cases the parties are supposed to have contracted in view of the uncertainty of life, and with full knowledge that death might ensue within the year, and thus end the contract. In such cases, as the contract was purely personal, and must end with life, it is held to be fully performed by death, and the court cannot say, from the terms of the agreement, that such was not the contemplation of the parties; but where the agreement, as in this case, stipulates in terms for a longer period than twelve months, the court is bound to see that the deliberate attempt of the parties was to bind each other verbally in the teeth of the statute for a longer period than one year. Where the time is indefinite, and supervening death may work completion within the year, the court will not infer an intention to violate the statute, but where two, five or ten years is expressly stipulated for, there is no room for inference, and the statute comes like a tyrant, and makes all unenforceable." Disapproving, Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208.

In Acker v. County of Anderson, 20 S. C. 495, it was held that a county is not responsible for injuries to a mule and buggy caused by the mule taking fright at a placard placed on a public bridge without the knowledge of the county commissioners, and removed by them as soon as it was brought to their attention. The court said: "This action was brought under this authority, and the only question was whether the plaintiff's injury was received through a defect in the repair' of Rocky river bridge. It appeared that the county commissioners had nothing to do with putting the placard on the bridge, which was placed there as a public place by some enterprising business man, intent on advertising the merits of the 'force-pump,' and that as soon as it was brought to their attention they had it taken down. If therefore any responsibility as to consequences arose out of the placard being on the bridge, it would seem not to attach to the county. Even if the commissioners had allowed it to be placed there, it is more than doubtful whether the county could have been made liable. The only matter for which the act gives an action against the county is a defect in the repair of a highway, causeway or bridge.' If there was no defect in this bridge there was no right of action against the county, and whether there was such a defect was a question of fact, which was submitted to the jury, upon what we must assume to have been a fair charge, as no complaint is made here on that point." We should suppose that a court might hold, as matter of law, that a placard on a bridge is not a "defect in a bridge."

In Roper v. Town of Laurinburg, 90 N. C. 427, it was held that a town may appropriate a reasonable amount of its funds to employ counsel to defend its police officers in actions for false imprisonment. The court said: "The right of a municipal corporation to provide an indemnity for its officers who may incur a liability to others in the bona fide exer

cise of their functions while engaged in the discharge of their duties, is too well settled by adjudications, and too well founded in considerations of public policy to admit of controversy. It is so expressly declared in 1 Dill. Mun. Corp., § 98, and the references fully support the general proposition asserted in the text. The consequence might be most serious if such officers were to be left to struggle alone and unaided against every action that persons arrested may choose to bring upon an allegation of abused authority, though honestly exercised, in the maintenance of the public peace and the preservation of good order, and the results of which, though successfully defended, might prove disastrous to the officer. Within the range of this conceded power must be embraced the employment of counsel, and the payment of a reasonable compensation for their services, and the more necessary is it to a municipal body, such as this is, who have no regular and salaried legal adviser to resort to in case the occasion shall require. Such a right, limited by a just responsibility for its exercise, must abide in the corporation as essential to its self-protection, and the attainment of the ends for which it is formed. Adjudicated cases are not wanting in the reports which sustain this view, to some of which we will refer." Citing Bancroft v. Lynnfield, 18 Pick. 566; Bobbitt v. Savoy, 3 Cush. 530; Hadsell v. Hancock, 3 Gray, 526; Sherman v. Carr, 8 R. I. 431. In the last case the court said: "Is it then one of the usual and ordinary expenses of a city to protect its officers, who, while exercising in good faith the functions of their office, have been found by the verdict of a jury to have exceeded the lawful powers of that office and to have trespassed upon the rights of a citizen? If the power to indemnify an officer under these circumstances does not rest in that body who appropriate the money for all the legitimate duties of a municipality within its own province, the various executive officers of a city perform their duties at the peril of an individual responsibility for all their mistakes of law and of fact, however honest and intelligent they may be, and also at the peril of the possible mistakes of a jury naturally jealous of the rights of the citizen when brought in conflict with the exercise of official power. If the officer is thus responsible, he will naturally be too cautious, if not timid, in the exercise of his powers which must be frequently exercised for the protection of socity, before and not after a thorough investigation of the case in which he is called upon to act. * * * We know of no case in which, while the officer continues to act in behalf of the community, and not in his own behalf, it is held that the community cannot indemnify him."

AN ARTICLED CLERK'S DAY IN LONDON. TURNING out of Fleet street, just on the city

side of Temple Bar (for be it premised we are speaking of days when the old Bar still retained its

of the elder female fixes upon yon unoffending youth; she summons him to her side, and the investigation commences. Her first demand is for "the man who wrote out that," and as it is evident that nothing short of the production of the original will and its collation on the spot, with the transcript, will satisfy her doubts, we leave poor Jackson in her clutches, reflecting that after all a berth in the civil service may have its drawbacks. Never did we visit this well-hidden office without finding there a more or less numerous gathering of legacy hunters, but how they get there remains a mystery Other public offices lie open and conspicuous to the passer-by, and are never invaded by the profane feet of the laity. This one, huddled away down a pair of back stairs in an obscure corner of an inner quadrangle, seeks privacy in vain.

