The defendant in error was the plaintiff in the State court, and brought her action of replevin for the recovery of specific personal property, to which she claimed title, and which she alleges was wrongfully detained from her by the plaintiff in error. The defendant below was deputy marshal of the United States, and as such had possession of the property replevied by virtue of an execution issued upon a judg. ment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan against Adolph Heyman, having taken the same by virtue of a levy under said execution as the property of the judgment debtor. Judgment was rendered in the Supreme Court of the State in favor of the plaintiff below, upon a finding in favor of her title to the property, reversing a judg meut in favor of the defendant below in the Circuit Court for the county of Kent. To reverse that judg ment this writ of error is prosecuted. The sole question presented for our decision is whether it was error in the State court to permit a recovery of the possession of property, thus held, against a marshal of the United States, or his deputy, in favor of the rightful owner; and whether, on the other hand, it should not have adjudged in favor of the defendant below, that his possession of the property by virtue of the levy under the writ was in itself a complete defense to the action of replevin without regard to the rightful ownership. The case of Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, was precisely like the present in its circumstances, except that there the process under which the marshal had seized and held the property replevied was an attachment according to the State practice in Massachusetts, being mesne process, directed however not against property specifically described, but commanding a levy as in cases of fi. fa., upon the property of the defendant. Whether that difference is material is perhaps the only question to be considered, for the doctrine of that decision is too firmly established in this court to be longer open to question. The proper answer to it will be found by an examination of the principles on which the judgment in that case proceeded, and of those cases which preceded, and of others, which have followed it. In the opinion in that case, Mr. Justice Nelson rerefers to the case of Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583, as a conclusive and sufficient authority on the point. He said: "The main point there decided was that the property seized by the sheriff under the process of attachment from the State court, and while in the custody of the officer, could not be seized or taken from him by a process from the District Court of the United States, and that the attempt to seize it by the marshal by a notice or otherwise was a nullity, and gave the court no jurisdiction over it, inasmuch as to give jurisdiction to the District Court in a proceeding in rem, there must be a valid seizure and an actual control of the res under the process.' And referring to the grounds of the dissent in that case he continues: "The majority of the court was of opinion that according to the course of decision in the case of conflicting authorities under a State and Federal process, and in order to avoid unseemly collision between them, the question as to which authority should for the time prevail did not depend upon the rights of the respective parties to the property seized, whether the one was paramount to the other, but upon the question which jurisdiction had first attached by the seizure and custody of the property under its process." The opinion then proceeds to show that no distinction can be made affecting the question between process in rem and an attachment issued by a commonlaw court, although the latter is not the foundation of the jurisdiction, and the property seized is not the subject-matter of the suit, which is simply for the recovery of a debt, without a lien or charge upon the prop erty except that resulting from its seizure, as security for the judgment. The objection that the process was directed against the property of the defendant and conferred no authority upon the marshal to take the property of the plaintiffs in the replevin suit is then answered, the court saying: "For the property having been seized under the process of attachment, and in the custody of the marshal, and the right to hold it being a question belonging to the Federal court, under whose process it was seized, to determine, there was no authority, as we have seen, under the process of the State court to interfere with it." The opinion of the court then points out the error of Chancellor Kent in his statement (1 Com. 410) that "if a marshal of the United States, under an execution in favor of the United States against A., should seize the person or property of B., then the State courts have jurisdiction to protect the person and the property so illegally invaded." Commenting on this statement, it is said that the effect of the principle, if admitted, would be to draw into the State courts "not only all questions of the liability of property seized upon mesne and final process issued under the authority of the Federal courts, including the admiralty, for this court can be no ex. ception, for the purposes for