nineteen and two one-hundredths dollars ($19.02) damages, and costs, taxed at sixty-seven and sixty-eight onehundredths dollars ($67.68); total, eighty-six and seventy one-hundredths dollars ($86.70). Said judgment was not written up till August 22, 1892, as the court was engaged in other cases, and could not write it up sooner.

"Dated August 22, 1892.

"ELIJAH BARTON, Justice of the Peace."

The contention of the appellant is that upon the return of the verdict the justice should have rendered his judgment thereon instantly, and entered the same in his docket, and that, not having done so until August 22d, he lost jurisdiction of the case; and to sustain this position he cites the General Statutes of 1878, chapter 65, section 68, which is as follows: "In cases where the plaintiff is nonsuited or withdraws his action, or where judgment is confessed and in all cases where a verdict 60 is rendered, the justice shall forthwith render judgment and enter the same in his docket."

The twenty-first day of August, 1892, was Sunday. Of this fact the court will take judicial notice. Under the laws of this state no one of the courts is allowed to be open on Sunday for the purpose of rendering judgments. The act of the justice in writing up the judgment was performed on the first court day after the return of the verdict. There are several cases decided by the supreme court of Wisconsin where it was held, in construing a statute like ours, that upon the return of the verdict the justice must render judgment upon the same instantly. The supreme court of Iowa held to the contrary in the case of Burchett v. Casady, 18 Iowa, 344, where it is decided that the word "forthwith," in such a statute, means within a reasonable time. We think that the ends of justice will be better subserved by a liberal and equitable construction of the law and practice relating to justice's courts than by the adoption of a harsh and unbending rule of strict construction. We therefore hold that the word "forthwith," in the section of our statute quoted, means, as there used, that the judgment must be rendered within a reasonable time after the return of the verdict. What constitutes such reasonable time will depend on the circumstances surrounding each particular case. There should be no unreasonable delay. In this case it appears that at the time of the return of the verdict the justice was engaged in hearing other

ment sooner.

cases, and was thereby prevented from rendering his judg That he used reasonable diligence and exertion in the performance of his duty seems unquestionable, and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

JUDGMENT OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE-TIME OF ENTRY.-The justice must enter judgment at once in accordance with the verdict: In re Dance, 2 N. Dak. 184; 33 Am. St. Rep. 768. A delay of ninety days will render it void: Tomlinson v. Litze, 82 Iowa, 32; 31 Am. St. Rep. 458. If the statute requires him to render it within a given time he cannot do so afterward: Sibley v. Howard, 3 Denio, 72; 45 Am. Dec. 448. If the statute requires him to render it "forthwith," and he at once renders judgment after verdict, the judgment will not be reversed because it was not entered in the docket until two or three days afterward: Hall v. Tuttle, 6 Hill, 38; 40 Am. Dec. 382.

UNION CENTRAL LIFE INSURANCE Co. v. TAGGART.

[55 MINNESOTA, 95.]

INSURANCE - PAYMENT OF PREMIUM BY PROMISSORY NOTES-CONSIDER. ATION.-Though one of the conditions of an insurance policy is that it "shall not be valid or binding until the first premium is paid," if it is silent as to the mode of payment, promissory notes received by the company, even in the absence of any express agreement, must be deemed to have been accepted in payment of the premium. The policy is binding, and is a valid consideration for the notes.

ACTION on certain promissory notes given in payment of a premium on an insurance policy. The plaintiff insured defendant's life, one of the conditions of the policy being that it should not be valid until the first year's premium was paid. Defendant paid part of it in cash, and gave his three promissory notes for the remainder. Suit was brought upon the notes after maturity and plaintiff obtained judgment. Defendant moved for a new trial. His motion was denied and he appealed.

J. F. Keene, for the appellant.

Charles P. Barker, for the respondent.

96 MITCHELL, J. The notes in suit were executed for part of the first year's premium on a policy of insurance on the life of the defendant. One of the conditions annexed to the policy was that it "shall not be valid or binding until the first premium is paid to the company or its authorized agent." The main contention of the defendant, and the only one we deem it necessary to consider, is that there was

an entire want of consideration for the notes, for the reason that, under the condition quoted, the policy never became operative, because the first year's premium had not been paid in cash. There is clearly nothing in this point.

It is usually provided that the policy, though delivered, shall not be binding until the premium is paid; and, where this is the case, the policy does not take effect, even though delivered, until the provision is complied with. But the mode of payment of the premium is immaterial if it be accepted by the company or its agent, and no special mode be provided for in the policy. The policy was silent as to the mode of payment. It was delivered with a receipt for the first year's premium attached, countersigned by the company's agent who accepted defendant's notes for part of it. On this state of facts, even in the absence of any express agreement to that effect, the company must, in judgment of law, be deemed to have accepted the notes in payment of the premium: See Tayloe v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., 9 How. 390-402.

97 This constituted a consideration for the notes. There is no other point in the case worthy of any special consideration. Order affirmed.

