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King of Great Britain, and all friendly Powers." "And is it," he exclaims, in the fervour of his loyalty, "only because he is one of the friendly powers, that Scotsmen, at a national anniversary, drink their good old King's health ?" And for what other reason, we should be glad to know, should those naturalized Scotsmen toast his health? The tie which connected them to the King of Great Britain is entirely dissolved by their emigration. The relation which subsisted between the two parties consisted entirely in the reciprocal duties ́of protection and allegiance. It was a connection of pure convenience. There was nothing in it to touch the heart or affections, and it is the extreme of folly or affectation to hold it out in any other light, or to speak of true Scotsmen as if they had had some interchange of friendly regards with their Sovereign, of which they might have carried off to America the endearing recollection. All the duties which they formerly owed their King were now due to the Sovereign of their adopted country; and, accordingly, as our author himself states, when our armies landed as enemies on the American shores, Scotsmen were found obeying the general call to arms, and fighting against the troops of their former Sovereign. Any other notion of loyalty is absurd and unconstitutionalit will not stand the test of common sense; and we should have thought, that, during his commerce with democracy, our author's mind would have been cleared of those prejudices, which would hold out loyalty to be some feeling of personal affection to the Sovereign, in place of being, as it really is, an obligation of pure political expediency. That this Scotsman, red-hot from his native land, should be mortified at the diluted nationality of those his countrymen in New York, we do not wonder; but it is no proof of it, that they had transferred all their political allegiance to the sovereign powers of America, and that they expressed, in their toasts, the permanent interest which they felt in their newly-adopted rulers.

We have a good account of New York, and of the manners and morals of the people, which do not

seem to be in a much better state than in any other large city, intemperance being the bane of the lower classes, and leading, as a necessary consequence, to every degrading form of vice and misery. His remarks on the inns, the mode of living, the travelling coaches, the police, and other points connected with manners, are judicious and amusing; and, lastly, his remarks on the important subject of the American Government are in a strain of great calmness, and are, in general, reasonable, though with a slight tinge of partiality, or, perhaps, preference, for his own national institutions, to the defects of which, however, he does not shew himself blind. He admits, that the American Government is the freest in the world, and the one in which the power of the people, as sovereigns in the state, is most distinctly recognised, both in theory and practice. He admits, also, that this form of Government is best adapted to display the energies of the nation. But his objections are, that the many are not sufficiently enlightened for the exercise of this important privilege, not being capable of judging in legislative questions of any nicety; and he hints at probable dangers which may arise, when the population grows more dense, the means of living not so easy, and the people, in consequence, liable to be discontented. In this case, he sees no safeguard against a general partition of property. He then goes on:

I do not, in these remarks, institute any comparison between Americans and natives of other countries. I feel persuaded that a pure democracy is not fitted for fallen creatures, and was never intended for them. Vox Populi, so far from being at all times Vox Dei, is not unfrequently the very reverse. The natural aristocracy of intellect, and still more, perhaps, the artificial aristocracy of property, must have a preponderating influence in the scale; or the bond of cohesion is broken, and the principle of order overthrown.

The happy medium is, where the equilibrium between property and numbers is of person and property is enjoyed, and most steadily preserved, where security full opportunity afforded for talent and industry to benefit themselves without injuring their neighbours. Whether the supreme magistrates be hereditary or elective, a king or a president, is a matter of

comparative indifference; if he is the former, the country is saved from the incessant annoyance and intriguing connected with popular elections, and all the misery resulting from disputed nominations; no doubt, the chance is, that a smaller average amount of talent will usually be

found for the duties of the office; but where

the public mind is well informed and properly directed, this is not generally of great importance. The abstract of perfection in political systems has certainly not yet been seen in the world; but I cannot help thinking, that the British is still the nearest to it. I should rejoice to see our great representative body rendered more consistent with its professed constitution; and I feel strongly persuaded, that not many years will go round till the strength of public opinion will compel its improve ment; but I would rather that it should remain as it is, than see it assimilated, in character and properties, to that of the United States. We err on the safer side, and that is a great matter in human institutions.

