ful and philanthropic to a degree. It is perhaps true however that under such a system, many a poor but honest wretch, victim of disease or want, might almost pray and seek the comfort, health and merciful consideration of a penitentiary life. It is possible, we suppose, to be too humanitarian. Imprisonment is partly retribution, partly the protection of society through the prevention of crime. A penitentiary should not be other than a terror to evil-doers. It may be so managed as that it shall lose this element and be little more than an enforced boarding-house. And yet the very word implies the infliction of suffering, if it does not, that this infliction shall be severe enough to produce penitence. I shall only notice further an act amending formed laws as to the rights of married women, proceeding still further in the direction adopted by statutes elsewhere. By it a husband is neither to be liable for his wife's contract, before marriage,nor for her tort afterward; nor upon any contract by her, except to the extent of any separate property of hers which he has acquired by ante-nuptial contract or otherwise. And the wife whom her husband deserts, or when he from intemperance or other cause neglects to provide for his family, may make contracts in her own name for the labor of her minor children and sue for and collect their earnings. She may file a petition in the County Court alleging this desertion or neglect and upon proof thereof, the court must enter judgment, vesting her with the rights, privileges, and liabilities of a head of the family, as to the care, custody and control of her minor children, and with all the powers of a feme sole, as to disposing of her real property, free from the custody of her husband. Verily Ohio has esestablished herself as the earthly paradise of deserted or neglected married women! Iowa has passed two hundred and three acts, almost all of them without interest elsewhere. A little act that it shall be unlawful and punishable with thirty days county gaol to "knowingly sell, present, or give any pistol, revolver, or toy pistol to any minor," goes rather far in a very right direction. A man is a minor until twenty-one. The anti-liquor laws of Iowa seem very stringent. Manufacturing intoxicating liquor is a crime. So is its sale. The buildings in which these offenses are perpetrated are nuisances and are to be abated. Common carriers of liquors to unlicensed consignees are liable, and their agents criminal. The spirit of the act may be understood from its last section, " every person who shall, directly or indirectly, keep or maintain by himself or by associating or combining with others or who shall in any manner aid, assist or abet in keeping or maintaining any club-room, or other place in which intoxicating liquor is received, or kept for the purpose of use, gift, barter or sale, or for distribution or division among the members of any club or association, by the means whatever, and every persou who shall use, barter, sell or give away, or assist another in bartering, selling, or giving away any intoxicating liquors so received or kept, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction therefor shall be punished by a fine of not less than $100, nor more than $500, or by imprisonment in the county gaol not less than thirty days nor more than six months. My task is well nigh done. I congratulate my auditors. What can be dryer work, even to lawyers, than the recital of statutory law? But I have one State to review, Kansas-and yet I have scarce any thing to say of her either. She is one of those happy Commonwealths who are satisfied with a dose of new law once in two years. In all such however power is given to the governor to call Legislators together, and the tiny pamphlet of "session laws" with which I have been furnished from that State is prefaced with a proclamation by which he announces, that " whereas there are about 2,000,000 head of cattle valued at $50,000,000, and sheep valued at $2,300,000, that constitute a large and valuable part of the wealth of this State, and whereas a very contagious and alarming disease, known as the foot and mouth disease, has been brought into the State, and said disease is declared by competent and reliable veterinary surgeons whom I have had to examine it, to be highly contagious and incurable, and whereas there is no power in the executive or other branches of the State to quarantine, destroy, stamp out, or prevent the spread of that contagion, and whereas the executive has been requested by a number of boards of county commissioners, and by large and respectable public meetings, letters, telegrams, and personal requests to convene the Legislature in special session, so that it may pass proper laws to eradicate and stamp out the disease, now therefore I, Governor of the State of Kansas, as on account of the extraordinary circumstances affecting the livestock interests of the State, do hereby convene the Legislature. One or two laws not relating to the stamping out process were crowded in and passed, but they are not "noteworthy." Federal legislation interesting to this association, has been during the past year