which it was seized, but also the arrests upon mesne and imprisonment upon final process of the person in both civil and criminal cases, for in every case the question of jurisdiction could be made." And the court adds: "We need scarcely remark that no government could maintain the administration or execution of its laws, civil or criminal, if the jurisdiction of its judicial tribunals were subject to the determination of another." To meet the objection, that the party whose property had been wrongfully taken and withheld, would be left without remedy, unless by virtue of citizenship he could sue in a Federal court, the opinion then explains the remedy in such cases by an ancillary proceeding in the court whose process has been made the instrument of the wrong; a remedy, the principle and procedure of which we had occasion recently, in the case of Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276, to restate and reaffirm. The point of the decision in Freeman v. Howe, supra, is that when property is taken and held under process, mesne or final, of a court of the United States, it is in the custody of the law and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court from which the process has issued for the purposes of the writ; that the possession of the officer cannot be disturbed by process from any State court, because to disturb that possession would be to invade the jurisdiction of the court by whose command it is held, and to violate the law which that jurisdiction is appointed to administer; that any person not a party to the suit or judgment, whose property has been wrongfully, but under color of process taken and withheld, may prosecute by ancillary proceedings in the court whence the process issued, his remedy for restitution of the property or its proceeds while remaining in the control of that court; but that all other remedies to which he may be entitled against officers or parties, not involving the withdrawal of the property or its proceeds from the custody of the officer and the jurisdiction of the court, he may pursue in any tribunal, State or Federal, having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject-matter. And vice versa the same principle protects the possession of property while thus held, by process issuing from State courts, against any disturbance under process of the courts of the United States, excepting of course those cases wherein the latter exercise jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing the supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the United States. The doctrine of Freeman v. Howe, supra, was fur ther defined by the decision in Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, which checked and corrected an attempted misapplication of its principle, which, if permitted, would cover actions against the officer for trespasses, not involving any interference with the property itself while in his possession. It was there satisfactorily shown that the officer was protected against such an action only in that class of cases where he could justify under process or order of a court directing expressly the very act alleged to be wrongful, and not in that other class where the writ or order, such as a writ of attachment or other mesne process, and the final process of execution upon a judgment, commends the seizure of property described not specifically, but only generally, as the property of the party named in the writ. In the latter the officer acts at his peril, and is responsible in damages to the party injured for the consequences of any error or mistake in the exercise of his discretion in the attempt to enforce the writ. In the former, as he has no discretion, it is the court itself which acts, and the officer is protected in his obedience to its command. Of this class the case of Connor v. Long, 104 U. S. 228, was an example; that of Buck v. Colbath, supra, fell within the latter. And in distinguishing that case from Freeman v. Howe, supra, Mr. Justice Miller stated the principle of the latter decision--"a principle," he said, "which is essential to the dignity and just authority of every court, and to the comity which should regulate the relations between all courts of concurrent jurisdiction; that principle is," he continued, "that whenever property has been seized by an officer of the court, by virtue of its process, the property is to be considered as in the custody of the court, and under its control for the time being; and that no other court has a right to interfere with that possession unless it be some court which may have a direct supervisory control over the court whose process has first taken possession, or some superior jurisdiction in the premises." Here it will be perceived that no distinction is made between writs of attachment and executions upon judgments, and that the principle embraces both, as indeed both are mentioned as belonging to the same class elsewhere in the opinion. And there is nothing in the nature, office or command of the two descriptions of process, by which, so far as the question here involved is concerned, they can be distinguished. One is mesne process, and the other final; but in the courts of the United States the attachment cannot be used, as in the