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STATUTE OF FRAUDS-AGENT TAKING TITLE TO LAND of making reasonable exertions to render the injury as
STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU-GARNISHMENT
the veudee, and the right continues until the goods plea A. demurred. Held, that the plea was good, and
have reached the vendee, and the delivery to him or that the action could not be sustained. The fact that the
his agent is complete. Hutch. Carr., $ 499; O'Neil v. defendant brought the estate for the plaintiff, as his
Garrett, 6 Iowa, 480; Calahan v. Babcock, 21 Ohio St. agent, does not make him any the less its legal owner,
281; Reynolds v. Boston & M. R. (0., 43 N. H. 580; and therefore his agreement to convey the greater part Sutro v. Hoile, 2 Neb. 186; 2 Redf. Rail. 132. This of it to the plaintiff for what he paid for the whole of right is based upon the just and equitable rule of law it is, notwithstanding the agency, an agreement to sell
that the property of one man shall not be taken to pay the greater part of it for the price which the defend
another man's debts, and is recognized in all civilized ant paid for the whole of it. There are numerous
countries. We think it is equally well settled that cases which support this view. Bartlett v. Pickersgill,
this right cannot be impaired or extinguished, during 4 East, 577, n.; Botsford v. Burr, 2 Johns. Ch. 406,
its existence, by the acts or interference of a third 409; Lathrop v. Hoyt, 7 Barb. S. C. 59, approved in
party, but will follow the goods and attach to them. Wheeler v. Reynolds, 66 N. Y. 227, 236; Bauman v.
Hence it is held that the seizure of such goods by an Holzhausen, 26 Hun, 505; Levy v. Brush, 45 N. Y. 589;
officer, under legal process in favor of some other credHarrison v. Bailey, 14 S. Car. 334; Jackman v. Ring itor, dues not destroy the right; but that the vendor land, 4 W. & Serg. 149; Payne's Admr. v. Patterson's
may follow the officer and retake the goods. Rucker Admrs., 77 Penn. St. 134; Howland v. Blake, 7 Otto,
v. Donovan, 13 Kan. 251; Greve v. Dunham (Iowa), 14 624; Wetmore v. Neuberger, 44 Mich. 362; Horsey v.
N. W. Rep. 130. In the case of O'Neil v. Garrett, Graham, L. R., 5 C. P. 9. In most of these cases the
supra, the court says: “As to the effect of the levy attempt was to charge the purchaser as trustee, and
upon the goods by the defendant, Garrett, as sheriff, the attempt failed, but in all of them the contract was
by virtue of an attachment at the suit of a creditor of recognized as a contract for the sale of land, or for the
Holmes, there can be no doubt but that the plaintiff's creation of an interest or trust in land, and therefore right as vendor is not divested by the levy before the ineffectual because not in writing. Spencer v. Lawton.
goods came into the possession of the buyer. The Opinion by Durfee, C. J.
plaintiff has the preference over the legal process of a [Decided April 12, 1884.]
general oreditor, although but for the suit, they would have fallen into the hands of the vendee.” In support
of which the court cites the following cases : Covell NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. v. Hitchcock, 23 Wend. 611; Buckley y. Furniss, 15 id.
137; 17,Wend. 505; Naylor v. Dennie, 8 Pick. 198; SawATTORNEY-COLLECTING MONEY-SUMMARY POWER yer v. Joslin, 20 Vt. 1722; Hause v. Judson, 4 Dana, 11; OF COURT.-The jurisdiction of the District Court to
Cox y. Burns, 1 Iowa, 64. If the right of stoppage
continues until delivery of the goods, and a lery compel an attorney to pay money into court which
thereon does not divest this right, it seems clear on had been collected by the attorney for the client cannot be questioned; but when the client has received principle, that the right of the vendor cannot be imall the money to which he is entitled, the power of the paired or extinguished by the garnishment of the carDistrict Court ceases, and it cannot in a summary way
rier, for the process of garnishment can have no greater compel the attorney to pay money into court for other
force than the levying upon the goods, as it is simply parties claiming a share in the fees retained by the at
one of the methods of reaching the property of the torney. That question must be settled by an action
debtor in the possession of a third party, which canbetween themselves. Baldwin v. Foss. Opinion by
not be reached by the ordinary levy and seizure. Reese, J.
