He decreed either that the wicked Christ was sent into the world to | lutely certain, that God must have die, the just for the unjust. He says himself, "For this cause came I unto this hour." But if God was not indifferent respecting Christ's death; then he could not have been indifferent respecting the means and manner of his death. The former must inevitably involve the latter. Hence, God could not have been indifferent respecting the wicked conduct of the Jews in betraying and crucifying the Lord of glory. But if God was not indifferent respecting the wicked conduct of the Jews, in the crucifixion of Christ; then he could not have been indifferent respecting any part of that vast chain of events, which, from the creation of the world, tended to prepare the way, and introduce the important scenes of Christ's sufferings. And if God was not indifferent respecting these events, or actions of his creatures; no reason can be given, why he should be indifferent respecting any action or event which takes place in this lower world. It may be received, then, as a settled point, that God can never have been indifferent respecting the wicked conduct of mankind. This leads me a step further, to ob serve, 2. That God must have decreed either that the wicked conduct of mankind should take place, or that it should not. This conclusion is inevitable. For if any being is not indifferent respecting an object, he must necessarily have some choice respecting that object. If I was not absolutely indifferent whether I should write this essay or not; then, certainly, I must have chosen either to write, or not to write. So of every being in the universe. But the decrees of God are what he chooses on the whole. If he chooses on the whole, that any thing should exist; that choice is his decree. Hence, it is also abso God 3. It is evident from fact, that God never decreed, that the wicked conduct of mankind should not exist. Wickedness has been practised by all mankind, in every age of the world, from the apostacy of Adam to the present time. himself has declared, that "the wickedness of man is great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart is only evil continually." If, then, God had decreed that evil should not exist; the wickedness of mankind must exist in opposition to his decrees. That is, it must exist in spite of all that God could do to prevent it. For to say, that God is not disposed to accomplish his purposes, is a contradiction. To suppose, then, that God chose, on the whole, to prevent the existence of evil, reduces us to the only alternative of supposing that he is unable to prevent its existence. That evil does exist, and has existed from the days of Adam, cannot be denied. But is God unable to do what he chooses? God is almighty. It is absolutely certain. then, that if he chose, on the whole, to prevent the existence of evil, it would never have had existence. There is no other conclusion possible. God has not decreed that the wicked conduct of mankind should not exist. 16. T If, then, God could not have been indifferent respecting the :wicked conduct of mankind; and, hence, must have decreed either that it should take place; or that it should not; but never decreed that their wicked conduct should not take place; it appears, to a moral demonstration, that He has decreed their wicked conduct. We may observe, 4. That the truth of this sentiment is established from the abundant testimony of Scripture. When Peter preached to the Jews, on the day of Pentecost, he said unto them, concerning Christ, "Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God, re have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain." Again it is written, "For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done." The apostles, also, declared concerning the death of Christ and his murderers, "For they that dwell at Jerusalem, and their rulers, because they knew him not, nor yet the voice of the prophets which are read every Sabbath day, they have fulfilled them in condemning him. And though they found no cause of death in him, yet desired they Pilate that he should be slain. And when they had fulfilled all that was written of him, they took him down from the tree, and laid him in a sepulchre." These passages of Scripture abundantly teach, that God had fore-ordained all the conduct of the Jews and rulers toward the Lord Jesus Christ, and caused them to accomplish his purposes; though their motives were entirely sinful, and their conduct grossly criminal in his sight. We might, also, cite a multitude of passages to prove, that God decreed the conduct of Pharaoh; of the wicked Canaanites; of Jeroboam; of Ahab; of Judas Iscariot, and that his eternal determinations extend to all the tribes of the earth, and include all the moral actions of all mankind. But sufficient, it is deemed, has been said, to establish this point; and we hasten to show, H. That the decrees of God afford no excuse for the wicked conduct of mankind. And, 1. Moral good, or moral evil, depends on the nature of the moral action, and not on any decree or determination. The distinction between virtue and vice is founded in the nature of things. This is agreeable to common sense.When we hear of a certain action performed by a certain individual, we never wait to enquire respecting any previous decree, or determination; but immediately pronounce the action virtuous or vicious from its own nature. The nature of things can never