government for their own security, and deputed certain individuals as their agents to serve them in public stations agreeably to constitutions which they prescribed for their conduct.

The world has not hitherto exhibited so fair an opportunity for promot ing social happiness. It is hoped for the honour of human nature, that the result will prove the fallacy of those theories, which suppose that mankind are incapable of self-government. The ancients, not knowing the doctrine of representation, were apt, in their public meetings, to run into confusion, but in America this mode of taking the sense of the people is so well understood, and so completely reduced to system, that its most populous states are often peaceably convened in an assembly of deputies, not too large for orderly deliberation, and yet representing the whole in equal proportions. These popular branches of legislature are miniature pictures of the community, and from the mode of their election are likely to be influenced by the same interests and feelings with the people whom they represent. As a farther security for their fidelity, they are bound by every law they make for their constituents. The assemblage of these circumstances gives as great a security that laws will be made, and government administered for the good of the people, as can be expected from the imper fection of human institutions.

In this short view of the formation and establishment of the American constitutions, we behold our species in a new situation. In no age before, and in no other country, did man ever possess an election of the kind of government under which he would choose to live. The constituent part of the ancient free governments were thrown together by accident. The freedom of modern European governments was, for the most part, obtained by the concessions or liberality of monarchs, or military leaders. In America alone reason and liberty concurred in the formation of constitu tions. It is true, from the infancy of political knowledge in the United States, there were many defects in their forms of government. But in one thing they were all perfect. They left in the people the power of altering and amending them whenever they pleased. In this happy peculiarity they placed the science of politics on a footing with the other sciences, by opening it to improvements from experience and the discoveries of future ages. By means of this power of amending American constitutions, the friends of mankind have fondly hoped that oppression will one day be no more, and that political evil will at least be prevented or restrained with as much certainty, by a proper combination or separation of power, as natural evil is lessened or prevented by the application of the knowledge or inge nuity of man to domestic purposes. No part of the history of ancient or modern Europe can furnish a single fact that militates against this opinion, since in none of its governments have the principles of equal representa tion and checks been applied, for the preservation of freedom. On these

two pivots are suspended the liberties of most of the states. Where they are wanting, there can be no security for liberty; where they exist, they render any farther security unnecessary.

The rejection of British sovereignty not only involved a necessity of erecting independent constitutions, but of cementing the whole United States by some common bond of union. The act of independence did not hold out to the world thirteen sovereign states, but a common sovereignty of the whole in their united capacity. It therefore became necessary to run the line of distinction between the local legislatures and the assembly of the states in Congress. A committee was appointed for digesting articles of confederation between the states or united colonies, as they were then called, at the time the propriety of declaring independence was under de bate, and some weeks previously to the adoption of that measure, but the plan was not for sixteen months after so far digested as to be ready for communication to the states. Nor was it finally ratified by the accession of all the states, till nearly three years more had elapsed. In discussing its articles, many difficult questions occurred. One was to ascertain the ratio of contributions from each state. Two principles presented themselves-numbers of people, and the value of lands. The last was preferred as being the truest barometer of the wealth of nations, but from an apprehended impracticability of carrying it into effect, it was soon relinquished, and recurrence had to the former. That the states should be represented in proportion to their importance, was contended for by those who had extensive territory, but they who were confined to small dimensions, replied, that the states confederated as individuals, in a state of nature, and should therefore have equal votes. From fear of weakening their exertions against the common enemy, the large states for the present yielded the point, and consented that each state should have an equal suffrage.

It was not easy to define the power of the state legislatures, so as to prevent a clashing between their jurisdiction and that of the general government. On mature deliberation it was thought proper, that the former should be abridged of the power of forming any other confederation or alliance of laying on any imposts or duties that might interfere with treaties made by Congress or keeping up any vessels of war, or granting letters of marque or reprisal. The powers of Congress were also defined. Of these the principal were as follows: To have the sole and exclusive right of determining on peace and war-of sending and receiving ambassadors of entering into treaties and alliances-of granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace-to be the last resort on appeal, in all disputes between two or more states-to have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the alloy and value of coin, of fixing the standard of weights and measures-regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians-establishing and regulating post-offices-to borrow money or emit

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bills on the credit of the United States-to build and equip a navy-to agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each state for its quota of men, in proportion to the number of its white inhabitants.