Chicago, etc., Railroad Co. v. Painler. Opicion by [Decided May 28, 1884.]
[Decided May 28, 1884.]
MASTER AND SERVANT - ACCIDENT
BURDEN OF peace. (2) A sale by sucb unauthorized person of such
PROOF-“FELLOW SERVANT”-ERRONEOUS CHARGE. chattels, as upon execution, conveys no title. (3) The
It was certainly incumbent on the defendant company plaintiff in such execution cannot be held responsible upon the facts shown by the record to show affirmafor the acts of such person in seizing or converting tively and positively that the accident was not caused such chattels, unless he requested or authorized such by its negligence, or the negligence of any agent for seizure in fact, or in some way ratified the same.
whose conduct the company itself was responsible. McMillan v. Rowe. Opinion by Cobb, C. J.
Greenleaf v. Illinois Cent. R. Cv., 29 Iowa, 14. And [Decided May 28, 1884.]
the evidence showing, by the defendant's own wit
nesses, that the train was not made up in the usual DAMAGES-EXPENSE RENDERING INJURY LIGHT.-In and proper way, and that the conductor was not a feladdition to the general measure of damages, the law low servant of Moon, but his superior, and in a posiin some cases imposes upou a party injured from tion wherein he exercised discretionary authority, and another's breach of contract or tort, the active duty was charged with certaiu duties for the proper per
formance of which the law holds the company itself GIFT-PAROL OF LANDS-EQUITY WILL ENFORCEresponsible, any negligence on his part in this behalf is STATUTE OF FRAUDS-PART PERFORMANCE-MAKING the negligence of the company itself. Railroad Co. v. IMPROVEMENTS.--A court of equity will compel the Fort, 17 Wall. 553; Brothers v. Cortter, 52 Mo.[373; Pat- conveyance of the legal title of land claimed under a terson v. Pittsburg and Connellsville R., 76 Peun. parol gift supported by a meritorious consideration, 389. H., the section master, in charge of a squad of and by reason of whicb the douee has been induced to hands working, altering and repairing the road, could alter his coudition, and make expenditures of money in no sense be regarded a fellow servant, in the same in valuable improvements upon the land, and equity common employment or department of service with will protect a parol gift of laud equally with a parol Moon, who was a trainhand and brakesman. Connolly agreement to sell it, if accompanied by possession, and V. Davidson, 15 Minn. 519. They were not co-employ. the donee, induced by the promise to give it, bas made ees, thrown together in a common duty, and having valuable improvements on the property. No writing opportunity to observe and judge of the babits and is necessary to create a good equitable title to real esqualifications of each other. Lewis v. St. Louis, etc., tate. If the contract, when in writing, would be enR. Co., 59 Mo. 495; Ryan v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., forced as founded upon a valuable consideration, it 60 Ill. 171. And where a company delegates to an would in like manner be deemed a valuable consideraagent or employee the performance of duties which tion when the contract was by parol. In the the law makes it incumbent on the company to per
of Neale v. Neales, 9 Wall. 1, in the form, his acts are the acts of the company-his negli- Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Jusgence is the negligence of the company. Brothers v. tice Davis delivering the unanimous opinion of Cortter, 52 Mo.373; Flike v. Boston and Albany R. Co., the court, said: “The statute of frauds requires a con53 N. Y. 549; Corcoran v. Holbrook, 59 id. 517; Mullan tract concerning real estate to be in writing, but courts v. Philadelphia & Southern S. S. Co., 78 Penn. 25; of equity-whether wisely or not it is now too late to Ryan v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 60 I11. 171. If corpo- | inquire-hare stepped in and relaxed the rigidity of rations could in such cases escape liability on the plea this rule, and hold that a part performance removes that its agent was fellow servant or co-employee of the bar of the statute, on the ground that it is a fraud the party injured, it follows that they could never be for the vendor to insist on the absence of a written inheld liable at all, since such corporations must need strument, when he had permitted the contract to be perform their duties always through agents, who partly executed. And equity protects a parol gift of have a common employer. Flike v. Bostou and Al. land equally with a parol agreement to sell it, it acbany R. Co., 53 N. Y. 549, supra; Hough v. Railroad companied by possessiou, and the donee, induced by Co., 10 Otto, 218-19; Whart. Neg., § 232. The fellow
