never been registered, and that, consequently, he, Plaintiff, had a right to be preferred to Opposant on the monies returned by the sheriff for the whole amount of his claim, with the exception of the sum of £49 6s 5d, amount of the obligation of the 30th January 1826, which had been registered.

Opposant, by his answer, pretented that the registration of the deed of 1826 was equivalent to registration of the original deed of the 19th March, 1782, and that the effect of such registration was to preserve the rights and privileges of Opposant as well in said capital sum as on the interests then actually due or thereafter to become due.

DAY, Justice: The only question is as to the pretension of Opposant, that the registration of the deed of 1826 is equivalent to registration of the orignal deed, and gives him a right to claim the principal of the rent and the arrears subsequently accrued. The court are against this pretension. (1) Looking at the obligation of 1826, we are satisfied that it did not amount, even between the parties to it, to a deed of recognition. There is no place or date mentioned, and the original obligation is only referred to in the most general terms. There is nothing in it to show an intention to recognize a former deed; and, when it is considered that the object here is to bind a third party, we can have no doubt on the subject. But, if we leave general reasoning, and turn to the fourth clause of the Registry Act (2), we there find that registration is required by memorial or by deed at length, and it does not say that a mere reference in one deed to another deed is sufficient. The contestation therefore, must be maintained, and the opposition dismissed, except as regards the arrears of rente previous to 1826.

The judgment is as follows: Considering that it doth not appear that the acte de constitution de rente in said opposition, mentioned, was at the time registered, and that, by reason thereof and by law, the same is void and of no effect against any subsequent mortgagee or hypothecary creditor, and that Opposant hath no right to be paid, by preference, as an hypothecary creditor of Defendant, out of the monies for the distribution of which said report of collocation was made, any other sum than the sum of £49 6 5, amount for which the acte of obligation by him in the said cause filed was made and executed, for arrears of the rent therein specified, doth maintain the contestation by Plaintiff of said report of collocation. Re

(1) L'enregistrement d'un transport d'une créance hypothécaire, ne constitue pas un enregistrement de cette créance, quoique l'acte de transport recite l'acte constitutif de la créance cédéc. (Girard vs. Paquet, C. B. R., Québec, mai 1845, 2 R. J. R. Q., p. 21.)

(2) Ord. 4 Vict., cap. xxx.

port of collocation ordered to be reformed accordingly. (3 D. T. B. C., p. 84.)

DRUMMOND, LORANGER and DUNLOP, for Plaintiff.
LAFONTAINE and BERTHELOT, for Opposant.

TEMOIN.-RESPONSABILITE.

SUPERIOR COURT, Montreal, 7 janvier 1851.

Before DAY, SMITH and MONDELET, Justices.

ROCHON vs. FRASER.

Jugé: Qu'une personne ne peut être poursuivie pour dommages à raison de paroles par elle prononcées en rendant témoignage devant une Cour de Justice. (1)

Action for verbal slander, alleged to have been uttered in the Court of Quarter Sessions, at Montreal, in the course of evidence which Defendant was giving as a witness, the words complained of being to the effect that Plaintiff" était un mal"honnête homme; qu'il était capable de faire un faux serment; que lui, le Demandeur, avait juré faux deux fois, en sa pré"sence, à lui, dit Défendeur."

Defendant pleaded, and it appeared that the words were spoken by him as a witness in the Quarter Sessions, in a cause in which Plaintiff was complainant, and that they had been elicited chiefly by the cross-examination of the witness by the Counsel of the Complainant.

(1) Le juge, même lorsqu'il excède ses pouvoirs et agit avec malice, n'est pas responsable en dommage. Le juré d'un coroner n'encourt aucune responsabilité, pour ce qu'il fait dans les limites de ses fonctions. C'est le droit anglais qu'on doit suivre, quant à sa responsabilité. Lorsqu'il agit dans les limites de ses fonctions, il est présumé le faire sans malice, et cette présomption n'admet aucune preuve au contraire. Aucun rapport d'un juré ne peut constituer un libelle. La malice en fait signifie un sentiment de malignité ou de mauvais vouloir. Ce n'est pas la signification de la malice en loi. Dans une action pour poursuite malicieuse, si la partie a agi avec cause probable, quoiqu'elle l'ait fait avec malice, elle n'est pas responsable. La signification ordinaire de la malice n'est pas la même en loi. La malice en droit est l'absence de justification légale. Celui qui fait tort à un autre, sans justification, est responsable. La question n'est pas de savoir quels sentiments l'ont animé, mais s'il a agi avec justification légale. Dans le cas d'un juré, la justification consiste dans le fait qu'il a agi comme juré. Le juré d'un coroner, qui, dans un rapport spécial, signé par plusieurs d'entre eux, fait des remarques, comportant qu'un témoin entendu devant eux s'est parjuré, n'est pas responsable vis-à-vis de ce témoin. Si un grand juré déclare qu'un acte d'accusation n'a pas été rapporté comme vrai, parce qu'un témoin s'est parjuré, ou, si un petit juré déclare qu'un verdict ne peut être rapporté pour la même raison, ni l'un ni l'autre n'encourt de responsabilité, pas plus que le juge, qui, en rendant son jugement en donne les motifs, le cas du juré et du juge est le même. Le juré est protégé, même lors qu'il agit dans la minorité. La protection de la loi est pour chaque juré individuellement. (Simard vs. Jenkins, C. S Montréal, 20 février 1851, Day, J., Smith, J., et Mondelet, J., 2 R. J. R. Q., p. 354.)

