cupied the evening before by Lieutenant-colonel Trimble, with a detach ment of the nineteenth infantry, whose well-directed fire, at the same time that it galled the enemy severely in the bastion, had completely defeated every attempt he made to penetrate farther. A destructive fire also had been maintained upon him by a detachment of riflemen under Captain Birdsall, who had posted himself advantageously for that purpose in the

raven without the fort.

The column of Colonel Scott being now routed, the guns of the Douglass battery were so directed as to cut off all communication between the contested bastion and the enemy's reserve-and a party of desperate fellows were about to rush in and finish the work, when a spark being communicated by some means to an ammunition chest under the platform, the bastion, with those who occupied it, were blown into the air together.

This explosion has been assigned by the British general as the cause of the ill success of his enterprise; but, in my opinion, the result was rather favourable to him than otherwise. The force in the bastion was to all intents and purposes defeated before it took place; the explosion could, therefore, give us no advantage over that: while, on the other hand, it caused the precipitate retreat of his reserve, which we should have intercepted in a few minutes more, and in all probability made prisoners.

The losses of the respective armies on this occasion, (of which you will find very accurate statements accompanying General Gaines's official letters,) brought them on a footing so nearly equal, that the enemy was obliged, for the present, to suspend his operations, and wait quietly the arrival of reinforcements. This interval was diligently improved by us in restoring the ruined bastion; which being soon done, we resumed the completion of our lines, and the unfinished bastions, as before. Four days after the action, the enemy, having had an accession of two full regiments, opened a second battery, and re-commenced the cannonade more vigorously than ever. This I consider the commencement of a period by far the most trying of any during the siege. Our men, daily subjected to the most. laborious fatigue-duties, were often called out during the night to perform those services which the fire of the enemy would not permit them to do during the course of the day; while, even with this precaution, we had the mortification to see them continually falling around us. I do not know what may have been the average of our daily losses about this time, but among the working-parties, particularly those in the face of the enemy, I know it to have been very severe. But this was not all the frequent alarms and constant expectation of another attack rendered it necessary to put at least one-third of our men under arms every night, while the remaining two-thirds lay down with their accoutrements on, their boxes stored with ammunition, their muskets in their hands, and their bayonets

The effect of these precautions was often witnessed in cases of alarm, and I venture to say, from my own experience on such occasions, that at no time during the continuance of this state, could an enemy have approached within three hundred and fifty yards, before the parapet would have been completely lined, and the men ready to fire.

I think it proper here to mention an additional precaution, designed to be used in case of a charge. At twilight, every evening, a great number of pikes, constructed of the British bayonets which were taken on the fifteenth, were laid at two feet distance from each other, along the whole extent of our line. These being of a length equal to the thickness of the parapet, would have been used with great effect in the event of an escalade.

This mode of life continued for about thirty days, with very little variation, except what was sometimes occasioned by the skirmishes of our pickets and corps of observation. In the course of this time the army had the misfortune to lose the services of its amiable commander, General Gaines, who was wounded by a shell in the early part of September, in consequence of which General Brown, though still labouring under the wounds he had received at the Falls, hastened to the spot, and resumed the command of his division.

At length, about the middle of September, our lines were entirely completed, the new bastions nearly so, and four guns actually placed in the one nearest the enemy. The brigade of General Porter having been strengthened about the same time by a considerable reinforcement of New York volunteers, we began to entertain some hopes of relieving ourselves from the confinement to which we had been so long subjected; and some measure appeared to be in agitation at head-quarters for the accomplishment of that object. Accordingly, on the seventeenth, orders were distributed to the different corps to supply themselves with ammunition, and be in readiness to march.

The order was eagerly obeyed, and at two o'clock, P. M., of the same day, the army being formed into two columns under Generals Porter and Miller, filed out of camp by the left, and advanced upon the enemy. The column of General Porter made a considerable detour through the woods, in order to gain the enemy's extreme right; while that of General Miller passed along the skirts of the wood, and concealed itself in the ravine mentioned above. While this was taking place, a heavy fall of rain came on, which continued during the remainder of the day, it had no effect, however, upon our operations; the column of General Porter approached its destination with such secrecy and address, that he was not discovered by the enemy till he rose upon them within pistol-shot of their lines. As soon as the firing announced this event to General Miller, he left the ravine in which he lay concealed, and charged upon the enemy's third

battery, which, being carried, their whole line, as far as their second bat tery inclusive, was in a few minutes completely in our possession.

