tial relation of parent and child, and the fiduciary relation of guardian and ward, are among those in which such relief is frequently granted. Equity looks with special jealously upon donations from a child to a parent when made recently after the child comes of age, or while he is under the constant and immediate influence of the parent (as for instance, residing with him), or while his property is in the parent's possession or control. Wright v. Vanderplank, 8 De Gex, M. & G. 133; Baker v. Bradley, 7 id. 597; Bergen v. Udall, 31 Barb. 9; Taylor v. Taylor, 8 How. 183; Pom. Eq. Jur., § 961. Donations from a ward to his guardian are regarded with still greater jealousy where the circumstances are such as to give the guardian an ascendency over the ward, for here the natural and mutual ties and obligations between parent and child are wanting, and the position of the guardian is fiduciary. Hylton v. Hylton, 2 Ves. 547; Hatch v. Hatch, 9 id. 292, and note; Fish v. Miller, Hoff. Ch. 267; Pom. Eq. Jur., § 962. Whether the donation be from a child to a parent or by a ward to his guardian, if the donor is so placed as to be subject to the control or influence of the donee, the onus is on the parent or guardian (as the case may be) to show that "the transaction is righteous.' Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 266; Hoghton v. Hoghton, 15 Beav. 299. In such cases the undue influence is, on grounds of public policy, prima facie presumed from the peculiar relations subsisting between the parties. Archer v. Hudson, 7 Beav. 551; Hylton v. Hylton, supra; Hatch v. Hatch, supra; Kerr Fraud & M. 178, 179; Williams v. Powell, 1 Ired. Eq. 460; Chambers v. Crabbe, 34 Beav. 457; Garvin's Admr. v. Williams, 44 Mo. 465; Todd v. Grove, 33 Md. 188; Berdoe v. Dawson, 34 Beav. 603; Huguenin v. Baseley, 2 Lead. Cas. Eq. (556) and notes; Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 961, 962. Substantially the same rules are applied to the case of an ex-guardian, where, notwithstanding the termination of the formal fiduciary relation between him and his ward, he still retains his dominion in fact, and his position of influence as respects the ward or his property. This is especially true where the donations called in question are made while (even after his majority) the ward continues to reside with the exguardian, or the ex-guardian continues to retain possession or control of the ward's property. Hylton v. Hylton, supra; Hatch v. Hatch, supra; Pierse v. Waring, 1 P. Wms. 121, note; 1 Story Eq. Jur., § 317; Pom. Eq. Jur., § 961. In all these cases where the law infers from the relations of the parties the probability of undue influence on the part of the party having dominion or ascendency over another, it requires that the influence in fact exercised shall be exerted for the benefit of the person subject to it, and not for the benefit of the party possessing it, otherwise the donations will be promptly set aside. Hoghton v. Hoghton, supra; Cook v. Lamotte, 15 Beav. 234. As remarked by Lord Eldon, the crucial question in cases of this kind "is not whether she knew what she was doing, had done, or proposed to do, but how the intention was produced; whether all that care and prudence was placed around her, as against those who advised her which from their situation and relation with respect to her they were bound to exert in her behalf." Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273; Hoghton v. Hoghton, Ashton v. Thompson. Opinion by Berry, J. [Decided April 9, 1884.] supra. MISSOURI SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.* PARTIES-POINT CONTRACT.-All the joint obligees of a bond are necessary parties plaintiff in an action for its breach; one of them cannot be made a co-de*Appearing in 78 Missouri Reports. fendant, upon an allegation in the petition that he refused to join with plaintiffs in the prosecution of the action. Section 3466, Rev. Stat., 1879, does not apply to such a case. McAllen v. Woodcock, 60 Mo. 174, distinguished. Hill v. Marsh, 46 Ind. 218; Andrews v. Mokelumne Hill Co., 7 Cal. 330; Habicht v. Pemberton, 4 Sandf. 657; Clark v. Cable, 21 Mo. 223; Rainey v. Smizer, 28 id. 310; Henry v. Mt. Pleasant Twp., 70 id. 497. Ryan v. Riddle. Opinion by Martin, Comr. COVENANT-AGAINST INCUMBRANCES-DAMAGES FOR BREACH.-An inchoate right of dower existing at the date of a deed containing a covenant against incumbrances, and the demand of dower after it becomes consummate, will constitute a breach of such cove. nant; and the covenantee may by purchase thereafter extinguish the dower and recover a reasonable price paid therefor as damages for such breach. Williamson v. Hall, 62 Mo. 405; Maguire v. Riggin, 44 id. 512; Dickson v. Desire, 23 id. 151, 157; Kellogg v. Malin, 62 id. 429; Morgan v. Hannibal & St. Jo. R. Co., 63 id. 129; brook. Opinion by Martin, Comr. Walker v. Deaver, 5 Mo. App. 147, 139. Ward v. Ash DEED OF TRUST ON PERSONALTY-VOID AS AGAINST CREDITORS.