And now, at last, for Westminster. We pass the Horse Guards with its glittering troopers, the less obtrusive Admiralty, and the splendid mass of the new Treasury, and crossing the grand old Hall, with its usual throng of applewomen, witnesses, lawyers and policemen, enter the Court of Exchequer, where Kelly, last of the chief barons, presides, patriarchal and garrulous. You will notice that the learned gentleman who happens to be addressing the court at the present moment occupies a little pen all to himself, instead of being mixed with the general throng of his compeers. He is Mr. Webster, the present "tubman" of the court, and by right of his mysterious title occupies his "tub." Have the Judicature Acts swept away even this old custom?

Our object being to see the list for to-morrow, which is not yet ready, we have half an hour to spare, and where can we spend it better than in the Abbey, just across the street? In three minutes we epitomize many a great lawyer's career passing from Westminster Hall through St. Stephen's into the Abbey, and con for the hundredth time the familiar inscriptions. A half hour quickly passes. Returning to the court we find the cause list ready, and resigning ourselves to the sulphurous discomfort of the underground railway we are soon back in the city, where the gas-lights gleam confusedly through the fast thickening fog. An hour's letter writing finishes the office day, and we make tracks homeward to resume with what spirit we can our study of Haynes' Equity."

The plaintiff in error being under arrest and about to be tried for the offense of having written and sent through the post-office a threatening letter for the purpose of extorting money, and the court having been informed by the district attorney in writing that there was a probability that the prisoner was then insane, and thereby incapacitated to act for herself, and ought not, for that reason, to be then put upon her trial, and praying that an inquisition into her mental condition be then and there ordered and had by the court in a summary manner, either by a jury or otherwise, as to the said court might seem meet, as provided by Rev. Stat., § 4700, the court did then and there order an investigation as prayed for in said application; whereupon a jury was impaneled and sworn for the purpose, and the investigation thereupon proceeded, and at the close thereof the jury, under the charge of the court, found and rendered a verdict that the prisoner was then insane. Thereupon the trial of the offense was, on motion of the district attorney, indefinitely postponed, and the court thereupon ordered that the prisoner be confined in one of the hospitals for the insane, as provided by law, to wit, the Milwaukee Insane Asylum at Wauwatosa, there to be held in the custody and care of the superintendent, as the law directed; and to be received, confined, and treated by such superintendent as other insane persons are kept and treated therein; and upon her recovery from such insanity to notify the sheriff thereof, and thereupon deliver her to him to be dealt with according to law. To review that order this writ of error is brought. David W. Small, for plaintiff in error.

W. C. Williams, district attorney, for defendant in

error.

CASSODAY, J. Can such an order be reviewed by this court on writ of error? The learned counsel for the plaintiff in error has made no reference to the question, and no authorities have been cited upon it in behalf of the State. At common law, such writ could only be brought upon a final judgment, or an award in the nature of a final judgment. Finch v. Ranow, 1 Ld. Raym. 610; S. C., 3 Salk. 145; Rex v. Dublin, 1 Strange, 538; Jaques v. Cesar, 1 Saund, 101, note; Samuel v. Judin, 6 East, 336; Tyler v. Hamersly, 44 Coun. 409; 2 Burrill, Pr. 132; Hill v. Bloomer, 1 Pin. 283; Merril v. Rollin, id. 411; Dean v. Williams, 2 id. 91; Wheeler v. Scott, 3 Wis. 362; Paine v. Chase, 14 id. 653; Jenks v. State, 16 id. 333; Eaton v. Gillett, id. 546; Crilley v. State, 20 id. 244; 1 Archb. Crim. Pr. & Pl. 623, *199. A writ of error does not lie to review an order. Paine v. Chase, supra; Jenks v. State, supra; Eaton v. Gillett, supra; Shannon v. State, 18 Wis. 604. It does not extend to a decree or judgment in an equity ease. Delaplaine v. Madison, 7 Wis. 406; Howes v. Buckingham, 13 id. 442; Costello v. Burch, 25 id. 477. Such was the writ which was preserved by the Constitution. Section 21, art. 1. The statute has not enlarged the functions of the writ. Delaplaine v. Madison, supra; Smith v. Thorp, 7 Wis. 514; Howes v. Buckingham,

supra.

In fact, the statute expressly provides that writs of error in criminal cases may issue, and bills of exceptions may be served, noticed, and settled, in the manner and within the time provided by law in civil cases. Rev. Stat., § 4724. And in civil cases it provides that writs of error may issue to review final judgments in actions triable by jury, except actions for divorce. Id. § 3043.

It seems to follow that the order in question being made before any "final judgment" had been pronounced, cannot be reviewed upon this writ of error. The same is true for another reason, even if the order made upon this collateral issue be construed as in the nature of a final judgment. The statutory provision

E. G. Comstock, for respondent.

D. G. Hooker, for appellant.

ORTON, J. This suit is brought upon a policy of endowment insurance, issued by the company to the plaintiff, bearing date June 3, 1867, to recover fourtenths of the $1,000 of insurance aud interest, on the ground of full payment of the cash premiums and of the interest on the premium notes for such years. After the first four years from the date of the policy the plaintiff failed to pay any more cash premiums, or to give any more premium notes, or to pay any more interest upon the premium uotes given for such years, and the defendant company declared a forfeiture of the whole policy, and notified the plaintiff thereof.

