a He might have added a third rea-dispensations required the aid and son, of still greater weight. He thus states his reasons in his Arcana Cœlestia. In respect to prodigies and signs, it is to be observed, that they were performed mongst such persons as were in external worship, and were not desirous of knowing any thing about internal worship; for they who were in such worship, were to be compelled by external means;hence it was, that miracles were performed among the Jewish and Israelitish people, who were merely in external worship, and none that was spiritual. Hence it was that so many miracles were performed among that nation. But with those who are in internal worship, that is, in charity and faith, miracles are not performed, being to such persons hurtful: for miracles force or compel to be lieve; and whatsoever is of compulsion, doth not remain, but is dissipated-hence it is that no miracles are performed at this day. That they are also of a hurtful nature, may appear from the follow ⚫ing considerations: they compel to believe, and fix in the external man an idea that the thing is so or --so: if the internal man afterwards ⚫ denies what the miracles have confirmed, then there commences an opposition and collision between the internal and external man; - and at length, when the ideas pro-duced from miracles are dissipat■ed, the conjunction of falsehood - and truth takes place, which is profanation. Hence it is evident, how dangerous and hurtful miracles would be at this day in the church." "Are not the things above mentioned above miracles!" The following passage is from Hindmarsh, in his defence of Swedenborgianism. He is a zealous disciple, and seems to have had as clear views as can be possessed on a subject so dark. As former assistance of miracles, in order to induce mankind to acknowledge them, this argues at least, that they did not carry with them that clear and rational evidence of their truth, which was of itself sufficient to gain credit among men; for wherever the truth of a thing cannot be established by any other means than by miracles, it plainly. implies that it is involved in obscurity, doubt and uncertainty. Such was the case with all former dispensations, which only shadowed forth and represented the last and most magnificent of all, the New Jerusalem. This last and greatest of dispensations requires no miracles, because the truths it displays are of themselves clear, rational and satisfactory. It is too dignified to stoop down to earth. for any thing that resembles a miracle; for by so doing, its heavenborn glory would be tarnished, and a cloud would overspread the sky, so as to interrupt the beams of celestial light, proceeding from him who is the sun of righteousness!" rev Rejecting the aid of miracles, because out of his power, Swedenborg relies wholly upon internal evidence for the credit of his elations. Did I not presume that I have already given the reader a sufficiently enlarged selection of this kind of testimony, it might be indefinitely increased. But there is one proof of the doctrine of Swedenborgianism, which may be brought forward by the disciples of this religion, if it be really true. We have not as yet seen a shadow of evidence in its favour. If it really be what it pretends to be, we have a right to expect and demand the proof now to be mentioned. It is this. The same revelation which declared to Swedenborg that his doctrines possessed a superiority in excellence and dignity above all the knowledges that have heretofore been published in the world," also revealed to him, that in the interior of Africa, far from the sea-shore, his system of religion had been revealed, and was rapidly spreading through all the region; consequently, that there is a large country, in the centre of Africa, which is inhabited by Swedenborgians! Now, if his disciples really believe in these revelations, why do they not send to the interior of Africa, and afford the world this one proof of the inspiration of their leader? It is easy to swallow absurdities in the gross, but difficult to digest them, when dealt out singly. Hindmarsh has given several instances of the prescience of Swedenborg. They are all of the same character as those with which straggling fortune-tellers in our day, delude the ignorant and superstitious; and what is remarkable, none of these examples are recorded till after their fulfilment. These relations are so puerile, and so nearly approximating to foolishness, that I fear the reader would think me imposing upon him, were I to give examples. The reader has probably, ere this, noticed a resemblance between the religion of Mahommet, and that of Swedenborg. As it respects personal character, they were certainly unlike; but in other respects there is no slight resemblance. Mahommet professed a high regard for the scriptures, and a high reverence for the character of Jesus Christ; so does Swedenborg. Mahommet believed in the Unity of God; so does Swedenborg. Mahommet declared his revelations superior to all others; Swedenborg does the same. Mahommet rejected the aid of miracles to prove his mission, and treats them with contempt; so does Swedenborg. Mahommet declared an Yet eternal war with all who would not receive his doctrines; Swedenborg, as we have seen, shuts them up in a dungeon and leaves them quarreling. Mahommet declared himself an inspired prophet, repeatedly went to heaven, conversed with God face to face, and is the founder of a new religion; Swedenborg does all this. The one described a sensual and material heaven and hell; so does the other. They both saw marriages in heaven, and lust in hell. The one saw angels whose heads were so