CHAPTER XI.

THE PLAN OF THE BRIGADIERS

HE letter written by General Wolfe, although not dated, appears to have been sent to General Monckton on the 29th of August.

The answer which followed, and the plan proposed in consequence, have caused much confusion and many errors have resulted therefrom.

These mistakes will be pointed out in their proper place. General Wolfe's letter read as follows:

"Head Quarters Montmorency Augst. 1759.

"To The Brigadiers,

"That the public Service may not suffer by the Gen"erals indisposition, He begs the Brigadiers will be so good to meet, and consult together for the public Utility "and advantage, and to consider of the best method of "attacking the Enemy.

"If the French Army is attacked and defeated, the "General concludes the town would immediately sur"render, because He does not find they have any provi"sions in the place

"The General is of opinion the army should be attackt "in preference to the place, because of the difficulties of penetrating from the lower to the upper Town, in which attempt neither the Guns of the Shipping, or of our own "Batteries could be of much use

"There appears three methods of attacking this Army. "Ist In dry weather a large detachment may march in a day and a night so as to arrive at Beauport (fording "the Montmorency 8 or 9 Miles up) before day in the "morning-it is likely they could be discover'd upon this (( March on both sides the River. If such a detachment penetrates to their intrenchment and the rest of the "Troops are ready, the consequence is plain

"2dly If the troops encamped here passed the Ford with "the falling Water and in the night march on directly "towards the point of Beauport, the light Infantry have a good Chance to get up the Woody Hill, trying different places and moving quick to the Right, would soon discover proper places for the rest. The upper Redoubts "must be attackt and kept by a company of Grenadiers. Brigadier Monkton must be ready off the point of Beauport to land when our people have got up the Hill, for "which Signals may be appointed

"3dly All the chosen Troops of the Army attack at the Beauport at Low water- a division across the Ford an "hour before the other attack.

"N: B: For the 1st it is enough if the Water begins to "fall a little before day light or about it. For the other (( two it would be best to have it low water about half an "hour before day. The General thinks the Country should

"be ruined and destroyed, as much as can be done con"sistant with a more capital opperation.

"N. There are guides in the Army for the detachment " in question."

From the text of another document we find that the answer of the Brigadiers was sent on the 30th of August. Answer of the Brigadiers

To General Wolfe

"The natural Strength of the Enemy's situation, between the River St Charles and the Montmorency, now im"proved by all the Art of their Engineers, makes the "defeat of the French Army if attackt there very doubtful. "The advantage their easy communication on Shore has (6 over our Attacks from Boats and the Ford of the Montmorency is evident from late experience, and it cannot be "denied that That part of the Army which is proposed to "March thro' the Woods nine miles up the Montmorency "to surprize their Army is exposed to certain discovery, "and consequently to the continual dis-advantage of a Wood fight-But allowing we got footing on the Beauport side, "the M. de Montcalm will certainly still have it in his power to dispute the passage of the St Charles, till the place is supplied with two months provisions (the utmost you can lye before it) from the Ships and Magazines "above from which it appears they draw their subsistance. We, therefore, are of Opinion that the most probable "method of striking an effectual Blow is by bringing the "Troops to the South shore and directing our opperations

"above the Town. When we have established ourselves on "the North Shore, of which there is very little doubt, the "M. de Montcalm must fight us upon our own terms, we "are between Him and his provisions and betwixt him "and the French army opposing General Amhurst. If "He gives us Battle and we defeat Him Quebec must be (( ours, and which is more all Canada must submit to His "Majesty's arms, a different Case from any advantage we can hope for at Beauport, and should the Enemy pass "the St Charles with Force sufficient to oppose this opper"ation, we can still with more ease and probability of success execute your third proposition, (in our Opinion the "most eligible of the three you have made) or any other attempt on the Beauport shore, necessarily weakened by "the detachments made to oppose us above the Town.

"With respect to the expediency of making an imme"diate attack, or the postponing it to be able the more "effectually to prevent the Harvest and destroy the Colony; or with a view of facilitating the opperations of our "Armies now advancing into the Heart of the Country, we cannot take upon us to advise, altho' we cannot but be "convinced that a decisive affair to our disadvantage must "enable the Enemy to make head against the army under "the Command of General Amhurst already far advanced "by the diversion this Army has made on this side"

Wolfe's letter and the answer of the Brigadiers have been published several times, but we are unable to say with certainty whether the "Plan of Opperations in consequence of the above answer" has ever been published until quite recently. It appears It appears in the "Military Life of Field