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what is true of form and quantity is true of moral principles or of human motives. Whenever you can associate forms and quantities, mechanically considered, in any one respect, in relations of equality or predominance, you can associate them in all; that is, if a is equal to b in one sense, it is equal in all; in other words, mathematics contemplates things in only one relation. But in morals, things are considered and compared by their categories or qualities,, whereof each thing has many, according to the view and purpose in reference to which the thing is looked at; what is affirmed of a thing in contemplation of one category is not true of it in respect of another, nor true in respect of that category in reference to all considerations-as, human, divine, individual, social. These are distinctions which mathematics misses, and if the geometer reasons generally with the habits of his science, he will fall into error. Thus, the position, that two things being equal to a third are equal to one another, may be true universally if we define equal' with absolute strictness, but, in use, will constantly lead to the logical fallacy of an undistributed middle term; and if you will examine the logic of a mathematician you will find the error of a nondistributed medii very often committed. Another mathematical axiom which is not true in the scope of general reason is, that all the parts taken together are equal to the whole. This is not always true of physical science, and is generally false in morals. It is not true in chymical combination, and the instinct of a chymist's mind would be to deny the axiom; it is not necessarily true that if two motives separately have given values, those motives united will have a value equal to their sum. Davenant has shown that the price of corn is not proportionate to the size of the crop; and in truth there seems to me no fixed relation between them. I might name to you many other principles of mathematical science which are not true beyond the boundaries of that science. In truth, mathematics is a composite science, like mechanics and electricity, and not a fundamental exhibition of reason; it is logic applied to the

sciences of form and quantity. Analyse any demonstration, and you will find that it consists of certain observations of the senses respecting form, applied by means of the syllogism. The only reasoning in the science is logic; and therefore I hold it better to go back to pure logic, and imbue the mind with that which is really fundamental. There is danger that the mathematician will mistake the axioms of his science for the principles of reason, and will apply universally what is true only of a particular system. If, however, he discriminates between the general and the partial, and looks in all other sciences for those peculiar axioms which belong to it, and carries from his own study only the skill in applying them which he has there learned, there remains the fear lest the habit of his mind has become so much warped and straitened by contemplating one set of truths, that he cannot freely deal with those which are essentially different. The custom of being conversant with forms and quantities gives to the mind a formal way of regarding and combining principlesa habit of rigid juxtaposition which the vacillating and unsubstantial elements of moral and mental science will not admit of. The great problems of life require the reconcilement of a variety of agents and interests by a constant system of mutual compensation; we can very rarely rest in a result furnished with reference to merely one system of causes and consequences. Now, mathematical training induces a man to contemplate one set of data strictly and extensively, but does not qualify him to obtain a simple result from composite causes. Hence, the mathematician is competent to judge well of the tendency of one principle, or the result of one agent; but to invent and to examine that which will suit various and opposing requisites, is hardly within the scope of the chalk and the black-board. While the statesman is devising a measure of policy which is to gratify the pride of one, the interest of another, and the prejudices of a third, the pig-headed algebraist is proving that a different scheme must be framed in order to fulfil completely any one of these objects.

We constantly see results anticipated by the prophetic eye of political wisdom, which strict reason could not educe, and we see schemes of conduct devised by some happy mental instinct, attaining their purpose in the end, which when stated were almost demonstrably inefficient. In these cases there is a system of compensation; a blunder of too much here is rectified by one of too little there, and the confusion of contending forces works out the directness of a right resultant. The comprehensive generalisation of Napoleon could rarely satisfy with a reason the bigoted scrutiny of that great analyst who carried into the cabinet the doctrine of infinitesimals.'

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"One of the advantages which mathematics has in the present time,” said I, “ is its tendency to check and chill the airy dreams of modern philosophy; dreams which are harmless enough in religion and metaphysics, but which are of fatal influence in political action. I should regard as a general blessing any thing which would dispel the heated visions of speculative reform, and arrest the progress of revolution in Europe."

