Wolfe's answer to this communication dated on board the Sutherland at 81⁄2 o'clock, on the 12th of Sept, however, settles the question beyond dispute. The general addresses his remarks to Brigadier Monckton whom he informs that the place of attack is the Foulon, situate about 2 miles from Quebec. He states also that when chosing the place he took Capt. Shads with him and also the Admiral.

He then designates the exact spot where they are to land and concludes by saying:

"It is not a usual thing to point out in the public orders "the direct spot of our attack, nor for any inferior officers not charged with a particular duty to ask instructions upon that point. I had the honour to inform you to day "that it is my duty to attack the French Army. To the "best of my knowledge and abilities, I have fixed upon "that spot where we can act with the most force and are most likely to succeed. If I am mistaken, I am sorry "for it and must be answerable to His Majesty and the public for the consequence."

In addition to this letter Wolfe addressed a brief communication at the same time to Townshend giving him instructions regarding the troops, and it is the termination of this document which Colonel Townshend publishes as a part of the " Plan of Operations."

It is true that the Brigadiers had prepared a plan of attack based on the lines indicated.

They proposed to make a descent on the north shore, twelve miles above Quebec, and all the details were arranged and assented to by Wolfe in the early days of September.

However, on the 10th of the month, three days before the

battle he reconnoitered the north shore himself, and at once discarded the plan of the Brigadiers and selected the Foulon as the place of attack.

As early as the eighteenth day of July when the first ships passed the town, more than a month before the date of the Brigadiers' plan, he had considered the advisability of making an attack in the vicinity of Foulon. In the Journal of an officer of Fraser's regiment we find this entry on the 18th of July :

"This morning General Wolfe reconnoitred the oppo"site or north shore above the town: seems to think a landing practicable. In the afternoon Major Dalling "marched with two companys along the south shore three "miles to the westward of our post, in order to look for places most convenient for the troops to ascend on the (( north shore. He found two or three."

Wolfe's attention at this time was directed to Montmorency where he determined to make an attack, but it is evident that the idea of attempting the north shore above the town did not emanate from the plan which we have quoted, for an inspection of the ground had been made long before the document in question was prepared.

If Wolfe had followed the suggestions of his Brigadiers, and made a descent twelve miles above the town, he would have had to encounter the force of Bougainville at Cap Rouge, but by the clever ruse which he adopted on the morning of the thirteenth of drawing Bougainville's force nearly twenty miles up the river, while his own army gained the heights within a mile and a half from the town, he not only disposed of a powerful foe in the meantime,

but he was able to occupy a commanding position within three quarters of a mile from the town batteries.

Wolfe's sudden rejection of the plan of the Brigadiers after all the details had been arranged naturally caused a feeling of resentment at the moment, and protests were made. This may have been the reason why Wolfe did not disclose his plan more fully to his officers at the time. He certainly had the utmost confidence in his Brigadiers as soldiers and neither he nor they would allow any personal feeling to interfere with their efforts in behalf of the cause in which they were engaged. Their letter to Wolfe clearly shows this, and the General's answer proves that he had not abandoned their plan in a spirit of jealousy, but simply for what he considered to be the good of the service. The Brigadiers had become accustomed to the independent actions of Wolfe, and they frequently did not approve of his conduct, but the zeal which they manifested during the campaign and particularly after this affair is striking evidence of the true nobility of the men.

Admiral Holmes, who had charge of the landing of the troops on the morning of the 13th of September, and who was therefore acquainted with the exact spot, refers to the change of the plan in these words: (1)

"A plan was immediately set on foot, to attempt a Landing about four leagues above the town, and it was ready to put into execution when General Wolfe recon"noitred down the River and fixed upon Foulon, a spot

(1) This letter is dated the 18th of September 1759, three days before the date of the official despatch which was sent to England.