be changed, by any decree or pre-determination, either in the natural or moral world. God has decreed that light and darkness shall take place in regular succession, by the means, which he has appointed. But who will say, that this decree changes the nature of light or the nature of darkness? So in the moral world. Holiness is holiness still, and sin is sin still; notwithstanding the divine decree. It was decreed and foretold, that the Lord Jesus Christ should be perfect in holiness, during the whole course of his mediatorial work. But who will say, that the holiness of the Divine Redeemer was not holiness, or that his conduct was not virtuous; because it was pre-ordained? Who will pretend to say, that the labours of the Apostle Paul were not virtuous and praise-worthy; because he was a chosen vessel, to 649016 A bear the name of Christ to Gentile | of glory? Who will say, that Judas nations? But if the conduct of good men is truly virtuous and praise-worthy in its own nature, notwithstanding the divine decree; why may not the conduct of wicked men be vicious and blameworthy in its own nature, notwithstanding the Divine decree? Who will say, that the lying spirit, which was fore-ordained and sent into the mouths of all Ahab's prophets, was not a lying spirit, because of the Divine decree? Such an assertion would be perfectly absurd and ridiculous. The wicked conduct of mankind, then, is evil in its own nature; and its quality can never be destroyed by any decree or fore-ordination whatever. But whatever is morally evil, in its own nature, always implies guilt. And whatever implies guilt, renders it absolutely certain that the guilty person has no excuse for his conduct. For no person can justly be considered and treated as guilty, who has any just or reasonable excuse for his moral condict. did not choose to betray Christ; or that Peter did not choose to deny him? Such an assertion would be contrary to common sense. Every one is conscious of choosing to do whatever he does do. But whenever any person acts of choice, it always supposes that he has power or ability to do differently. And this power to do differently, is not destroyed by any divine decree. Those, who act of choice, are certainly under no compulsion. Choice is the very opposite of compulsion. Judas was not compelled to betray his Lord; nor was Peter compelled to deny him. Hence, they both certainly had power to do differently. But still their conduct was decreed and foretold. It is a dictate of common sense, that mankind act freely in all their conduct. But when mankind choose to conduct wickedly, and consequently, are able to conduct otherwise; what excuse can they offer for their sinful conduct? What excuse could the Jews offer for their wicked conduct, in crucifying the Son of God; though it is expressly declared that they fulfilled the Divine purposes? It is a demonstrable fact, and often has been demonstrated, that God has fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass: and it is a demonstrable fact, and often has been demonstrated, that-mankind act freely in all their conduct; and consequently, have no excuse for any sinful action, but are altogether blame-worthy. 2. The decrees of God do not destroy the free agency of mankind. Free agency consists in choosing. This is all the free agency of which we are able to conceive. No one can desire to be any more free, than to act of choice. This is all the free agency there is, or can be, in any being whatever. It is all the free agency that God possesses. He acts voluntarily, and is, therefore, a free agent; and mankind act voluntarily; and are, therefore, free agents. We cannot conceive of any moral being, who does not act of choice. Nów, in order for the decrees of God to destroy the free agency of mankind, they must prevent their choosing. But this is contrary to fact. Who will say, that the Jews and Gentiles did not choose to do as they did, in crucifying the Lord | But if we say that the Divine de 3. The holy and wise God condemns mankind for their wicked conduct. He threatens the transgressor with eternal destruction. He says, "Wo unto the wicked! it shall be ill with him; for the reward of his hands shall be given him." And God has actually punished thousands of incorrigible sinners for their wicked conduct. 12 E crees afford mankind an excuse for | declared to his face, that he would their wicked conduct; we impeach the Divine character. We virtually charge God with injustice and cruelty. "But, who art thou, O man, that repliest against God?" Who will rise up, and urge, that God condemns and punishes the wicked, while yet they have a reaf sonable excuse for their conduct? This is the language of rebellion. It is bringing the highest charges against the Sovereign of the uni verse. We may add, betray him. But, after the commission of this horrible crime, Judas came and cast down the thirty pieces of silver in the temple, and said, "I have sinned, in that I have betrayed the innocent blood." Peter had been informed of the Divine purposes, that he should surely deny his Lord. But when the deed was done, his conscience smote him, " and he went out and wept bitterly." The Jews, also, were pricked in their hearts, at the sermon of Peter, on the day of Pentecost, though he told them plainly, that they had fulfilled the Divine decrees in crucifying the Son of God. Thus the consciences of mankind have condemned them for their wickedness in thousands of instances. 