We may observe in general, of these remarks, that the writer's facts and inferences are generally at variance. He tells us, that a democracy is not for fallen creatures, and was never intended for them; yet he has before his eyes a successful example of democracy. This popular form of government does not imply so much any extraordinary degree of virtue, properly so called, as of intelligence. The people must be so far instructed, as to see the value of these institutions, and they must also be trained to the necessary restraints of order and law. But with such an instrument, we do not see in what point the popular institutions of America are deficient, in respect to their great ends. Without the natural aristocracy of intellect, and, still more, the artificial aristocracy of property, the principle of order, he tells us, is overthrown. Is it then overthrown in America? Is there any country in which there is a greater degree of order, or in which Government answers all its chief purposes, in which less money is expended,in which personal liberty is better secured, or in which the people, in general, are more flourishing and happy? These are the tests of good government, in which the democracy of America may challenge a comparison with any of those aristo

cracies founded on the artificial influence of property. As to the natural aristocracy of intellect, it is precisely when the free voice of an intelligent people is allowed to operate, that it is most perfect. It is description rise to their just level, there only where talents of every there being no other rival influence to keep them down. With regard to the misery of a disputed nomination, no such evil is known in the American Commonwealth. There cannot well be any dispute about the nomination of a President. The majority decides it; and where is the individual who could have the least hope of disputing this decision? As to the notion of a partition of propercould be suggested, and is entirely ty, this is the wildest chimera that and reasoning tone of our author's at variance with the otherwise sober remarks. There is no nation in the world in which any such proposition was ever made; and it is not likely that any thing so mischievous should first spring out of a highly-intelligent community. As to the permanence of the American Government, we see no reason to doubt this. We are always told that it has not had a sufficient trial. We really do not understand this. If a bar of iron bear a certain weight one day, why will it not bear the same weight every other day? Are we to measure the durability of governments by the time which they have stood? Does this make them stronger, or better able to support the accidents to which they are exposed? How did this appear in the case of the old French Government, when it was assailed by the Revolutionary tempest? Did its antiquity save it? If a Government stand 50 or 100 years, why may it not stand 500? We see no germ of disturbance in the American system. The people are the rulers. They see plainly how things are managed. Every thing is open and above-board. There is the most cautious management of the public money; and if they are dissatisfied with any branch of the public management, as they themselves chuse almost all the great functionaries of the State, they have only to change them at the next election, in order to rectify the error. We do not see, therefore, where

would be the object of a revolution in these circumstances, nor is it, we think, at all probable that the people would sanction any change in which they themselves would have their own importance diminished. If other Governments, then, are stable, where there are jarring and contrary interests, much more ought this to be the case with the Ame

rican system, where there is only one permanent ruling interest,where the conflict of opposite principles cau never, therefore, shake the state, and where it is least of all likely that the people should ever lend themselves to artful demagogues, who could not here make out a case that would not be hooted down at the very first hearing.

RITCHIE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW *.

No temporal subject more deeply affects the public interest than that of Law, and yet to none is it so difficult to draw general attention. Men, in general, conceive law to consist of a collection of abstract rules, and of absurd precedents, destitute equally of sense and principle; it is regarded, at a distance, with a kind of indescribable horror; and a determined resolution is formed, by each individual, never to come within reach of its influence. In consequence, every one imagines that legal principles and forms do not concern himself; and while he thinks it proper that those who have to do with them should look to their condition and improvement, he secretly resolves, for his own part, to keep as far off from their operation and consideration as possible. The wisdom of such views, however, is more than questionable. In a very rude state of society, when men enjoyed no political rights, and held no property, this neglect might have been practicable without any serious evil consequences; but in a civilized and opulent community, the regulations of the civil and criminal code, on one occasion or another, will assuredly affect the dearest interests of every individual raised in any degree above absolute poverty. The law of succession, for example, reaches every family at the death of the parents. Certain rules, for the distribution of the fortune of the father and mother among the children, are recognised by the public law; but power, within certain limits, is committed to individuals to alter these rules, if they exercise the privilege in a proper