DAY, Justice, in giving the judgment, said: There is no doubt that the exception pleaded is sufficient in law, and sufficiently proved to exempt Defendant from responsibility in damages. I am of opinion that a witness is never liable in damages for what he says in that capacity. The law protects him in this respect. If he swears falsely, he is liable to be indicted for perjury, but cannot be held liable in damages. (1)

MONDELET, Justice, concurring in the judgement: I dissent from the broad general principle laid down by the President of the court. I cannot go so far as to say that a witness may say anything he likes in the witness box, without punishment. Any man who, with malice, causes injury to his neighbour is responsible for the injury he causes. To maintain the contrary would be most dangerous. A witness should not take advantage of his position to defame. If he becomes “accusateur malicieux," he is responsible.

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The following is the Judgment: "Considering that the words in Plaintiff's declaration set forth and complained of, were, in so far as the same are proved to have been spoken by Defendant, so spoken in the course of evidence by him given as a witness under examination in a Court of Justice, and "that, by law, he is not liable to be impleaded or sued in damages by reason thereof, doth dismiss the said action. (3 D. T. B. C., p. 87.)

OUIMET, A. & G., for Plaintiff.

BETHUNE & DUNKIN, for Defendant.

PROCEDURE. ENQUETE.

SUPERIOR COURT, Montreal, 23 novembre 1852.

Before DAY & MONDELET, Justices.

WRIGLEY v8. TUCKER.

Juge: Que lorsqu'une objection à l'enquête a été décidée et maintenue, et que la partie adverse a procédé à l'examen du témoin, et que la déposition a été close sans aucune réserve, la cour ne recevra pas une motion pour reviser la décision du juge donnée à l'enquête.

Motion to revise a ruling at enquête. Plaintiff's Attorney had put a question to a witness, which was objected to, and the objection maintained; whereupon, he proceeded with the examination of the witness, whose deposition was afterwards closed without any reservation. He now moved to revise the order of the judge at enquête.

(1) 6 Dalloz, Dict. General, Supplement, verbo Presse, Nos. 5, 20 et 28.

PER CURIAM: The motion comes too late. The deposition being closed, the witness is out of the hands of the court. Plaintiff's counsel should have stopped the examination, or reserved his right.

The following is the Judgment: The court having heard the parties upon the motion of Plaintiff of 9th November instant, that the court do reverse the ruling in this cause made and rendered, by the judge presiding at enquete sittings, on the 6th November instant, maintaining the objection made and taken by and on behalf of Defendant, at and upon the examination in chief of Edward T. Taylor, a witness produced and examined in this cause on behalf of Plaintiff, to the question in the said motion set forth, examined the proceedings and deliberated; considering that the examination of said witness hath been completed, and his deposition finally closed, without the reservation of any right to the further examination of said witness, upon the question in said motion specified, doth reject said motion. (3 D. T. B. C., p. 89.)

MACKAY and AUSTIN, for Plaintiff.
BETHUNE and DUNKIN, for Defendant.

REVENDICATION.-PREUVE.

SUPERIOR COURT, Montreal, 16 mars 1852.

Before DAY and SMITH, Justices.

THE BRITISH AMERICAN LAND COMPANY, vs. STIMPSON.

Sur demande en revendication contre un individu qui a coupé du bois sans autorisation, sur des terres incultes, les Demandeurs établissent suffisamment leur droit de propriété en prouvant des actes de possession en différents temps, sans produire de titres.

This was an action commenced in April, 1851, by a saisierevendication of 68 trees of pine timber, converted into logs, alleged by Plaintiffs to be their property and unlawfully in the possession of Defendant.

The declaration alleged the possession of Plaintiffs at the time of the institution of the action and for upwards of thirty years before, of lots 1 and 10 in the 8th range of lots in the Township of Roxton, that Defendant had, within six months before the action commenced, without authority, cut and removed 68 trees from these lots: that, by the cutting and removal of the trees, Plaintiffs had suffered £25 cy., of damages, over and above the value of the trees.

Besides the ordinary conclusions of a declaration en saisie

revendication, the declaration prayed that the Defendant might be condemned to pay £25, for damages, and. in default of his giving up the trees, that he might be condemned to pay £68, as the value of the trees, besides the damages.

Defendant,by a first plea, denied that Plaintiffs were possessed of the land, or that he cut the trees on these lots, and, further, averred that he purchased the trees in good faith from divers parties in Roxton, and had paid the full market price, and that the trees were worth £10 cy., and no more.

In evidence, it appeared that the land from which the trees had been taken was wild, and Plaintiffs han no title to file, and in fact no letters patent had ever issued from the Crown Lands Department, for these lots: but the proprietorship of Plaintiffs was made out, in the opinion of the court, by evidence of acts of possession during eighteen years, all tending to establish the presumption that they were proprietors, by a survey of the whole range having been made in 1844, by a surveyor, under the directions of Plaintiffs, by the tenants of Plaintiffs occupying different portions of the range under the survey, by Plaintiffs having been in the habit of advertising these lands for sale, by their paying road taxes, making a road along the range, selling timber, interfering with trespassers, and getting compensation from them. (1)

There was also in evidence a lease by Plaintiffs of a portion of lot No. 1 to a farmer, but not that portion on which the trespass had been committed. The proprietorship of lot No. 10 was further shewn by a lease from Plaintiffs to a party whom in fact Defendant had employed to supply him with a portion of the timber.

The court considered that Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged and proved possession. They also held Defendant to be in had faith, although he had bought the logs from third parties as was proved, and condemned him to deliver up the logs, and further to pay £10, for damages done the land, and in default of his giving up the logs, to pay £27 3 9 as their value, beside £10 for damages. (3 D. T. B. C., p. 90.)

TORRANCE, F. W., for Plaintiffs.

DRUMMOND and LORANGER, for Defendant.

(1) As to what are actes of possession, Vide Merlin, Rep. verbo Complainte p. 290.