very meagre. Using the words of the distinguished member of the general council from the District of Columbia, I remark that "the session lasted more than seven months and its records show the passage of 113 public acts, 44 public resolutions and 70 private acts." The rest of the legislation at the late session is occupied with matters affecting merely the ordinary administration of the government, changes in laws of purely local application, and grants of one kind and another for the benefit of private individuals and corporations, and has no special interest, of course, for the Bar Association. The conclusion from the review of the work at the last session is either that there is very little for Congress to do in the field of National legislation, or that Congress has left much undone. I believe the latter conclusion is the one generally accepted by the country. One of these acts relates to official oaths. It repeals the iron-clad oath, and thus, and by force of a separate section admits to office under the United States all not excluded by the Constitution, except those who having held a commission in the army and navy at the beginning of our civil war, served in the Confederate army, navy or civil service. Another act punishes the counterfeiting or fraudulent passing within the United States of notes, bonds, or other securities of foreign governments. Another establishes a bureau of animal industry seeking to extirpate contagious diseases among animals and prevent the exportation of diseased cattle. Another, perhaps most important of all, seeks by removing burdens on the American merchant marine, and by other means, to encourage the American foreign carrying trade. Another politic and philanthropic act establishes a bureau of labor under the charge of a commission who shall collect information upon the subject of labor, its relation to capital, the hours of labor, the earnings of laboring men and women, and the means of promoting their material, social, intellectual and moral prosperity. Another constitutes a board of navigation in the treasury department. It is an act evidently designed with the one already noticed to renovate the American merchant marine. Another act is in aid of Indian civilization and authorizes the expenditure of money for erecting, furnishing, and repairing school buildings, for the further instruction and civilizing Indian children dwelling west of the Mississippi. Noble objects have all these laws. Patriotism and philanthropy should hail them cordially. The obliteration of the disabilities made necessary by the civil war, and the condonation by a united people of all offences against the Union, the restoration of our merchant marine, so far as possible, to its ancient prosperity and usefulness; the prosecution of the civilization of the Indian tribes, through the instruction in the arts of life of their children; what grauder objects could Congress seek than these, having in view the peace, greatness and prosperity of the country? Three principal subjects, which to my mind, at this day call specially for patriotic effort, are the restoration of brotherly love between North and South, the restoration of our slaughtered commerce, and the civilization of the Indian tribes, and their adoption, as citizens, into our fold. Add to these two more, the extinction through wise civil reform of the vile maxim that "to the victors belong the spoils," and the solution of the great problem how to make friends of capital and labor, and the field of statesmanship is well nigh covered. Happy the day which would see us all united upon these grand objects. Woe betide our beloved land if somehow party spirit, communism, and inordinate greed of gold, and gold-bought power, be not eradicated or permanently bridled! I cannot leave this review of legislation without calling attention to the argument it presents in favor of only biennial legislation. Why should so many law manufacturing shops be busy, three months on the average every year to produce at last so little? Think of it, thirty-eight regular statute manufactories, and as many more to come as there are territories now to be constructed, busy grinding out laws, which override common law, civil law, canon law, and the decisions of all courts upon them, or either of them, and with how much appreciable improvement? Think of the expense of all this. But that is the lowest argument. Think of the fraud, bribery, and corruption which festers in and around Legislatures during their process of gestation, known to all men, seen by scarcely any; punished when, out of New Jersey? think of the agitation caused by each session in the public mind, its effect upon business, how it cows enterprise and checks business effort. Think of the crudeness generally of the schemes devised, and the frequent obscurity and illiteracy of the language adopted. Think of the relief felt on every hand, when the nuisance comes to an end! Annual sessions may probably be necessary for Congress, and possibly for such a great Commonwealth, as New York. But I think of no other State in the Union which might not, at least, try the experiment already adopted by so many