painfully on sensitive ears, which regard it as an unwarrantable disturbance of the quiet of the night. Such a difference is hardly a sufficient ground for the prohibition asked for in the bill, but we do not think that it should be dismissed, or that the complainant's case is so entirely groundless that he ought to bear the respondent's costs." The court above said: "A person who resides in the center of a large city must not expect to be surrounded by the stillness which prevails in a rural district. He must necessarily hear some of the noise, and occasionally feel slight vibrations, produced by the movement and labor of its people, and by the hum of its mechanical industries. The aid of a court of equity may be invoked to keep annoying sounds within reasonable limits. Every noise however is not a nuisance, nor when produced in the exercise of a lawful occupation should the strong arm of a chancellor necessarily be extended to suppress it. Under the conflicting evidence in this case, both of the noise and of the vibratory effect of the working of the presses, and in view of the great damage which the appellee would sustain, if he were enjoined against pursuing his business, we think the learned judge committed no error in refusing the injunction." See McKeon v. See, 51 N. Y. 300; S. C., 10 Am. Rep. 659. In Smith v. Baker, United States Circuit Court, S. D., New York, July 5, 1884, 18 Rep. 200, the defendant took his children when they had whooping cough to the plaintiff's boarding-house. Plaintiff's child took the disease, and boarders were kept away from plaintiff's house by the presence of the disease. Held, that defendant was liable to plaintiff for the damages caused. The court, Wheeler, J., said: "The defendant took his children when they had whooping-cough, a contagious disease, to the boarding-house of the plaintiff to board, and exposed her child and children of other boarders to it, who took it. The jury have found that this was done without exercising due care to prevent taking the disease into the boarding-house. She was put to expense, care and labor in consequence of her child having it, and boarders were kept away by the presence of it, whereby she lost profits. Words which import the charge of having a contagious distemper are, in themselves, actionable, because prudent people will avoid the company of persons having such distemper. Bac. Abr. Slander, B. 2 The carrying of persons infected with contagious disease along public thoroughfares so as to endanger the health of other travellers is indictable as a nuisance. Add. Torts, § 297; Rex v. Vantandillo, 4 M. & S. 73. Spreading contagious diseases among animals by negligently disposing of, or allowing to escape animals infected, is actionable. Add. Torts (Wood's ed.), 10, note; Ander on Buckton, 1 Stra. 192. A person sustaining an injury not common to others by a nuisance is entitled to an action. Co. Litt. 56a. Negligently imparting such a disease to a person is clearly as great an V. injury as to impute the having it, and negligently affecting the health of persons injuriously as great a wrong as so affecting that of animals." See Boom v. Utica, 2 Barb. 104. In Welsh v. Village of Rutland, 56 Vt. 228, it was held that an incorporated village is not liable for * * * * damage resulting from the negligence of an engineer of its fire department in thawing out a hydrant, whereby water escaped, formed ice on the street, and a traveller falling on it was injured. Royce, C. J., said: "At common law it has been a settled principle ever since the leading case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T. R. 667, decided by Lord Kenyon in 1788, that an individual cannot sustain an action against a political subdivision of the State based upon the misconduct or non-feasance of public officers. This rule of exemptions extends, necessarily, to municipal corporations so far as the reason of it applies, and that is so far as the acts done are governmental and political in their character, and solely for the public benefit and protection, or the negligence or nonfeasance are in respect of the same matters. * When however municipal corporations are not in the exercise of their purely governmental functions, for the sole and immediate benefit of the public, but are exercising as corporations private franchise powers and privileges, which belong to them for their immediate corporate benefit, or dealing with property held by them for their corporate advantage, gain or emolument, though inuring ultimately to the benefit of the general public, then they become liable for negligent exercise of such powers precisely as are individuals. Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344; 102 id. 499; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. II. 284; Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161. So of the construction and maintenance of water works. Murphy v. Lowell, 124 Mass. 564; 122 id. 344; 102 id. 489; City of Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80; Gibson v. Preston, L. R., 5 Q. B. 219; Southcoat v. Stanley, 1 Hurlst. & N. 247; 2 id. 244; 4 id. 67. Of ditches or drains: Chicago v. Langlass, 66 Ill. 361; 44 id. 295. Of bridges or culverts, and in respect of structures which may obstruct the flow of natural water courses, and of the pollution of them by sewage and the like: Hill v. Boston, supra; Wheeler v. Worcester, 10 Allen, 591; 4 id. 41; Parker v. Lowell, 11 Gray, 353; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158; Merrifield v. Worcester, supra; Hazeltine v. Case, 46 Wis. 391; Hig. Waterc. 