If,

manner and in proper time. however, the parents either have made no inquiry concerning the public rules of succession, or have lacked courage, when in health, to correct them by a deed of settlement, and died in the belief that they had no interest or concern with the law, the whole miseries which may be suffered by their children, from an unequal distribution of their estate, if such take place, are attributable to them. The law of intestate succession, to be of any value, must be fixed; it is intended, in short, to be a general will for the whole community, which they may adopt if they please, or set aside by executing a special destination of their funds; but being precise and unbending, it is impossible that it can be framed by the skill of man, so as to quadrate in all circumstances cf property, and connexion with the dictates of natural justice. If it approach these in the cases which most generally occur, it is all that can be expected; but, nevertheless, great suffering frequently arises from its departures from justice in particular instances. If, for example, a father be proprietor of an estate worth £.50,000, and live up to his income and die, leaving ten children; by the common law, the eldest son takes the whole estate, and the nine younger children are left suddenly in splendid beggary. But the real fault here lies with the parent. The law proclaimed to him and his family, that if he made no settlement, this result would ensue, committing to him, at the same time, the power of avoiding it, by a more suitable distribution; and if he either neglected

Essays on Constitutional Law, and Form of Process, &c. By Wm. Ritchie, Solicitor of Supreme Courts in Scotland. Edinburgh: Bell & Bradfute. 1824.

to inform himself of the law, or wanted prudence to avert its consequences, he alone is chargeable with the evils which ensue.

At marriage, also, the law may come to affect the interests of the parties. The wife's moveable estate becomes instantly the property of the husband, in return for which, he be comes subject to all her debts, whether incurred previous or subsequent to the marriage. At the dissolution of the marriage, by the death of the wife, if there be no children, her relations may claim one-half of the moveable property of the husband; and if he be a merchant or manufacturer, his whole effects may be in this form of investment. We knew an instance of an old man, who, having realized two thousand pounds, retired from trade, and married a woman younger than himself by fifteen or twenty years, as a companion and solace to him in his advancing infirmities. She had no property, and he never dreamed of a contract of marriage, or troubling himself about the law. After two years, she caught a fever and died, and her relations demanded, and obtained, one-half of all he possessed, it being all moveable. This consequence was entirely owing to his own inattention; for the law allowed him to defeat this distribution by a contract before marriage, or enabled his wife to set it aside by a testament executed after it.

In mercantile affairs, again, it is inconceivable how much loss is sustained, and anxiety endured, through ignorance of the provisions of the law. Two parties enter into a verbal agreement for the sale and purchase of goods, and think they have clearly settled the whole points of the contract, when perhaps a great rise or fall in the price of the commodity takes place before delivery, and it becomes the interest of one party to draw back, and, of the other, to compel him to implement his contract. The dispute is carried into Court, and the claimant gives his statement of the conditions of the bargain, and the defendant tells a wholly different story. The judge mentions, that as the claimant is the party demanding implement, he must prove the terms of his agreement; and that the law admits only of written documents,

VOL. XIV.

under the hand of the defendant, or of the testimony of witnesses, but by no means of his own writings, statements, or oath, as evidence in his favour. The bargain, however, was made without the intervention of writing, and in the absence of witnesses; and the claimant finds himself destitute of proof. The defendant's denial, therefore, prevails, and the claimant loses his suit, and is subjected in costs, while, probably, he is conscious of being completely in the right. The Judge may even be impressed with the same opinion; but as it would be a most dangerous rule to admit the statements of one party, when denied by the other, as evidence of a contract, he is obliged to decide against him, even although he believe the defendant to be a rogue. The remedy for this evil would clearly have consisted in the merchant making himself acquainted with the kind of evidence which the law would acknowledge as sufficient to establish an agreement, and taking care to preserve it.

