Through ruftling corn the hare aftonish'd springs; We would recommend it to the Author to alter the laft line of stanza lviii. He will fee that it is below the mark of true and elegant fimplicity. L. ART. II. An Essay on Military First Principles. By Major Thomas Bell. 8vo. 4s. fewed. Becket. 1770. FR ROM this fpecimen of Major Bell's abilities, he appears to be a good foldier, and it would have given us pleasure could we have added that he is also a good writer. By a good writer is here meant, one whofe knowledge of language is equal to the purpose for which the pen is affumed: for to write, and at the fame time to difclaim all pretenfion to literary skill, though this is fometimes done, is an abfurd affectation of felf-denial, and ftands no chance of being accepted as a fatisfactory apology for infufficiency. The language of this tract is by no means equal to the matter of it for it is fo obfcure, and the train of thought is fo defultory, that in reading the preface we could not help contracting an unfavourable idea of the work that was to follow, as a fyftem of firft principles, or elements of military science. The first principles of any art, are its fundamental truths; and on the proper choice and clear eftablishment of these principles, depend the strength, fymmetry, and beauty, of the fuperftructure raised on them. But though the Author is fond of the expreffion first principles, let the Reader determine by the following extract from his preface, whether we have done this gentleman any injuftice by these preliminary obfervations: To treat of any art or fcience by a primary relation of first principles, and from thofe principles to attempt to draw juft inferences, muft ever be the way leaft liable to err, and when erring, its errors the eafielt perceived:-for that method which drily addreffes itself to the understanding alone, will ever by it have its fyftems acknowledged, or detected and exploded. There are fome truths to which a large part of mankind give an entire affent, yet it has been thought neceffary to have thofe truths, thofe first principles by all confeffed, to all for ever repeated and inculcated. The first principles of all military matters have ever had, and perhaps ever will have, the utmoft neceffity of repetition; as peace continually fhews in all flates, practices and cuftoms repugnant to true principles, and war has ever produced plans and actions where principles have been unknown or forgotten. T 4. • Whatever Whatever profeffion is embraced as the purfuit for life, to ar rive at, comprehend, and if pofiible, be master of the first principles of fuch profeflion, muft be the ardent with, nay the only, the ultimate end of all application. For he who applies himself to any bufinefs, art, or fcience, civil or military, and although poffeffing the greatest love, the utmoft paffion for it, yet if he does not obtain a knowledge of the true means, of firft leading truths, he never can arrive at the only end. In the military profeffion firft principles are the only governing rules; if they are difregarded, appearances may dazzle and mislead, and the most fatal effects may flow from a choice void of attention to them. Without first principles all forts of preparations in peace, all forts of operations in war will never be brought to the bar of truth -which is also the bar of national utility and of victory,-and all warfare will pafs away without impreffing on the mind truths and lights for future conduct and future benefit:-they are the only clue that lead through the labyrinth; they fet up and pull down ftates and kingdoms-with fuch companions, all countries find every thing within themfelves;-the clothing, the exercife, the manœuvres, the difcipline of troops are found without external fearch. Cicero is an authority that may without fear be cited, in his treatile De Oratore he writes, " I pofitively fay there is no art in -which rules can be laid down for all its effects, but whoever has entered into the nature of certain directing principles, can never be under any difficulty of compafling the reft." There can be no man fo ideal, fo abfolutely uninformed, fo 'unterreftrial, as to fuppofe any fociety of men will, for any length of time, act up to the firft principles of their inftitution; but the neceflity for knowing first principles is not in the leaft destroyed thereby, for in critical fituations it must be from the perception of fuch truths, and the acting, confiftently with them, that can alone give birth to fafety; and the military fociety can in war only hope for victory and conqueft, but by the like fimilar means. All history from the first record of events to the prefent time, however voluminous and various, might have the greatest part of its military relations comprized in a very few pages of first principles.' From this last paragraph the Author does not appear to use his words with any precifion; for we can never fuppofe