The object of the enterprise being thus accomplished, the army retreated again within its lines. I have touched very lightly on the particulars of this achievement, as every circumstance relating to it has been happily described in the official letters of Generals Brown and Porter; and I should not be able to add a single item to your stock of facts by so doing. Referring you to them, therefore, I shall barely observe, that within half an hour after the commencement of the action, the enemy had lost cre than a thousand of his number, and nearly all his artillery and military stores. Many of the British officers, who were present at this affair, pronounced it to have been at least equal, if not superior, to any thing of the kind in military history. The best comment upon it, however, in my view, is the practical one of General Drummond-who broke up his camp three days afterwards, and retired rapidly down the river. Thus ended a siege of fifty-one days, undertaken with the most sanguine hopes, not to say entire confidence of immediate success. On visiting their works, after they raised the siege, it was astonishing to see the obstructions through which our men had been obliged to penetrate to get at the enemy. All their works were faced with one or more lines of abatis, or felled timber, and you could not move a dozen yards, in any direction, without encountering the same kind of impediment. I am, &c.

The achievements of the American army during the last campaign in Upper Canada, considering the circumstances under which they were effected, need no comment. They are their own best interpreters, speak ing in a language which cannot be misunderstood. They announce in the commander, talents, perseverance, and daring enterprise, and in his brave associates, patience and gallantry, invincible firmness and military discipline in its highest style. They will be selected hereafter by the hand of history to enrich and emblazon some of her choicest pages. To triumph with inferior numbers, and in open conflict, over troops that had defeated the veteran legions of France, is of itself sufficient to consummate the glory of any commander: and such has been the fortune of General Brown. We know it has been said by some, that the movements and measures of the last campaign were characterized by rashness, and that their successful issue is to be attributed more to good fortune than to able generalship. We consider the charge as neither generous nor just. What might well be deemed rashness at one conjuncture is wisdom at another; and that general who does not trust somewhat to fortune will rarely become great. He may, indeed, save his forces, and acquire the reputation of a prudent commander; but, if he calculate too nicely, he is not the man to gain for his country a name in arms, nor suddenly to

revive, by deeds of valour, the hopes and prospects of a people broken in their spirits by repeated disasters.

It has been already stated that, at the opening of the Canadian campaign, the reputation of the American land-arms was at a low ebb. To retrieve this, and arouse the spirits of the nation, something of noble and impetuous daring-something beyond the mere dictates of cold, calculating prudence and gray-haired wisdom, had become essential. The commander who would thus adventure-thus overstep the limits of common military discretion, would hazard his fame as well as his life. Of this General Brown was as fully sensible as the sternest inculcator of wisdom and caution. But he was no less sensible that the times demanded the risk, at least, of a sacrifice, and he was willing, should Heaven so order it, to be himself the victim. Hence the source-and wisdom herself will yet applaud them-of the hardy and hazardous measures he pursued. At another time he might have been as circumspect in his calculations as he has been heretofore venturesome: for such conduct, and such alone, belongs to the character of an able captain-to suit his plans, by corresponding changes, to the nature of the crisis, his own situation, and the exigency of affairs. Notwithstanding the prevalence of a contrary belief in the minds of many, such was unquestionably the conduct of Washing. ton, that model of all that is praiseworthy in a commander.

E

HE following are the official accounts of this barbarous invasion of the British, attended with circumstances of atrocity which would have disgraced the Vandals. BALTIMORE, August 27, 1814. When the enemy arrived at the mouth of Potomac, of all the militia which I had been authorized to assemble there were but about one thousand seven

hundred in the field, from thirteen to fourteen hundred under General Stansbury near this place, and about two hundred and fifty at Bladensburg, under Lieutenant-colonel Kramer; the slow progress of draft, and the imperfect organization, with the ineffectiveness of the laws to compel them to turn out, rendered it impossible to have procured

more.

The militia of this state, and the contiguous parts of Virginia and Pennsylvania, were called on en masse, but the former militia law of Pennsylvania had expired on the 1st of June or July, and the one adopted in its place is not to take effect in organizing the militia before October. No aid, therefore, has been received from that state.

With all the force that could be put at my disposal in that short time,