the promise to give it, has made valuable improveservant and co-employee, for whose negligence the ments on the property; and this is particularly true company is not responsible, is one who is in the same when the donor stipulates that the expenditure shall common employment; that is, in the same shop or be made, and by doing this makes it the consideration place with, and having no authority over the one in- or condition of the gift.” In the case at bar it must be jured, and wbo is no more charged with the discre- borne in mind, as has been stated, that the agreement tionary exercise of powers and duties imperatively sought to be enforced is a parol agreement to give the resting on the company than the injured party; but land in question. It has been held in many reported where a person is placed in charge of the " construc- cases that a court of equity will compel the conveytion or repair of machinery," the dispatching of ance of the legal title to the land claimed under a patrains," the “maintenance of way,” etc., he is not a
rol gift supported by a meritorious consideration, and fellow servant with those under him, nor with those
by reason of which the donee has been induced to alin a different department of the company's service. ter his condition and make large expenditures of He is the agent of the company, which has assumed
money in valuable improvements on the land; and through him the performance of duties which are abso- that the donee under such circumstances becomes the lute and imperative, the omission or the negligence of
equitable owner of the land, and may demand the leperforining which the law will in nowise excuse. gal title. In the case of Syler v. Eckhart, 1 Biovey, Clarke v. Holmes, 7 Hurls. & Nor. 937; Ford v. Fitch.
380, Tilghman, C. J., said: “It has been settled that burg R. Co., 110 Mass. 241; Hough v. Railroad Co., 10
when a parol agreement is clearly proved, in conseOtto, supra. The second instruction given by the quence of which one of the parties has taken possession court was: “And the jury are further instructed that and made valuable improvements, such agreement if they believe the accident which caused his death shall be carried into effect. We see no material differwas occasioned by any negligence of H., the section ence between a sale and a gift; because it certainly foreman, iu failing to signal the train, they cannot im. would be fraudulent conduct in a parent to make a pute such negligence in this case to the defendant,and gift which he knew to be void, and thus entice bis should find for the defendant." This instruction is child into a great expenditure of money and labor, of erroneous, and is against law and reason. An instruction which he meant to reap the benefit himself.” See also which assumes that an employee "takes all risks" is Eckert, etc., v. Eckert, 3 Peun. 362; Eckert v. Mace erroneous. His contract is based on the iniplied duty | and others, id. 364; Stewart v. Stewart, 3 Watts, and undertaking of the company to provide safe and 253; France v. France, 4 Halstead Ch. 619; Lobdell adequato machinery, competent and vigilant agents, v. Lobdell, 36 N. Y. 327 ; Bright v. Bright, 41 Ill. 97; and to keep its roadway and structures always in good Law v. Henry, 39 Ind. 414; Young v. Glendening, 6 and safe condition when he is required to go over Watts, 509; Mahon v. Baker, 2 Casey, 519; Atkinsou v. them. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. y. Jackson, 55 I11. 492; Jackson, 8 Ind. 31; Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N. Y. 34; Corcoran v. Holbrook, 59 N. Y.517; Baxter v. Roberts,
Peters v. Jones, 35 Iowa, 512; Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. 44 Cal. 187; Snow v. Hougatonic R. Co., 8 Allen, 441; & Rawle, 267 ; Sheppard v. Bevin and others, 9 Gill, Lewis' Admr. v. St. Louis & Iron Mountain R., 59 Mo. 32; Shobe's Exrs. v. Carr, etc., 3 Mun. Jo. In the caso 495; Pattesou v.Pittsburgh & Connellville R.,76 Penn.
of Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N. Y. 34, Grover, J., said: 389; Drymala v. Thompson, 26 Min. 40; R. & D. R.
