great mass of the Army. That Army is very unequal in its training and no resolution or personal qualities can improve this. It exhibits only in a small degree the merits of the British nation. As regards supply, the men are very exacting and disinclined to help themselves. On the other hand, these troops have excellent officers, penetrated with the idea of England's invincible greatness and possessed of a reckless daring brought about and nourished by a spirit of adventure. It is, however, a question whether the training and skill in command of these officers are, especially as regards the infantry, on a level with their moral excellence. The result is, that the men are led and follow with a courage that is without any tactical prudence, and, in spite of a fearful sacrifice of officers, the objective is still unattained. This was shown in nearly all the battles; the troops failed in their attempts after losses, from 3 to 6 per cent. among the men, but 12 to 30 per cent. of officers.

A NATIONAL ARMY AND A PROFESSIONAL ARMY.

The character of the opposing forces, the "Nation in Arms" on one side and paid troops on the other, offered opportunities for a comparison of the two systems. Shortly after the continued successes of the Boers in the early part of the war, the favourite theories of the advantages of a Militia force over a Standing Army began again to be revived. Their advocates believed that the events in South Africa had confirmed these views. The third phase of the campaign corrected them. It was proved to demonstration that the defence of a country by a Militia with warlike qualities may give good results on the battle-field, but from the nature of its organisation cannot guarantee the successful conduct of a great war. On the other hand, we cannot agree to the general opinion that, notwithstanding the great difficulties which the expansion of the forces in England meets with, the army sent out to South Africa was in no way fitted for its task.

England landed with great rapidity on that distant theatre of war an army equal in numbers to those we were accustomed to see brought into the field in great European wars (220,000 men), and quite strong enough to subdue the Boers. But as regards the system of expansion of such an army, the test of its value is the creation of a foreign service army. For the idea of employing our national Militia in a foreign country has never yet been carried into practice with any advantage. Italy has had bitter experience of this. On the contrary, we see France setting about the establishment of a Regular Colonial Army; Holland has long since been furnished with one; that portion of the United States Army, which has been employed abroad, organised on a plan similar to that of the English Army; and Germany, compelled to adopt the principle of voluntary service in support of its colonial policy. When we speak, therefore, of the critical military condition of England, we do not refer to that of the Army engaged in South Africa, but to the fact that by this employment England was all but denuded of troops.

No great difference existed in the armament of the opposing forces -that most important factor in the conduct of the fighting—at least,

none sufficient to carry with it any advantage worth mentioning to either side. The infantry on both sides were armed with breech-loading magazine rifles. The special preponderance of the English in artillery did not bring about that decisive advantage in battle that we are accustomed to expect. The want of detailed information prevents our forming a judgment as to the cause of this. But the performances of the Boer heavy artillery, especially in action against the besieged towns and troops, did not come up to the expectations formed of it. The employment of ship guns and guns of position in the open field is interesting.

Cavalry, as we understand it, was only brought into the field by the British. It was its especial task to guard their flanks, and in the later stages of the war to carry out outflanking and enveloping offensive movements. Actual cavalry attacks were very seldom delivered, and then were very indecisive or very irregular. The well-known dictum that cavalry is powerless against infantry, unless surprised and in disorder, always asserted itself. On the other hand-and this is one of the most original of the lessons of the war-this arm distinguished itself as mounted infantry, as did our dragoons in the seventeenth century.

The majority of the Boers being mounted, we can look upon their army, as in the main, a force of mounted infantry.

This fact of being mounted was not only favourable to the individual man, but was of the greatest importance for the rapid manoeuvring of small detachments.

It affected the question of supply also, for each man personally rode away from his detachment and foraged or "requisitioned" for himself.

Most of the Boers capable of bearing arms join mounted, because after a certain period of service furloughs are granted to enable them to look after their farms and families, and so recoup themselves the expense of their outfit and equipment. The commandos are, therefore, of constantly varying strength. The going and coming entailed by this system of interchange of men would without the aid of their horses be quite impossible, and the Army would soon break up, notwithstanding the well-known fidelity and trustworthiness of the Boers. We observe little, however, of the great advantage which we should look for in large bodies of mounted troops, that is, strategical mobility.

