Opinion of the Court. "ART. 3157. The pawn invests the creditor with the right of causing his debt to be satisfied by privilege and in preference to the other creditors of his debtor, out of the product of the movable, corporeal or incorporeal, which has been thus burdened. "ART. 3158. But this privilege shall take place against third persons, only in case the pawn is proved by an act made either in a public form or under private signature: Provided, Such act has been recorded in the manner required by law : Provided also, That whatever may be in the form of the act, it mentions the amount of the debt, as well as the species and nature of the thing given in pledge, or has a statement annexed thereto of its number, weight and measure. "When a debtor wishes to pawn promissory notes, bills of exchange, stocks, obligations or claims upon other persons, he shall deliver to the creditors the notes, bills of exchange, certificates of stock or other evidences of the claims or rights so pawned; and such pawn so made, without further formalities, shall be valid as well against third persons as against the pledgers thereof, if made in good faith. "All pledges of movable property may be made by private writing, accompanied by actual delivery; and the delivery of property or deposit in a warehouse shall pass by the private assignment of the warehouse receipt, so as to authorize the owner to pledge such property; and such pledge so made, without further formalities, shall be valid as well against third persons as against the pledgers thereof, if made in good faith." The notes disclosed the amount of the debt, as well as the fact of the pledge, and the property which was pledged; and the delivery of the warehouse receipts, as stated in the last clause of Article 3158, was a delivery of the property; so that the pledgee had possession of the property as security for an indebtedness whose amount, time and payment were stated in, writing. In Cater v. Merrell, 14 La. Ann. 375, 378, it is said that "the word pledge is used in the statutes of 1852 and 1855 in the sense of the definition of Article 3100 of the Civil Code, which defines the contract of pledge, and as the second section of these acts requires the contract to be in writing, the private VOI. CXXXV-31 Opinion of the Court. act between parties must contain what is declared to be essen tial by this article, to constitute a pledge, that is, a declaration of the thing given in pledge, and of the particular debt for which the thing is pledged." And in Martin v. Creditors, 15 La. Ann. 165, the court observed: "The assignment of a warehouse receipt, in the absence of a stipulation that the property is given in pledge to secure the payment of a principal obligation, amount of which is specified, does not confer a privilege upon the transferee. H. W. Cater, use of, v. H. B. Merrell & Co., 14 An. 375. Privileges are of strict right; and parties claiming them must conform to the requirements of the law. It is required, in order to create a pledge, not only that delivery should accompany the private deed, but that the instrument itself should exhibit the nature and extent of the rights and obligations of the contracting parties reciprocally." The transaction at bar comes within the requirements of these authorities. The transfer of the warehouse receipts was a delivery of the property; and the full terms of the contract of the pledge were stated on the face of the notes. And as Ermann gave to the pledgor $5000 in cash, as well as his two notes for $5000 each, there is no room to doubt that the transaction was a real and not a simulated one; as well as that the pledge was made in conformity to the laws of the State of Louisiana. The first question therefore must be answered in favor of the appellees. A like answer must also be given to the second. That Ermann gave the $5000 and executed his two notes, and thereafter paid those notes, so that he is out the $15,000 of the loan, is not disputed. That he had no other security, and must rely for repayment solely on the pledge, is clear. That he was a man of means, and able to make such a loan, though before he had never made a single loan of that magnitude; that he had theretofore accommodated Meyer with loans; that his relations with Meyer were such as to justify him in loaning upon what seemed to be sufficient security; that he had no knowledge of whence the goods in question were obtained; that the attendant circumstances were not such as to arouse suspicion in the mind of a reasonably prudent man; and that Syllabus. the loan and pledge have all the appearance of an ordinary business transaction, are conclusions which the testimony satisfactorily establishes. It is objected that after notice by the action at law and sequestration he paid the notes which he had given to Meyer; in other words, that he unnecessarily paid a portion of this loan, after notice of the fraudulent character of the transactions by which Meyer acquired title, and after, by suit, his own rights under the pledge had been challenged. But the only attack by this litigation, up to the time of payment, was upon the reality of the pledge, and of that there was no question. While doubtless the failure of Dreyfus, the suits commenced against him, and the facts concerning Meyer's and Dreyfus' condition, as developed in litigation and otherwise, disclosed that the property which he had in pledge had come to him through a devious channel, yet, until some assertion of personal wrong was made against him, he was under no obligations to let his own paper go to protest, and thereby tacitly, at least, admit that his own conduct and good faith were objects of suspicion and inquiry. We think that the conclusion of the Circuit Court on the question of bona fides was correct, and the decree is Affirmed. ANDERSON v. CARKINS. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA. No. 322. Argued May 1, 2, 1890.- Decided May 19, 1890. In decreeing specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of a tract of land in a suit where the defence was that the contract was against public policy and void under the homestead laws of the United States, a state court necessarily passes upon a federal question, although it may put its decision upon other grounds. A contract by a homesteader to convey a portion of the tract when he shall acquire title from the United States is against public policy and void; and it cannot be enforced, although a valuable consideration may have passed to the homesteader from the other party. Opinion of the Court. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. John A. Casto (with whom was Mr. James M. Woolworth on the brief) cited to the merits: Mellison v. Allen, 30 Kansas, 382; Brake v. Ballou, 19 Kansas, 397; Dawson v. Merrille, 2 Nebraska, 119; Oaks v. Heaton, 44 Iowa, 116; Nichols v. Council, 9 S. W. Rep. 305; Cox v. Donnelly, 34 Arkansas, 762; Sorrels v. Self, 43 Arkansas, 451; Sherman v. Eakin, 47 Arkansas, 351; Marshall v. Cowles, 48 Arkansas, 362; Coppell v. Hall, 7 Wall. 542; Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 16 How. 314; Scudder v. Andrews, 2 McLean, 464; Leavitt v. Palmer, 3 N. Y. (3 Comstock) 19; S. C. 51 Am. Dec. 333; Aldrich v. Anderson, 2 Land Dec. 71. Mr. A. H. Bowen (with whom was Mr. C. Hoeppner on the brief) for defendant in error cited to the merits: Smith v. Bromley, 2 Doug. 696 n; Jaques v. Golightly, 2 Wm. Bl. 1073; Browning v. Morris, 2 Cowp. 790; Williams v. Ileadly, 8 East, 378; Worcester v. Eaton, 11 Mass. 368; Lowell v. Boston & Lowell Railroad, 23 Pick. 24; White v. Franklin Bank, 22 Pick. 181; Schermerhorn v. Tolman, 14 N. Y. 93; Blanchard v. Jamison, 14 Nebraska, 244; Mc Blair v. Gibbes, 17 How. 232, 237; Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wall. 70; Planters' Bank v. Union Bank, 16 Wall. 483; Wann v. Kelly, 2 McCrary, 628; Simmons v. Yurann, 11 Nebraska, 516. MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court. On December 16, 1876, the parties hereto entered into the following contract: "This agreement made and entered into on this 16th day of December, by and between Joseph Anderson and Hannah Anderson, his wife, of the county of Adams and the State of Nebraska parties of the first part, and Levi Carkins of Adams County, Nebraska, party of the second part, witnesseth: "That the said parties of the first part have this day sold, for and in consideration of the sum of one hundred dollars, to them in hand paid by the said Levi Carkins, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the following real estate, to Opinion of the Court. wit: The south one half of southeast corner of section ten (10), in town eight (8), range ten (10) west in Adams County, Nebraska. "And the parties of the first part further agree with the party of the second part that they will make and execute to him on or before the 1st day of May, 1881, a good and sufficient warranty deed of said premises, clear of all incumbrance. and for the faithful performance of this contract they hereby bind themselves, their beirs, executors, administrators and assigns. "In witness whereof they have hereunto set their hands and seals, this 16th day of December, 1876. (Signed) "JOSEPH ANDERSON, "HANNAH M. ANDERSON, "LEVI CARKINS, "Party of the Second Part. "In presence of L. P. HAWLEY." In October, 1885, the defendant in error commenced his action in the District Court of Adams County, Nebraska, for a specific performance of this contract. The plaintiffs in error answered, pleading distinctly that the contract was against public policy and void, for the reason that at the time of its execution the land belonged to the general government; that it was made in contemplation of Joseph Anderson's taking the land as a homestead; that on the 7th day of March, 1877, he did enter the land as a homestead; and that he continued to reside upon and cultivate it until the 31st day of March, 1884, at which time he made final proof under the homestead law, and thus only obtained title. The case, after trial in the District Court, passed to the Supreme Court of the State, by which a final decree was entered for a specific performance. To reverse such decree this proceeding in error has been brought. Two questions are presented—one of jurisdiction, the other of error. First, with respect to jurisdiction: It will be observed that the contract is prima facie good. The land is described, the |