“It is insisted that an executory promise, not founded v. Moore's Admr., 8 Va. L. J. 84. Moon v. Richmond
upon any valuable consideration, is a mere nude pact,
furnishing no grounds for an action at law, and that & A. R. Co. Opinion by Fauntleroy, J.
performance of such a promise will not be enforced in [Decided April 24, 1884.]
equity. This is true so long as the promise has no cou
sideration. Any thing that may be detrimental to the penses, and commissions are paid, and this right is not promisee or beneficial to the promisor in legal estima- limited to charges on the particular consigument of tion will constitute a good consideration for a promise. goods, but covers a general balance on the accounts Expenditures made upon permanent improvements between the factor and the principal, so far as concerns upon land with the knowledge of the owner, induoed the business of factorage. Whart. Ag., $ 767; Edw. by his promise made to the party making the expendi. Fact.,SS 71, 72; Story Ag.,$ 376; Matthews v. Menedge, ture, to give the lands to such party, constitute in 2 McLean, 145; Bryce v. Brooks, 26 Wend. 374; Kruger equity a consideration for the promise. Citing Lobdell v. Wilcox, 1 Amb. 252; Jordan v. James, 5 Ohio, 99; v. Lobdell, 33 How. 347; ('rosbie v. McDoual, 13 Ves. Weed v. Adalis, 37 Com). 378. The statute of this 147; Shepherd v. Bevin, 9 Gill, 32; 3 Pars. on Con., State in this respect would seem to be in confirmation 359. The statute of frauds has no bearing on the case. of the common law. Rev. Stat., § 3315. But where If the promise, reduced to writing, could under the cir- the general balance on the accounts of the factorage is cumstances be enforced in equity, it may be although by largely against the factor and in favor of the principarol.” It is agains: conscience to suffer a party who had pal, the former can have no lien upon the property in entered and expended money on the faith of a parol his possession, for he has no enforceable claim. Godagreement to be treated as a trespasser, and for the frey y. Furzo, 3 P. Wms. 185; Zinck v. Walker, 2 W. other party, in fraud of his engagement, though that Bl. 1154; Tooke v.Hollingworth,2 H. B1.501; Walker v. was verbal, to enjoy the advantage of the money laid Birch, 6 Term R. 258; Weed v. Adams, supra; Jordan out. Courts interfere in such cases not on the ground V. James, supra; Enoch v. Wehrkamp, 3 Bosw. 398; of a breach of the verbal agreement, but because of the Beebe v. Mead, 33 N. Y. 587. Iu such case the factor's acts done under it on the faith of its terms, and which right of retention and sale is merely to reimburse him. it would be bad faith in the vendor not to carry out self for the balance due him on the general account of by executing its terms, and a court of equity will the factorage. Brown v. M'Gran, 14 Pet. 479; Overt. always enforce a promise upon which reliance is Liens, $ 105. Neither can a factor, who is indebted to placed, and which induces the expenditure of labor his principal on account of previous sales, acquire a and money in the improvement of land. Such a prom- particular lien upou goods subsequently sent to him ise rests upon valuable consideration. The promisee for sale for expenses incurred on account of them, unacts upon the faith of the promise, and we can per- less such expenses exceed the amount of his indebtedceive no important distinction between such a promise Edw. Fact., $ 72; Enoch v. Wehrkamp, supra. aud a sale. Permitting the promisor to avoid perform- The lien of an agent and factor on the goods of his ance operates as a fraud as much in the case of a gift principal for specific expenses does not exist when the as in the case of a sale, so far as expenditures upon im- general balance of account is against him. Id. We provements are concerned, when possession has been must therefore hold that where a factor is largely intaken and valuable improvements made upon the faith debted to his principal on account of the factorage, of the promise. These acts constitute part perform- and thereupon voluntarily makes ad vances in the busiance by the donee, and the agreement will be specific ness not exceeding such indebtedness, such advances, cally en forced by a court of equity Halsey v. Peters. being made for and in behalf of his principal, must be Opinion by Lacy, J. (See 27 Am. Rep. 535.)
deemed to have been so made by the factor in liquida[Decided May 1, 1884.)
tion of his own indebtedness pro tanto. McGraft v. Rugee. Opinion by Cassoday, J.