-A deed of trust to secure a debt described the property as "all and singular the farming implements and tools and live dairy cattle now on the grantor's farm, together with all their increase or substitutes therefor during the lien of this deed, to the value at any time of $4,000," and again as "a constant and continuous stock of farming implements, tools, aud live dairy cattle and their increase, of a valuation of at least $4,000." It also stipulated that the grantor should at all times keep on his farm property of the kind described, "worth on peremptory sale under the provisions hereof at least $4,000," or as stated in another place, "at any time in value equal to an appraisement of $4,000." No method was provided for having an appraisement made, and it did not appear but what the implements, tools and cattle on the farm exceeded $4,000 in value. Held, that as against other creditors of the grantor the deed was void, (1) because by the use of the word "substitutes" it impliedly gave the grantor authority to sell and dispose of the cattle in the ordinary course of business; (2) because of indefiniteness in the description of the property. White v. Graves, 68 Mo. 218. Goddard v. Jones. Opinion by Norton, J. RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. WILL-"MONEYS"-WHAT INCLUDED IN TERM.The word "moneys" in a will is a flexible term, having a more or less extended meaning, according to the facts of the case and the terms of the will. The court is bound however to put upon the word its ordinary and literal meading unless the context shows that a larger meaning should be put upon it. In 1874 a testatrix made her will appointing executors, and directing payment of her debts and other expenses, and giving "all her moneys" to her brothers and sisters in equal shares. She then proceeded specifically and minutely to dispose of her furniture and trinkets, without however expressly referring to any stocks or investments, or residuary real or personal estate. By a codicil made in August, 1883, she bequeathed all her furniture and effects in the house in which she and a named sister might be living together at the time of her death to such sister for life, with remainder to the persons to whom such effects were bequeathed by her will; and she confirmed her said will in all other respects. In September, 1883 the testatrix died, leaving (inter alia) New Three per cent Annuities, Great Northern Railway Consolidated and Preference stocks, and Chilian, Government Bonds (payable to bearer) as well as cash in the house, and debts due to her, and furniture and trinkets, including some small articles not specifically bequeathed. Held, on originating summons, that although the gift of "all my moneys" could not be treated as a residuary bequest, yet that under the circumstances such gift in fact passed all the items, other than furniture and trinkets, of which the testatrix died possessed. Lowe v. Thomas, 5 De G. M. & G. 315, distinguished. High Ct. Just., Chan. Div., March 5, 1884. Townley v. Townley. Opinion by Pearson, J. (See 17 Am. Rep. 422.-ED.) TRUSTEE-DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY-- EMPLOYMENT OF BROKER-USUAL COURSE OF BUSINESS.—(1) A trustee cannot delegate to others the execution of his trust, but he may in the administration of the trust fund avail himself of the agency of such persons as bankers and brokers in the regular course of business, and will not be liable for any loss which may be occasioned to the trust fund thereby, if he has acted with the reasonable care and prudence with which a man would act in his own business, and has not been guilty of any negligence or default. (2) A trustee, at the request of the cestui que trust, employed a broker to purchase certain securities authorized by the trust. The broker presented a bought-note to the trustee, and on his representation that the purchase had been made subject to the rules of the London Stock Exchange, and that the money was payable the next day, which was the account day, the trustee gave him a check for the money. He had not in fact purchased the securities, and he misappropriated the money to his own use, and became insolvent. Held (affirming the judgment of the court below, Lord Fitzgerald dubitante) that there being nothing in the form of the bought-note to excite any suspicion in an ordinary prudent man of business, and the whole transaction having been carried out in the usual course of business, the trustee was not liable for the loss incurred. Ex parte Belchier, Amb. 218, approved. House of Lords, Nov. 26, 1883. Spright v. Gaunt. Opinions by Selbourne, Lord Chau., Blackburn and Fitzgerald, JJ. (50 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 330.) [See 20 Eng. Rep. 523.-ED.] WILL-" ESTATE "-DIRECTION TO CARRY ON BUSINESS. (1) A testator made no express devise of his real estate, but gave a legacy of 500l. "to be paid out of his estate," and after giving other legacies, directed that his executors might realize such part of his estate as they thought right and in their judgment, and pay the afore-named legacies. The personal estate was sufficient to pay the legacies. Held, that estate meant personal estate only. (2) A testator at the time of his death carried on business as a mechanical engineer on certain freehold land of his own, a part of the machinery used in the business being fixtures attached to the land. By his will the testator made no express devise of the freehold land, but directed his executors to carry on the business until M. (heir-at-law) attained the age of thirty. Subject to payment of the funeral and testamentary expenses, debts, and legacies, the general personal