it will be necessary to attend to the reasoning and conclusions of Bishop Butler, who has brought the energies of his singularly capacious intellect, to bear closely upon the subject. He shows most clearly, that we can obtain no accurate conception of the mind and its faculties, by merely examining those faculties in detail, nor yet by considering them all together, unless we are also careful to observe the mutual relations which they bear to each other. Man has various passions and appetites which impel him to seek present gratification, without regard to consequences. This is one part of his nature. But he has a check on these propensities, in that cool and temperate regard to his own interests, which teaches him to weigh future consequences against present indulgences; and this is as much a part of his nature as his passions themselves are, even though it may be often overborne by their headstrong impetuosity. And not only is this prudent self-love a part of man's nature, as well as the passions to which it is opposed; but it has an acknowledged right of superiority over them. So that even those persons who allow themselves to be hurried away by impulses of passion, confess they ought to have listened to the dictates of prudence. That is, they confess that the right of their different mental powers to govern, does not depend upon the degree of strength which these powers may happen 1 Preface to Sermons. Works, Vol. II. p. ix. to possess, but upon some essential difference in their nature. Further, we have seen that man has various affections, which lead him to do good to his kind; and these affections, though they may often be blasted by a withering selfishness, yet evidently hold a place of rightful superiority over that principle by which they are thus violently suppressed and overcome. They ought to be obeyed and respected; and the man who, in practice, most audaciously violates them, yet owns their right, while giving such abundant evidence, in his own case, of their weakness. To ascend, however, one step higher in our argument: there is in man a principle of reflection, or conscience, which claims and is entitled to the supremacy over all these powers. It is not merely a faculty among the rest: it is a faculty above them all. If we regard conscience as nothing more than an associate and equal of the other powers of the mind, then, though sometimes one and sometimes the other should prevail, man would, under all the unaccountable changes produced by such a confused mass of equal and conflicting faculties, still be acting according to the constitution of his nature. But no such equality exists; there is the most obvious subordination of one set of faculties to another, and of the whole to conscience. Hence man never acts according to that mental constitution with which the Author of his being has endowed him; but when he yields 1 to conscience the supreme authority over all the rest of his faculties, or, in other words, when he is determined in all his conduct, not by passion, nor self-interest, nor affection, but by a sense of duty. Thus speaks Butler: 'The very constitution of our nature requires, that we bring our whole conduct before this superior faculty; wait its determination; enforce upon ourselves its authority, and make it the business of our lives, as it is absolutely the whole business of a moral agent, to conform ourselves to it. This is the true meaning of that ancient precept, Reverence thyself. And again: There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man, which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions; which passes judgment upon himself and them; pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust; which, without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him the doer of them accordingly.' 'It is by this faculty, natural to man, that he is a moral agent, that he is a law to himself; but this faculty, I say, is not to be considered merely as a principle in his heart, which is to have some influence as well as others; but considered as a faculty in kind and in nature supreme over all others, and which bears its own 1 Preface to Butler's Sermons, vol. ii. p. xv. authority of being so.'1 This faculty was placed within to be our proper governor; to direct and regulate all under principles, passions, and motives of action. This is its right and office; thus sacred is its authority. And how often soever men violate and rebelliously refuse to submit to it, for supposed interest which they cannot otherwise obtain, or for the sake of passion which they cannot otherwise gratify; this makes no alteration as to the natural right and office of conscience." 6 2 ... Every bias, instinct, propension within, is a natural part of our nature, but not the whole; add to these the superior faculty, whose office it is to adjust, manage, and preside over them, and take in this its natural superiority, and you complete the idea of human nature. And as in civil government the constitution is broken in upon and violated by power and strength prevailing over authority, so the constitution of man is broken in upon and violated by the lower faculties or principles within prevailing over that which is in its nature supreme over them all.'3 In answer to the question, What obligations are we under to follow the rule of right which conscience prescribes?' he says: 'Your obligation to obey this law, is its being the law of your nature. That your conscience approves of and attests to such a course of action, is itself alone an 1 Butler's Sermons. Works, vol. ii. p. 31. 2 Ibid. p. 37. obligation. Conscience does not only offer itself to shew us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority with it, that it is our natural guide-the guide assigned us by the Author of our nature. It therefore belongs to our condition of being, it is our duty to walk in that path, and follow this guide, without looking about to see whether we may not possibly forsake them with impunity." The same argument is fully stated by Dr. Chalmers, in his excellent chapter 'On the Supremacy of Conscience.' He compares its office to that of a regulator in a watch: In every human heart,' he observes, there is a faculty-not, it may be, having the actual power, but having the just and rightful pretension to sit as judge and master over the whole of human conduct. Other propensities may have too much sway, but the moral propensity, if I may so term it, never can; for to have the presiding sway in all our concerns, is just that which properly and legitimately belongs to it. A man under anger may be too strongly prompted to deeds of retaliation, or under sensuality be too strongly prompted to indulgence, or under avarice be too strongly addicted to the pursuit of wealth, or even under friendship be too strongly inclined to partiality; but he can never, under conscience, be too strongly inclined to be as he ought and to do as he ought. We may say of a watch that its 1 Ibid p. 43. |