INSURANCE-VALID PAYMENT OF PREMIUM.-ACCEPTANCE OF A PROMISSORY NOTE for the premium is a waiver of the condition for prepayment of the premium on an insurance policy, and a payment in accordance with a custom to give credit, even after a loss, will be valid in spite of a provision in the policy avoiding it for nonpayment of premium: Lebanon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoover, 113 Pa. St. 591; 57 Am. Rep. 511, and note.

SCHILLING V. MULLEN.

[55 MINNESOTA, 122.]

ASSIGNMENT OF PART OF CLAIM, Demand, or OBLIGATION may be made, and the courts will recognize and protect the equitable interest of the assignee. ASSIGNMENT OF PART OF CLAIM-ACTION.-If part of an obligation or demand has been assigned the assignee can maintain an action to recover his share by joining the assignor and assignee as plaintiffs; or, if the former does not join, by making him a defendant, so that the whole controversy may be settled in one suit.

NOTICE OF AN ASSIGNMENT OF A DEMAND OR OBLIGATION, or a part thereof, given to the debtor, tixes the rights of the parties, and protects the assignee.

ASSIGNMENT OF PART OF DEMAND-NOTICE-PAYMENT.-A debtor making payment in full to his creditor after notice that a part of the obligation has been assigned, is still liable to the assignee for his share of the claim.

ACTION by plaintiff to recover his part of a claim assigned to him. The defendant McFadden, in January, 1892, sold and delivered to defendant Mullen his confectionery store. McFadden was then employed by Mullen as a clerk at a salary of eighteen dollars a week. A few days after this arrangement the plaintiff recovered a judgment against McFadden, and instituted proceedings supplemental to execution. In February, 1892, McFadden settled by assigning to plaintiff fifteen dollars a month of his salary, and by giving an order on Mullen to pay that amount each month out of his salary to plaintiff, until the judgment should be paid. On the next day plaintiff notified Mullen of the assignment, and gave him a copy of the order. These monthly installments were demanded as they became due, but nothing was obtained. In the following December plaintiff requested McFadden, who was still at work for Mullen, to unite with him in an action against Mullen to recover the money, but he refused. Plaintiff then brought an action against Mullen, and joined McFadden as a codefendant. Mullen answered, by way of counterclaim, that McFadden was owing him one hundred dollars, when the copy of the order was handed to him, no part of which had been paid. He further answered that on March 10, 1892, McFadden revoked the order and directed him to pay the plaintiff nothing, and demanded that his wages be paid to him personally each week, and that he had accordingly paid McFadden in full. McFadden answered that Mullen had paid him for his services in full as the services were performed, and owed him nothing. There was entered a judgment for plaintiff on the pleadings, and Mullen appealed.

Leon T. Chamberlain, for the appellant.

Johnson W. Straight and Leonard A. Straight, for the respondent.

125 COLLINS, J. In Canty v. Latterner, 31 Minn. 242, it was determined, in accordance with the weight of authority, that an assignment of a part interest in a demand or obligation might be made, and that the courts would recognize and protect the equitable interest of the assignee. This doctrinewas referred to in Dean v. St. Paul etc. R. R. Co., 53 Minn. 504, where the real question was whether a separate and independent action could be maintained by the assignee to recover his share of the demand, the debtor refusing to recog

nize the assignment. The conclusion of the court was that such an action would not lie, but it was said, in substance, that where the assignor and assignee were joined as plaintiffs, or the former, not joining, was made a defendant, so that the whole controver y might be settled in one suit, the action could be sustained. By means of proper allegations in the complaint the assignor, McFadden, was made a party defendant to this action, and on this branch of the case the court below ruled correctly when ordering judgment for plaintiffs on the pleadings.

In addition to the one just disposed of, several points are made by appellant's counsel, only one of which needs special consideration. The others are without merit. The plaintiff's claim was a little less than one hundred dollars when they obtained the assignment from defendant McFadden. In his answer defendant Mullen alleged that prior to the time of the execution and delivery of such assignment, and consequently before he had notice of it, McFadden had received from him a sum exceeding one hundred dollars upon a promise to return and repay the same; that he had not returned or repaid any part thereof; and that the whole remained due and unpaid. These allegations constituted, it is claimed, a complete defense to plaintiffs' cause of action, because they would have been a perfect defense, by way of counterclaim, if found in an answer interposed in an action for services brought by McFadden against Mullen.

From the pleadings in this action it clearly appears that under McFadden's contract with Mullen the former had earned a trifle less than eight hundred dollars between the day upon which due notice of the assignment 126 was served on the latter and the day this action was brought, some eleven months, and it was alleged in Mullen's answer that he had fully paid McFadden for the services admitted to have been rendered, as before stated, so that it may be taken as conclusively shown that, when this action was commenced, the former was indebted to the latter about seven hundred dollars, over and above all setoffs, or that, subsequent to notice of the assignment, he had paid over about that sum to McFadden, ignoring the fact, which had been brought to his knowledge, that these plaintiffs had an assignment for a por tion of it. If he still owes the amount earned, the plaintiffs are entitled to the sum which McFadden assigned and ordered to be paid over to them. If, upon the other hand, Mullen has