In the decisive days of February in this year (1900) we expected to see a concentration of the Boers against Bloemfontein while General Buller was held in check in Natal. It is true that after Colenso they did move a certain number from the Tugela and around Ladysmith, but no real combination against Lord Roberts was made. In April only were from time to time efforts made to harass the flank and rear of the British Main Army.

All these facts show that we cannot look upon the Boer mounted infantry as a new factor changing the art of war, but that they are only special troops fighting in a peculiar country, which, strictly speaking, did not influence the conduct of the war in general, or its decisive actions in particular. At the same time, an exact study of the details of the war

could not fail to be of great use in determining the proper dismounted action of cavalry, as the British also brought large bodies of mounted infantry into the field. We miss, however, in spite of the well-known excellence of the British cavalry, any great performances in marching, by which the chief element of cavalry superiority, surprise, can alone be effected.

In the much talked-of relief of Kimberley by Lieut.-General French with 4,000 horsemen three marches were made, the second of which, 40 kilometres (25 miles) long, so knocked up the horses that the Cavalry Division had to make a day's halt on the Modder and give up the idea of surprise.

If we consider what has been said above, we see that the war in South Africa loses on close examination its extraordinary character, or, at all events, merely confirms previous experience. Nothing has transpired to change the accepted principles of war. This war, like all those since 1870-71, only illustrates certain principles of action established in that war and in the Bohemian campaign of 1866 in such epoch-making manner. The place of the South African War is also to be judged by the same standard.

We find many details of great interest in the Boer War which confirm the deductions from the Franco-German War. The Boer War again teaches us that the whole course of a campaign is shaped by the strategical idea which governs the commander in his conduct of it, and that it is false teaching to allow "strategy" as the especial province of the commander to sink to the lower level of so-called "practical knowledge of war." Von Moltke said, "Strategy is the application of sound common sense to the conduct of war." The application of common sense to quantities and values is mathematics. No one ventures to dispute this as a science. He who does not bring common sense to bear upon the strategical idea can form no sure judgment in regard to this.

THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR.

The early opening of the campaign, probably originating from President Krüger in concurrence with General Joubert, is one of those ideas whereby we recognise great characters and acute thinkers. The mobilisation of its 1st Army Corps at the end of September, 1899, left no doubt as to the intention of Great Britain to overthrow the Transvaal. If the Boers were to attain any success in arms, therefore, it was imperative on them to attack before the English could bring overwhelming forces to bear. These hoped-for successes would, it was thought, cause the Cape Boers to rise and friendly foreign Powers to intervene. Any successes which the Boers gained were due to this early opening of the campaign, which found the British unprepared.

By these the Transvaal brought Great Britain into a predicament, of which the impression is to this day in everyone's recollection. The above resolution is not affected by the fact that this crisis was not taken advantage of by the Boers or by hostile foreign Powers, or that the Boers showed themselves incapable of an offensive on a large scale,

and that, consequently the insurrection of the Cape Boers failed. It remains for all time an example of rare decision and clear perception of the exigency of the case, an example of what can be accomplished in this world, if we only know what we want and do not shrink from carrying it into execution. To this firm resolution is to be attributed the fact that the greatest Empire of the present time trembled' before a little Republic not more populous than a suburb of Vienna.

But the British also took a strategic resolution that deserves full attention. It not only evinced a clear-sighted perception of the situation, but it was also the cause of the rapid and decisive change in favour of the British arms in the third phase of the campaign.