96; Wood Nuis., § 688. And public works and improvements generally: Lyme Regis v. Henley, 3 B. & Ad. 77; Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2 Black, 590; 1 id. 39; Dayton v. Pease, 4 Ohio St. 80; Bigelow v. Randolph, 14 Gray, 543; Child v. Boston, 4 Allen, 41. This rule has been held to apply to the discharge of sewage or other noxious substances in such manner as to pollute the surface-water, and damage the property of individuals. Winn v. Rutland, 52 Vt. 481; Gale Eas. 308; Merrifield v. Lombard, 13 Allen, 16; Johnson v. Jordan, 2 Met. 234. And if a plan adopted for public works must necessarily cause injury or peril to private persons or property, though executed with due care and skill, the law regards the execution of such a plan as negligence. 2 Thomp. Neg. 742; Haskell v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 208; S. C., 30 Ind. 235; S. C., 35 Mich. 296; S. C., 33 Ala. 116; S. C., 3 Comst. 463. The fire department and its service are of no benefit or profit to the village in its corporate capacity. They are not a source of income or profit to the village, but of expense, which is paid- not out of any special receipts or fund, nor defrayed, even in part, by assessment upon particular persons or classes benefited, as in case of sewers or water works but from the general fund raised by taxation of all the inhabitants. The benefit accrues, not in any sense to the corporation as such, but directly to the public, and the members or employees of the department, whether acting as an independent, though subordinate organization, or under the direct authority of the general officers of the corporation, are, while acting in the line of duty prescribed for them, not agents of the corporation in the sense which renders it liable for their acts, but are in the discharge of an official duty as public officers. To such it is held in many cases that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply, and for their acts no liability can be imposed upon the corporation except by statute. Dill. Mun. Corp. (1st ed.), 774; Hafford v. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 297; Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87; Maxmilian v. Mayor, 62 N. Y. 160; Smith v. Rochester, 76 id. 513; Jewett v. New Haven, 38 Conn. 368; Ogg v. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495; Field v. Des Moines, 39 id. 575; Heller v. Sedalia, 53 Mo. 159; Howard v. San Francisco, 51 Cal. 52; Wilcox v. City of Chicago, Ill. S. C.; Edgerly v. Concord, 59 N. H. 78, 341. AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND LAWS. [Address before the American Bar Association at Saratoga Springs, August 21, 1884, by JOHN F. DILLON.] Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Association: The embarrassment of selecting a suitable topic for the annual address before your associatiou must have been felt by all who have previously undertaken it, and may easily be imagined by others. Shall it be a technical reading of some important statute, a discussion of some controverted question connected with the law or its administration, or shall it be more general in its scope and purpose? This seems to be settled by precedent, for I find that each of the addresses previously made on the like occasion, although directly relating to our profession, and imbued and tinctured with a legal flavor, has been of a general or quasi popular character. While I assent, without demur, to travel in the accustomed path, still the question recurs, what general topic shall be selected, and this, Mr. President and gentlemen, has been determined almost by accident. I found the invitation which brings me before you today awaiting my return from a recent first visit to the Pacific coast. In the long journey, some old notions were modified; others were confirmed; and here and there some new vistas of our institutions and laws opened The laws of every enlightened nation and its cor- How far our system of law is wise and consonant with our institutions; how far the general laws of that system are adapted to the genius and wants and to the industrial, commercial, and social life of the people: and how far the system itself, or the general condition of the laws, admits or requires amendment or change, are indeed complex and difficult, but nevertheless important, and it may be useful inquir ies. In 1878, while holding a term of court at Omaha, I was one day pleased on entering the hotel to see the stately form and familiar face of the late Mr. Justice Clifford. He was accompanied by his wife, who with an affectionate fidelity, so well known, was throughout his public career as inseparable from him as his shadow, going with him whenever he journeyed as a justice in eyre, or settled down to the labors of a term in Washington. I expressed my surprise at seeing him beyond the Missouri river, remarking that I had never before heard of his being out of the orbit, which embraced his circuit and his yearly journey from Portland to Washington and return. "Yes," he answered, "I am surprised at myself. In the course of my long judicial service, I was never out of what you call my orbit but once or twice, and then not far or long. But this time I yielded to the persuasions of Mrs. Clifford and the children, and I have been to the Pacific coast and am so far on my return." With judicial gravity he added: "Two things I wish to say. The first is that I have enjoyed every mile of the route. The second that I reproach myself with having been so long judge of the Supreme Court without an adequate conception of the vastness and grandeur of my country.' Chief Justice Marshall, according to the pleasant reminiscence recalled by the esteemed and deeply lamented Mr. Potter in his address before this association at its fourth meeting, assumed the knowledge which Mr. Justice Clifford eventually acquired by experience.