[Decided May 15, 1884.] WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.
NEGLIGENCE DEFENDANT PROVING PLAINTIFF'S
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT * CONTRIBUTORY.-In an action for negligence, if the plaintiff can prove his case without disclosing his own MARRIAGE-ANTE-NUPTIAL AGREEMENT— SPECIFIC contributory negligence, then such contributory PERFORMANCE-MONEY VALUE IN LIEU.-By an ante. negligence is purely a matter of defense to be proved nuptial settlement it was covenanted that the intended by the defendant. Randall v. N. W. P. Co., 54 Wis. wife, if she survived the husband, should receive at 147; Hoth v. Peters, 55 id. 405. The same rule his death one dwelling-house, to be vested in her abprevails in the Supreme Court of the United States solutely, in lieu of dower, or distributive share in his and many of the States. See cases cited in Abb. Tr. estate. The husband, baring become estranged from Ev. 595. The burden of proving such contributory the wife shortly before his death, left her in his will a negligence being ordinarily upon the defendant, there dwelling-house of comparatively small value and subwould seem to be no objection to his affirmatively al-ject to an annual ground rent of $64, which she releging a fact which he may thus be required to prove. nounced. He disposed of his entire estate by will, Kelley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. Opinion by Casso- which he made during the period of alienation from day, J.
his wife. On a bill by the widow asking for a specific [Decided May 15, 1884. ]
execution of the covenant, and that she might have a AGENCY
dwelling-house suitable to her and her late husband's - FACTOR-LIEN FOR ADVANCES DOES NOT EXIST.-An agent employed to sell, or to
rank in life, and pecuniary circumstances, assigned to purchase and sell, goods or other personal property in
her, to be vested in her absolutely, or in lieu thereof trusted to his possession, by or for his principal, for a
a sum of money which the court might deem adequate, compensation, commocly called factorage or commis
it was held that the complainant had a right to resion, may properly be regarded as a factor. Ştory Ag.,
Dounce the bequest, and was entitled under the coveS33, 34a; Edw. Fact., § 1; Whart. Ag., § 735. Here
nant to receive from her husband's estate a dwelling. the duties, powers, and compensation of the factors,
house suitable to his pecuniary circumstances, and and their relation to their principals, were originally
position in society. But in all such cases, the agreeregulated by agreement. True there were some de
ment must be sufficiently definite to guide the court partures after the business had continued for a while,
in the direction to be given for the specific performbut there is nothing to indicate any change as to the
ance, or at any rate, that it may be made certain and title of the property, or the measure or source of com
definite upon proper inquiry. Storer v. Great W. R. pensation. Undoubtedly a factor is eutitled to retain
Co., 2 Y. & Coll. Ch. 48, 53; Wilson v. Furness R. Co., goods in his possession as such until his advances, ex.
* Appearing in 61 Maryland Reports.