practice of other jurisdictions, as means of compelling the appearance of the defendant, or of founding jurisdiction as a proceeding in rem. Both alike command the seizure of the property of the defendant without a specific description, and in obeying the precept, the officer exer. cises prescisely the same discretion, and with the same consequences, if he commits a wrong under color of it. The court has the same control over both forms of its process, and has custody of the property seized by virtue of them in the same sense. The circumstance that as to property held under an attachment, the final judgment may direct its sale, while the execution is issued upon the præcipe of the party, and is executed without further order, cannot alter the relation of the court, either to the officer or the property. It has jurisdiction over the latter to meet and satisfy the exigency of either writ, and that jurisdiction can be maintained only by retaining the possession acquired by the officer in executing it. A third person, a stranger to the suit and claiming as owner, may prosecute his right to restitution in either case, in the same methods, as pointed out in Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276, or he may pursue his remedy for damages against the officer, either personally for the trespass, as in Buck v. Colbath, supra, or for the breach of his official duty, upon his bond and against his sureties, as in the case of Lammon v. Feusier, 110 U. S. The very point was involved in the decision in Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400, where it was expressly held that property held by a sheriff under an execution from a State court could not be taken in execution by a marshal of the United States by virtue of final process upon a judgment in a Federal court. Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the court, said: 'Had the property remained in the possession of the sheriff under the first levy it is clear the marshal could not have taken it in execution, for the property could not be subject to two jurisdictions at the same time. The first levy, whether it were made under the Federal or State authority, withdraws the property from the reach of the process of the other." A most injurious conflict of jurisdiction would be likely often to arise between the Federal and State courts if the final process of the one could be levied on property which had been taken by the process of the other. The marshal or the sheriff, as the case may be, by a levy, acquires a special property in the goods, and may maintain an action for them. But if the same goods may be taken in execution at the same time by the marshal and the sheriff, does this special property vest in the one or the other, or both of them? No such case can exist; property once levied on remains in the custody of the law, and it is not liable to be taken by another execution in the hands of a different officer; and especially by an officer acting under a different jurisdiction." That which cannot be done by final process is equally out of the reach of original or mesne pro cess. The forbearance which courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction administered under a single system exercise toward each other, whereby conflicts are avoided, by avoiding interference with the process of each other, is a principle of comity with perhaps no higher sanction than the utility which comes from concord; but between State courts and those of the United States it is something more. It is a principle of right and of law, and therefore of necessity. It leaves nothing to discretion or mere convenience. These courts do not belong to the same system, so far as their jurisdiction is concurrent; and although they co-exist in the same space they are independent and have no common superior. They exercise jurisdiction, it is true, within the same territory, but not in the same plane; and when one takes into its jurisdiction a specific thing, that res is as much withdrawn from the judicial power of the other as if it had been carried physically into a different territorial sovereignty. To attempt to seize it by a foreign process is futile and void. The regulation of process, and the decision of questions relating to it, are part of the jurisdiction of the court from which it issues. "The jurisdiction of a court,' said Chief Justice Marshall, is not exhausted by the rendition of its judgment, but continues until that judgment shall be satisfied. Many questions arise on the process subsequent to the judgment in which jurisdiction is to be exercised." Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1. The principle which defines the boundaries of jurisdiction between the judicial tribunals of the States and of the United States, the application of which effectually prevents their confusion, was set forth and vindicated in the judgment of this court in Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506. It was there said by Chief Justice Taney, p. 516, "that the sphere of action appropriated to the United States is as far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by a State judge or a State court as if the line of division was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye." And speaking of the procedure in cases of habeas corpus issued under State * authority, and admitting the duty of the officer of the United States, holding the prisoner under its process, to return the fact and show his warrant, the chief justice continues: "But after the return is made, and the State judge or court judicially apprised that the party in custody under the authority of the United States, they can proceed no further. They then know that the prisoner is within the dominion and jurisdiction of another government, and that neither the writ of habeas corpus nor any other process issued under State authority can pass over the line of division between the two sovereignties. He is then within the dominion and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. If he has committed an offense against their laws, their tribunals alone can punish him. If he is wrongfully imprisoned, their judicial tribunals can release him and afford him redress." * * No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued, and any attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence." And in Tarble's case, 13 Wall. 397, commenting on this language of Chief Justice Taney in Ableman v. Booth, supra, Mr. Justice Field points out that it was not intended merely to meet cases where the authority of the United States was undisputed, but cases where its validity was questioned, and it appeared that the prisoner was held under claim and color of such authority, in good faith, and not by way of mere pretense and imposition. And the exclusive authority of the court issuing the writ extends, not only to the decisions of all questions affecting its jurisdiction, and the form and force of the writ itself, and the validity of the proceeding in issuing and executing it, but also of all questions affecting the identity of the person or property seized and held under color of its authority, and the right to exempt them from its operation. It does not avail therefore to say that as the writ commands the officer to take the property of the defendant, he cannot under that claim to take and hold the property of another, because the property which he does actually take he takes and holds as the property of the defendant, claiming it to be such, and therefore he has it in his possession uuder color of process and claim of right. In Lammon v. Feusier, 110 U. S., already cited, it was said by Mr. Justice Gray, in reference to the case of a common-law attachment, that "the taking of the attachable property of the person named in the writ is rightful, the taking of the property of another person is wrongful; but each, being done by the marshal in executing the writ in his hands, is an attempt to perform his official duty, and is an official act." The same is true of a similar levy under an execution, as we have shown that there is no difference relevant to the point between the two writs. Property thus levied on by the attachment or taken in execution is brought by the writ within the scope of the jurisdiction of the court whose process it is, and as long as it remains in the possession of the officer it is in the custody of the law. It is the bare fact of that possession under claim and color of that authority, without respect to the ultimate right, to be asserted otherwise and elsewhere, as already sufficiently explained, that furnishes to the officer complete immunity from the process of every other jurisdiction that attempts to dispossess him. That was the defense made and relied on by the plaintiff in error in the present case, and to which the Supreme Court of Michigan refused to give its due and conclusive effect. For that error the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded, with directions to affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for the county of Kent in favor of the plaintiff in error, and It is so ordered. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AB- COVENANT-TO ADVANCE MONEY TO TAKE UP COUPONS-RAILROAD LEASE.-By a lease from one railroad corporation of its railroad to another railroad corporation, subject to a previous mortgage, the lessee covenanted to pay as rent a certain proportion of the gross earnings, and to state accounts semi-annually, and further covenanted, if the rent for any six mouths should be insufficient to pay the interest due at the end of the six months on the mortgage bonds, then to advance a sufficient sum to take up, and to take up, the balance of the coupons for such interest; and it was agreed that for all sums so advanced the lessee should have a lien before all other liens except the mortgage. Eighteen months later, after the lessee had accordingly paid and taken up some coupons, and had declined to take up others, on account of the refusal of the lessor to accept in payment of rent coupons so taken up, the two corporations executed a supplemental agreement, by which, in lieu of the rent reserved in the lease, and of all advances of money to take up coupons, the lessee covenanted to pay, and the lessor to accept, as rent, larger proportion of the gross earnings, "all accounts being settled exactly, and all liabilities and obligations between the two companies being adjusted and discharged by and upon the semiannual statements