estate of the testator was undisposed of, but the will directed that the executors might realize such part of the estate as they might think right to pay the legacies. Held, that the business was to be carried on by the use and employment in it of the same property, whether real or personal, which was employed therein at the testator's death, and that the executors were entitled to the use of all such property without paying any rent to the heir in respect of the land and fixtures; but that there was no gift of the real estate by implication to the prejudice of the heir in favor of the next of kin. Held also, that the business ought only to be carried on so long as was neces sary for payment of the legacies not otherwise sufficiently provided for; that when the legacies were paid or provided for the direction as to carrying on the business till the heir was thirty was inoperative, and that if there were any surplus profits they must be divided between the heir and next of kin in proportion to the respective values of the real and personal estate employed in the business whilst the profits were being made. Ct. of App., Feb. 4, 1884. Nixon v. Cameron. Opinion by Selbourne, Lord Chan. (50 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 339. MASTER AND SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF MASTER-SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT-LORD CAMPBELL'S ACT (9 & 10 VICT., CH. 93).-M. was a cloak-room clerk in defendants' employ, and assisted at the parcels office; he used to take up parcels for passengers from the cloak-room to the train, when there was no porter there, and that was a regular thing for him to do." A passenger had asked him to take a parcel to the train, which he did, and as he was running back, he rau against another porter, who in turn came against the ticket-collector, and the ticket-collector upset the plaintiff's wife, causing injuries which resulted in her death. Field, J., nonsuited the plaintiff, holding that there was no evidence to go to the jury of any negligence on the part of the defendants or their servants, and that there was no evidence, that at the time of the accident, M. was acting within the scope of his employment. It was agreed at the trial, that if the court should be of opinion that the nonsuit was wrong, judgment should be entered for the plaintiff for 2361. and costs. Held, that there was evidence to go to the jury that at the time of the accident M. was acting within the scope of his employment, that the nonsuit was wrong, and that judgment should be entered for the plaintiff as agreed. High Ct. Just. Q. B. Div., March 6, 1884. Milner v. Great Northern Railway Co. Opinions by Lopes, Stephen and Cave, JJ. (50 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 367.) FINANCIAL LAW. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENI-PRODUCTION OF NOTE AT TRIAL. A person who seeks to recover upon a negotiable instrument must be prepared to produce it, and have it before the court on the trial, as controlling it, unless the instrument is lost, and the owner brings himself within the exemption afforded by equity or the statute. It is not enough to show that the note is in the possession of or claimed by some one else. Sup. Ct. Mich., Apr. 30, 1884. McKinney v. Hamilton. Opinion by Campbell, J. (19 N. W. R. 263.) NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-TRANSFER TO ONE PARTNER--PAYMENT TO ANOTHER.-- When a note payable to a partnership firm is indorsed by the firm in blank and transferred to one of the partners before maturity, the maker, if he has notice of the transfer, is not discharged of his liability to the transferee by payment of the amount of the note to another member of the firm. Cir. Ct., W. D. Texas, 1884. Stevenson v. Woodhull. Opinion by Turner, J. (19 Fed. Rep. 575.) THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE HE Seventh. Annual Meeting of the Association will be held at Saratoga Springs, on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, August 20, 21, and 22, 1884. The sessions will be held at 10 o'clock A. M. and 7:30 P. M. on Wednesday and Thursday, and at 10 o'clock A. M. on Friday, at Putnam's Music Hall, corner of Broadway and Phila street, nearly opposite the United States Hotel. Wednesday morning.-The President's Address, by Cortlandt Parker, of Newark, N. J.; Nomination and Election of Members; Election of General Council; Wednesday evening.-A paper by Andrew Allison, of Nashville, Tenn., on "The Rise and Probable Decline of Private Corporations in America." Араper by Alexander Porter Morse, of Washington, D. C., on "The Citizen in Relation to the State." Discussion upon the subjects of the papers read. Thursday morning.-The Annual address, by John F. Dillon, of New York; Reports of Standing Committees; Reports of Special Committees. Thursday evening.-A paper by M. Dwight Collier, of St. Louis, on "Stock Dividends and their Restraint." A paper by Simon Sterne, of New York, on "The Prevention of Defective and Slipshod Legislation." Discussion upon the subjects of the papers read. Friday morning.