* *In the simplicity of Marshall's day, when the only indulgence was a bottle of Madeira in bad weather, Chief Justice Marshall would, it is said, occasionally ask one of his associates to step to the window and see how the weather was, and when the judge was compelled to report that the sky was cloudless and the sun was shining brightly, Marshall would pronounce this judgment: 'Well, our jurisdiction is so extensive that I am sure it must be raining within it somewhere to-day, and I think on the whole, we will have our bottle of Madeira.'" Address of Mr. Clarkson N. Potter, published in the report of the fourth annual meeting of the American Bar Association, p. 193. Mr. PRESIDENT: Every Nation must stand for, embody and represent some adequate, underlying principle which permeates, vitalizes, and binds it together. True, all sovereignty must be founded on territory, since without territory it is impossible to conceive of National existence. But real National grandeur and National exaltation are not measured by territorial area, but are determined by the moral and intellect ual character, aspirations, ideas, aims and purposes of its people. tions and duties, duties as citizens toward our country, and duties as lawyers toward its laws and jurisprudence? I offer no apology for this line of remark, since it is impossible properly to estimate the merits and value of any system of laws, dissociated from the institutions out of which those laws spring and to which they relate, and since also it ought never to be forgotten that our primary and fundamental relation is that of citizens. We were citizens before we were lawyers; the lawyer does not merge the citizen. It is not uncommon to hear it said that although we have not as yet gone to pieces, we are liable to do so; at any rate, the practical workings of our institutions are unsatiswill be found in almost every considerable city of Europe an American colony, where it is rather the prevailing tone, especially among those without social distinction at home, to talk in this deprecatory strain, and to award to other governments and institutions a superiority to their own. As more than any other class, the lawyers of a century ago shaped and moulded our institutions, it is especially the duty of the lawyers of to-day, to show, in their lives and conversation, that they appreciate at their undiminished value the free and popular institutions of their country, and to acknowledge that howsoever much we owe to law, we owe more to liberty. Our system of government, State and National, embodies and rests upon the fundamental proposition of the absolute and essential civil and political equality of all its citizens, whose collective will, expressed by majorities, is the rightful and only source of all politi-factory, and they have failed of real success. There cal power, and the only supreme majesty. By this principle, we must stand or fall. In adopting it, we reversed the accepted doctrines of the old world, England included; which doctrines were, "that all popular and constitutional rights, all useful and necessary changes in legislation and administration, can only emanate from the free will and concession of the monarch or instituted government." You will recall the discussion of this subject by Mr. Webster in the celebrated Hulsemann correspondence. The political doctrine he asserted, as well as the elevated style and the sustained dignity, force and logic of this remarkable State paper, combined to fix upon it the attention of the contemporary world. Is this fundamental prin- Our institutions failed of success! I deny it. A ciple sound? As applied to our government, it has thousand times, I deny it! In the name of every man, now stood the test of a century, overcoming our fears, who like myself, has come through the terrible or'strengthening and establishing our faith. I do not deal of poverty, and knows what it is; in the name of purpose to discuss its soundness. The stage of discus- the unnumbered and unborn thousands of generous sion ended with us more than a century ago. We then youth, who must yet walk barefoot upon the heated adopted it. We staked everything upon it; our insti- ploughshares of this ordeal, I deny it; for the genius of tutions to-day have no other foundation, and by-it "we our institutions will attend them, unseen throughout must sink or swim, live or die, survive or perish." We the fiery trial, and give them a safe deliverance. What, must believe and maintain, indeed, that such a gov-let me ask is the cause of our unexampled growth, our ernment rests upon the broadest, deepest, and most secure of all possible foundations, since it rests upon the consent and interest of all; in a word upon the sovereignty of society at large, which possesses all the powers necessary to preserve and promote the general welfare and safety, "powers which," says Blackstone, no climate, no time, no Constitution, no contract, can ever destroy or diminish. 1 Black. Com. 245. matchless prospects? Not alone, or chiefly, a favored climate and a fertile soil, but the magnetic force and marvellous power of our free institutions, whose chief glory is, that every man is equal before the law, whose priceless benefaction is, that every man has equal opportunities. It is, Mr. President, the laws and the legal in stitutions of such a Nation, founded upon the sov It would seem to result from this that our self-govereignty of the public will, with the cherished tradierned Nation is fitted to live, that it ought to live, and that it will live so long as it promotes the interest, protects the rights and liberties, and secures the general welfare and happiness of its people. Let us rise, if we may, to adequate conceptions. We have already a population exceeding 50,000,000, a number greater than all the other peoples who speak the English language, inhabiting 38 States and 9 Territories, reaching