States, and I respectfully suggest that this association at its present meeting, express its opinion upon the subject. I could almost wish that this had been the session year in the States of the great West, the West of today, not simply that of half a century ago, that we might have seen on their statute books the indications such books always give of the character of a people, their sentiments, their grogress and their future. For the West, the great States beyond the great river and stretching over the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific ocean, States which half a century ago were scarce more than a wilderness populated by the savage and wild animals upon whose capture they were supported, is the type and picture after all of what this country is to be. Grand in its extent, its rivers, its lakes, and its mountains; grand in its enterprises, which dwarf all precedent audacity; grand in its fertility and its agricultural productions; grand in its wealth, whether dug from the bowels of the earth, or expelled by the blasting of its rocks, or gathered from its numerous flocks and herds, or from the wonderful cultivation of its wonderful farms; it gives promise of a future in which humanity may obtain greater and more admirable development than elsewhere on the habitable globe. Eastern, middle and south, yea, the States, once western, now central, lying east of the Mississippi, are belittled by the strides of the West beyond the river. It is the land for the fairest and speediest trial, and for the most unprejudiced settlement of all vexed questions, social or political. No puritanism anchors it to strict and defined views. No quakerism as in the land of Penn, or inheritance of Holland blood as in New York, or commingling of these and other conservative elements as in New Jersey, or long habituation to the system of slave labor as in the States below Mason and Dixon's line, embarrass or in any wise give tone or color to their ideas. They are more cosmopolitan than any region under the sun. Their people is made up almost of every Nation under Heaven. Their laws and their social life ought to be the best, for they have all the past and all the present, for their teachers. If they are so wise as to rise mere acquisition as the motive of social life; to enforce universal education; to encourage in their midst institutions for the spread of learning and science, to adopt and cherish the freedom which comes of the open Bible, which is founded on true religion, which recognizes the Most High as the monarch of all Nations, and obedience to the law as obedience to Him; if in short they build on the foundation of education and religion, the civilization of the great West will be the crowning triumph of mankind; and in the States which coustitute it will be verified and fulfilled the prophecy so familiar to us all: "Westward the star of empire takes its way : The fifth shall end the drama with the day; May I be permitted, now that my allotted task is done, to add a few words which seem to me called for by the occasion. To-day begins the eighth year of this association. Its conception was eminently happy. Its popularity is exhibited by its yearly increase in attendance, and its present large number of members. But has it attained its avowed objects? It has "upheld the honor of the profession of the law." It has "encouraged cordial intercourse among the members of the American Bar." In these respects I claim for it high distinction. These meetings which bring and keep so many of us together coming from all portions of this wide Union, have done more to unify the American Bar than any thing else throughout its history, and yet they have only begun to do their work. Nor is the benefit thus effected easy to be exaggerated. It makes us realize that we are not merely of the bar of Massachusetts, of New York or of New Jersey, of Louisiana, or South Carolina, or Texas, or California, but of the bar of America. It stimulates our curiosity as to the peculiarities, advantages or defects of the laws of Commonwealths outside our own. It tends to lead us to forget State divisions, and to love the whole great country. But what have we done so far to advance the science of jurisprudence? What to promote the administration of justice? What to promote uniformity of legislation throughout the Union? We have attempted to promote the administration of justice. The situation of the docket of the Su preme Court of the United States is a shame and a disgrace to jurisprudence. Appellants wait three years before they can be heard. This is established fact. The pace of the court through its list is measured with accuracy, so that you may learn at the beginning of a term with well nigh precise certainty on what day your case will be reached aud called. Cases, by the time they reach that tribunal, are largely winnowed of unnecessary matter. Printed briefs, rather say arguments, are in the hands of the court before. hearing. Counsel are economically restricted in time. The court gives four hours each week day but one to hearings. Their sessions begin in October and, with little intermission, conclude in May. While