large, that it would take a bird a thousand years to fly from one ear to the other; the other never allows these angels to turn their faces from the east. The one gave a religion full of absurdities; the other does no less. The former gave us a revelation utterly unworthy of God; the latter levels the Deity to a man. Both religions are alike unfitted for man. in some respects these two men were very dissimilar. Mahommet raised his blood-stained sword, and proclaimed it the key of heaven; Swedenborg unlocks the door quite as effectually by his key of correspondencies. Mahommet spread his religion by fear and force; Swedenborg relies on the ignorance and credulity of mankind. The one was unquestionably the greatest impostor the world ever saw; the other the greatest self-deceiver the world ever pitied. The one came like a demon, strewing his path with desolation, while he trampled on the cross of Christ; the other clothes himself with clouds and mysteries, while he debases Christianity. The one walked on the wings of destruction; the other comes in the stillness that precedes the earthquake. The former shocked us by his hardened and bold impiety; the latter escapes the charge of the most dreadful blasphemies, only because we believe him deranged. Mahom- | light on morals already revealed, met fed on ambition and conquest; Swedenborg suffered his reason to be devoured by a disordered imagination.v It has been hinted above, that • Swedenborg was probably deceived by a visionary mania, or enthusiasm. This is all that the utmost stretch of charity can admit. If this was not the case, his is one of the most daring and impious forgeries that the world ever saw. If he was not what we have supposed him #Oh! when he traced the mazes of his plan, A How did his soul contemn deluded man Light as the desert sand, on every blast Of passion's burning gale at random cast; scorn, But on himself he wreaked his deepest Who stooped to cheat a creature so forPlorn!" I cannot forbear observing, that if this " new dipensation" is such that "all former dispensations only shadowed forth and represented the last and most magnificent of all, the New-Jerusalem, "-if "this last and greatest of dispensations would have its heaven-born glory tarnished by stooping to earth for any thing that resembles a miracle," to prove its truth, then it follows legitimately, that every miracle performed by our Saviour and his apostles, only proved that their dispensation was involved in "obscurity, doubt and uncertainty;" and that every miracle which they performed, was a blemish, a stain apon their characters and the religion which they taught. There is no evading this conclusion. The system under consideration reveals no new morals, throws no new FOR THE HOPKINSIAN MAGAZINE. ESSAYS UPON HOPKINSIANISM. No. V. The Character and Works of God. As the Existence of God is the and only darkens every point on which it touches. It fairly "puts out the sun of righteousness, and brings back darkness visible." It declares that ever since the days of Christ, if not since the time of Job, the church has been grovelling in darkness and in error.These clouds of darkness can be scattered only by this "new Star," whose forty volumes of light have for fifty years been shedding their glories on the world. Now I would solemnly ask those who are exerting themselves to spread the system of Swedenborg, if they do really believe in these revelations ? If so, have they any evidence for so believing, unless it be the assertions of a fanatic, or a madman? It is in vain for them to tell us to read and examine his works; we have done so; and after wading through volumes of the greatest absurdities and nonsense which were ever printed, we say that there is nothing in Mather's Magnalia, or even the "Rain-water Doctor's" book on diseases, which we could not as easily believe and digest, as the writings of Swedenborg. If his disciples do not believe in these marvellous revelations, why are they endeavouring to make the ignorant believe them? O if I had in my heart to war with any class of men, it would be with those who are making exertions to impose upon others a system of religion so foolish, so pernicious, that they do not, and cannot believe it themselves. Ο. Ε*****. Christ. Spect. first principle of all religion; so every system of religion must take its complexion from the views, which are entertained of the Character of God. The Character of God results from his Moral Per his own will." fections. These, according to the | eth all things after the counsel of views of Hopkinsians, are all comprehended in Love, or impartial, disinterested benevolence. "God is love." His Knowledge, Wisdom and Power are all under the influence of his impartial, disinterested, universal love, or good will. God loves himself supremely, but not selfishly. He is of infinitely more worth, than all his creatures, who are before him as a drop of the bucket, or the small dust of the balance. God is, therefore, under moral obligation to love himself supremely, and to aim at his own glory and felicity, as his ultimate and chief end in all his works, whether of creation or providence. Hence, the Scriptures teach, that He hath made all things for himself; and that for his pleasure they are and were created.? From whence it follows, that the created universe is, on the whole, as good, as it is possible it should be; i. e. as good as perfect Power, guided by infinite Wisdom, and prompted by infinite Goodness, could make it. Though evil, both natural and moral, exists in the universe; yet there is no more of either than God saw to be necessary to his own glory and blessedness. The glory of