in unbroken continuity from ocean to ocean, and from the lakes to the gulf. Behold the map of our country. How fortunate that the great mountain ranges and the intervening rivers run from north to south, nature's eternal ligaments. If the Rocky mountains or the Mississippi river had been co-incident with what was ere while known as Mason and Dixon's line, the Nation probably had not come out of the civil war undivided. Consider not only its territorial extent, but the variety of climate, soil, productions and resources. Territory suited to the most varied agriculture, vast plains adapted to grazing; coal and iron lying side by side; long stretches of mountain ranges rich with deposits of the precious metals. If we apply to the future the law of our past growth (and why may we not?), there are those present who will live to see our country with a population of 100,000,000 of people. Shall we, the lawyers of America, be insensible to the responsibilities growing out of our two-fold rela tions and rich heritage of its past history and achievements, with its present greatness and grandeur, with the bright visions of the future which it opens to our view, and which expanding illimitably as we gaze, swell our hopes and exalt our pride; a homogeneous people, widely distributed over a Territory of more than imperial extent, with a common language, with common interests, with common aspirations and hopes; it is the laws and legal institutions of such a country, that are placed under the immediate guardianship of the bar of America, aud in no small degree of this association, which is National in its membership and objects. The lawyers of America ought especially to remember that the strength of a Nation largely depends upon its laws and the manner in which they are administered. Are the laws just and are they justly administered? The inquiry must be answered by the *In one of the greatest of all his speeches, "For Conciliation with America," March 22, 1775, Burke observes of the American Colonies, "in no country, perhaps in the world, is the law so general a study. The profession itself is numerous and powerful and in most provinces it. takes the lead. The greater number of the deputies sent to Congress were lawyers. I hear that they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone's commentaries (then recently published) in America as in England.” divine test. "By their fruits, ye shall know them. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?" Justice is the fruit of good laws, well executed; and "Justice," says Sir James Mackintosh, in his famous lectures, delivered in Lincoln's Inn Hall," is the permanent interest of all men and of all Commonwealths." Conscious of its general truth, we give a ready assent to this sentiment, without often pausing to inquire why it is that justice is of such commanding and supreme importance to the Nation as well as the individual. It is the justice of good laws, well enforced, that restrains and punishes the criminal; that erects the only effectual barrier against the uncurbed and multitudinous passions of men as they come surging on with the power of the ocean, and proclaims "thus far and no farther;" that protects with absolute impartiality every right recognized by the law, whether in favor of natural persons or corporate, of the weak or the strong, against any who menaces or invades it; that stands as the impersonation of the highest attribute of God, not passively with her scales in equipoise, but with flaming sword, to guard the injured and the innocent, and to strike down the highhanded or the fraudulent wrong-doer. The most satisfactory ideal, I have ever been able to form of justice is embodied in the picture of a judge, courageous enough "to give the Devil his due," whether he be in the right or in the wrong. It is to protect public and private rights that courts, with their judges and officers, their jurisdiction and machinery, are established and maintained. Their usual function, their most obvious use is to decide civil and criminal causes. But this is far from the measure of their usefulness. We readily see how important the admistration of justice is to the individual but why is it so important to the Nation. What how ever, let it be asked, is the Nation but the aggregate of individual citizens? In our times, certainly in our country, no government is secure that does not rest upon the interest and affection of the governed. Ordinarily when things are moving on in the even, accustomed tenor of their way, we lose sight of the vital dependence of National life upon National justice But let the safety of the Nation be threatened from within or without, in the pressure and stress of such an exigency, which comes sooner or later to all Nations, then is instantly perceived and felt the vital relation between the National justice and the National existence. If all interests in the State, those of labor and those of capital, which are always closely allied and rarely antagonistic except as the result of laws which operate unjustly upon the one or the other; if all persons within the State regardless of birth, race, religion, or condition feel that the State is the highest embodiment of practical beneficence, and surely to be relied on to do equal and exact justice to all men and all interests, then in the moment of peril, all persons rise and rally, dilated and transfigured by a sublime and irresistible patriotism, bringing as free-will offerings their treasure and lives to defend and preserve laws and institutions which they have found to be so dear. Then especially it is that the strength of popular institutions, such as ours, is revealed and demonstrated. If these observations be well founded, can the lawyer, statesman or citizen, conceive any