-Nomination of Officers; Miscellaneous Business; Election of Officers. The Annual Dinner will be given at the Grand Union Hotel at 8:30 o'clock on Friday evening. A A SKETCH IN AN AMERICAN court. LIGHTING from the street car at one of the busiest corners of this city, we are confronted by a statue of white marble, representing a man sejant, whom it requires but little intimacy with the national monumentology to recognize as the ubiquitous Pater Patria. He is apparently keeping watch over the main entrance of a dingy-looking red brick building, solid but unpretentious. But the marble janitor makes no sign, and no man pries into our business or bars the door to curiosity. We climb the worm-eaten staircase unchallenged, and wauder idly on till checked by a plain white-painted door, above whose lintels are the words "Common Pleas No. 3." It swings open at a push, and entering we find ourselves in a square room of fair size, lighted from two sides by several windows, all of which are double-sashed to exclude the jingling of the horse-car bells and the multifarious noises of the outer world. Facing the door is a long raised desk-table, occupying about half the side of the room and shaped in an arc of a circle, the concavity being toward the body of the room. Books and papers are piled or scattered on this table, behind which, at the apex of the arc, sits an elderly man of strikingly handsome and intelligent appearance-the judge of the court. He is in ordinary morning dress, and is busily engaged in revising the notes he has made during the progress of the case in hand-an occupation which does not apparently interfere with keen attention to what is passing around him. Round the other three sides of the room, at a distance of about eight feet from the walls, runs a wooden railing some four feet in height, forming a barrier between those concerned in the present business of the court and the mere spectators like ourselves, who are accommodated with seats on a double row of benches ranged round the wall outside the charmed square. Within the inclosure, to the right-hand side of the bench, two rows of chairs, twelve in number, are arranged at right angles to the chord of the arc; and on these chairs, in various attitudes indicative of attention, indifference and repose, are seated the "twelve good men and true," upon whose verdict the issue of the trial depends. They are all apparently of the tradesmen class, and here and there among their number one sees the dark skin which proclaims its wearer to be not many degrees removed from African parentage. A closer inspection of the jury reveals the curious fact that the jaws even of the most somnolent are moving slowly and ruminatively, as if engaged upon some toothsome cud; near them are some spittoons. In front of the jurymen is a plain deal table with a few books and rolls of paper littered on it. The rest of the inclosure is studded with a score or so of comfortlesslooking bent-wood chairs, and occupied in groups by the parties to the suit and their witnesses and legal advisers. Another deal table in front of the bench accommodates the clerk of the court; and a few battered metal spittoons and a register stove make up the remaining equipments of the hall of justice. The plaintiff in the present case appears to be a puny, sickly-looking boy of about twelve years of age, one of whose hands is enveloped in bandages, and who appears, through his "next friend," to claim damages for injury caused by the negligence of his employer, the defendant a hard, shrewd-faced, middle-aged man, who is lolling at his ease on a chair close in front of the jury, with his legs resting across the seat of another chair at a convenient distance. Seated negligently on a corner of the table facing the jury and carelessly dangling his feet in mid-air, is a young man, plainly dressed, whose eloquent appeal to the jury proves him to be acting as counsel for the defendant. Despite the nonchalance of his attitude and bearing it is at once evident that he is fully alive to the interests of his client and the difficulties of his case; and his speech for the defense is logical and plausible. The sympathies of his audience are sure to be enlisted on behalf of the injured child, and he therefore appeals strongly to their business instincts as employers of labor on behalf of a brother tradesman. In some small matter of detail, a date or name, the judge has occasion to interrupt and suggest a question. The young advocate merely recognizes the interruption with a quick glance round toward the bench, and the words "Is that so?" and then adopts the emendation and continues his address with no further sign, respect or regard for authority. Presently he brings his speech to a close with an impassioned appeal to the honesty and impartiality of his hearers; and then slipping from his perch he saunters carelessly across the court, exchanges a few laughing remarks with his client, bites a corner off a plug of tobacco which he produces from his pocket, expectorates meditatively, and finally drops into a chair to hear what reply his opponent is prepared to give. Meanwhile an elderly man, tall, gaunt and awkwardlooking, has stepped nervously up to the vacated place and stands facing the jury, leaning heavily forward with his hands planted on the table. He begins speaking in a low tone, and with monotonous delivery merely restating the facts of his client's case; but presently a change comes, and warming to his work, he waxes eloquent and indulges in a savage