Law, therefore, ought to be a collection of rules founded on the most enlarged views of equity and general utility, and calculated for the determination of the rights of parties, in all cases in which they may come into conflict. In its general spirit, the law of Scotland, and that of every civilized country, corresponds to this description; and in these cases in which aberrations from principle appear, it will be found, that the rules complained of were instituted in a different state of society, and were really consistent with reason, as things then stood, and have come to stand in opposition to it only through the change of outward circumstances, to which the law has not been accommodated. Law, therefore, ought to be progressive with the manners and institutions of society; and this brings us to the question, by whom ought it to be carried forward, with the current of knowledge and social improvement? The public, as we have said, conceive it to be an unintelligible mystery, lying altogether beyond the reach of their comprehension, and, therefore, disburden themselves of all concern about its amelioration. The lawyers, on the other hand, positively profit by its

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abuses, and are, besides, trained up to its artificial views and arrangements, and become blind to the evils they produce; and, between the two, society advances, and law stands still. But whose are the loss and damage? Altogether those of the public. They suffer the vexations of bad laws, they endure the anxieties arising from obscure laws, they pay the cost of debating uncertain laws, and, in short, the whole calamities result ing from a defective or absurd legal code fall upon them. The only circumstance that renders them patient under all this pressure is, that only a few suffer at a time: one man writhes to-day, and denounces his bitterest execrations against both law and lawyers; but, by to-morrow, the sorrow is past, and the plague has infected his neighbour. He, in his turn, goes through the same ordeal, with equal impatience; but time relieves him, and conveys the burden to a third. Thus, at every given period, there are many sufferers, and as many persons anxiously desiring an amendment of legal rules and forms; but they are isloated and unconnected, and each despairing of being able to effect any reformation by his own exertions, calls in patience to his aid, and comes at last to view the law's vexations and delay like a fever or shipwreck, as a dispensation from Providence, which must be submitted to, because it is inevitable, and without a remedy. Such views, however, are extremely ill founded and superficial. If the intelligent part of the community would employ their ordinary good sense upon the law, they would perceive both its excellencies and defects; and if they would boldly proclaim the latter, and insist upon their being removed, we cannot doubt of a speedy amelioration.

in the

Impressed with these views, we were particularly pleased with the Essays before us. They are just the kind of work that was wanted to draw the public attention direction now pointed out. They combine that knowledge of legal principle which distinguishes the lawyer, with these comprehensive views of general utility which characterise the philosopher, and interest all; and, at the same time, they are plainly and

even popularly written. At the first perusal, the mere lawyer may undervalue then, because they do not deal extensively in subtlety and refinement; and the merely speculative philosopher may feel disappointed at the absence of disquisition on the abstruser points of legal principle; but every man, possessing good sense and a comprehensive understanding, will find them to contain precisely what is suited to his use; namely, views of principle clearly expounded, and familiarly and judiciously applied. The Essays, indeed, relate more to public and constitutional law than to that which affects private rights; but they are more calculated, on this account, to attract attention, and to prepare the reading population for considering these other branches of the law, on which we hope Mr Ritchie may, at a future period, afford them instruction.

The work commences with an "Introductory Notice," in which we are informed, that

nent.

-the author is not so presumptuous as to imagine that he has built an edifice; but he would fain hope that he has cleared away some rubbish, and provided a few materials. The object to which some of his suggestions are directed,the meliorations of our forms of process,-is probably, though not certainly, of temporary interest; but the principles with which he endeavours to deal are permathese principles can never cease to be inIf sound, as he trusts they are, teresting; and, though convinced, that, in the progress of society, the reforms in our Courts will be carried, and, in the same direction, much farther than he has ventured to recommend at present, he is by no means sure that his very moderate suggestions will be antiquated for a century to come. He is quite certain, however, that improvement in our forms of process -and form has here a great deal to do with substance-must proceed with a very slow pace, until the public generally feel so much interested in the subject, as to take the trouble of understanding it. Nor is the task so difficult as is commonly imagined; the foundations of law and morals tial to either which good sense, with a are the same; and there is nothing essenreasonable degree of attention, may not speedily comprehend. There is no barrier here which the educated and intelligent part of the public may not readily surmount. On their part, nothing is re

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