inquiry more important than an examination into the character and condition of the laws and jurisprudence of his country. I therefore purpose to attempt a survey, necessarily brief, of the general nature of our system of laws and its practical workings, with a view to see how far it is consonant with our political institutions, and adapted to the temper and wants of our people, and with the further view to see how far it deserves on the one hand, the eulogies so often pronounced upon it, or on the other, the complaints so frequently made against it. Such a survey will moreover tend to define the extent to which the "choice and tender business" of introducing changes therein seems to be practicable and expedient. It is observed of the constitution of the human mind, that it “continually oscillates between an incli nation to complain without sufficient cause, and to be too easily satisfied." Guizot Hist. Civ. Europe, Lect. 1. Either extreme is injurious. If we erroneously conceive an institution or system to be perfect, it induces self-satisfaction and inactivity. If we magnify its defects, it may discourage the needful attempt to remedy them. Let us come then to this inquiry, not as partisans, nor with the zeal and bias of the advocate, but with the "cold neutrality of impartial judges." "Paint me as I am," was the command of Oliver Cromwell to Lely. "If you leave out the wart, the scars, or the wrinkles, I will not pay you a shilling." Now the great fact, which as we approach this subject meets our view, is that the common law (including in the phrase "common law" as here used, the supplemental equity system of the court of chancery which grew out of the common law and constitutes a part of it), underlies the whole system of American jurisprudence. The expression "the common law "is used in various senses; (a) sometimes in distinction to statute law; (b) sometimes in distinction to equity law; and (c) sometimes in distinction to the Roman or civil law. I use it in this address in the latter sense. I do not stop to inquire how the common law came to be introduced here, and adopted by us. I deal with the fact as it exists, which is, that the common law is the basis of the laws of every State and Territory of the Union, with comparatively unimportant, and gradually receding exceptions. And it is indeed a most fortunate circumstance, that divided as our Territory is into so many States, each supreme within the limits of its power, a common and uniform general system of jurisprudence underlies and pervades them all. Taking into consideration the genius and situation of our people, and the nature of political institutions at which, with this view, I have already glanced, the inquiry presents itself, what is the general character of the common law? What its adaptation to our people and our situation? what its merits? what its defects? The first observation I submit is, that the common law, as well as the institutions which it developed or along side of which it grew up, is pervaded by a spirit of freedom, which distinguishes it from all other systems and peculiarly adapts it to the institutions of a self-governed people. It is clearly established by the laborious and learned researches which have been more recently made, that the germs and elements of this law and of English polity are of Germanic origin. Stubb's Const. Hist. ch. 1, et seq. The Saxon conquerors of Great Britain were not mere bodies of armed invaders. They went to England during several centuries in families and communities. And what manner of men were they? Guizot, certainly no partial witness, dwells upon the fact that the distinguishing character of the Germans was “their powerful sentiment of personal liberty, personal independence and individuality." He affirms and repeatedly reiterates, that it was they who "introduced this sentiment of personal independence, this love of individual liberty, into European civilization; that this was unknown among the Romans; unknown in the Christian church; and unknown in nearly all the civilizations of antiquity. The liberty which we meet with in ancient civilizations is political liberty-the liberty of the citizen, not the personal liberty of the man himself." Hist. Civ. Europe, Lect. 11. Thus conquering and colonizing England, they carried with them "from lands where the Roman eagle had never been seen, or seen only during the momentary incursions of Drusus and Germanicus" (Freem. Norm. Conq., ch. 1), their language, their religion, their customs, their laws and their organizations. These were indigenous-homebred, without trace or tincture of the Roman law and institutions. Digby, 11, 12. They borrowed nothing from antiquity or from surrounding people. They founded, and in the course of centuries their successors and descendants, the people of England, built up their institutions on their own model. Macaulay speaks of this with his accustomed vividness. "The foundations of our Constitution," he says, "were laid by men who knew nothing of the Greeks, but that they had denied the orthodox procession and cheated the crusaders; and nothing of Rome but that the Pope lived there. Those who followed contented themselves with improving on the original plan. They found models at home; and therefore they'did not look for them abroad." Essay on Hist. In words, well known, the author of the Spirit of the Laws, referring to the checks and balances of the English Constitution, says: "This beautiful system has been found in the forests of Germany." Ce beau système à été trouvé dans les bois. Montesquieu, Book 11, ch. 6. This love of personal freedom and independence was impressed upon the institutions they founded, or adopted or modified. Learned investigators differ concerning the extent to which Roman law existed and