that the greatest part of the military relations in hiftory, might be comprized in a few pages of firft principles; though poffibly the principles of attack and defence, deduced from thofe relations of military tranfactions, might be contained in a very small compafs. The vague ufe our Author makes of his terms, is ftill more apparent in the following paffage, where, for first principle, thè fenfe of the paffage requires first duty, and they are by no means fynonimous expreffions. The first principle of a commander in war, is, to ftudy the fubject, be it campaign, battle, fiege, or expedition. A dug attention to fuch principle, is productive of found plans, of en terprize, terprize, of conqueft, decifiveness of conduct, happy decifions, of little flaughter, undifmay, and victory.' A writer of fcientific principles, has no manner of use for figurative modes of expreffion; brevity and perfpicuity being the beft characteristics of his language. The enfuing odd incoherent fimile could not be paffed over without notice: All fancies in war might be like infectious provifions, buried; and when peace comes, they might be ploughed up, and fee day-light, if it fhould be fo ordained.' The objects of Mr. Bell's attention, are treated of in the following order: Of First Principles-Invafions in general, and their Principles Exercife-Exercife of the Firelock-Battalion Firings Evolutions-War in general, and of its Study-Campaigns-Battles —Sieges-Expeditions-The long Linen Gaiter-A Cloak-The Military Conflitution, and of Difcipline-Light Infantry-Power of Speech. Though this arrangement of fubjects cannot be called either analytical or fynthetical, yet in a detached view there are many judicious and pertinent remarks under each head, which prove the Major not to have been inattentive to those studies which diftinguish the able officer. That our military readers may be enabled to form a competent judgment of the manner in which these principles are delivered, we fhall give that fection entire which treats of battles. Battles have ever been the laft refource of good generals; a fituation where chance and accident often baffle and overcome the most prudential and most able arrangements, and where fuperiority in numbers by no means are certain of fuccefs, is fuch as is never entered into without a clear neceffity for fo doing.-The fighting a battle only because the enemy is near, or from having no other formed plan of offence, is a direful way of making war: Darius loft his crown and life by it; King Harold of England did the fame; and Francis I. at Pavia, loft the battle, and his liberty.-King John of France fought the battle of Poitiers, though ruin attended his enemy if he did not fight. The true fituation for giving battle, is when an army's fituation cannot be worse, if it is defeated, than it must be if it does not fight at all, and when the gain may be great, and the lofs little.Such was the Duke of Cumberland's at Haftenbeck, and Prince Ferdinand's at Fellinghaufen. Another fituation for giving battle, or attacking, is, when the enemy fhall have put himself, or be drawn into a fituation in which there may be the moft moral probability of defeating him. There may be exigencies of ftate that require its army to attack the enemy at all events.-Such were the caufes of the battles of Blenheim, and of Zorndorff and Cunnesdorff in the late war. Another cause for giving battle, is, to attempt to relieve a place befieged, when, by overcoming either the befieging army or the covering one, the enemy may be obliged to abandon the fiege, when, 1 if defeated, the enemy's offenfive projects can only aim at the taking of the place. A battle may alfo be proper to be given when any great corps is near making a junction with the army of the enemy, which, when made, will give him fuch a fuperiority, as to be decifive of the campaign in his favour, and when a defeat will not difenable to purfue the defenfive plan. 'Extraordinary despondency in an army, a want of all confidence in their chief or chiefs, a difunion among them, the general commanding not in any great meafure to be dreaded, the army differently compofed, and badly disciplined, and the oppofites of the foregoing being in the oppofing army, may induce the general of the latter to give battle.