provided in said lease; "the lessor released the lessee from any obligation to make future advances of money to take up coupons, and from liability for any previous neglect to make such advances, and from any obligation to pay money in the nature of rent and advances, except the proportion of the gross earnings stipulated in the supplemental agreement; and all the provisions of the lease, except as so modified, were ratified and confirmed, and "all causes of action for breach of any agreement therein contained," which had arisen since its execution, were mutually waived and released. The lessee afterward paid rent computed according to the supplemental agreement. Held, that any claim of the lessee against the lessor, or against the mortgaged property, for money paid to take up coupons, was released and discharged. Stewart v. Hoyt. Opinion by Gray, J. [Decided April 21, 1884.] JURISDICTION-FEDERAL QUESTION MUST APPEAR. -From the beginning it has been held that to give us jurisdiction in this class of cases it must appear affirmatively on the face of the record, not only that a Federal question was raised and presented to the highest court of the State for decision, but that it was decided, or that its decision was necessary to the judgment or decree rendered in the case. Murdock v. Memphis, 2 Wall. 636. The judgment in the State court was a bar to this action, and precluded the court below as well as this court from reopening the original litigation and considering again the questious that were put at rest between the parties by the decision in their former suit. It is apparent therefore that no Federal question which there may have been in the case was decided by the State court, and that the decision of such a question was not necessary to the final decree rendered. Choteau v. Gibson. Opinion by Waite, C. J. [Decided March 31, 1884.] CONFLICT OF LAWS-ADMINISTRATION-POLICY OF INSURANCE-WHERE AUTHORITY.-A policy of life insurance, issued by a company incorporated in one State, payable to the assured, his executors or administrators, is assets for the purpose of founding administration upon his estate in another State, in which the corporation, at and since the time of his death, does business, and as required by the statutes of that State, has an agent on whom process against it may be served. The general rule is that simple contract debts, such as a policy of insurauce not under seal, are for the purpose of founding administration, assets where the debtor resides, with⚫ out regard to the place where the policy is found, as this court has recently affirmed in Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U. S. 654. But the reason why the State which charters a corporation is its domicil in reference to debts which it owes, is that there only can it be sued or found for the service of process. This is now changed in cases like the present; and in the courts of the United States it is held that a corporation of one State doing business in another is suable in the courts of the United States established in the latter State, if the laws of that State so provide, and in the manner provided by those laws. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404; Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65; Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369; Railroad Co. v. Koontz, 104 id. 5, 10; see also Bowdoin v. Holland, 10 Cush. 17; Memphis R. Co. v. Alabama, 107 U. S. 581. This case is not governed by the decision in Insurance Co. v. Lewis. 97 U. S. 682. The question there was as to the authority of a public administrator in Missouri, under a statute of that State, to bring an action on the policy. It appeared affirmatively that the intestate resided in Wisconsin wheu he died, and died there, and that there was already an administrator appointed in Wisconsin, so that the defendant could not be protected against a future suit by a proper representative of the estate. Under section 18, chapter 3, of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, of 1874, a husband is entitled to administration on the estate of his wife, if she left property in Illinois. Letters of administration, which state that the intestate had at the time of death personal property in the State, are sufficient evidence of the authority of the administrator to sue in that State, in the absence of proof that there was no such property. Life Insurance Co. v. Woodworth. Opinion by Blatehford, J. [Decided March 31, 1884.] ABATEMENT-PLEA IN-ACTION PENDING-APPEALUSURY-SET OFF.-The plea of another action pending is a plea in abatement (Bac. Abr. Abatement M; Com. Dig. Abatement H,24; 1 Chitty's Pl.