they last their labor is burdensome. Perhaps they might increase the length of their daily sessions and the length of their terms. But this doubtless would interfere with time for incubation, and might not really benefit the suitors. Outside relief must somehow be given. Could this association have united on a scheme, it would have had great weight. But unfortunately, minds have differed. That variance of opinion was represented in Congress. Besides legislation, even upon such a subject, is embarrassed by political strife. The advantage of one plan discussed in the association was that it created no new judges, and therefore neither party as such had any motive to oppose or delay it. The great practical objection to the other plan is that one party or the other will always be in the way of its passage, because it will not agree that its opponent should supply all the new judges, and as for arranging for a division, that would be contrary to that established maxim already mentioned superior in political force to Holy Writ, "To the victors belong the spoils." So the only effort on our part to promote the administration of justice has failed. What other effort have we made? We have done something tending to promote "uniformity of legislation throughout the Union." A very valuable paper on the recording laws of the United States, by an eminent lawyer, judge and author, projected changes which commended themselves to every mind, and which were duly discussed, published, and there was the end. I believe that one State has adopted an act as to the acknowledgment of conveyances which was approved by this association. An able report has been made on the subject of marriage and divorce, and the necessity of uniform law on this subject. If any thing further has been done, or any change of any State law recently been made in this most important direction, I have not been so fortunate as to hear of it. We have done something too “to advance the science of jurisprudence;" that is, papers have been read at our annual meetings by distinguished and able lawyers discussing subjects of great moment, and thus have tended, as does every thesis upon the law, to accomplish this high end. And yet comparatively has much been done? I do not think our Constitution is at fault, nor its machinery. Annually, in conformity with the Constitution, committees are appointed for the year ensuing on jurisprudence and law reform, on judicial administration and remedial procedure, on legal education and admissions to the bar, on commercial law, on international law. What has been done by these committees? How many reports have been made? That on legal education and admissions to the bar has reported, and beneficial effect has followed in at least one State. The agitation of that subject, and of the proper education for the bar has, I believe, done much good. It has braced up the practice, if it has not improved the rules, in one State that I know of at least; I have hope that it has elsewhere. But what about jurisprudence and law reform? What about judicial administration and remedial procedure? What about commercial law? What about international law? Perhaps there is defect in the practicalness of otherwise well-devised machinery. It must be difficult to report generally upon such subjects. Any report to be profitable must select some one topic from those connected with the large subject-matter, and devote attention exclusively to that. It has occurred to me to suggest an addition or a change in the present plan of our meetings. It is the same successfully adopted in a leading religious denomination for a meeting termed its congress. Let the executive committee de termine upon some question or topic connected, we will say, with law reform, and request four members whom they shall select, to prepare and conduct a discussion of it, arranging, if possible, that there shall be difference in the views presented. Then let the subject, after they are through, be open to debate by speakers limited in time. Besides this addition to the interest of our meetings let the efficiency of our association be enhanced by determining upon some one or two amendments to the law, say upon the subject of the acknowledgment and record of conveyances, and upon that of marriage and divorce, as to which all will admit the laws of the States should be uniform. And then let a committee be appointed of one from each State, whose duty it shall be to bring the measure before its Legislatare, and if possible secure its adoption. The mere motive of obtaining uniformity will be a strong argument with every Legislature, and by prudent action on the part of the committeemen it will not be difficult to secure the adoption of a wisely-drawn statute. "Ars longa, vita brevis." Let us strive, brethren and friends, to make these delightful convocations something more than simple occasions of enjoyment. Let us strive to become a power, a power for good, a power which shall be recognized, a power which through the welding together of strong minds and earnest hearts of the many thousands engaged in our noble profession, and through the attainment by means of uniform laws governing social and business life, shall aid the rail and the telegraph in that glorious work, the fruition fully of that which is our National motto; a motto adopted, I must believe, not simply as descriptive, nor even as also prophetic, but besides, as briefly declaring the duty of every citizen in reference to the State and to the Nation, E Pluribus Unum." HABEAS CORFUS DISCHARGE REVIEWABLE ONLY ON CERTIORARI. WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT, MAY 16, 1884. IN RE CROW.