-Such circumstances, in great measure, caused the battle of Rofbach to be fought by the Pruffians. • The preparations for battle admit of infinite variety; by a knowledge of the detail of battles, the precept will accompany the example. The main general preparatives are, to profit of any advantage of ground, that the tactical form of the army be in fome measure adapted to it; and that fuch form is, if poffible, a form tactically better than the adverfary's; and, in forming the army, to have a most careful attention to multiply refources, fo that the fate of the army does not hang on one or two fingle efforts; to give any particular part of the army, whofe quality is fuperior to fuch part in the enemy's army, a pofition that enfures action; and, finally, to have a rear by nature, or, if poffible, by art, capable of checking the enemy in cafe of defeat. Since the use of fire arms, tactics have in great measure been difregarded; thofe forms have only been fought which opposed the greatest quantity of fire: cannon will deftroy columns, and troops drawn up with depth, are not fo properly formed to defend hedges, where a long line of fire may be neceffary: but, however, victories perhaps may be gained at prefent by mere dint of tacticism, as Turely as they were ever gained heretofore. If an army attacks, and marches of, courfe to its adversary, impreffion must be its object, and that very often will be best done by an effort of weight upon a particular part; for when one part of an army gives ground, it is in general likely it will be defeated.—The concealing the real purpofed attack may not always be poffible, from the nature of the ground affording the enemy a view of all proceedings;, but it will, on the contrary, very often permit concealment.-Marthal Luxembourg, at the battle of Fleurus, perceiving the Prince of Waldeck could not fee the march of his cavalry on the left wing, drew them up on the Prince's right, which they attacked, and gained the victory. The drawing up an army in two long lines and a fhort one, must be from the different nature of ground, the different form and numbers of the enemy, only just taking things as they are found, without any fort of adjufting armies to ground, and to their op ponents. The coup d'ail of field fortification is, by irregular and detached works adapted to ground, to form a complete fyftematical piece of fortification, though to a common eye disjointed and unconnected. The The coup d'ail of battle is to throw an attacking army into only one, perhaps, or two or three points of form that fhall bear down, or, by its fucceffion of refource, drive away an oppofition not formed adequate to repulse its attackers. The ftratagems of battle are without end.-If any particular part of the enemy's army should be less liable to refift than the other parts, there would be attack on that part. It has been faid, the Duke of Cumberland's fituation at Haftenbeck was one to give battle in.-The Duke having been, from the great fuperiority of the French army, obliged to retreat, arrived at Haftenbeck; if he retreated farther, the electorate of Hanover was certainly loft; if he fought a battle, and was beat, he could but then still retreat, and lofe the electorate; and if he was victorious; he might be able to preferve Hanover, if not fome part of the bishoprics :-if he had fought a battle before, he would have had no near place of fafety for retreat; and if he fought it on the ground near Haftenbeck, he had Hamelin close in his rear, which would afford him a fecure and a fafe one. Here then was a true fituation to fight a battle, much to be got by its gain, and nothing to be loft by defeat *. Duke Ferdinand, at the battle of Fellinghaufen, had Ham to protect his retreat; if he croffed the Lippe without fighting, Lipftadt. would have quickly been invefted; if he did fight, and was fuccefsful, the fecurity of the bishoprics would probably be the fruits of the fuccefs:if he was beat, he then only would have croffed the Lippe, and do what he would otherwife have done had he paffed it without fighting at all.-Moreover, the having both the French ar mies acting against his whole army, was a point to be wifhed; ift, Because his army was unable to divide in any degree of equal oppofition to the French; and, as there was a great jealoufy and difagree ment between the French Marshals, he might reasonably and justifiably hope that fuch jealoufy would produce its natural effects, and which it did do. This then was another fituation for battle, where the gain was great and probable, the lofs not to be attended with fatal effects, and where an opportunity offered to fight, with fuch favourable circumstances, as, if miffed, would not probably be regained, The King of Pruffia's battles, during the late war, were chiefly battles of Яtate neceffity; he was ruined if he did not fight.-In 1758, when the King of Pruffia fought the battle of Zorndorff, his country was either to be ravaged by the Auftrians or the Ruft fians, if he acted on the defenfive, as he could not make head against both ;—a battle therefore might free him from one, and enable him to keep the other in check at least.-The victory of Zorndorff freed him from the Ruffians, and gave him liberty to act against the Austrians. In 1759, the battle of Cunnesdorff against the Ruffians, was another of abfolute neceffity: all the Pruffian dominions were in poffeflion of his enemies; defending was ruin; and nothing but vic Our Author having, juft before, obferved, that if the Duke had not fought, he must have loft the electorate, tory& |