The plaintiff claims (1) that by the terms of the policy he is entitled to four-tenths of the whole insurance, because he has fully paid the cash premiums and interest on the premium notes for such years, if he had entirely failed to give the premium notes and to pay the cash premiums and the interest on the premium notes which he gave for the first four years thereafter, during the life of the policy; and (2) that there were dividends of surplus, from year to year, due him from the company, sufficient to pay such interest.

The defendant contends (1) that by the terms of the policy it could be forfeited in toto by the company upon the failure of the assured to pay the interest in cash upon such premium notes at the end of each year during the time of the polley; and that (2) the policy should have such a construction, if possible, because absolutely necessary and essential to the continued business of the company in this department of insurance, and to any estimates of future resources, dividends or liabilities upon the basis of interest paid on all premium notes outstanding, and the anticipation thereof, as one of the certain and permanent resources of the company for such purposes.

The last consideration may reasonably affect the rule that forfeitures are not favored, and will not be judicially declared if the rights of the parties can be fully saved or secured without. Or the rule of forfeiture may be stated as in Hall v. Delaplaine, 5 Wis. 206, and Button v. Schroyer, id. 598; it will be mitigated or relieved against when it can be done without violence to the contract of the parties. The law in respect to forfeiture of contracts is really elementary, and is as claimed by the learned counsel of the respond. ent. See authorities cited in his brief. With the rules in respect to forfeitures established in those cases, and the ordinary rules of interpretation "to give the language its just sense, and to search for the precise meaning to give the contract the sense in which the promisor believed the other party to have accepted it, or in which he had reason to suppose it was understood by the promisee,' " and the practical interpretation of the contract, by the practice and conduct of the parties under it, in view, we shall endeavor to place the proper construction upon it. I will not incumber and confuse the question by quoting more of the language of the policy than absolutely necessary to its elucidation, or obscure it by redundancy.

The matter of difference between the parties has already been sufficiently stated, and I will first quote those clauses of the policy by reason of which the de

fendant claims it tɔ have been completely forfeited and determined, and then the clauses by reason of which the plaintiff claims the policy to be valid to the extent of four-tenths of the whole amount of the insurance, as a paid-up policy for four years, and only forfeited as to the remainder: First. After stating the consideration of the annual premium note, the language in brackets is "the interest upon which must be paid annually, in cash, at the date of the maturity of the annual premium." Second. After stating the terms of such proportion of tenths, as the complete payment of the annual premiums at the time of the default, the language is: " But in order to secure such proportion of the policy all premium notes must be taken up or the interest thereon be paid annually, in cash, on the date of the annual maturity of the premium, until the notes are cancelled by returns of the surplus, or the whole policy will be forfeited." This language has the effect as a condition (1) to the payment of any portion of the insurance less than the whole, and (2) to avoid the forfeiture of the whole policy. If the notes are paid and taken up, or cancelled by returns of the surplus and divinends, then of course the interest thereon ceases; but if they are not, the interest must all be paid when due. Third. The first premium note given at the date of the policy for the first year, and the other three notes also, after stating the interest at 7 per cent per annum, the language is, "which interest shall be paid annually or the policy be forfeited." At the expiration of the policy by death or limitation of time, the provision for payment is followed by the language, "the balance of the year's premium and all notes given for premiums, if any, being first deducted there from." The fourth express condition of the policy that "in every case where this policy shall cease, or become null and void, all payments thereon shall be forfeited to the company." It will be seen that there are four express conditions, or four repetitions of the same condition, upon which the whole policy and insurance will become forfeited at the option of the company. These provisions are so plain, clear and explicit that there can be no ambiguity, uncertainty or doubt. If in any or all of these specified cases the policy may, notwithstanding, be valid and effectual to secure to the assured the proportion of tenths of the insurance so provided for in another part of the policy then all the above conditions and provisions are rendered entirely nugatory, and are in effect stricken from the policy. For if the payment of the cash premiums and of the interest for the first year is not made, or the premium note given, the policy would of course not take effect for any purpose, and it would not be proper to call it a forfeiture. If after the payment of the premiums and interest for the first year had been fully made, and no future premium notes given, or future premiums or interest paid, the policy would still be effectual for one-tenth of the insurance, then in no case can there be a forfeiture of the whole policy, as provided for in the above contingencies.

We will now consider the provision or provisions of the policy which are claimed to have such a sweeping effect upon all these express conditions of forfeit

ure.

1. The policy provides that if default be made in the payment of any premium, the company is to pay the assured as many tenth parts of the original sum assessed as there shall have been complete annual premiums paid at the time of such default." This clause is followed by the above specified condition of forfeiture, beginning with the qualifying words "but in order to secure such proportion," etc. In short, the provision so qualified is that on the default of the payment of premiums the company shall pay as many tenths as the years in which all payments have been