"I look upon the spirit of change as already crushed in the old world,” he replied, "and the destiny of Europe as settled for the next century in favour of conservatism. A few clear heads and strong hands on the continent have shown what an empty delusion is the spirit of the age; and the governments of those countries seem to be resolving themselves into great military establishments-a form of polity which I very highly approve. In England, there never was the slightest ground for thinking that principles so unnational as those of radicalism, would eventually succeed; for, there, patriotism is toryism-for as far as either the head or the heart are concerned, the institutions of the country are the country. In America we have long suffered under a moral absolutism, and our experience has shown that a democracy is merely one of the forms of despotism; but the facility with which this people is moved in masses affords a fair prospect of the speedy establishment of a formal monarchy. In fact, nothing is so idle

as the hope of liberty. Men love despotism. They cannot exist without a thraldom of some kind. In all conditions and under all circumstances they will carve out a tyranny for themselves. And this delight which men take in fixed and firm control, arises, in part, from the native inclination of the heart to serve and look up -in part, from its weakness, and its impatience and hatred of care and responsibility—and in part, from its instinctive fondness for that which is certain, unchanging, and may be calculated upon, and which it may cling to amid the fluctuations of feeling and the vacillations of opinion. In action and in speculation; in the conflicts of danger and the confusions of opinion; in science, philosophy, and literature—men habitually look for that ruler who is firm, stable, confident, and composed, and to him they take their oath of fealty. It is the idlest foolery of babyhood to expect equality before the world has been emancipated from the slavery of the passions, and the power of intellect has been effectually abolished. In politics you will always find that the clearest and simplest principle of action is that which draws the mass toward it, while those rules of conduct which are perplexed or complicated are never cordially embraced. Hence, in ancient establishments, loyalty is likely to be the predominating sentiment, and in times of excitement if you can stave off the first assault of a restless mob, the people will come forward to the rescue. In democratic constitutions, personal attachment is the easiest and clearest guide, and will probably be the controlling power in the nation. A polity whose plan contemplates that the multitude should think, and reason, and take intelligent conclusions, must needs fail. For, a nation, a mob, and that class of persons who, being at the head of the latter are at the heart of the former, can very well comprehend one idea, and indeed they never act vigorously except in executing an idea; but they can never put two ideas together."

"Your remark is just and it will generally be found that that party prevails in the commonwealth whose purpose is the simplest, and whose guiding principle

may most easily be reduced to a maxim and a watchword. No scheme of policy which embodies more than a single idea can ever be popular or national, and in truth such a system will rarely be right. Hence, the theories, or complex ideas of the economists are necessarily unpopular; and perhaps this very complexity makes them false, that is-in the only sense in which a polity can be false-unsuited to the nation."

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"What a splendid nation America would become," said Mr. Tyler, "if some great man were to place himself at the head of the government, who should have spirit and the power to strike from the body politic the dull cancer of democracy, and revive that soul of manly freedom which the elder statesmen of our country breathed into the constitution, and who could perceive the mighty difference that there is between a great nation, and a great collection of individuals. It is the tendency of democratic principles to destroy nationality, and to reduce society to the dust and powder of individuality; it is essentially a separating and a selfish principle; its guide is personal, and not public interests; it is a principle, which if introduced into society, would reduce men to the level of the infamous, the sensual, and the malignant. But if a man of genius and enterprise attains the highest office, and banishes this baneful meanness from the counsels of the country, and gives full developement to the great resources of the nation, we shall behold the noblest spectacle of public greatness that the world has ever seen. I want no change in the principles of the constitution, or in the character of the people or the times; the republican and revolutionary doctrines of the age, if freely and fairly carried, will, I am persuaded, give a noble result. Men who have drawn their maxims of political reasoning from the states of the old world, have never rightly comprehended this new spirit as exhibited in our land. I admit, that liberal sentiments displaying themselves under the constitutions of hoary monarchies, must work unmingled evil; for they find nothing connate to their fashion but in a young, unfettered, ever-moving nation,

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