poignant regret to the spirit and conduct of his early days, when he had borne so conspicuous a part in opposing the gospel of Christ. He wonders that one so guilty should have become the object of Divine compassion; and still more that he should have been designated to the apostolic office. “I thank Christ Jesus our Lord, who hath enabled me, for that he counted me faithful, putting me into the ministry, who was before a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and injurious.' How touching is this penitent allusion to a series of actions, in which he had once gloried as deeds of highest service to God and to the religion of his fathers! Scarcely less affecting is the tone in which he introduces his own testimony to the miracle of the Saviour's resurrection from the dead: “ Last of all he was seen of me also, as of one born out of due time. For I am the least of all the apostles, which am not meet to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the church of God."2 Hence it appears, on his own confession, that his conduct had been highly culpable, even when he was acting from a sense of duty. He deplores, as aggravated crimes, the acts which he once admired as virtues. His zeal for God, his excessive attachment to the tradition of the fathers, his indefatigable labours to eradicate what he called heresy, his willingness to adventure his own life in maintaining the religious principles in which he

1 Tim. i. 12, 13.

21 Cor. xv. 8, 9.

had been educated, now seemed to him nothing better than grievous offences against God. Those things which once were gain to him-among which he expressly mentions his zeal in persecuting the church-he now resolved to count but loss for Christ.1 What a change then appears to have taken place, in his estimate of duty and of sin! By what different standards did he judge his principles and conduct, before and after his conversion! In what different language did conscience speak within the same breast, on different sides of that boundary which divides the kingdom of darkness from the kingdom of God's dear Son! The conscience of Paul the servant of Christ, condemns the decision of the conscience of Saul of Tarsus, and pronounces judgment on the acts which it had instigated and sanctioned. Yet let the ground of this condemnation be distinctly kept in mind. He does not censure himself for having acted conscientiously, but for having acted sinfully. We shall still further clear our way to a satisfactory solution of the difficulty before us, by the observation

II. That it is less sinful to err in conformity with, than in contradiction to the dictates of conscience. If we suppose, for example, the sin of persecution to originate from any other conceivable motive than that of conscience, we shall instantly invest it with much darker moral pro

1 Phil. iii. 5-7.

perties. And the same remark is applicable to every other criminal act for which conscience can in any way be pleaded. Let the persecutor be imagined as acting from natural cruelty and severity of temper, from envy of superior excellence, from malignant feelings, from proud impatience of contradiction, from vehement enmity against God and religion, from a sneering and affectedly philosophical contempt for divine truth, or let him be supposed to act from avaricious motives, and even from a mere love of ease which will not allow the slightest disturbance of the existing course of things-any of these motives-some in a much greater degree than others-will clearly augment the guilt of the act. It is the adding of sin to sin, and darkening the shadow of one fault, by casting over it that of a still greater.

But let the same persecuting act be regarded as originating in a decision of the conscience, whether it has, for its supposed object, the public good, or the glory of God, the present or the eternal welfare of mankind,-we discern a principle combined with the persecuting spirit, which instead of increasing, abates its guilt, though it may not always abate its rigour.

These remarks show, that conscience, even where it is misled, and consequently misleads its possessor, is still a very different principle of the mind from passion, pride, cruelty and selfishness, and is evidently, even in its fall and ruin, superior in every respect to them all. The case then, un

der review, does not prove that conscience is destitute of the right to govern our other faculties; it only proves-what may not be denied, but must be strenuously contended for-that the best and highest principle in our nature, needs something better and higher than itself, for our guidance in the infinitely important questions of religion. We are now prepared to advance to our third remark; which is,

III. That whenever conscience is found giving allowance or encouragement to evil, this may be accounted for, without rendering its authority ques

tionable.

It will not be disputed, that reason ought to govern human conduct in all transactions relating to the present world. Yet a man's reason is often defective, its conclusions often unsound, and the course of action resulting from it often. wrong. Shall we thence infer, that it were better not to consult so fallacious a guide?-better to act against its determinations?-better to follow some other propension of our nature?-This would be too absurd to pass for argument. It might justly be answered by alleging Reason is the best natural faculty I possess, if it would mislead me, any other would mislead me still more. Amidst conductors confessedly imperfect, I must follow the wisest. I ought to do all I can to gain additional light, but I must not extinguish the glimmering taper which will still conduct me to some just conclusions, though it may not be competent to every service I

wish it to fulfil. Let not reason be abandoned or dethroned, for then inevitable confusion will succeed; let me rather try to train and educate it for its post, than to deprive it of its power.'

If conscience be here substituted for reason, and the affairs of the soul and of eternity for the concerns of the present life, no change whatever is necessary in the argument. Let it be granted, that conscience is often ill-formed, often weak, often led astray, still it is the only part of our mental constitution which brings us into immediate connexion with things eternal and divine ; and shall we snap the link which binds us to the spiritual world? shall we refuse to listen to the voice, or to own the authority of conscience? Rather let us learn what it needs to rectify its mistakes, to heal its wounds, and to render it a safe, a holy and an enlightened guide.

It is a general rule laid down by Bishop Taylor, that in the decisions of conscience, 'what is first is truest, easiest, and most useful.' A little consideration will show the great practical importance of this rule. To act upon it firmly and decidedly) would nearly supersede the whole of that most perplexing and unsatisfactory code of laws, which fills up voluminous works on casuistry. The rule, however, let it be observed, is not, that what is first thought of, or first designed, but what conscience first approves, is best. If we consult incli

1 Duct. Dub. Works, Vol. X1. 421.