army of 700,000 men is so well calculated to inspire, we proceed to make a few observations on the importance of being prepared for any contingency that may arise. Neither England nor any other nation can blame us for putting our harbors in a state of efficient defence-especially those of our principal seaboard cities. Louis Philippe commenced the fortifications of Paris, Havre, Cherbourg, St. Malo and Bordeaux, almost simultaneously, in the midst of profound peace, and no one believes now that he had any hostile intention in doing so. A similar remark would apply to the strongest fortresses of Russia, Austria and Prussia.

But scarcely two years have elapsed since England herself spent millions on her national defences; while her leading organs were openly discussing the probability and possible results of a French invasion. Until she had expended immense sums in strengthening her forts, and building new war vessels, it was in vain that Louis Napoleon assured her that she had nothing to fear from him. France took no offence, however; and why should England take offence now against us.? At all events, it is not against the well-prepared and strong, that any nation, however belligerent, is most disposed to take offence. The experience of the world proves the reverse of this-and certainly, the conduct of England forms no exception to the rule. While we were all united, and consequently powerful, she treated us with the greatest respect as a nation; when she was led to believe that we were weak, because we did not suppress a formidable rebellion in two or three months, she soon altered her tone. First, she believed that but little resistance would, or could, be made against secession. The promptness and enthusiasm with which the people of all the loyal states rushed to arms, in defence of the Union, convinced her that this was a mistake; and, for a time, she ceased to insist that our downfall was at hand. But the result of the battle of Bull Run changed her mind again. Now, she was sure that the Secessionists were braver than the Federalists-that, in short, the latter could never conquer the former-nay, that it was more probable that they would be conquered themselves; and that, in time, we should all have to submit to the Southern yoke. In this view of the case she continued to indulge, until the taking of Hatteras and Port Royal by our navy, when she began to regard us once more with some marks of esteem. Without

entering into further particulars on this point, we may safely conclude, that when she has been made acquainted with our recent splendid victories in the taking of Roanoke Island, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, &c., she will have little disposition to pick a quarrel with us on any such absurd grounds as our undertaking, in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation, to strengthen our harbor fortifications. But were it otherwise, should we leave our large and wealthy cities at the mercy of any great European power, that might seek a pretext to attack them? Have we not already been taught how humiliating, as well as dangerous, it is to be unprepared for war when it is forced upon us?

It is needless to discuss this point at any length. We believe that ninety-nine out of every hundred of our loyal citizens are in favor of constructing such works at the entrance of our harbors, let them cost what they may, as would be deemed sufficient by competent engineers to secure the safety of our principal cities. We believe that for no other purpose would money be contributed more readily. Certainly no intelligent business man would grudge to be taxed for such a purpose; if he did, his loyalty might well be questioned. The reason is obvious enough. Supposing, for example, that a large hostile fleet appeared before New York, having forced its way down the Narrows, who is so credulous as to believe that it would return without doing ten times more harm, within range of the heart of the city, than the amount it would have cost, in the form of taxes or voluntary contributions, to effectually prevent its entrance? Perhaps it would not bombard the city; if not, its forbearance would be dearly bought; it would undoubtedly levy large contributions on all who have property that could be seized upon. This would be in strict accordance with the laws of war. Unfortunately, there are but too many examples of this mode of warfare. Athens, Lisbon, Madrid and Naples have in turn had to pay large sums, in order to save themselves from bombardment. And that it is still worse to refuse to pay or to surrender, when the harbor defences are not sufficiently strong, we have a startling example in the case of Copenhagen. Be it remembered that there was no declaration of war against Denmark. This would have given the Danes time to make some adequate preparation; though they had done nothing to excite hostility. Their only crime was, to have a large fleet which might possi

bly fall into the hands of Napoleon. Lest any such event as this may happen, they are called upon to surrender it. As a matter of course, they refuse so unreasonable a demand. The result was, that the whole Danish fleet was destroyed or captured-seventeen sail sunk, burned, or seized; six thousand Danes killed and taken prisoners. Six years after, the same nation is found guilty of the new crime of having built another fleet, and it is resolved to destroy this too. We might also cite the case of Genoa, which, if possible, is a still more fearful warning than that of Copenhagen. It was precisely to guard against attacks like these that Louis Philippe commenced the fortifications above referred to; indeed, they had the effect of engaging the attention of the best engineers in every maritime nation in Europe. Previous to the first attack on Copenhagen, the fortress of Cronstadt, now considered impregnable, was but an inconsiderable fort, and the fortress of Sebastopol had scarcely been commenced. In view of these facts, we had expected to find some valuable suggestions in the pamphlet which stands first at the head of our article, seeing that it is the "Report of the Engineer-in-Chief of the State of New York;" but never have we been more utterly disap-、、 pointed. Surely the chief engineer of the Empire State ought to be able to prepare a paper on the subject of our harbor defences, containing something that was not generally known before; but nothing of this character do we find, on a careful perusal, except that the author of the Report has lately purchased $80,000 worth of square timber, by order of his Excellency Governor Morgan, for the purpose of "obstructing the channel at the Narrows, upon a sudden emergency." It is evident, however, that he regards himself as having performed a great feat, in having laid out so much money on "a little less than half a million cubic feet of square timber," "being an average cost of 164 cents per cubic foot." But what seems strange to us, in our way of looking at the matter, is, that the engineer-in-chief should think that the timber should not be used until it is wanting. This is just what the Danish engineers thought when they were consulted by the crown prince on the subject of defending the harbor of Copenhagen. There is some interesting if not valuable information, however, in the Report; we mean that contained in the long extracts taken from Major Barnard's paper entitled "The Dangers and Defences of New York," and