L. R., 9 Eq. 28; Lytton v. Great N. R. Co., 2 Kay & J. ferent disposition of the estate is sought to be made,
MARRIAGE-ANTE-NUPTIAL DEED--CONSTRUCTIONspecified place, but substituted one at a distance of
INTENTION.- Whenever it appears from the face of a two miles therefrom. This substituted station the
deed executed in contemplation of marriage, and as an landowner refused to accept in lieu of the one to wbich
ante-nuptial settlement of the property of the woman,
that the intention is to carry the title to the property he was entitled under the agreement. And the court upon application for specific performance, while hold
beyond the period of the wife's death, and to exclude ing that the case was fully within the jurisdiction for
the husband, that intention must prevail, and the specific performance of the agreement, concluded that
court will give a liberal construction to its language in because of the indefinite character of the agreement,
order to discover and effectuate such intent. Ward s. more complete justice could be done by awarding com
Thomp801), 6 G. & J. 349; Waters v. Tazewell, 9 Md. pensation, by way of damages, under the Stat. 21 & 22
291 ; Townshend v. Matthews, 10 id. 251; Hutchins v. Vict., known as Lord Cairu's Act, which only applies
Dixou, 11 id. 29; Denton v. Denton, 17 id. 403; Marshin cases where the court has jurisdiction to entertain
all v. Beall, 6 How. 70. In some of these cases the prothe application for specific performance. But as in
visions of the conveyances are very similar to those in this case the specific execution of the covenant would
the present deed, while in others the intention to exbe attended with no little difficulty, and as the relief
clude the husband is much less apparent; but the rule
of decision is the same in all. A deed executed in prayed by the bill was in the alternative, she was entitled to receive a sum of money equivalent to the
contemplation of marriage conveyed certain property value of such house in lieu thereof. 2 Story Eq., S
in trust, the grantor to be permitted to take and re799; Rider v. Gray, 10 Md. 282, 300; Bowie v. Stone
ceive during her life the net income and profits street,6 id. 419,431. This case would seem to fall within
thereof, to her sole and separate use, full power to the reason and scope of the principle upon which com
dispose of the same by deed or will being reserved, pensation may be awarded. Busey v. Curley. Opiu
and failing so to do, and dying intestate, the same to
be held for her children or their descendants if she iou by Alvey, C. J.
left any, if not, for her heirs-at-law. The intended JURISDICTION-OVER PERSON WAIVED BY APPEAR- husband was one of the witnesses to the deed, wbich ANCE.-- Where the subject-matter of the suit is one
was placed on record after the marriage. The grantor over which the court has jurisdiction, the appearance died intestate without issue, leaving her husband surof the defendant by attorney waives the objection to viving ner. Held, that the intent of the grantor to carry the jurisdiction. In Oulton v. Radclitfe, L. R,9 Com.
the title to the property beyond her life and to exPleas, 195, Denman, J., says: “Actual service of the
clude her husband, was plainly manifest, and he was writ is not essential. If the defendant appears, that mot entitled to any interest or share therein. Moody v. gives the court jurisdiction to proceed, provided the Hall. Opiniou by Miller, J. subject-matter of the action is one over which the court has jurisdiction." Keating, J., says in the same
STATUTE OF FRAUDS- MEMORANDUM-TIME OF DE* The question is, whether the fact of the writ
LIVERY-CUSTOM-INSTRUCTION MUST PREJUDICE TO having been served out of the jurisdiction makes the
REVERSE. --It is not necessary in the written note or subsequent proceedings void; in other words, whether
memorandum of the sale of goods, required by the the appearance of the defendant by his attorney,
Statute of Frauds, that the time of the delivery should though the service was such that he was not bound to
be stated, provided no time was fixed in the parol appear, gives the palatinate court jurisdiction. I am agreement. But if a time for the delivery of the goods of opinion that the appearance did waive the objection
be fixed in the verbal agreement of sale, such time to the jurisdiction." After an appearance it is too
must be incorporated in the written note or memo. late to object to any infirmity in respect to the service
ravdum thereof. 1 Benj. on Sales, 277. If no time be of the writ or summons, except where the appearance
fixed in the agreement, for the delivery of the goods is made for the special purpose of raising the objection.
sold, the law will imply that it is the duty of the selIreton v. Mayor, etc. Opinion by Irving, J.
to deliver them in a reasonable time, and what is
a reasonable time must depend upon the circumstanWILL-OBLITERATION --INOPERATIVE ALTERATION
ces surrounding the case, and the character of the STATUTE MUST BE FOLLOWED.-A testator cannot by goods dealt in. If there be an established custom the obliteration of certain words in his will, convert a
among merobants who deal in the particular goods life estate into a fee simple. A testator left ten chil
sold, regulating the time of such delivery, the delive dren- -seven sons and three daughters. By his will be
ery will be regulated and controlled by such custom. directed that his estate be divided into ten equal parts
2 Benj. on Sales, 891; Williams v. Woods, Bridges & or shares, and he gave to all his children life estates in
Co., 16 Md. 220; Salmon Falls Manf. Co. v. Goddard, their respective shares, with remainders over to their
14 Hlow. (U. S.) 446. Before a case will be reversed, it children, except his sons J. E. and L., to whom he
must appear, not only that the instruction complained gave their respective shares absolutely and in fee.