No coercive power was given to the general government, nor was it invested with any legislative power over individuals, but only over states in their corporate capacity. As at the time the articles of confederation were proposed for ratification, the Americans had little or no regular commercial intercourse with foreign nations, a power to regulate trade or to raise a revenue from it, though both were essential to the welfare of the union, made no part of the federal system. To remedy this and all other defects, a door was left open for introducing farther provisions, suited to future cir

cumstances.

The articles of confederation were proposed at a time when the citizens of America were young in the science of politics, and when a commanding sense of duty, enforced by the pressure of a common danger, precluded the necessity of a power of compulsion. The enthusiasm of the day gave such credit and currency to paper emissions, as made the raising of supplies an easy matter. The system of federal government was therefore more calculated for what men then were, under these circumstances, than for the languid years of peace, when selfishness usurped the place of public spirit, and when credit no longer assisted in providing for the exigencies of government.

The experience of a few years after the termination of the war proved that a radical change of the whole system was necessary to the good government of the United States.

FTER the retreat of the American army from Long Island, a council of war recommended to act on the defensive, and not to risk the army for the sake of New York. To retreat, subjected the commander-in-chief to reflections painful to bear, and yet impolitic to refute. To stand his ground, and by suffering himself to be surrounded, to hazard the fate of America on one decisive engagement, was contrary to every rational plan of defending the wide extended states committed to his care. A middle line between abandoning and defending was therefore for a short time adopted. The public stores were moved to Dobbs' Ferry, about twenty-six miles from New York. Twelve thousand men were ordered to the northern extremity of New York island, and four thousand five hundred to remain for the defence of the city; while the remainder occupied the intermediate space, with orders either to support the city or Kingsbridge, as exigencies might require. Before the British landed, it was impossible to tell what place would be first attacked. This made it necessary to erect works for the defence of a variety of places, as well as of New York. Though every thing was abandoned when the crisis came that either the city must be relinquished, or the army risked for its defence, yet from the delays, occa sioned by the redoubts and other works, which had been erected on the idea of making the defence of the states a war of posts, a whole campaign was lost to the British and saved to the Americans. The year began with

hopes that Great Britain would recede from her demands, and therefore every plan of defence was on a temporary system. dependence, which the violence of Great Britain forced the colonies to The declaration of inadopt in July, though neither foreseen nor intended at the commencement of the year, pointed out the necessity of organizing an army, on new terms, correspondent to the enlarged objects for which they had resolved to contend. Congress accordingly determined to raise eighty-eight battalions, to serve during the war. Under these circumstances, to wear away the campaign with as little misfortune as possible, and thereby to gain time for raising a permanent army against the next year, was to the Americans a matter of the last importance. Though the commander-in-chief abandoned those works which had engrossed much time and attention, yet the advantage resulting from the delays they occasioned, far overbalanced the expense incurred by their erection.

The same short-sighted politicians who had before censured General Washington for his cautious conduct in not storming the British lines at Boston, renewed their clamours against him for adopting this evacuating and retreating system. Supported by a consciousness of his own integrity, and by a full conviction that these measures were best calculated for securing the independence of America, he, for the good of his country, voluntarily subjected his fame to be overshadowed by a temporary cloud.

General Howe having prepared every thing for a descent on New York island, [Sept. 15,] began to land his men under cover of ships of war, between Kepps's bay and Turtle bay. A breast-work had been erected in the vicinity, and a party stationed in it to oppose the British in case of their attempting to land. But on the first appearance of danger, they ran off in confusion. The commander-in-chief came up, and in vain attempted to rally them. Though the British in sight did not exceed sixty, he could not either by example, entreaty, or authority, prevail on a superior force to stand their ground and face that inconsiderable number. Such dastardly conduct raised a tempest in the usually tranquil mind of General Washington. Having embarked in the American cause from the purest principles, he viewed with infinite concern this shameful behaviour as threatening ruin to his country. He recollected the many declarations of Congress, of the army, and of the inhabitants, preferring liberty to life, and death to dishonour, and contrasted them with their present scandalous flight. His soul was harrowed up with apprehensions that his country would be conqueredher army disgraced, and her liberties destroyed. He anticipated, in imagination, that the Americans would appear to posterity in the light of high sounding boasters, who blustered when danger was at a distance, but shrunk at the shadow of opposition. Extensive confiscations and numerous attainders presented themselves in full view to his agitated mind. He aw, in imagination, new formed states, with the means of defence in their

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