it was found that these representatives were more formidable to the power of the crown than the nobility had been. In Elizabeth's reign compliant judges decided that, although the right of election was, by the original constitution or charter, in the whole assembly, still from usage, even when within the time of memory, a by-law may be presumed giving the right of election to a select class (more readily controlled by the crown) instead of the whole body.1

Afterwards, to increase the power of the crown, James incorporated towns or boroughs, endowing them with the parliamentary franchise, but confining the exercise of the right to vote to select classes. The immense power of popular representation was a most active agency in the overthrow of Charles I. This power proving inimical to the arbitrary schemes of the Protector, he expelled the members by violence, and subdued their authority in parliament by force. He then secured this power in his own favor by expelling all hostile magistrates and officers and supplanting them with others of his own creation.

On the Restoration, Charles II. found the principal opposition to the court to come from the cities and boroughs. He commenced his reign by reconstructing the corporations and filling them with his own creatures. Judges, also creatures of the king, holding commissions during his pleasure, aided him in his scheme to acquire absolute control over the corporations of the realm. London, as the largest and most influential, was selected as an example, and in 1683 the famous quo warranto was issued against the city to deprive it of its charter, for two alleged violations, one of which was stale and both were frivolous. Judgment passed, of course, against the city, and its ancient charter was abrogated.2 As a condition of its restoration, it was, among other things, provided that thereafter the mayor, sheriff, clerk, &c., should not exercise their office without the king's consent; and that if the king twice disapproved of the officers elected by the corporation, he might himself appoint others. In short, the city was deprived of the right of choosing its own officers, and was made dependent upon the crown. Such also was the fate of most of the considerable corporations in England. The whole power was in the hands of the king,3

select or definite bodies alone. Post, sec. 35.

1 Willcock on Municipal Corp. 8; 3 Hallam, Const. History, 52; 1 Stephen, English Const. chap. vi. p. 277 et seq.

2 Rex v. City of London, Mich. 33 Car. II.; 2 Show. 262, Pulling, Laws, &c. of London, 14. The history of the

seizure of the city franchises, by virtue of the writ of quo warranto, is given at some length by Norton, Com. on the History, &c. of London, Book I. chap. xx. ; see also The Case of the City of London, 8 How. State Trials, 1340 et seq.

8 There were eighty-one quo warranto informations brought against municipal

Nor were these arbitrary proceedings confined to England. In 1683 writs of quo warranto and scire facias were issued for the purpose of abrogating the charter of MASSACHUSETTS. Patriotism and religion mingled their fervors and combined in its defence, but in vain. Servile judges, in June, 1684, one year and six days after judgment against the city of London, adjudged the charter to be conditionally forfeited. The charter government was displaced, and popular representation superseded by an arbitrary commission. In 1687 similar writs were issued against the charters of Rhode Island and Connecticut; when, as is well known, the people of the latter colony unsuccessfully endeavored to preserve this cherished muniment of their liberties by concealing it in the charter oak. The colonies, as a result of the English Revolution of 1688, had their charters restored. Very shortly after the accession of William and Mary a bill to restore the rights of those English corporations which had surrendered their charters to the crown during the reigns of James II. and Charles II. was introduced into parliament, and became a law, with the general applause of men of all parties.1

Reference has already been made to the fact that in the time of Elizabeth, the controlling power of corporations was virtually vested in "select bodies." The abuses in the corporations arising out of select bodies continued after the revolution of 1688, and until act of parliament in 1835, next to be mentioned.2 To remedy these and many other abuses, the MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS REFORM ACT (5 and 6 Will. IV. ch. 76, A. D. 1835) (referred to more fully in a subsequent chapter 3) was passed. This statute sought to restore corporations to their original design, as institutions for the local government of the place, to be controlled by those interested in it, and not by a favored few. It is undoubtedly true, as remarked by Mr. Hallam, that "no political institution can endure which does not rivet itself to the hearts of men by ancient prejudice or acknowledged interest." That is, it cannot permanently endure, although it may exist long after it ought to cease. If ever an institution outlived its usefulness-lived long after it became a positive evil - it was the municipal corporations of England, prior to the reform act of 1835. In many important places in England the number of corporators ranged as low as from ten to thirty. In a large majority of the municipalities, the corporations were close; that is, the governcorporations by Charles II. and James II. 21 Stephen, Eng. Const. chap. vii. p. 479.

2 Chandl. Com. Debs. 316; 1 Stephen, English Const. chap. vii. p. 455.

1 Macaulay, History of England, Vol. III. chap. xv., where a graphic account of the history of its passage is given.

8 Chap. III. infra, secs. 35, 36, and note.

ing body had the power to determine who should be admitted to freedom or membership; and often the privilege was conferred upon non-residents and the residents excluded. The most important franchise they possessed was that of electing members of parliament, and this, in many places, was the principal function of the corporation. Not only were the councils self-elective, but their tenure was for life. They were frequently controlled by a single party, and all persons entertaining other opinions were excluded. The corporations were not in sympathy with, nor did they reflect the wishes of, the people over whom they exercised local jurisdiction. There was no check upon mal-administration. The property was wasted; extravagance characterized the expenditures of money; officers were elected by the irresponsible councils from favoritism or devotion to party. One of the first acts of the Reformed House of Commons was the overthrow, in 1835, of this intolerable system, by the passage of the above-mentioned Municipal Corporations Statute,2 to which we shall have frequent occasion to refer in the subsequent pages of this work.