* A court commissioner has jurisdiction to determine whether a prisoner has suffered and served the full term of the imprisonment fixed by his sentence, and his adjudication is conclusive. The discharge of a prisoner on a writ of. habeas corpus is When a prisoner has been discharged upon a writ of habeas *19 N. W. Rep. 713. D. S. Rose, for J. W. Crow, petitioner. H. W. Chynoweth, Asst. Atty. Gen., for sheriff. ORTON, J. This is an original petition by J. W. Crow for writ of habeas corpus, and for his discharge from imprisonment in the county jail of the county of La Fayette, and from the custody of the sheriff of said county. The petition was filed and the writ issued on the 18th day of March, 1884. By the petition and the return of Nelson Bower, the sheriff of said county, the following facts of record appear. On the 14th day of December, 1883, the petitioner was sentenced by the Circuit Court of La Fayette county, on four several convictions for misdemeanors, to pay fine and costs, and if not paid forthwith, to be imprisoned in the county jail, on the first conviction, for 10 days; on the second, for 10 days; on the third, for 10 days; and on the fourth, for 40 days; to be so imprisoned on the second after the termination of the first, on the third after the termination of the second, and on the fourth after the termination of the third, for the aggregate term of 70 days. The defendant was present in court when said sentences were pronounced, and on the same day the clerk of the court duly made his certificates of the said convictions and sentences, and the same came to the hands of said sheriff. On the 10th day of March, 1882, the said sheriff arrested the petitioner, and held him in custody in the county jail by virtue of said certificates; whereupon the said Crow presented his petition, reciting the above facts, to the Hon. John W. Blackstone, court commissioner of the Circuit Court for said county, for a writ of habeas corpus, and for discharge thereon from said imprisonment, alleging as the ground of such discharge, in respect to the first three of said sentences, "that at the time of rendering said judgments by said court, he was present in open court and ready to enter upon the service of said terms of sentence, and did in law so enter upon the service of said terms of sentence, and that said terms of sentence expired, and that he became entitled to his discharge under said judgments and certificates of conviction on the expiration of the terms mentioned therein; " and in respect to the fourth of said sentences, that (in addition to the above) said term of imprisonment was fully served and has completely expired." It is further stated in said petition "that the petitioner, since the rendition and entry of each and all of said several judgments, has been in the city of Darlington, in said county, upon the streets and in the public places, and has almost daily during said term met and conversed with said sheriff." It may be noted here that there is nothing in this petition inconsistent with the fact that the petitioner had been imprisoned in the county jail upon those certificates of sentence for the full aggregate term of seventy days. (1) He was in the city of Darlington, upon the streets and in the public places, since the rendition and entry of the several judgments. This might have been long after he had been imprisoned in the jail for the full terms. (2) He almost daily, during said term, met and conversed with said sheriff. This he could have done within the county jail. But besides there being nothing in the petition to show that the petitioner had not suffered his full term of imprisonment in the county jail, as to each of the first three sentences it is stated that he entered upon the service of said terms of sentence, and that said terms had expired, and as to the fourth that said term of imprisonment "was fully served and had completely expired." The return to the first writ on this petition was simply that he, the said Nelson Bower, "imprisons and restrains said John W. Crow, as aforesaid, under and by virtue of four certain certificates of conviction and sentence, issued out of said court by the clerk thereof, December 14, 1883, in four separate actions of record in said court," etc. The certificates referred to are appended to the return the same as to the petition. On the hearing of this petition and return the honorable court commissioner discharged the petitioner on the 11th day of March, 1884. The decision of this court upon the case made here, upon the petition and the return of the sheriff to the writ, must exclusively depend upon the question whether the commissioner had