of was erroneous, but that the appellant was preju. Some time after the execution of the will, the testator
diced thereby. Youug v. Mertens, 27 Md. 114; Parker erased or obliterated the names of bis sous J. E. and
v. Wallin, 60 id. 15. Kriete v. Myer. Opinion by L., wherever they occurred by drawing a line through
Stone, J. them with his pen, but leaving the names legible. The erayures operated to confer estates in fee simple on all the sons. Hell, that the attempted obliterations were
CRIMINAL LAW. inoperative, and the will should be read as it was originally written and executed. Any alteration in a LARCENY-PRESUMPTION FROM POSSESSION.-priowill by iuterlineation or obliteration, whereby a dif- oner's exclusive and unexplained possession of stolen
property, recently after a theft, raises a presumption 28 Eng. Rep. 534; per Bramwell, B., followed. Cir. Cas.
JUROR-DISQUALIFICATION, NEW TRIAL-VIEW the same effect see Phil. Ev. (7th ed.) 186; Knicker
WAIVER.–A petition for a new trial on the ground bocker v. People, 43 N. Y. 177; People v. Walker, 38
that one of the jurors was disqualified by a relationMich. 156; State v. Brady, 27 Iowa, 126; State y.
ship of consanguinity is addressed to the discretion of Creson, 38 Mo. 372; State v. Turier,.65 N. C. 592; Wal
the court. Such a petition will not be granted when ters v. People, 104 III. 544; Sahlinger v. People, 102 id.
the relationship was by consanguinity in the sixth de242. Aud so far as we bave been able to discover, the
gree, was probably unknown to the juror, avd was not California courts (18 Cal. 383; 48 id. 253) staud almost
shown to bave injuriously affected the accused. “A alone in the modification of the doctrine. Sup. Ct.
new trial will not be granted in a criminal case," says Arizona, Jan., 1884. Territory v. Casio. Opinion by
the Supreme Court of West Virginia, in a case sipilar Pemey, J. (2 Pac. R. 755.) [See 58 Ind. 310; 56 N. Y.
to the case at bar, “for matter that is a principal cause 315; 6 Neb. 102; 52 Miss. 695; 114 Mass. 299; 1 Hun, 670;
of challenge to a juror, which existed before he was 54 III. 405.- ED.]
elected and sworn as such juror, but which was uniACCESSORY-RECORD OF CONVICTION-REMARKS OF known to the prisoner until after the verdict, and PROSECUTING OFFICER-WHEN NOT ERROR. --The stat- which could not have been discovered before the juror ute authorizes the charging of an accessory before the was so sworn by the exercise of ordinary diligence; fact as a principal. State v. Cassady, 12 Kas. 550. uuless it appears from the wholọ case that the prisoner Upon the trial of an accessory before the fact, the re- suffered injustice from the fact that such juror sat cord of the conviction of the principal is proof prima upon the case.'! State v. Williams, 14 W. Va. 851, 869; facie of that fnct; but this is not conclusive, and other State v. McDonald, 9 id. 456; McDonald v. Beall,55 Ga. evidence of the commission of the crime by the prin- | 288, 293. When a view is bad in a criminal case the accipal is admissible. Levy v. People, 80 N. Y. 3:27; cused may waive his right to be present at the view. Arnold v. State, 9 Tex. Ct. App. 435. (2) Upon the Such a waiver is presumed when he does not ask to be trial of a defendant charged with a criminal offense, the present and makes no objection in the course of the latter rested without testifying. The State introduced trial after the view; and when the view was allowed at a witness and offered to prove certain facts, to which the request of his counsel, who stated that the health the defendant objected as not being proper rebuttal. of the accused precluded his attendance. A reporter Thereupon the county attorney said to the court, in who was present at the trial, whose occupation would the hearing and presence of the jury: “Your honor, naturally lead him to note and remember the incidents we had a right to presume that the defendant would of it, makes affidavit that the court spoke to one of the testify as a witness in his own behalf, in which case counsel for the prisoner in regard to wbat was to be this evidence would have been proper rebuttal, and