4. That mankind have frequently condemned themselves for their wicked conduct: notwithstanding the Divine decrees, Pharaoh knew the Divine purposes respecting himself; for God told him, that he had in very deed raised him up to fit him for destruction. But the conscience of Pharaoh condemned him for his wickedness, and he was constrained to cry out, at different times, "I have sinned; the LORD IS RIGHTEOUS; but I and my poople are wicked." The consciences of Joseph's brethren smote them for their wicked conduct; though God had " sent" him into Egypt, " to preserve them a posterity in the earth, and to save much people alive." "They said one to ano-assurance, that the decrees of God ther, We are verily guilty concerning our brother, in that we saw the auguish of his soul, when he besought us, and we would not hear." Judas knew the Divine purposes respecting himself; for his conduct was foretold ages before he was born. Our Lord, also, Since, then, moral good and evil do not depend on the Divine decrees, but on the nature of moral actions; since the decrees of God do not destroy the free agency of mankind; since the holy and wise God condemns them for their wicked conduct; and since mankind have so frequently condemned themselves, and justified the conduct of God; we may have the afford not the least excuse for the least transgression. This subject suggests a number of important inferences, which, by the leave of the Editor, will be submitted in a subsequent essay. PHILO-HOPKINSIAN. ON REVIVALS OF RELIGION. | it is not easy, in all cases, to dis No. V. The subject introduced in my last essay, was the distinction between a genuine and a spurious revival. It was then discussed in part only. It was observed, that tinguish between a genuine and a spurious work, because they are so often intermixed with each other, and because they have so many points of resemblance. A few remarks were made on the nature of false religion, and a definition of a sparious revival was given. Some | of the points of resemblance between a genuine and a spurious work were then brought into view, and the subject left for the consideration of my readers. In this essay, and the following, I propose to point out some of the principal marks of distinction. are 1. In a genuine revival, there is real conviction of sin; in a spurious one there is not. There is, indeed, in a spurious revival, much that is called conviction. We often hear the word applied to every degree of awakening, let its nature be what it may. Whenever a sinner is alarmed, whenever he feels a sense of his danger, whenever he begins to manifest any anxiety for securing his eternal happiness, he is said to be under conviction. If this were the proper meaning of the word, there could be no distinction made, in this respect, between a genuine and a spurious revival. Such appearances common to both. But this is not the proper meaning of the word. Conviction of sin is something very different from all this. To produce all this, nothing more is necessary, than that the sinner should realize that God is angry with him, and disposed to punish him according to his deserts. He is indeed, convinced that he is a sinner; for no man can refuse to acknowledge that. But his sense of his sins is obtained by looking over his past life, and considering the outward acts of transgression with which he has been chargeable. And perhaps he takes into view, also, some of the grosser sins of the heart, such as the indulgence of unlawful desires, and the plans of wickedness he has contrived. Comparing these with the threatenings of divine vengeance, which sound in his ears, he is alarmed and filled with anxiety. He begins to enquire what he must do to be saved; he begins to resort to religious meetings, to read the bible, and to attend to all sorts of religious duties. He breaks off his external immoralities, and reforms his life. He weeps abundantly, and cries for mercy with great earnestness. But there is no conviction in all this. He has no sense of the spirituality and extent of the divine law. He has no sense of the deep depravity of his own heart. He is not sensible of any enmity of heart against God. He thinks he is growing better, and doing many things acceptable to God. And not unfrequently, when he has continued this course a short time, he begins to think he has become truly religious. He cherishes a hope that his sins are forgiven, and that God is his friend, and begins to love him with great ardour. But when the work is genuine, it goes deeper. The sinner discovers that the law of God is spiritual and holy, and extends much farther than he had before thought. He sees that it reaches to every secret desire and purpose of the soul, and requires perfect obedience, on pain of eternal death. In the light of the law, thus set home upon his conscience, he obtains a new discovery of the temper of his own heart. He sees that it is all sin. He now realizes that he has done nothing but sin all his life. He now sees that his heart is enmity against God; and considering himself in God's hands, and that God will probably destroy him forever, to glorify his own great name, he feels his heart rise, and rage, with a spite and malice, of which he before thought himself incapable. He no longer denies the doctrine of total depravity. He knows it is true in his own case. He sees that all his prayers and tears and cries have been selfish and wicked. He is no longer able to |