jurisdiction of the first writ to hear and decide the case made by the petition and return. The argument of this case was especially able on the part of the learned counsel of the petitioner, and on behalf of the State, by the learned assistant Attorney-General, Mr. Chynoweth, who not only made a very cogent argument, but presented and commented upon a very large number of cases, which he claimed to be authority for his positions; (1) that the commissioner had no jurisdiction whatever over the case; (2) that if he had jurisdiction to issue the writ, he had no lawful authority to discharge the petitioner; and that in either case his judgment was absolutely void, and not conclusive, or a bar to this second hearing upon habeas corpus of the same causes of imprisonment. He contends (1) that when it appeared by the petition that the petitioner "had been committed or detained by virtue of the final judgment or order of any competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction, or by virtue of any execution issued upon such order or judgment," it then appeared that the petitioner was "not entitled to prosecute such writ" according to section 3408, Rev. Stat.. so providing. It might be a sufficient answer to this contention that the petition in that case did not claim that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to render judgment of sentence in those four cases of conviction, or that the certificates of such convictions and sentences, as commitments of the petitioner in execution of the judgments, were not in every respect sufficient and valid, but that he claimed only that he had endured and suffered the full punishments and imprisonments thereon, and that he was imprisoned long after the full expiration of said terms of imprisonment to which he had been so sentenced. If in such a case however as claimed, or in any other, the facts in the above prohibition of the statute appearing, the petitioner is not entitled to prosecute such writ, that of course is the end of the case, and a prisoner held in custody and imprisoned long after he has completely fulfilled the whole sentence, and been imprisoned for the whole term, cannot procure his liberty by this writ. If not by this writ, especially made a part of Magna Charta for the express purpose of delivering a subject or citizen from unlawful imprisonment, and which has been used always since effectually for such purpose in all possible cases of unlawful imprisonment, where is the remedy? If a person sentenced to imprisonment may be saved from all of it except the arrest, when the judgment, though just, may be without jurisdiction, or the execution, though formal, may be without authority, why may not one be released and enlarged by this writ, after he has suffered the full measure of the imprisonment for which he was sentenced, when he is still held without the pretense of any lawful authority? The question auswers itself. But such has always been proper ground for the writ, and it is no answer by return of the officer that be holds the prisoner by virtue of a valid judgment and an authorized execution of it. "A prisoner held by valid process may be discharged by habeas corpus by reason of some omission or event occurring since the issuing of it." Wood Mand. Hab. Corp., etc., 174. Many of the cases cited by the learned assistant attorney-general, and many other cases, affirm this jurisdiction on habeas corpus. In Trotter v. Mills, 6 Wend. 42, in a suit on a judgment, the defendant pleaded nul tiel record, and discharged from imprisonment. Held, that if discharged by reason of payment or satisfaction of the judgment, such discharge was final and conclusive. In Hoose v. Sherrill, 16 Wend. 38, the defendant was served by summons when he was a non-resident, and not amenable to summons. The case went to judgment of fine and imprisonment for 30 days, unless the fine was paid. Held, that a judge at chambers had jurisdiction in habeas corpus to issue the writ, but that the former judgment was final, because the court had jurisdiction to issue a summons in a proper case, and whether it was a proper case could only be inquired on certiorari. So here the commissioner had jurisdiction to issue and hear the writ of habeus corpus for such cause, and such cause could only be reviewed on certiorari. In Rex v. Collyer, Sayers, 44 (26 Geo. II.), defendant was convicted of an assault, and sentenced to imprisoument for one month, but it was added that he ask pardon of the injured party, and publish the sentence in the daily Advertiser, and be imprisoned until he had done so. The month's imprisonment had not expired. Held, that king's bench had jurisdiction to discharge him on habeas corpus, for excess of jurisdiction. In Cleek v. Com., 21 Grat. 777, the conviction and sentence were in July, for 10 months. Defendant escaped in September, was recaptured in January, and remained in prison until May, 10 months from date of sentence. On habeas corpus and refusal to discharge an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals on error, and it was held that the three months he was out of prison on escape must be added to his sentence, because his