Lord Brougham has many claims to the regard of posterity. Few of these are stronger, however, than those which arise from his faithful and effective services in promoting the reform of the Municipal Corporations of Great Britain, by abolishing these self-elected and perpetual councils, by organizing the corporations upon a uniform model, and by establishing in the act the principle that the councils should be selected for short and fixed periods by the votes of the burgesses, thus recognizing and adopting the representative system based upon the vote of persons actually interested in the municipality. Mr. Willcock, in concluding his treatise,3 had recommended a

1 Glover on Corp. xxxviii. et seq.; Report of Commissioners of Corporate Inquiry, 32 et seq. On January 1, 1883, the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882 (45 and 46 Vic. chap. 50) went into force, repealing, re-enacting, and consolidating the previous Acts. Post, sec. 35.

2 Post, sec. 35, note, where the leading provisions of this important enactment are given.

3 Willcock, Municipal Corp. 513, 514. London, with its "great and notable franchises, liberties, and customs," to treat of which, says Lord Coke (4 Inst. 250), "would require a whole volume of itself," was not embraced in the general act of 5 and 6 Will: 4, chap. 76, but there was subsequently passed an important statute

known as the London Corporation Reform Act of 1849. See Supplement to Pulling's Laws, &c., of London.

On the 15th day of August, 1867, after a memorable struggle between the lords and the commons, what is known as the Disraeli Reform Bill became a law, by which the right to vote for members of parliament for boroughs was greatly extended. This right was, in boroughs, extended to all occupiers of dwelling-houses which were rated to the poor rates, and to lodgers occupying lodging-houses of the annual value of £10, unfurnished. It practically enfranchised the working class.

Referring to the English system of corporate local government and administra

similar reform, but disclaimed being so visionary as to suppose it would soon be effected, since parliament would not willingly relinquish its influence over venal boroughs, and members elected by corporations would not be allowed by their constituents to abandon their ancient though unjust privileges; but within ten years from the time his language was written, the reform of which he almost despaired was accomplished. Fifty years' experience has vindicated its wisdom.

§ 8 a. Coming now, in this general survey, to the municipal institutions of the UNITED STATES, the great fact which first meets our view is that the common law is the basis of the laws of every State and Territory of the Union, with comparatively unimportant exceptions. It is indeed a most fortunate circumstance, that, divided as our territory is into so many States, each supreme within the limits of its power, a common and uniform general system of polity underlies and pervades them all. The common law, as well as the institutions which it developed or along side of which it grew up, IS PERVADED BY A SPIRIT OF FREEDOM, which distinguishes it from all other systems and peculiarly adapts it to the institutions of a self-governed people. It is established by the learned researches which have been more recently made that the germs and elements of this law and of English polity are of Germanic origin. The Saxon conquerors of Great Britain were not mere bodies of armed invaders. They went to England, during two or more centuries, in families and communities. What manner of men were they? Guizot dwells upon the fact that the distinguishing character of the Germans was "their powerful sentiment of personal liberty, personal independence and individuality." He affirms and repeatedly reiterates, that it was they who "introduced this sentiment of personal independence, this love of individual liberty, into European civilization; that this was unknown among the Romans; unknown in the Christian Church; and unknown in nearly all the civilizations of antiquity. The liberty which we meet with in ancient civilizations is political liberty, -the liberty of the citizen, not the personal liberty of the man himself." 2

§ 8 b. Thus conquering and colonizing England, the Saxons carried with them " from lands where the Roman eagle had never been seen, or seen only during the momentary incursions of Drusus and tion, Mr. Gladstone declared that "Our municipalities produce qualities which are the best safeguards of England's greatness." Williams & Vine, English Munic. Code, P. 12.

1 Stubbs, Const. Hist. chap. i. et seq.; Prof. Adams, Germanic Origin of New England Towns, in Johns Hopkins University Studies.

2 Hist. Civ. Europe, Lect. II.

Germanicus," their language, their religion, their customs, their laws, and their organizations. These were indigenous, homebred, without trace or tincture of the Roman law and institutions. They borrowed nothing from antiquity or from surrounding peoples. They founded, and in the course of centuries their successors and descendants, the people of England, built up their institutions on their own model. Macaulay speaks of this with his accustomed vividness: "The foundations of our Constitution," he says, "were laid by men who knew nothing of the Greeks, but that they had denied the orthodox procession and cheated the Crusaders; and nothing of Rome but that the Pope lived there. Those who followed contented themselves with improving on the original plan. They found models at home; and therefore they did not look for them abroad." This love of personal freedom and independence was impressed upon the institutions they founded, or adopted, or modified.

4

§ 8 c. Learned investigators differ concerning the extent to which Roman law existed and prevailed at the time of the Saxon conquest, and the extent to which it was adopted or incorporated into the English laws, usages, and institutions. But there is a general assent to these propositions, viz.: that the Saxon spirit of freedom was embodied in the various local courts; that it was in these popular tribunals that the principles of law and local government were cultivated and disseminated; that the Saxons breathed into the English government and institutions "a spirit of equity and freedom which has never entirely departed from them," and that in the course of time the common law intertwined its roots and fibres inseparably into the constitution, polity, local and municipal institutions, the civil and criminal jurisprudence, the family relation, and the rights of person and of property. So, as we have above seen, from an immemorial or early period the local territorial subdivisions of England, such as shires, towns, and parishes, enjoyed a degree of freedom, and were permitted to assess upon themselves their local burdens and to manage their local affairs. The ratepayers were thus dignified by being an integral part of the communal life; the foundations of municipal liberty were laid; administrative power was decentralized; knowledge of the laws and reverence for and obedience to them were constantly taught by a participation in their administration and enforcement. This was exactly the opposite of the systems which concurrently prevailed on the Continent, where the central

1 Digby, Real Prop. 11, 12.

4 Mackintosh, Hist. Eng. Vol. V.

2 Freeman, Norman Conquest, chap. i. chap. i.; Reeves, Hist. Com. Law, In3 Essay on History. troduction by Finlason.