Everyone remembers the critical condition of the 10,000 men with 1,200 horses shut up in Ladysmith at the beginning of January last, while General Buller had definitely given up the relief of that town after the unfortunate combats round Spion Kop. The capitulation of General White was daily expected. From the beginning of the war it was thought that any attack on the Transvaal should be made from Port Natal, and aim at Pretoria, as the shortest way to strike at the heart of the Boer resources. Now in the middle of January we learnt that the British in the face of this irrefutable calculation were sending no reinforcements to General Buller, but were pushing forward bodies of troops successively as they arrived towards the Orange River, and had decided on the line Cape Town-Port Elizabeth-Bloemfontein-Pretoria as the main line of operations. Field-Marshal Lord Roberts united his main army far away from the hitherto decisive field of battle, to lead them forward on a line of operations two or three times as long as that of Durban-Pretoria, and against the less important body of the hostile army. Yet this decision was justified not only by the result, but by every

consideration.

Lord Roberts, like the rest of the world, must have suffered from the depression caused by the continued British defeats. It must have seemed to him, therefore, of the greatest importance to restore the self-confidence of the British troops. There was no certainty that this would be regained on the Tugela against the main body of the Boers, even with overwhelming numbers. The nature of the country there was favourable to the Boers and their fighting methods. They had everywhere entrenched themselves. A victorious advance even of the British would carry them forward into the mountain range of the Drakenberg. It was, moreover, to be expected that the Boers of both Republics would hasten with every exertion to the support of Joubert's force immediately they heard of the concentration of the main British Army in Natal. His invasion of the Orange Free State offered no such disadvantages. On the contrary, it offered many decided advantages. Above all, the main army in its advance covered the Cape Colony, which prevented the insurrection of the Cape Dutch in support of the Boers. Success against the weak forces of the Boers in the west was also reckoned on.

1 Is not this a little exaggerated?-TRANSLATOR.

As we know, the Boers who after their fashion trekked in small bodies to the theatre of war in the Orange Free State after a short furlough to visit their wives, in February, March, and April last year were no longer in a condition to carry on a powerful active defence. All the world, and certainly Lord Roberts, thought that the main body of the Boers would make a stand at Kroonstadt or on the Vaal. Nothing of the kind happened. Partisan warfare with many Boer successes was carried on in the neighbourhood at Bloemfontein, but no decisive action was fought. The change of the line of operations had completely upset the Boer plan. The success of the British would have been great had they decisively defeated the Boers in Natal, as the occupation of Pretoria would have followed thereon most rapidly. On the other hand, had England's last army met with defeat on the Tugela or in the Drakenberg mountains, the disaster would have been even greater. The flames of insurrection in Cape Colony would then have burst forth with renewed vigour. Lord Roberts has, therefore, by his choice of the Orange Free State as the theatre of war, shown remarkable intuition as a commander, or has had remarkable good luck, which is also as a secondary thing of much value, but only as secondary, for, as is well known, the wheel of fortune is ever round; careful strategic calculation can alone give any security for the future.

THE LEADERSHIP IN BATTLE.

The leading of the forces in action seems at first sight to be less interesting than the leading features of the war which we have discussed. We see nearly everywhere the British frontal attack. At all events, the Boers generally succeeded in forming front to the British attack at the right moment. It follows from this, as we had already deduced from the campaign of 1866, that defenders armed with breech-loading rifles (and a fortiori with magazine rifles) cannot be driven from a position by frontal attack, and that piercing the enemy's centre is only possible at manœuvres.

The consciousness of this inability to break the enemy's front was strongly impressed on public opinion by Councillor von Bloch (who is said to be the originator of the Hague Peace Conference), by his having subtly proved that war is now impossible, because both sides would remain on the defensive, and so no encounters take place. Bloch will, perhaps, have changed his opinions since then. For professional military men these battles have shown that now, as heretofore, the problem of infantry attack is the most important and the most difficult in the training and leading of the troops; that, in fact, everything turns on infantry attack, especially the effect of the auxiliary arms; that the value of its infantry is the measure of the worth of an army; that the excellence of an infantry may determine the fate of States and nations; that by the side of the great question "What can its infantry achieve in attack?" all other questions concerning an Army are collateral and of little importance.

Although this war, like others, teaches us that all frontal attacks must be accompanied by simultaneous flank attacks, it reminds us also that every infantry attack, except that of the extreme outer flank of an envelop