personal attack upon the character and motives of the defendant. Involuntarily we turn to look at the man who is being described to the assembled crowd as 'this greedy employer of cheap labor," "this man without heart or conscience, who pays children twenty-five cents a week to do work which would be full of peril for grown men," this, etc., etc.; but are surprised to find, that instead of writhing under the sarcasms leveled at him, he still reclines in his former ungraceful attitude, and accepts the compliments with an indifferent smile. The appeal for helpless childhood follows as a matter of course; but passionate as is the language and cleverly as the points are made they elicit no sign from the inanimate twelve. Then after a few minutes' silence the judge proceeds to sum up the case, his cool, impartial statement and shrewd analysis contrasting strangely with the addresses that preceded it. In ten minutes be places the jury in possession of the legal aspect of the case, and then he dismisses them to consider their verdict. Each in turn rises, stretches himself, addresses himself to a spittoon, and saunters after the foreman; and as they leave the court we too rise and retire, to ponder upon the majesty of law stripped of its externals and its traditious of respect.-St. James' Gazette. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, AUGUST 23, 1884. CURRENT TOPICS. HIS is the season of law-school commencement magnifying glass to be seen. The truth is that our country was very young, very sensitive, very conceited, and very "fresh," and when the great author made his second visit a generation later we were wiser, and with his remarks upon his last visit no one had any fault to find. In speaking Judge Elliott an Taddresses, and among the best is that of Chief authority fog of witchcraft, at denne mitions of Justice Elliott, of Indiana, delivered at the com- human beings went to death upon this charge.' tion of our people against Dickens on account of his "American Notes" and Martin Chuzzlewit." Making due allowance for the exaggeration of a professed humorist, there never was a book written on America so full of deserved criticism and generous praise as the "American Notes." Dickens ridiculed and denounced only what was ridiculous and abominable, as for example, our national habit of chewing tobacco and spitting, and our national sin of slavery. (We have gotten rid of the latter, but the former is as common and as nasty as ever.) On the other hand, Dickens gave the most appreciative and generous praise of what was noticeably good in our system, as for example, our State prisons, our deaf and dumb asylums, and our common schools. It may not have been gracious in him to tell the unpleasant truth about us, but his criticisms on this country were milk and water compared with his writings upon his own. Therefore we think him not fairly chargeable with "prejudice and egotism," and we believe that our national faults needed no VOL. 30 No. 8. These are also the days when the judges at the watering-places, and Messrs. Blaine, Cleveland, Butler and St. John are importuned for their autographs. To these gentlemen and to others whose sign-manuals are demanded, we would cordially recommend a little pamphlet which has just been sent to us, entitled, "Seven Hundred Album Verses, suitable for writing in autograph albums," etc. The selections are generally very non-committal and senseless. We have glanced over its pages to find something appropriate for the presidential candidates, and this is the best we can point to: "Be content with the lot God has marked out for you." Here is one fit for lawyers: "Always have a willing hand,full of kind deeds." Here is one fit for poor widows: What you do, do with your might." There is only one remarkable thing in the collection, and that is that the familiar couplet, "The man convinced against his will "He who complies against his will “One In Governor Hoadley's late address before the Yale Law School, on Codification, he told the following story of common-law pleading, which is too good to be withheld from our readers: advantage indeed this arbitrary, technical and most unscientific system had — its precedents of pleading were in print and could be copied. Of this a pleader in North-western Ohio once took conspicuous benefit. With the volumes of Chitty on Pleading before him, he prepared and filed this plea: 'Now comes the defendant aforesaid and defends the wrong and injury when, etc., and says that the plaintiff aforesaid his action aforesaid ought not to have and maintain because he says (down to the asterisk on page 533), and this he is ready to verify, wherefore he prays judgment.' Tradition has it that this was his last plea, at least in Ohio. He fled the court-house, went west, and grew up with the country in some employment not open to copyists." Now seriously, it seems to us that this plea gave the plaintiff as much information of the real defense as it would have done if it had been formal. Mr. Howard Payson Wilds, writes us: "A letter dated July 30, 1884, just received from James G. Alexander, Honorary Grand Secretary of the Association for the Reform of Codification of the Law of Nations, states as follows: 'You will doubtless have received the telegram which was dispatched to you by Sir Travers