prevailed at the time of the Saxon conquest, and the extent to which it was adopted or incorporated into the English laws, usages and institutions. But there is a universal assent to these propositions, viz., that the Saxon spirit of freedom was embodied in the various local courts; that it was in these popular tribunals that the principles of law and local government were cultivated and disseminated; that the Saxons breathed into the Euglish government and institutions "a spirit of equity and freedom which has never entirely departed from them." Mackint. Hist. Eng., vol. 5, ch. 1; Reeves Hist. Com. Law, Introduction by Finlason; and that in the course of time the common law intertwined its roots and fibres inseparably into the Constitution. polity, local, and municipal institutions, the civil and criminal jurisprudence, the family relation, and the rights of person and of property. So from an immemorial or early period, the local territorial subdivisions of England, such as towns and parishes, enjoyed a degree of freedom and were permitted to assess upon themselves their local taxes and manage their local affairs. The rate-payers were thus dignified by being an integral part of the communal life; the founda.ions of municipal liberty were laid; political power was decentralized; knowledge of the laws and reverence for the obedience to them were constantly taught by a participation in their administration and enforcement. This is exactly the opposite of the systems prevailing on the continent, where the central power absorbs, governs, regulates every thing, thereby destroying municipal freedom and the capacity to enjoy and exercise it, as well as the power to defend and preserve it. In our country, this system of decentralizing political power, and of intrusting the direction of local affairs to the local constituencies, has from the earliest colonial periods been carried to a much greater extent than in England. As you pass from one end of this country to the other, alike in the older regions and in the newest organized settlement, you will see the af fairs of each road-district, school-district, township, county, town and city locally self-managed, including the administration of local justice. Every township in the United States has a local court with power to summon a jury of the vicinage, thereby bringing justice home to the business and bosoms of the people, and making it their own affair. We are somewhat apt to look with disdain upon the courts held by justices of the peace. But in reality, we have few more useful institutions. The eyes of the ordinary justice have not indeed been couched to the "gladsome light of jurisprudence." He may be prone to make technical mistakes, but in general, he manages by himself or the jury to work out substantial justice in the decision of the disputes arising out of the everyday affairs of the people. It is in no slight degree instructive to trace the institutions of this new country back to the germs of the Saxon or Anglo Saxon polity, for when we touch to-day, even in our frontier settlements the electric chain wherewith Providence hath bound the ages and the generations of men together, we discover that we are in historic communion with rude and remote ancestors although separated from us by seas, mountains, and centuries. The States of this country bind together the congeries of local municipal institutions, which they severally create and regulate independent of Federal control; thus happily preventing a concentration at the National center of the governmental power and duty of legislating for and regulating the affairs of local communities throughout a country of such vast extent, that with its exact situation, wants, and interests, it would be impossible for Congress to become accurately acquainted. So in the ascending scale, the Federal Constitution constitutes the States and the people of all the States into a National government. It defines the relations of the States to each other and to the general government, and limits the power of the States under any pretext, to deprive any citizen however humble of the great primordial rights of freedom and equality before the law. Magna Charta remains to-day one of the chief foundations of English liberty.* Its chief glory is the provision "that no freeman shall be imprisoned or diseized of his freehold, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land." This provision, memorable in its origin, historic in its associations, luminous with the light of universal justice, beneficent in its effects, and long ago embodied in all of the State Constitutions, has been recently carried into the Federal Constitution, thereby placing the rights of life, liberty and property, as against invasion by the States, under the protection of the National authority. The ancient lawgivers, to induce the highest possible veneration and esteem for the laws, taught that they came from Heaven and were sacred. If any human work ought to be regarded with sanctity by us, it is the Constitution of the United States. Unmatched and matchless instrument; source and guaranty of National life, of general prosperity and of countless blessings-making the States and the people one great, free, happy, united Nation. If the Supreme Court during the period of active National development covered by the long official career of Chief Justice Marshall had put a narrow and inelastic construction upon the Federal Constitution, so that it could not have expanded with the growth and answered the necessities of a great people, it *"The whole of the constitutional history of England is little more than a commentary on Magna Charta." Stubb's Const. Hist., vol. 1, ch. 12. Magna Charta is the key-stone of English liberty. Hallam Middle Ages, vol. 2, chap. 8. |