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have seen a man who, though his memory was by no means defective, assured him that he had never dreamt till after a fever which affected him about the twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth year of his age; and Plutarch mentions his friend Cleon, who though he had attained a great age, had never dreamed, and says that the same was recorded of Thrasymenes. It is possible, however, that these persons had dreamed, though the impression made on their mind might have been so slight as not to excite any recollection. Aristotle observes, that those who never dream till grown up are generally liable after their experience of this kind to some change of constitution, a remark cons firmed by Beattie, who professes to have known a gentleman who never dreamed but when his health was disordered. The habit of dreaming, however, prevails so generally, that it may be considered as an ordinary exercise of the human mind, and its tending to prove its inherent powers of reflection; and it is probable that if the mind is capable of being entirely quiescent, it rarely ceases to think

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however its thoughts may sometimes be forgotten as speedily as they arise.

Clemens Alexandrinus deemed an entire quiescence to be a death of the soul. Mr. Locke's

argument that it is not essential to the soul to think, because it does not always dream *, is founded upon an argument which is at least disputable, for though it may be allowed that the mind cannot think without being sensible that it does think, it need not necessarily be admitted that it does not always dream, because it cannot recal its dreams when awake, or because it does not even remember that it has dreamed; since it might be conscious of its reflections when the body was asleep, though no recollection of them be retained at the return of morning, which instantly presents new scenes to the eyes, and excites new and stronger impressions on the mind. The voluntary operations of the mind seem to cease during sleep,

* Locke's Essay on the IIuman Understanding, B. ii. C i. §. 1. Watts’s Essays, p. 12). Aristot, de Insoun. Hobbes's Leviathan, B. ii. C. 45.

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so that the mind becomes in great measure passive, and we can seldom discern any accurate recollection or powers of reasoning.

“ Ebon night is no logician*.”

Many things which did occur in sleep, and many things which strike the mind when we are awake, escape almost instantly from the memory, and are not recollected till perchance some remote event recall them to our remembrance : so likewise drunken persons often forget the events and actions which took place during their intoxication; and with respect to dreams, Nebuchadnezzar forgot his dream till Daniel recalled it to his mind t.

Dreams, though sometimes forgotten almost as soon as framed, are not to be considered as useless: they may serve to exercise the faculties and improve the temper of the mind, which

* Mysterious Mother. + Dan. ii. 5.

may derive profit from the contemplation of successive images, but could receive no advantage from apathy.

Incoherent as they are, they enable us on reconsideration to watch the temper of the mind, to regard its predominant affections, and to note its undisguised propensities; and they who are disposed to correct any mischievous tendencies, may be assisted thereby in discovering where it may be done with most benefit and effect.

Zeno was of opinion, that every one might form a judgment of his advancenient in virtue from his dreams, since if he found himself not pleased with any thing disgraceful and unjust, but his powers of mind enlightened by reason, shining out for the reflection of pure images, like a placid and waveless sea, he might have ground for self approbation *; on the other hand, if in sleep the mind seemed readily to yield itself to vicious passions, there must be much cause for vigilance.

* Plutarch. Wyttenbach, vol. ij. p. 316.

It was upon a similar conviction that Dionysius inflicted the punishment of death on Marsyas, for having dreamt that he had cut the tyrant's throat, being persuaded that it must have formed the subject of his waking thoughts *. When we are awake, as Plutarch has observed, if vice peeps out, it accommodates itself to the opinion of men, and is abashed; and veiling its passions, it does not entirely give up itself to its impulse, but restrains and contends with it, but in sleep flying beyond opinions and laws, and transgressing all modesty and slame, it excites every lust and stirs up its evil propensities, aiming even at the most dreadful crimes, and enjoying illegal things and images which terminate in no pleasure, but promote disorder. It is observable, however, that

* Plutarch. Dionys. $ Plut. vol. i. p. 398. Edit. Ilyttenbach,

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