God consists in his Perfections; and in the exercise and display of these, consists his felicity. It is necessary, therefore, to the highest glory and blessedness of God, that He should exercise and display all his perfections; not only his power, wisdom and goodness, but his justice also, and his grace. But, these last can be exercised and displayed upon sinful, guilty creatures only. Hence Solomon says, "The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil." And David says, "Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee; the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain." As every wise being lays a plan, before he begins to operate; so the only wise God, before He began the work of creation, having a clear and comprehensive view of all things possible, designed to bring into existence, such a universe, as would be best adapted to his ultimate and chief end in all his works. As it is absurd to suppose, that two schemes of creation and providence, should be exactly alike, or should equally well answer the end of creation; so it is rational to conclude, that God has chosen the best possible scheme of things and events. This scheme He carries into effect, by his own agency, in the natural and moral world. He causes such creatures and things to exist, and so to move and act, as best to subserve his original design. Hence we read, "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world-Of him, and through him, and to him, are all things-In him we live, and move (are moved) and have our being-Who work-free, moral agent. It is a point, Since all God's moral perfections are comprehended in love, or disinterested benevolence, it is manifest, that, in accomplishing his great design in creation, which is to advance his own glory and blessedness to the highest degree, He must produce the greatest possible sum of created good; i. e. the greatest possible quantity of holiness and happiness in his moral kingdom. "Whatever God doeth, it shall be forever; nothing can be put to it, nor any thing taken from it." The free moral agency of man. Probably there is no one, who embraces Christianity, certainly there is no one among the Orthodox, who will deny, that man is a are excusable for not explaining it intelligibly; since that, which is absurd, can neither be conceived nor described. in which all are agreed, that if self-determining power in man, men were not free, moral agents, they would not be accountable creatures, and could not, with propriety, be rewarded for their good deeds, or, with justice, be punished for their evil ones. Indeed, if they were not free agents, they would not be capable of acting at all; and if they were not moral agents, their actions would have no moral quality; and though they might be useful or hurtful, yet they would be neither good nor evil. But, while all admit, that men are free, moral agents, very different opinions are entertained of the nature of free, moral agency.Some suppose, that free, moral agency consists in doing as one chooses to do. But, upon this supposition, men are free agents, only when liberated from all restraint; and in order to be completely free, they must possess unlimited power. Liberty to do as one pleases, is more properly called natural than moral freedom. It is the opinion of others, that free, moral agency consists in men's causing their own exercises of choice and volition, or in choosing to choose and willing to will. But if this were correct, it would follow, that men never could have begun to be free, moral agents; because it is impossible, that they should have chosen to have their first exercise of choice, or have willed to have their first exercise of will; as this would imply, that they had one act of choice, or one exercise of will before the first. -To avoid this absurdity, some run into another equally as great; which is this, that men have a self-determining power, by which they are enabled to begin to choose and will, not only without the agency of any other being, but without any previous choice or volition of their own. The advocates of such a "the In opposition to these notions of moral freedom, it is the sentiment of Hopkinsians, that free, moral agency consists, simply, in choosing or willing. Agency is state of being in action." But, men are active in nothing besides choice and volition. In these consists their agency; and these are, in their very nature, free. It is absurd to suppose, that choice and volition should ever be the subjects of constraint. To suppose that one is constrained or compelled to choose or will, is the same as to suppose, that he chooses against his choice, or wills against his will. Men may be caused, but can never be compelled to choose or will. Choice and volition are, therefore, in their very nature, free. Every being who exercises choice and volition, is a free agent. The Deity is a free agent, because He acts of choice. It would be as absurd to suppose, that He causes his own volitions, as to suppose, that he caused his own existence. If the supposition, that He created himself, implies, that he acted before he existed; the supposition, that He causes his own volitions, implies, that He acted before He began to act. Free agency does not consist in any thing preceding or following choice and vclition, but in choice and volition themselves. But, though all beings, who choose and will, are free agents; yet many of this description, are not moral agents. To constitute any being a moral agent, it is necessary, not only that he should choose and will, but that he should be able to perceive the difference between right and wrong. No one can be a proper object of praise or |