[10th Am. ed.] 453; 3 id. 903, note y), and by section 1011 of the Revised Statutes, which is a re-enactment of a similar provision in the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, ch 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 84, 85, it is expressly provided that there shall be no reversal in this court or the Circuit Court for error in ruling any plea in abatement, other than a plea to the jurisdiction of the court. Under this statute, it was held in Piquignot v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 16 How. 104, which came from the same district as this case, that the Judgment of the Circuit Court, on precisely such a plea as that contemplated by this affidavit of defense, was "not subject to our revision on a writ of error." The defense is one which merely defeats the present proceeding, and does not conclude the plaintiff forever, either as to his right to sue in the Circuit Court of the United States, or as to the merits of the matter in dispute. All the other defenses are covered by the decision of this court in Barnet v. Nationa! Bank, 98 U. S. 555 The only difference between that case and this is that there the defendant was the maker of the note who actually paid the usurious interest, and here the defendant is the surety of the maker. It is difficult to see how the surety stands, as to the question now presented, in any better position than his principal. The ground of that decision was, that as without the statute there could be no recovery from the bank for usurious interest actually paid, and as the statute which created the right to such a recovery also prescribed the remedy, that remedy was ex clusive of all others for the enforcement of that right. KANSAS SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.* NEGLIGENCE-RAILROAD-EVIDENCE TO SHOW.-A portion of the evidence introduced on the trial tended to show that the plaintiff's intestate, who was a yard switchman in the employ of the defendant railroad company, and whose duty it was to couple cars, and who was a new man in the yard, and had but little knowledge of the same, while attempting to couple a flat car, loaded with projecting bridge timbers, and a box car, properly went in between them to couple them, and stepped into a ditch made by the railroad company, of which ditch he did not have previous knowledge, and slipped, and in recovering himself so raised his head that it came between the projecting timbers and the box car, and was so crushed that he immediately died. Held, that such evidence tended to show negligence on the part of the railroad company and did not necessarily show negligence on the part of the plaintiff's intestate. Brown v. Atchison. Opinion by Valentine, J. CHATTEL MORTGAGE, SUFFICIENT DESCRIPTION. In a chattel mortgage of certain neat cattle and other property the descriptions of the neat cattle were generally correct, except that it described one of such cattle as "dark red," when in fact it was dark red, with some white spots on it; and described another as light red," when in fact it had some white on its belly and a little white on its back; and described two others as "two spring heifer calves," when in fact one of them, in addition to the description given in the mortgage, was a roan heifer with an enlarged knee; but taking the entire descriptions of such cattle, with the inquiries which the mortgage itself would suggest, any person could have ascertained the cattle that were mortgaged; therefore held, that the descriptions are sufficient, and the mortgage itself is valid. Adams v. Hill, 10 Kans. 627; Brown v. Holmes, 13 id. 482; Shaffer v. Pickrell, 22 id. 619; King v. Aultman, 24 id. 246, Miller v. Kansas Lumber Co., 26 id. 574. Griffith v. Wheeler. Opinion by Valentine, J. TITLE-TAX SALE-WHAT PURCHASER MAY RECOVER IF DEFECTIVE.-A purchaser at a tax sale whose title in an ejectment action is adjudged defective, is entitled to a recovery of all taxes paid by him and interest thereon, whether paid within three years before Smith v. the commencement of the action, or not. Smith, 15 Kans. 290; Hoffmire v. Rice, 22 id. 749; Jef *To appear in 31 Kansas Reports. fries v. Clark, 23 id. 454; Fairbanks v. Williams, 24 id. 16; Morgan v. Comm'rs of Miami Co., 27 id. 89; Russell v. Hudson, 28 id. 99; Flint v. Douglass, id. 414; Myers v. Coonradt, id. 211. A tax purchase is not primarily a purchase of the lien, but a purchase of a title. Upon the payment of taxes by a tax purchaser he acquires no lien which he can foreclose as an ordinary lien. Corbin v. Young, 24 Kans. 198. (2) A party is not entitled to the benefit of the occupying-claimant act, or to a recovery for the value of improvements made by him, unless at the time of such improvements he has the full and actual possession. He may not go upon land in the possession of another, and make improvements and receive compensation therefor, but must first acquire full and actual possession. Coonradt v. Myers. Opinion by Brewer, J. JUDICIAL SALE-VOIDABLE-NO COLLATERAL ATTACK.-The great weight of authority would seem to be that neither a sheriff's deed nor a sheriff's sale is void, but at most only voidable; and that in order to defeat either the sale or the deed, it must be attacked by some direct and appropriate proceeding. See Johnson v. Hovey, 9 Kans. 65; Paine v. Spratley, 5 id. 525; Bunker v. Rand, 19 Wis. 271; Raymond v. Pauli, 21 id. 531; Raymond v. Holborn, 23 id. 57; Tillman v. Jackson, 1 Minn. 183; San Francisco v. Pixley, 21 Cal. 56; Williams v. Allison, 33 Iowa, 279; Cunningham v. Cassidy, 17 N. Y. 276; Mohawk Bank v. Atwater, 2 Paige's Ch. 54; Van Valkenburg v. Trustees,66 Ill. 103; Evans v. Wilder, 5 Mo. 313; Rector v. Hartt, 8 id. 448; Winters v. Heirs, etc., 6 Coldw. 