another paper, by one whose name is not given; but the former was written nearly three years ago (1859), and the latter eight years; and all know that important improvements have since been made, especially in cannon. If any observations, that can be called new, have been added to these extracts by Gen. McArthur, it is such as the following:

"A landing in the face of a dense population, attacked upon their own ground, daring and determined in the defence of their homes, and their forces constantly augmented by overwhelming numbers from other quarters, would be a most dangerous experiment for any enemy to attempt, however strong and well prepared and equipped.”—p. 14.

It requires but a small amount of scientific skill-nay, of ordinary intelligence to see that our engineer-in-chief is by no means a safe authority as to the means necessary for the defence of our large cities. Were it otherwise, then, there would be no use in our undertaking to capture any of the large cities of the South. But it is well known that a dense population can offer but feeble resistance to a well-disciplined army. To refer again to Copenhagen-had not that city a "dense population" when it was captured by Nelson? What people in the world are braver or more patriotic than the French? yet did not the allies take possession of their capital in 1815? Even New York has not a denser population than Paris; nor is the population of the whole United States, from Maine to California, so large as that of France was in 1815. It seems to us that, instead of making statements like this, and filling his "Report" with extracts from papers which, although valuable when written, if acted upon, he should rather have devoted his attention to some definite system of defences. But the most important information he gives us is that which relates to the number of guns mounted and unmounted in the different forts, commanding the approaches to the city. It seems that, when he prepared his Report, there were but 222 guns mounted along the Narrows, while nearly as many more were required for the forts already completed. There is no doubt but we require several new forts in New York, in order to enable us to bid defiance to any force which the great maritime powers of Europe might bring against us; at the same time, we have every confidence that, if Fort Columbus, Castle William, Fort Richmond, Battery Hudson, Fort Schuyler, Sandy Hook, &c., were garrisoned by such, for example, of our militia regiments as the Thirty-seventh and Twenty-second, the most formidable

fleet that could be sent against us would find it difficult, if not impossible, to approach the city.

We have statistics enough at hand, altogether independent of the Report of the chief engineer; but, for obvious reasons, we do not deem it advisable to publish them just now; we prefer to wait until the different works are in a better position to resist an attack than they are at present, hoping that that will not be long. In the mean time, several new works should be commenced at once. There is no excuse for delaying them; for Congress has already appropriated the sum of $1,050,000 for the fortifications of New York harbor alone. This, although by no means sufficient, would greatly increase the strength of our defences; and no sooner would Congress see that it had been judiciously expended, than it would appropriate any further sums deemed necessary to complete the works; so that, before the end of two years, we might be in a position to resist the combined attacks of England and France, should any such be made.

On the present occasion we can say no more of the defences of other Northern cities, whether on the Atlantic or the great lakes, than that we hope they will not be neglected. Boston, especially, should be secured from all danger, since, next to New York, it is the most important city in the loyal states. As for Philadelphia, it is easily defended; the largest fleet that even Great Britain could concentrate on any one point would hardly venture to enter the Delaware as far as Delaware city; and, even if it did, it would still be nearly forty miles from Philadelphia. But the best way to make sure of this is, to build two or three strong forts on Delaware Bay-say opposite Smyrna and Melville.

Desultory as these remarks necessarily are, on account of the brief space we have now left, they remind us that it is nothing new for Lieut. Maury to favor the plans of the Secessionists. We have now before us a paper of his, published in the "Southern Quarterly Review," nearly twenty years ago, and subsequently copied into the "Southern Literary Messenger." Its object is two-fold: first, to arouse the cotton-growing states to a due sense of their superior importance, as compared to the Northern states; secondly, to induce Congress to fortify all the principal cities and harbors of the South. An extract or two will give a more correct idea of the character of this paper than any observations we could now make upon it.