we done with him, and that the counsel replied that his haring failed to do so, we claim the right to introduce health was such that it would not be prudent for him it now." Held, that these remarks to the court were to go with the jury on such a severe day. We think not such an infringement upon the statute forbidding that under these circumstances the prisoner must be the prosecuting attorney to refer to the fact that the held to have waived his privilege, which in our opindefendant did not testify in his own behalf as requiresion it was competent for him to do. State v. Adams, us under the circumstances of this case to grant a new 20 Kans. 311, 323; United States v. Sacramento, 2 Mont. trial. We understand the statute is explicit that 239, 241; People v. Murray, 5 Crim. Law Mag. 223 ; State when a defendant in a criminal cause declines to tes- v. Polson, 29 Iowa, 133; Carroll v. State, 5 Neb. 31 ; Hill tify in his own behalf, absolate silence on the subject v. State, 17 Wis. 697 ; Fight v. State, 7 Ohio, 180; MCis enjoined on counsel in their argument on the trial, Corkle v. State, 14 Iud. 39. Sup. Ct. Rhode Island, and that the courts will hold prosecuting attorneys to April 4, 1884. State v. Congdon. Opinion by Durfee, & strict observance of their duty in this respect. State C. J. (As to first point see 6 Allen (N. B.), 389. [14 V. Grabam, 17 N. W. Rep. 192; Long v. State, 56 Ind.
R. 1.] 182; 26 Am. Rep. 19; Commonwealth v. Scott, 123
EVIDENCE-LEADING QUESTION-ASSUMING FACT.Mass. 239; 25 Am. Rep. 87. Yet we do not think the
A question which assumes the existence of a fact esincidental allusion to the court by the county at
sential to a conviction, where there was no evidence torney, under the circumstances, was such miscon
that the fact existed, is entirely inadmissible. The duct as requires us to grant a new trial. The reinarks
question is leading, as are all questions to a witness of the county attorney were not made in an address
which assume the existence of facts material to the isto the jury, were not directed to the jury, nor in
sue, which have not been proved. 1 Greenl. Ev. $ 434; tended for the jury. It is possible and more than
1 Starkie Ev. (10th ed.) 197 ; Turney v. State, 8 Smedes probable that the members of the jury heard the re
& M. 104. Hence the specific objection was well iaken marks, as they were uttered in their presence, but the
and ought to bave been sustained. But it is sometimes county attorney evidently did not intend to infringe
said that it rests in the sound discretion of the trial upon the provision of the foregoing statute, and we
court to allow leading questions to be put to witnesses, cannot regard his remarks, made as they were, as ma
and that error cannot be assigned on the rulings in Calkins v. State, 18 Ohio St. 366. Sup.
that behalf. It is undoubtedly the law tbat if a witCt. Kansas, Jan., 1884. State v. Mosley. Opinion by
ness appears to be hostile to the party producing him, Horton, C. J. (31 Kans. 355.) [See 2 Pac. Rep. 609;
or unwilling so give evidence, it is in the discretion of 61 Iowa, 559; 32 Eng. Kep. 277-9.-Ed.]
the court to allow leading questions to be put to him, EVIDENCE--POSSESSION OF STOLEN GOODS.-On an and in such cases error cannot, in general, lie assigned indictment for stealing goods, and also for receiving
upon the ruling. 1 Greenl. Ev., $ 255. But here the ing them knowing them to have been stolen, under witness does not appear to have manifested any hostilsection 19 of the Prevention of Crimes Act 1871, evi- ity to the prosecution, or any unwillingness to testify. dence of other stolen goods being found in the posses
Under all the circumstances of the case, we think the sion of the prisoner is not admissible unless they are ruling of the court permitting the above question to found in his possession at the same time; that is, at be put to the female witness was not a proper exercise the time he was found in possession of the goods he is
of the discretion of the court, and that such ruling indicted for stealing Reg. v. Drage, 14 Cox C. C. 85; may be assigned as error. See opinion by Chief Jus