escape was his own fault and crime. It is said in the opinion that the sheriff had the right to continue his imprisonment without any further order than the original sentence, because he was cognizant of the facts, and if the prisoner desired to have the question decided he could have had a writ of habeas corpus and the facts inquired into, and that the court would have jurisdiction in such a case. Here the same or a similar question was involved on the first habeas corpus, viz., whether the term of imprisonment had expired. In State v. Chancellor, 1 Strob. (S. C.) 378, the defendants were sentenced to receive twelve lashes, but were pardoned on condition that they leave the State and not return. They returned to the State. They were then brought before the court for resentence. The question was raised whether this was the proper practice in such cases. It was held that it was, because the defendants had the right to be heard on the question whether they should be punished after the day had passed by; and that they might show reasons for their return to the State, such as that they were kidnapped and brought back by force, or other reason why the condition of their pardon was violated; or that they were not the same persons; and that such a case presented questions of both law and fact which ought to be inquired into by the court; and that such was the practice in England in such cases-citing cases. So here, whether the defendant had fully suffered his imprisonment, and was therefore entitled to go at large, was a question of fact to be inquired into by the commissioner on habeas corpus. Can there be any doubt that the commissioner had jurisdiction in such a case to inquire further than the judgment of sentence, which was unquestionably valid, and rendered by a court having jurisdiction? The same practice was followed in State v. Fuller, 1 McCord (S. C.). 178. In State v. Smith, 1 Bailey (S. C.), 283, the defendant was pardoned on condition of his leaving the State. He left the State and then returned, and after staying some time, he returned to the foreign State, and while there was arrested and brought back, and re-imprisoned on the old sentence. He was then brought before the chief justice at chambers on habeas corpus, and was remanded on resentence by the court, on rule to show cause. On the hearing before the chief justice on habeas corpus there was proof by affidavits of the prisoner's voluntary return to the State. The opinion of Chief Justice Harper is appended to the case, affirming his jurisdiction in habeas corpus in such a case. In People v. Potter, 1 Parker Crim. 47, the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment, and pardoned on condition of leaving the State, but returned and was rearrested, and remanded by the general sessions of New York city to serve out the remaining part of the term The jurisdiction of the General Sessions was denied, and Judge Edmonds held by authority of Judge Bronson that the prisoner should have been brought before one of the judges of the Supreme Court, in Oyer and Terminer, on habeas corpus, to inquire into the facts before the defendant should be reimprisoned. In People v. Porter, 1 Duer, 709, it was neld that a judge at chambers had jurisdiction on habeas corpus to discharge or remand an infant, although he had no authority to provide for the future custody of the infant, and the court of chancery only had such authority; but in Wilcox v. Wilcox, 14 N. Y. 575, it is held that the judges there could also provide for such future custody because they succeeded to this chancery jurisdiction. In Haggarty v. People, 53 N. Y. 476, the sentence for robbery had not expired when the prisoner escaped. He was recaptured and brought before the court on information for 'resentence for balance of the term. Held on error, that such a proceeding was unnecessary because if there was any good cause why the prisoner should not be so reimprisoned, it could be shown on habeas corpus, when the facts could be inquired into. In People v. Cowles, 4 Keyes, 38, a judge at chambers discharged a prisoner imprisoned on a fine, on habeas corpus, and admitted him to the jail liberties; the reason for the discharge being that he was entitled to such liberties. Held, on error, that the judge had jurisdiction to discharge the prisoner for such reason, but had no jurisdiction to admit to the jail liberties, that power being only in the court; and the judgment was reversed. In Ex parte Milburn, 9 Pet. 704, the defendant was under indictment and out on bail, and was rearrested on capias, and discharged from such restraint by habeas corpus. He was then arrested on a bench-warrant for trial. On a second habeas corpus it was held that he was imprisoned the second time on a very different process aud cause, and therefore his first discharge was no bar to the second writ. The jurisdiction under the first writ was conceded, and the judgment on the same cause was held final until reversed. This case was cited for the State, as in point that the same case might be twice tried on two distinct and successive writs of habeas corpus. But it is really very much in point the other way. |