328. See also Paine v. Spratley, 5 Kans. 525; Freeman on Exec., §§ 311 and 343; Rorer on Judic. Sales, § 1059. In Michigan and Indiana, the decisions are the other way under local statutes, though the following decisions in Indiana are in accordance with the general rule: West v. Cooper, 19 Ind. 1; Patten v. Stewart, id. 233. See also upon this subject, Freeman on Exec., § 296; Rorer, on Judic. Sales, § 749, et seq. The proper way to attack a sheriff's sale for irregularities is by motion, in the same case and before confirmation of the sale, to set aside the sale. There may be other proper modes of defeating irregular sheriff's sales and sheriff's deeds, but we do not think it is necessary now to refer to them. Pritcnard v. Madren. Opinion by Valentine, J. TEXAS COMMISSION OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. V. AGENCY-DECLARATIONS TO PROVE AUTHORITY TO RELEASE DEBT.-It is a general rule that the declarations or admissions of one who assumes to be agent for another, are not of themselves admissible to prove such agency, but such declarations, or admissious, when taken in connection with other facts tending to establish the agency, are admissible. Latham Pledge, 11 Tex. 440. Ordinarily an agent having authority to collect a debt, has no authority to compound or release it, and when such authority is claimed for the agent it devolves upon the party so claiming it to prove it. Wheeler & Wilson Co. v. Crossland. Opinion by Hurt, J. [Decided Dec., 1883.] LANDLORD AND TENANT-RENT-SUB-TENANT.-It is well settled that a sub-tenant is not responsible to the landlord for the rent due by the tenant, nor can the crop of the sub-tenant be taken for the payment or the same. W. & W.'s Con. Rep., 3 607; Hewey v. McGrew, 44 Tex. 412. Knight v. Old. Opinion by Hurt, J. ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.* JUNE TERM, 1883. PARTNERSHIP-RIGHT TO USE PATENT GRANTED BEFORE DISSOLUTION-RIGHT TO SHARE OF ROYALTIES.A. and B. entered into a copartnership, the former to furnish $1,000, and the latter, as his capital, his patent for the manufacture and sale of "incased glass vessels," the articles of copartnership providing that the profits of the business and the proceeds arising from either the sale or leasing of any territory should be equally divided between them, either one of the partners having the right to sell or lease, and that the partnership might be dissolved by either, on giving notice thereof, at any time. The contract also provided that a division of the assets should be had in case of a dissolution "without a sale of the business," in which event each partner was to take back what he put into the business. Prior to the dissolution of the firm and notice thereof, B., the patentee, granted to C. the exclusive right to manufacture and sell wares under the patent, and all reissues of the same, for the entire term it might run, reserving a certain royalty or li cense fee on all wares manufactured and sold by C. Held, that as the transfer of the exclusive right under the patent to C. was the same as a sale, and was made prior to the dissolution, A. was entitled to one-half of the royalty or license fees thereafter to be paid by C. to B., and that if it was a mere leasing to C. the same result would follow. Norris v. Rogers. Opinion by Scott, J. TAXATION-WHEN COLLECTION ENJOINED-OWNER PERMITTING SALE OF LAND-TENDER TO HOLDER OF CERTIFICATE.—(1) A court of equity will never interfere to enjoin the collection of taxes unless they are void or levied without authority on the part of the officers executing the revenue laws. As long as such officers are acting under the law in imposing and collecting taxes the courts will not interfere, except where they transcend their powers and act without legal warrant. Ottawa Glass Co. v. McCaleb, 81 Ill. 556. Nor for the reason that the assessment is not strictly ac cording to the letter of the law. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Siders, 88 Ill. 320. Numerous other cases in this court announce the same doctrine. (2) If the owner of land lies by and permits judgment to go against his land for taxes, and the same to be sold and paid for, it is the settled law of this court that he must tender or offer to pay the holder of the certificate the purchasemoney and all taxes he has paid, with interest thereon, before he can have relief. Reed v. Tyler, 56 Ill. 288; Reed v. Reber, 62 id. 240; Farwell v. Harding, 96 id. 32; Barnett v. Cline, 60 id. 205. Other cases announcing the same rule might, if necessary, be cited. It is based on the fundamental rule that he who seeks equity must do equity. Moore v. Wayman. Opinion by Walker, J. MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. MASTER AND SERVANT-RISKS OF EMPLOYMENTSERVANT MUST USE ORDINARY CARE.-A railroad company does not owe to its employees the duty of having its side tracks perfect, and the risk of imperfections there is one of the risks of the employment. The company has a right to expect that every brakeman will use ordinary care in examining his footing and surroundings, and cannot be held liable for not guarding against an occurrence likely to happen in any place where the ground was uneven. It is not true, as often imagined, that as between the employer and employee all mishaps arising from defects of appliances or prem*To appear in 107 Illinois Reports. |