, by referring the welfare of the community to causes which were only not strong enough to destroy it.

-

But there are other views of this subject, and these by no means the least material. Though we before observed, that it was not necessarily connected with Parliamentary Reform, in the proper sense of that term, yet we have no doubt that a popular election of Burgh Magistrates would be attended with the most beneficial consequences, both to the representation of the country, and to the political character of the people. It is well known, that there is nothing in Scotland approaching to an open election. The members of Parliament for the Burghs are elected by the Town-councils and Magistrates only; immediately in Edinburgh, and by means of delegates, in the other Burghs, which are formed into classes, each class sending one member. If the citizens, then, have little to say in the election of their Magistrates, they are absolutely without the slightest influence in the choice of the members by whom the Burghs are said to be represented. An election, accordingly, excites scarcely any sensation; and if one be not particularly informed, it may be impossible to discover, even on the day of election, that any thing remarkable is going The sentiments of the people are not at all consulted by the representative of their town, either directly, or in his

on.

--

conduct. He has only to make his court to the Town-council ; since, if he establishes an interest there, his seat is perfectly se Cure, though he might not be able to command another suffrage in the place. In this respect, unquestionably, the situation of the Burghs would be very much bettered by a freer election of their Magistrates; for, though this were but a small step towards that more general reform which would be in every way so advantageous to this country, it would nevertheless establish some connexion between the people and their representative,beget some sympathy in their sentiments, and some communion of interests, and make their voice be in some measure heard in Parliament, by means of one who entertained kindred views, and who was not indifferent to their welfare, or careless of their opinions. Among the Burgesses, on the other hand, a popular election, even of their Magistrates, would cultivate the virtues of citizens, as it afforded them some opportunity of exerting their rights. It would enable them constitutionally to assemble for the exercise of a political franchise; it would be a legal occasion for the open declaration of their wishes; and would contribute, in the end, to create in them a livelier interest in the government of the country, and to give greater weight and efficacy to the public feeling.

In terminating what we have to say respecting the reasonableness of Burgh reform, it is proper to recal one circumstance, namely, that the Burgesses, in requiring to elect their own Magistrates, not merely demand what is quite consistent with the nature of their original constitution, but in truth seck only to shake off a very visible infringement of their privileges. It is not easy to conceive that the statute of James, which abridged their liberties, was justified by the causes assigned in its preamble, or recommended by any true considerations of expediency. But whatever may be thought upon this head, it is indisputable, that the ostensible reason and colour of the enactment have long since passed away. Is there any body who now thinks it necessary that a Town-Council should perpetuate itself by the choice of its successors, in order to preserve the peace and tranquillity of the Burgh, or that clamour and sedition would be the consequence of reinstating the Burgesses in their original rights, and placing in their hands the only means of securing an intelligent and respectable administration? Were there any chance of danger even, we think the claims of the citizens ought to be granted: Much more so, when in restoring to them a franchise, of which they should never have been deprived, there is not only no hazard, but a prospect of the most important benefits.

« السابقةمتابعة »