Twiss, to announce the postponement of our conference at Hamburg. This step has been taken in view of the obstruction to travelling caused by the quarantine regulations in force on the frontiers of most of the European States. We feared that the attendance from both England and America would be so greatly diminished by this circumstance that it was thought desirable to communicate with the Senate of Hamburg, and we received a reply that under the circumstances they thought it better for the conference to be postponed. A resolution to that effect was accordingly passed by a unanimous vote of our council yesterday.' Observing that you have published a notice in reference to the postponement of this conference, it may be proper to note the occasion therefor." · "Eternal vigilance" has taken a fresh startthis time in Demosthenes. Mr. R. D. McGibbon, of Montreal, writes us: "I was much interested in the discussion which took place in your columns, anent the saying 'Eternal Vigilance, etc.' I applied to a friend, Mr. George Murray, B. A. (Oxon), a scholar of great erudition who edits an ably conducted column of 'Notes and Queries' in the Montreal Star, and whose library contains nearly every work of reference, likely to afford the information required. Verbably Mr. Murray tells me that he has diligently searched the English Notes and Queries ab initio, including the indices, without dis covering a single note or query as to the saying in question. Mr. Murray has also sent me the enclosed letter, which I am sure will interest you." Mr. Murray writes: "After much research employed in trying to ferret out the origin of the saying, 'Eternal Vigilance is the price of liberty,' I can do no better than send you the following quotation from Demosthenes, Philip. I, 23. It seems to contain the germ of the famous common place. Dr. Ramage rather freely translates the passage as follows: 'But there is one bulwark which men of prudence possess within themselves, the protection and guard of all people, especially of free States, against tyrants. What is this? Distrust.' I am sorry that I can do no better for you, but I believe that this Greek sentence contains the sentiment which some Greek orator has condensed into the English dictum.” The prize of $250 offered by the New York State Par Association, will be awarded at the association's annual meeting, in Albany on the third Tuesday of January, 1885, to the writer of the best original "The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, its reason paper on: and its extent." Essays should be sent to the chairman of this committee, No. 115 Broadway, New York, by the first day of December, 1884, signed with a fictitious name, and accompanied with the real name and address of the writer in a sealed envelope. Only the envelope, accompanying the successful essay will be opened, the others will be either destroyed, unopened, or returned with the manuscripts to the authors upon request. The successful essay will be the property of the associa tion, and the others not required to be returned, will be preserved among its archives. Competitors for this prize must be members of the bar of the State of New York, of at least five years' standing, and the prize will be awarded only in case there should be five or more competitors. David Dudley Field, chairman, New York; Asa W. Tenney, Brooklyn; Geo. L. Stedman, Albany; John S. Gilbert, Malone; Charles D. Adams, Utica; Elliot Danforth, Bainbridge; James L. Angle, Rochester; Ansley Wilcox, Buffalo, committee on prizes, New York State Bar Association. IN NOTES OF CASES. 'N Moore v. Settle, June 14, 1884, 6 Ky. Law Rep. 58, it is held that the statute against gaming which gives a right of action to the loser or his creditors, or any other person, to recover money lost wife of the loser. This reverses the decision below, at gaming, does not embrace a married woman, the noted in the ALB. LAW JOURN. The court said, by Hargis, C. J.: "The section means by th. words any other person,' any other person competent to institute the suit. It creates no new cause of action in favor of persons who could not sue. Nor does it relieve any person of disabilities existent at the date of its passage. It simply created a new cause of action in favor of such other persons, besides the loser and creditor, as had legal capacity, either in person or by another, to sue. Else aliens, the wife of the winner and others wholly incompetent to sue, could institute such actions, and thus, instead of the mere creature of a new cause, the statute would be misapplied to the removing of disabilities which are no part of its subject and not mentioned or alluded to in it. As therefore the statute has nothing to do with prescribing the capacity of 'any other person' to bring such suits, leaving that branch of the law untouched, the appellee's right to sue the winner must depend upon the law found outside of this statute. We can find none to support her claim to sue. By the first sub-section of section 34 of the Civil Code it is provided that 'in actions between husband and wife; in actions concerning her separate property; and in actions concerning her general property in which he refuses to unite, she may sue or be sued alone.' * * * It cannot be soundly said, this suit is concerning either her separate or |